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PHILOSOPHY PAPER 1 TERMS > Epistemology > Flashcards

Epistemology Flashcards

(73 cards)

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1
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2
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A posteriori argument

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An argument in which at least one premise is a posteriori.

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A posteriori knowledge

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Propositional knowledge acquired from/justified by experience.

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A priori argument

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An argument in which all of the premises are a priori.

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5
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A priori intuition

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A belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified and (2) a priori/‘rational’. For Descartes, the cogito (I am, I exist) is an example of an a priori intuition.

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6
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A priori knowledge

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Propositional knowledge not acquired from/not justified by experience.

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7
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Ability knowledge

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Knowing how to perform/complete a task/action.

For example, knowing how to swim.

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8
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Acquaintance knowledge

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Knowing X (a place/thing/person) by [direct] contact (normally through experience) with X.

For example, knowing the taste of pineapple/how pineapple tastes.

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9
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Analytic truth

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A proposition whose truth depends only upon the meanings of its constituent terms/concepts.

For example, vixens are female foxes.

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10
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Berkeley’s idealism

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The (immaterialist) view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (caused by God). All that exists is minds and their ideas.

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11
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Clear and distinct idea (Descartes)

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A concept/belief for which (a) its content/truth is obvious to an attentive mind (it is clear) and (b) any concepts/beliefs not belonging to it are excluded from it (it is distinct).

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12
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Cogito (Descartes)

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One’s knowledge of one’s own existence - ‘I am, I exist’. An a priori intuition which is the foundation of one’s other knowledge and is undoubtable.

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13
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Coherence of various kinds of experience (Locke and Cockburn)

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The fact that perceptual experiences from the different senses contain the same/similar information or change in reliable/regular/predictable ways. Used as a reason for thinking that there is an external world that best explains this coherence.

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14
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Complex concept/idea

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A concept which (a) can be analysed in terms of other, ultimately simple, concepts and (b) need not be the direct effect of experiences.

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15
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Concept

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A constituent of a thought/proposition.

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16
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Contingent truth

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A proposition that is true in the actual world but false in at least one possible world.

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17
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Deduction (Descartes)

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By ‘deduction’ Descartes meant an argument that is (a) deductive and (b) a priori.

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18
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Descartes’ sceptical arguments / ‘waves of doubt’

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The arguments that Descartes uses as part of his method of doubt: (1) the ‘illusion’ argument, (2) the ‘dreaming’ argument/hypothesis, and (3) the ‘evil deceiver/demon’ argument/hypothesis.

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19
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Direct realism

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The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties.

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20
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Empiricism

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The view that (a) all of our concepts are ultimately caused by experience and (b) all synthetic knowledge is a posteriori.

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21
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Epistemic virtue (an account of) / virtue epistemology (VTB)

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The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p, and (3) S arrives at the truth of p due to the use of their epistemological virtues.

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22
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Epistemology

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The area of philosophy that examines the sources, limits and nature of our concepts and knowledge.

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23
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External world

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The sum total of all mind-independent objects and their properties.

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24
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Gettier’s counter-examples

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Gettier’s two counter-examples which aim to show that the conditions of the tripartite view are not jointly sufficient.

