Ep Flashcards
(42 cards)
‘Gettier’ case
An example where (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p, but (4) S does not know that p (i.e. an example that shows the three conditions not to be jointly sufficient).
(false) lemma
A (false) proposition that you rely on as part of your justification of another proposition.
ability knowledge
knowing how to perform/complete a task/action
aquaintance knowledge
knowing X (a place/thing/person) by direct experience of X (it/him/her)
propositional knowledge
knowing that some claim – a proposition – is true (or false) / knowing that p (where p is a proposition)
epistemic virtue / virtue epistemology
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is justified in believing that p (the belief is adroit), (2) p is true (the belief is accurate), (3) S believes that p and (4) The accuracy of the belief is explained by the epistemological virtues possesed by S
infallibilism
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is INFALLIBLY justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p (these being the three necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).
no false lemmas theory
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true, (3) S believes that p and (4) S’s justification for p does not involve any false beliefs (these being the four necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).
reliabilism
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S’s belief that p was caused by a RELIABLE cognitive process (2) p is true, and (3) S believes that p (these being the three necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).
tripartite view of knowledge
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) S is justified in believing that p, (2) p is true and (3) S believes that p (these being the three necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge).
(individually) necessary condition (for being X)
If C is a necessary condition for something being X then something cannot be X without C being the case.
(jointly) sufficient condition/s (for being X)
If C1 and C2 are jointly sufficient conditions for something being X then if something meets these two conditions then it is X.
global scepticism (vs) local scepticism
The former is the view that we can extend doubt without (or at least almost without) limit; that none (or almost none) of our usual forms of justification for our beliefs are adequate. The latter is the view that we can extend doubt to all beliefs of a specific type (e.g. those about the past); none of our usual forms of justification for certain kinds of beliefs are adequate.
philosophical scepticism (vs) normal incredulity
The former is the attempt to render doubtful every member of some class of propositions that we think we know such that the reasons for this doubt cannot, in principle, be removed (or at least not by ordinary means). The latter is where you doubt specific claims because of other things that you think that you know and the reasons for this doubt can be removed either by showing them to be false or neutralising them.
“impressions” (vs) “ideas” (Hume)
The former are experiences - they are “forceful and vivid”. The latter are caused by impressions and are “copies of impressions” that we can recall later - they are (normally) less forceful and duller than impressions.
Berkeley’s idealism
The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects.
direct realism
The view that (a) mind-independent material/physical objects and their properties exist and (b) we perceive them immediatel;y (i.e. without any intermediaries/sense data)
hallucination
It seems to you as if there is an object that has some properties. But there is NO suitable mind-independent object with these properties (i.e. no such object that bears the right kind of relationship to your experience).
illusion
A mind-independent object (supposedly) exists. It seems to you as if an object has a particular property/relation. But the mind-independent object (supposedly) does not have this property/relation.
indirect realism
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects
perceptual variation
A mind-independent object (supposedly) exists. The mind-independent object’s properties (supposedly) do not change in a certain respect. But, it seems to you as if the properties do change in that respect. The changes occur because of changes in the perceiver (or their body) or in the relationship between the perceiver’s body and the object.
primary quality (Locke)
They are powers of mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which resemble the actual inherent properties of the object. The PQs of a M-I object are number, extension, motion, shape, solidity. (Extras: they are inseparable from the object; the object cannot be conceived of as not having them; they do not vary based on the perceiver; they can be accessed by more than one sense.)
secondary quality (Locke)
They are powers in the mind-independent objects to cause IDEAS in our minds which do not resemble the the actual inherent properties of the object. The SQs of a M-I object are colour, taste, smell, sound, (felt) texture. (Extras: the object CAN be conceived of as not having them; they DO vary based on teh perceiver; they CANNOT be accessed by more than one sense.)
quality (Locke)
A “power [of an external mind-independent object] to produce an idea in our mind”.
