ethics Flashcards
(4 cards)
free will (12)
(1) free will (general)
- opposite of predestination, responsible for own post-mortem fate (pelagius, arminius, irenaeus)
- FW vital/G-given/only ‘true’ relationship
- irenaeus; ‘soul making theodicy’; imago dei; completion via character development, G> perfection attained in imperfect world; G at ‘epistemic distance’/day of judgement (purgatory, heaven, hell)
(2) pelagius
- 354CE; ‘in defence of free will’, monk; sanctification over justification/soteriology
- FW necessary for good actions to have value (saint justin)
- original sin modified human nature, not corrupted; humanity inherits free-will, not sin
- G wouldn’t create commandments that humans couldn’t follow; ‘good works’/G guides within FW contraints; atonement via Christ’s sacrifice (e.g. Matthew 25, sheep/goats parable)
(3) support/criticism for pelagius
- C: too much emphasis on FW/’hack’ heaven repenting on last day; rejects OS, makes Christ’s sacrifice redundant; based on self-determination (arth, augustine, bishop simms, calvin)
- S: for FW/choice; universal/accessible; opportunity for atonement; emphasises ‘good works’ (cole, gray)
(4) arminius
- 1560CE, theologian; (5)
- (1) G’s grace only can remove sin (via Holy Spirit)+prevenient grace; (2) denied predestination; (3) tainted by The Fall, inclined to sin, FW compromised; (4) prevenient grace = capacity for G’s guidance; (5) elect, +others can be saved by degree of faith (HP only balances sin impulse)
(5) article 5
- ‘five articles of remonstrance’; condemned heresy by Reformed Churches (1618)
- (1) believers in jesus are saved; (2) salvation available via jesus’ sacrifice; (3) repentance for salvation; (4) grace is G’s gift, to be rejected/accepted; (5) those with faith in christ can resist evil
(6) varying views (wesley, luther, erasmus, calvin/’tulip’, wes/’acura’, arminianism/’parts’)
- calvin; TULIP
- wes; ACURA
- arminius; PARTS
(7) libertarianism (via phil, science, psych)
- ‘incompatibalism’/’causa sui’; ‘agency theory’/morally self-responsible, within constraints of natural law
- rejects det/pred; cause/affect doesn’t impact human choice; moral actions result of individual character
(8) lib/FW vs determinism
- rejecting FW is rejecting reality; experience/intention proves FW (campbell, inwagen)
- christian view: G omnip, allowed FW; bible demonstrates virtue; free in constraints of G’s will
(9) strengths/weaknesses + scholars
- S: opportunity to be saved; give choice; emphasis on impact of good/bad actions; ethics is a foundation of human culture
- W: lacks empiricism/isn’t quantifiable; determined via socialisation/biology; belief in freedom isn’t true freedom (hume, spinoza, kant, aquinas, vardy)
(10) jean-paul sartre
- 1905, AT philosopher; FW supporter; consciousness/’neant’, suffering/death prove FW
- humanity condemned to freedom; pour-soi (being for itself)/etre-en-soi (being in itself); FW but restricted by natural laws/’the gap’ (reason)
- waiter/play acting; mauvaise foi/self-deception; negative ecstasy/inner conflict
(11) FW and science
- ‘uncertainty principle’/heisenberg; chaos theory; sirigu/jolts suggest intentions can be simulated (haggard, koch, yong, maslow)
(12) carl rogers (+criticism)
- 1902; humanistic psychologist; client-centred therapy/self-reflection; freud rejector; bio isn’t deterministic/supports FW/self-determination (‘actualising tendency’)
- ‘experiencing beings’/external conditioning; 3 forms (genuineness, acceptance, empathy); sully actualise vs conditional positive regard
- inherent ‘actualising tendency’; if done, break ‘chains’ of FW; ideal vs real self (cong/incong, maladjustment)
(13) strengths/weaknesses of rogers:
- W: lacks empiricism; subjective, doesn’t clarify (augustine, arminius)
- S: swinburn/toy world; mackie/triad; FW can coexist with religion; FW facilitates value of life; FW facilitates salvation/atonement (howard, ross, lemmy, hick)
deontological ethics (16)
(1) john finnis
- 1940, dev NL to negate flaws/’flourishment’; modern positivism/reinterpret; ‘rational basis for moral action’; guided by moral principles, but derives from ‘objective reasonableness’