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25
Global scepticism
Philosophical scepticism applied to all knowledge claims.
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God
A perfect being that has the following attributes: omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and is either eternal/timeless or everlasting.
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Hallucination
An experience which is subjectively indistinguishable from an experience of a mind independent object, but where there is no suitable mind-independent object.
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Hume's Fork
The division of knowledge into only two types: (a) 'matters of fact' and (b) 'relations of ideas'.
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Ideas (Hume)
'Idea' is Hume's term for a concept and includes simple and complex ideas/concepts.
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Illusion
An experience where it seems to you as if there is a property/relation but the mind-independent object does not have this property/relation.
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Immediate object of perception
The object that a perceiver is directly aware of during perception.
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Impressions (Hume)
Hume's term for experiences which are more 'forceful and vivid' than ideas/concepts.
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Indirect realism
The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
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Individually necessary condition (for knowledge)
A condition that is 'needed' for X. A necessary condition for X is one that must be fulfilled in order for something to be X.
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Infallibilism (response to Gettier's counter-examples)
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p and (3) S has a justification that guarantees the truth of p.
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Innatism
The view that some rationalists take that our mind has always contained particular truths and/or concepts which we can 'discover'.
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Intuition (Descartes)
A belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified and (2) a priori/‘rational’. For Descartes, the cogito is an example of an a priori intuition.
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Intuition and deduction thesis (Descartes)
The view that all knowledge is either: (a) justified non-inferentially by a priori intuition or (b) justified inferentially through a priori deduction.
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Involuntary nature of our experience (Locke)
The fact that our perceptual experiences are not under our control.
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Jointly sufficient conditions (/for knowledge)
Conditions that, together, are 'enough' for X. Jointly sufficient conditions for X are conditions that, when all fulfilled, guarantee that something is X.
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Leibniz's argument (for innatism) based on necessary truths
Leibniz's argument that necessary universal truths must be innate, since no amount of experience of contingent truths about particulars can justify them.
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Lemma
A proposition that is used by someone as part of their justification of another proposition.
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Local scepticism
Philosophical scepticism about a specific domain and/or based on a specific type of justification.
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Mind-dependent object
An object whose existence is dependent upon the existence of at least one mind.
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Mind-independent object
An object whose existence is not dependent on the existence of any mind/s.
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Necessary truth
A proposition that is true in all possible worlds.
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No false lemmas theory (response to Gettier's counterexamples)
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p, (3) S is justified in believing that p and (4) S’s belief that p is not inferred from any false proposition.
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Normal incredulity
Doubt that arises about a specific claim because of beliefs you don't doubt.
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Object
A (physical/mental) thing that has properties.
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Ordinary objects
The everyday objects we are talking about when we talk about chairs, footballs, spoons etc.
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Perception as a source of knowledge
Perception is the process by which we gain knowledge about our environment or our own body.
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Perceptual variation
The fact that a perceiver's experiences change along with changes in the perceiver’s spatial position relative to the object.
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Philosophical scepticism
The view that we lack knowledge in such a way that the reasons for this doubt cannot be removed.
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Post-Gettier analyses/definitions of knowledge
Alternatives to the tripartite view in which Smith would fail to meet at least one condition thus explaining his lack of knowledge.
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Primary quality (Locke)
A power of mind-independent objects to cause an idea in our minds that resembles the actual inherent properties of the object.
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Propositional knowledge
Knowing that a proposition is true/knowing that p.
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Quality (Locke)
A 'power [of an external mind-independent object] to produce an idea in our mind'.
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Reason as a source of knowledge
A priori methods of gaining knowledge/concepts: innate knowledge/concepts, knowledge from intuition and deduction.
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Reliabilism (response to Gettier's counter-examples)
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p, (3) S’s belief that p was caused by a reliable cognitive process.
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Scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects
The view that we do not/cannot know that mind-independent objects exist.
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Secondary quality (Locke)
A power of a mind-independent object to cause an idea in our minds that does not resemble the actual inherent properties of the object.
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Criticism about the existence of mind-independent objects
The view that we do not/cannot know that mind-independent objects exist. Also known as external world scepticism.
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Secondary quality (Locke)
A power of mind-independent objects to cause an idea in our minds that does not resemble the actual inherent properties of the object. The secondary qualities of a mind-independent object are colour, taste, smell, sound, (felt) texture. The object can be conceived of as not having them; they vary based on the perceiver; they cannot be accessed by more than one sense.
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Sense-data
Sense-data are what we are directly/immediately aware of during perception. They have the properties that they appear to have; properties that are known to us with certainty (maybe infallibly). They are private (only experienced by one perceiver). According to indirect realists, they are mind-dependent objects caused by, and mediating our experience of, mind-independent physical objects.
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Simple concept/idea (Locke/Hume)
A concept which (a) cannot be analysed in terms of any other concepts (it is phenomenally simple/”uncompounded”) and (b) only exists as the direct effect of an experience (for Hume, as a 'copy' of a simple impression).
66
‘Slave boy' argument (for innatism) (Plato)
Plato's argument that geometric truths must be innate, since an uneducated slave boy can come to recognise one such truth (a version of Pythagoras' theorem) without having been taught it and only by being asked questions.
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Solipsism
The view that my mind is all I can have knowledge of (epistemological solipsism). The view that only my mind exists (metaphysical solipsism).
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Synthetic truth
A proposition whose truth depends upon how reality is in addition to the meanings of its constituent concepts.
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Tabula rasa
'Tabula rasa' means 'blank slate' and this refers to the empiricist view that no concepts or truths exist within the mind at the moment that it begins to exist. It is, therefore, the denial of innatism.
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The likeness principle (Berkeley)
The view that an idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea; that something sensible cannot resemble something insensible. Used to question the possibility of the representation involved in indirect realism.
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The 'Master' argument (Berkeley)
Berkeley's argument that we cannot conceive of mind-independent objects since to conceive of them requires them to be in the mind, and therefore to be mind-dependent.
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Time-lag
The fact that the physical processes associated with experience (e.g. the visual process) take a finite amount of time (the 'time-lag'), no matter how small. This means that at the exact moment that it seems to you as if there is an object with particular properties, it could be the case that the way things are in the external world at that moment are different to how they seem at that moment to you. For example, when it seems to me that there is a star in the night sky, it could be the case (and sometimes is the case) that the star has exploded by that point.
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Tripartite view of knowledge
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes that p and (3) S is justified in believing that p.

PHILOSOPHY PAPER 1 TERMS (2 decks)

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