Mi

Question 1

“category mistake” (Ryle)

Answer 1

When someone represents certain facts/terms/concepts as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another.

Question 2

epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 2

(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) The mental is caused by the physical - it is a “by-product” of the physical; (3) The mental, however, is causally impotent: the mental consists of epiphenomena - the mental has no effects.

Question 3

interactionist dualism

Answer 3

(1) Dualism (of some form) is true, so minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies (i.e. substance dualism) or some mental properties are not reducible to physical properties (i.e. property dualism); (2) What happens mentally causally affects what happens physically; (3) What happens physically causally affects what happens mentally.

Question 4

philosophical zombie

Answer 4

A being that: (1) is physically identical (or duplicate of) a (normal/conscious) human being (ie has all and only the same physical properties as a normal/conscious human being) but (2) lacks any consciousness/qualia/phenomenal properties.

Question 5

property dualism

Answer 5

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.

Question 6

qualia

Answer 6

These are (1) phenomenal properties of mental states which are (2) intrinsic and non-intentional [i.e. non-representational]and are (3) introspectively accessible

Question 7

functional role

Question 8

substance dualism

Answer 8

Minds (mental substances) exist and are not identical to (and can exist independently from) bodies or to parts of bodies (physical substances).

Question 9

functional duplicates

Answer 9

Two systems are __________________ (isomorphs) if the functional relations are the same (i.e. the same inputs would cause the same outputs, internally and externally).

Question 10

functionalism

Answer 10

All mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised

Question 11

eliminative materialism

Answer 11

At least some of those mental states (phenomena, properties, processes) that are supposed to exist according to the common-sense folk-psychological theory of the mind do not exist.

Question 12

folk-psychology

Answer 12

(1) The ‘ordinary’ understanding of the mind (one’s own mind and the minds of
others) which (2) involves the positing of the existence of ‘inner’ mental states/events with certain features and (3) is used by people to explain and predict human behaviour.

Question 13

hard’ philosophical behaviourism

Answer 13

All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (i.e. analytically reduced) to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states / movements

Question 14

mind-brain type identity theory

Answer 14

All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although the concepts/terms ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction).

Question 15

physicalism

Answer 15

Everything (including the mental) is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist).

Question 16

self-refuting

Answer 16

If a claim/theory is _____________ then something about theory/claim means that the theory/claim itself is undermined/contradicted (e.g. the verification principle and eliminative materialism)

Question 17

soft’ philosophical behaviourism

Answer 17

(At least some) propositions about mental states are (at least in part) propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language)

Question 18

Super-(Super)-Spartan’ (Putnam)

Answer 18

Beings that (1) feels pain-qualia but (2) has the ability to successfully suppress all voluntary pain behavior (and, if a SSS, (3) does not even talk about pain)

Question 19

intentional properties (intentionality)

Answer 19

A mental state has _____________ if is is about something, if it has an “intentional object”

Question 20

Functionalism

Answer 20

Mental states can be reduced to (are identical to) functional roles which can be multiply realised.

Question 21

multiple realisability of mental states
(vs MBTIT and for functionalism)

Answer 21

Many different types of thing (which need not be humans) can have exactly the same type of mental state. A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be realised / instantiated in many (perhaps even infinite) ways.

Question 22

multiple realisability of mental states
(vs philosophical behaviourism)

Answer 22

A single mental kind (property, state, event) can be identified with multiple (perhaps infinite) behaviours.