- goods ‘self-evident truths’, underived/indemonstrable
- aristotle/phronesis/wisdom; reason over human nature
- !!! law legally valid even if unjust; no moral justification for enforcing an unjust law
(2) finnis’ basic goods (+key points, application)
- multiple/all valued/none can harm another; substantiative (1-3) +reflective (4-7)
- self-evident, universal, ‘flourish’; existence evident from practical reasoning
- (7): life, knowledge, play, aestheticism, sociability, practical reasonableness, cosmic order
(3) finnis’ theoretical vs practical reason
- theoretical: relies on self-evident principles, describes truth, can’t produce contradictions
- practical: ‘how’ to act; self-evidence BGs, est how to practise in reality; can be contradictory
(4) finnis’ 9 requirements
- creates optimum 7BG pursuing-conditions; practical reasoning
- (9): (1) life as a whole, (2) no value preference, (3) BG apply to all equally, (4) no obsession, (5) attempt to flourish, (6) aim for the most good, (7) never harm a BG, (8) common good for community, (9) act in own conscience
(5) using 7Gs+9Rs for actions
- primary/secondary precept structure> begin 9Rs, move to 7BG pursuit; discretion
- FW determines choice, PRs enables structure, theoretical reasonableness enables free-thought
(6) finnis’ common good + authority
- CG never achieved; participated in (all)
- authority to coordinate actions for CG
- law necessary; made with BGs in mind; if one accept legal system, obligated to obey all laws
(7) laws/legal system + finnis’ DE
- ‘lex injusta non est lex’ (morally wrong laws not laws at all); morally unjust law imposes legal (not moral) obligation
- intrinsically evil law (opposes BGs) vs extrinsically unjust laws (don’t promote CG)
- legal system serves BG+accordance with PR; authors of law dictate
- F> agreed with Fuller’s 8 requirements of ‘the inner morality of law’
- F> NLs are normative statements (Kelsen)
(8) strengths/weaknesses
- S: works in secular society; present day/not post-mortem incentive (aristotle summum bonum)
- S: universal, subjective/relative/postmodernist; works with law and politics; works with NL; Green, Aquinas, Vardy
- W: little structure/guidance; can’t be empirically proven; elitist; ignore primal impulse/nature
- facilitates totalitarianism; homophobic (finnis OG); Cole, Porter, Buckle
(9) proportionalism
- catholic, 1960s, NL revisionists; Knauer, ‘objective’ ethical reasoning
- rules broken only for a proportionate reason; intention, context, results factored; condemned by catholic church (PP> no act inherently evil)
- mccormick, hoose, jans, porter
(10) bernard hoose’s PP
- 1987, ‘the american debate’; H> goodness vs rightness/tel vs deo distinctions in NL
- only go against principle for proportionate reason
(11) PP pre-moral vs ontic evil
- both underlie action, not act itself
- pre-moral evil (intrins/obj evil; PP> exceptions); ontic evil (moral ambiguity; ‘fallenness’ genesis 3); evil moral act (immoral/PP’s intrinsic evil; greater disvalue than value)
- hoose, jard, mac
(12) PP good vs right act
- good: doesn’t deviate from rule it follows (deon/theo; must have right intention)
- right: may deviate from moral principle, but for proportionate reason (context)
(13) PP + natural law/agape love
- hybrid: more tel than deo: ethics dictated by outcome; elements of deon (action, duty)
- agape: >another form of SE; love >element of ethical criteria; agape highest virtue (corinthians 13); love can’t dictate ethics of actions solely
(14) PP’s strengths/weaknesses
- W: rejected by CC, subjective/relative/human error, no objective/empirical criteria, individualistic; much predicting/guesswork; port, gray, hoose, jard, cole
- S: supports autonomy; subj/obj/abso used together; universal/postmodern; both structured but individualist; sira, long, reed, cole
(15) capital punishment (PP for/against)
- gov-sanctioned practice, murder/espionage/genocide (pakistan, US, japan, cuba); Amnesty International: 25 countries = 1,600 2015
- for: deters, closure, finance, vengeance
- against: human value, no second chance (e.g. timothy evans/vs dr john christie), fear-based, societal brutalisation, against religion; Aq, Pope Francis, deon ethics
- finnis: conflicting views: works for/against bgs; if you accept legal system, you accept legal obligation to obey every law
(16) immigration (pp for/against)
- 60mil displaced globally (2016)
- for: empathy, help, cultural diversity; do good/avoid evil, preserve common good (world community)
- against: sacrifice own community+cultural identity, disrupt societal stability
- for: Catholicism, Aq, deon support; PP> for a PP reason, is justified
determinism (12)
(1) PD - augustine
- 350AD; catholic theologian, doctine of OS; ‘massa peccati’/mass of sin); predestined to sin, free (liberum arbitrium) but lost moral liberty (libertas)
- infl by plato: G+evil exist; A> sin defect by DofOS, ‘concupiscence’/longing = vulnerability to sin
- some given salvation/grace (chosen before birth)/only elect can accept (not chosen = reprobate)
(2) PD - john calvin
- protestant reformer, doctrine of election; total sovereignty of G/’sola scriptura’; a posteriori/general revelation; inclined to sin bc DofOS
- rejects FW; DofE/the saints (salv/aton by omnisc G; can sin, but forgiven so saved)
- unconditional election (via faith/virtue can be saved); election and grace (saved irrespective of bias/merit+justification not sanctification/new-found faith)
- reprobates/damned (totally depraved/no way out/apostasy; randomly chosen but show sinful traits)
- TULIP (Synod of Dort 1619; FW/PD debate+arminianism vs calvinism)
(3) hard determinism
- no FW; principle of causality/all ogd by antecedent events (william james 1884); humans preconditioned
- aren’t responsible for our moral actions + DON’T INCLUDE DETERMINISM IN A PDN ESSAY
(4) philosophical determinism
- john locke (1600); ‘Human Understanding’; dev PD on universal causation theory/all has past cause
- voluntary vs involuntary actions
- knowledge limited, causes fixed, all derived from past experience = FW illusory
- analogy: escape through door>door is locked, so never had autonomy
- tabula rasa: ‘blank slate’ mind, environment/conditioning/socialisation infl view of autonomy
- locke, bowie, spinoza, bolback
(5) scientific determinism
- genetics determine the human/i.e. no FW: Dawrin’s TofE/1809> DNA/genetic predispositions = no autonomy/’autos’/’nomos’ (Dennet/’genetic fixity’)
- cases: 1990 obese gene (limits leptin production); ‘God’ gene/VMAT2 (inclined to faith); mckee (genes contribute 40% to religious behavious - 2005); galton+eugenics (facilitate ‘genius’ gene/e.g. hitler+aryan ‘master’ race); birke gay gene (bio/social impact sexuality)
(6) psychological determinism
- behaviours can be explained without needing to consider internal mental states/consciousness
(7) ivan pavlov (+john watson)
- pavlov 1840: reactions determined by stimuli (work dogs: salivated/bio reaction>bell/neutral sim>assoc food with bell>bell but no food=conditioned to salivate/produce unconditional reflex) = little/no FW
- watson 1870: emotional responses conditioned> stimuli controlled, so is responce (‘little albert vs rat/loud noise)
- skinner 1904: classical/reflex conditioning; repeated behaviour conditioned through rewards/incentives
- 4 quardrants of operant conditioning: 1 (positive reinf/reward); 2 (negative punishment/delayed or removed reward); 3 (positive punishment/adding punishment); negative reinforcement (delaying/removing punishment)
(8) thomas hobbes + a.j. ayer (classical/sd)
- soft determinism: humans mostly determined, but elements of agency = morally responsible (freedom+dete work together/not FW)
- hobbes + ayer: actions partially det by genes/envir; limited freedom; morally responsible; god can intervene via miracles
(9) modern soft determinists
- vardy: intellectual scientific understanding enabled more freedom (bio disposition); kane: freedom to make choice is freedom nonetheless
- dennet (self-awareness+intellect creates freedom = compatible w determinism); nehru (life is like a game of cards)
(10) thomas hobbes/a.j. ayer (more)
- hobbes (1580, ethical egoist, CSD); inclinations deter by external factors, we’re still free; but someone else’s infl determines a freely-willed determined action
- ayer (1910, emotivist, CSD); A>freedom is ‘consciousness of necessity’/kleptomaniac vs thief
(11) supporting SD scholars
- augustine (G allows; + due to fallenness omni G foreknows free human choice); kant (all causes excluding FW are determined)
- james (highly vs modestly constrained appears involuntary vs voluntary); westcott (students felt more free when relieved of responsibility, less free when recognising behavioural limits)
(12) strengths/weaknesses of SD
- S: creativity of choices; values moral responsibility; unreasonable to hold humans wholly responsible; enabled moral right to punish; clarifies feelings of both FW and responsibility
- W: ultimate cause outside human control; little empiricism/quantifiable data; argued for being a middle road, not enough of any view; contradiction of FW+determined (‘quagmire of evasion’ - james)
ethical thought (18)
(1) meta/normative ethics (general)
- ethical terminology (right, wrong, bad, good)
- meta ethics: study of ethical lang vs normative ethics: describes varying moral codes of behaviours (NL, UT, SE)
(2) cog/non-cog (emotivism) - general
- ^is meta ethical view> ethical statements don’t assert propositions/express factual claims; can’t be verified
- ES> expressions of opinion; not propositional
(3) moral realism/moral anti-realism
- MR: facts of right/wrong in actions> cog/realist (2 forms: ethical intuitionism/non-naturalism; ethical naturalism)
- MAR: no obj values; lang not just for stating; MAR non-propositional, non-cog, anti-realist (2 forms: ethical subjectivism; non-cognitivism)
(4) ethical naturalism (+objective moral laws, natural world)
- obj moral laws exist indep of humans; moral terms understood via analysing natural world; ES cognitivist, can be verified/falsified>verified moral statements become objective moral truths
- epistemology (knowledge via senses/empiricism - hume, locke)>naturalism; EN: morals are objective, determined via empiricism (cognitive/quantitative assessment of propositions before agreeing)
(5) naturalist types (+meta-ethical statements)
- theological Ns (goodness via G’s will; seen in natural world, e.g. revealed via NL/G’s creation)
- hedonic Ns (goodness as fact of pleasure/happiness e.g. UT; applied ethical reasoning from basis of happy experience/most happy = morally good)
- meta-ethical statements: rooted in scientific/empiricist methods> good can be defined
(6) f.h. bradley
- 1840 ‘ethical studies’; british idealist; highly polemical works; B>self-realisation by empirical observation of community
- ‘my station and its duties’: community over individuality to self-realise; applied hegel’s dialectical synthesis to UT, Kantian ethics (!!later retreated this view)
- B> true ES can be universally observed; B> aim of morality to cease separateness; via self-sacrifice the self is restored
(7) challenges to ethical naturalism (+hume)
- hume’s law (is-ought/hume’s guillotine)> famous objectino to EN; can’t take what ‘is’ (fact/descriptive) to what ‘ought’ (duty/normative statement)
- H> ‘ought’ statements fit neither synthetic or analytic, so can’t be fact
- H> feelings/desires provide motivation
- Hume’s Fork: analytic statements/tautologies (deduction, a priori, maths) vs synthetic statements/emprical (a posteriori, sense-exp); moral proposition isn’t either, so can’t be deduced logically/demonstrated empirically
(8) moore (naturalistic fallacy, open question)
- 1903, ‘principia ethica’; ethical terms indefinable, like colours
- M> ENs have the ‘naturalistic fallacy’; M> can only know ethical terms via intuition
- NFY: good indefinable; some conflate good with what it infl/takes on (e.g. rain (good) indefinable; rain on things (smell/attached to good) = what is ‘empirically’ rain/good)
- M> by attemping good definition via natural properties, we precipitate an open question; defining good is impossible
(9) naturalism strengths/weaknesses
- S: objective moral laws provided; find morality via society; obj truths found via observation; aids in self-realisation; ethical/non-ethical statements are the same
- W: naturalistic fallacy (moore); EN illogical, is ought-based (hume), can’t v/f (ayer); lacks empiricism; based on humans ignoring selfish nature (baier)
(10) meta-ethical approaches/intuitionism
- universal/innate intuition to find moral truths; obj moral laws (‘self-evident truths’) exist independent of humans
- obj, cog, realist, a priori, meta-ethic; ethical non-naturalism, non-metaphysical moral realism
- use moral intuition to determine what produces most good (=most moral act)
- >good universal (innate intuition for goodness; ‘sui generis’/unique)
- >good inherently perfect; how we interpret is fallible (e.g. aristotle’s virtue cultivation)
- ross (intuitive awareness/prima facie duties - correct until proven otherwise)
(11) h.a. pritchard
- 1870; ‘moral mistakes’; intuitionist, dev moore’s work
- ‘ought’ indefinable/underivative/irreducible> intuition lead to what we ‘ought’ to do, duty/deon to do so
- P rejects M’s tel/end goal roots; P>for deon/’ought’ intuition
- P> some have better-developed intuition
(12) w.d. ross
- 1960; ‘the foundations’; agreed right/ought indefinable like good
- R> some actions inherently right; when rights class, follow most relevant/applicable to context
- deciding on which/how is dependent on mental maturity
- PDFs/prima facie duties (fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence)
(13) general moral thinking
- intuition not necessary for moral thinking; obj, empirical, a posteriori used to develop morality; intuition innate, but developed by different/superior means
(14) intuitionism strengths/weaknesses
- S: universal, autonomy, common sense/shared human experience, inherent structure (follow intu at all costs), facilitates subj, rela, indiv; reid, tyler, kant, jamieson
- W: no proof of moral intuition, no intrinstic evidence, social conditioning/religion debunk intuition, no set criteria for value of differing intuition, no plan b for conflicting intuitions; dancy, rachels, ayer, hume, jamieson
- W cases: UK jury study (all perceived ‘honesty’ differently); aquinas (scripture explains good); mackie (arg of queerness); macmahon (intuition just glorified self-interest)
(15) emotivism
- non-cog, form of ethical non-naturalism, moral anti-realist ethic/irrealism
- obj moral laws don’t exist; ES not verifiable or analytic; moral terms express personal emotional attitudes, not propositions
- ethical terms: approval/hurrah vs disapproval/boo
- hume’s fork (MSs meaningless but still subj meaningful); hurrah/boo theory (morals emotional responses only); ayer/VC (lang only meaningful if it can be verified; epistemology/cog/testable truth)
- ayer: >ethical judgements can’t be v/f; 4 types of ESs (props defining ethical terms; props describing moral exp; exhortations of virtue; ethical judgement); ESs not based on facts, can’t be obj = must be subj, not worthless but not factial/verifiable
(16) subjectivism vs emotivism
- subj: ES express emotion, can be verifiable; emv: ES express emotion/are emotional utterances, contain no facts about the self
- Ayer: rejects IN, not verifiable; A>E props not worthless; A> words like ‘good’ meaningless, can’t be validated/verified
- C.L. Stevenson: >EM more than just emotion; S>subj opinions meaningful bc based on obj facts; S’s iceberg theory (moral statement on top, socialisation/conditioning below)
(17) emotivism strengths/weaknesses
- S: universal, autonomy, variety of ways to meaningfully explore morals; hume (is/ought), sartre (individuality), ayer (no obj moral truths), jamieson, tyler
- W: virtually lawless (risk of guideless agents/antinomianism; amorality, anarchy); doesn’t facilitate moral debate bc all opinons; if supporting EM, supports that all thoughtful discussions are meaningless; bowie, reid, rachels
(18) prescriptivism (+hare, strengths/weaknesses)
- meta-ethic; R.M. Hare (1919) >aims to make moral statements obj
- >moral statements prescriptive, universal; ES command/guide behaviour
- S: accessible; opportunity to explore gradients of morality/actions; links to hegel’s historic dialectic
- W: provides no valid reason to follow; morals aren’t universal; mackie (rejects), sartre (>must create own truth/purpose)
