Exam 2 Flashcards
(160 cards)
1
Q
What is BATNA?
A
Best alternative to negotiated agreement, it determines the resistance point of each actor or bargaining power.
2
Q
What factors can influence what a BATNA consists of?
A
Status quo (high tariffs now), potential domestic change in policy (want protectionism), and potential international change in policy (have a trade pact with other states)
3
Q
Why is BATNA important?
A
It constrains the bargaining space and is often a function of relative power
4
Q
What is a Pareto improving offer?
A
An arrangement that makes at least one actor better off without making any actor worse off
5
Q
What is a Pareto optimal offer?
A
An arrangement that cannot make any actor better off without making an actor worse off
6
Q
What is the relationship between Pareto improving and Pareto optimal offers?
A
The Pareto optimal offer is at the limit of Pareto improving offers
7
Q
What is a Pareto frontier?
A
The set of all Pareto optimal offers
8
Q
What does one dimensional bargaining consist of?
A
No offer improves both sides’ utilities simultaneously, and all offers are already on the frontier
9
Q
What is the zone of agreement?
A
The space between both sides resistance points (the blue brackets). A would be an acceptable agreement, while B would not, because it is beyond the left side’s resistance point
10
Q
What happens in this scenario?
A
There is no zone of agreement, therefore no agreement is possible, also known as deadlock.
11
Q
Why, in a situation of deadlock, would the negotiating parties even come to the table?
A
Resistance point is private information, and false claims of resistance point may make it appear to be deadlock, but it really isn’t
12
Q
What is the green zone?
A
Pareto improving offers relative to A
13
Q
What is the purple line?
A
The ideal point they end up at (Pareto frontier)
14
Q
What determines bargaining outcomes?
A
In many ways, it is arbitrary. But, it can be determined by resistance points (BATNA), knowledge about the location of the Pareto frontier (which is determined by context, and not easy to find, according to Odell), and bargaining strategies (rule changing vs rule abiding, cooperative vs confrontational, though almost every bargain involves some confrontation and cooperation)
15
Q
What does the blue cross represent?
A
The resistance points of the actors.
16
Q
Why will the agreement wind up in the green?
A
Because both state know the Pareto frontier
17
Q
How can this scenario occur?
A
When there is currently investment, and there is a negotiation for new investment, if there is another option for China to take all their investment to, say Cambodia, then Laos’ BATNA is below their current level
18
Q
What is a two level game?
A
When domestic politics affects your BATNA
19
Q
What are the steps of the negotiation process (two level game)?
A
Domestic groups pressure their government, the government negotiates an agreement, then the agreement has to be ratified domestically
20
Q
What factors affect a negotiators win-set?
A
Domestic preferences (political power of groups that oppose or support compromise, hawks v doves), domestic institutions (ratification rules, like the US senate supermajority), and negotiators strategies
21
Q
What is happening here?
A
In a two level game, the US resistance point has gone down because of the domestic pressures they face.
22
Q
What happens when a negotiator faces a more constrained win-set?
A
They are more likely to obtain a favorable deal, but if one or more negotiators face a constrained win-set, bargaining is more likely to fail.
23
Q
What is an international regime?
A
Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations
24
Q
What are international institutions?
A
Explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, or authorize behavior
25
What are international organizations?
Actors that implement policy decisions and pursue their interests strategically
26
What is regime theory?
Theories about international regimes, institutions, and organizations
27
What is rational choice institutionalism?
Theories about international regimes, institutions, and organizations based on rational choice assumptions
28
What was Keohane's first label of his work?
Modified structural realism- states are rational, unitary actors, motivated by survival, and relative power is the ultimate arbiter of conflict but he reexamines realism in the light of rational choice theory and with sensitivity to the significance of international institutions
29
What was Keohane's second label of his work?
Regime theory- in After Hegemony.
30
What was Keohane's third label of his work?
Neoliberalism- Apropos the "Neo-neo" debates on relative vs absolute gains, but this was a bad name.
31
What was Keohane's final label for his work?
institutionalism- economical vis a vis the rise of constructivism.
32
What were the common assumptions in the 1980s?
American hegemony is declining and multipolarity is imminent.
33
What was Keohane's idea on if cooperation would survive post American hegemony?
He was an optimist
34
What is functionalism?
An explanation that accounts for causes in terms of effects, we observe such institutions and rationalize their existence
35
What are the blind spots of functionalism?
Emergent phenomena (ex. Invisible hand) have no function and unintended consequences
36
Why do functionalists believe state's create regimes?
To solve problems of cooperation and regimes serve their intended purpose.
37
When does Keohane believe that regimes will arise?
In dense policy space, because ad hoc agreements will interfere with each other.
38
What does Keohane believe international regimes are a response to?
Market failure, potential gains are left unrealized by transaction costs
39
What are some transaction costs with bargaining?
How do you decide who participates (specify terms of membership)?, How do you structure interaction (provide stable rules, iteration)? How do you facilitate substantive agreement (foster reputation, knowledge of interest, BATNAs)?
40
What are some transaction costs with information?
How do you understand the issue (policy expertise, scientific research)? How do you monitor compliance (data clearinghouse, reports generation)? How do you avoid moral hazard and adverse selection (reduce information asymmetry)?
41
What are some transaction costs with decision making?
| IO already established
How do you operate efficiently (bureaucratic economies of scale)? How do you create neutrality (autonomous bureaucracy)?
42
What are some transaction costs associated with compliance?
How do you resolve conflicts (judicial arbitration)? How do you enforce agreements (specific penalties, conditions for exclusion)?
43
What is the relationship between Keohane and Pareto optimality?
By reducing transaction costs, international regimes move us closer to the Pareto frontier
44
What are the rational choice redux?
Methodological individualism, consistent preferences, and instrumental rationality (maximize expected utility and strategic thinking)
45
What are the flaws in maximizing expected utility and thinking strategically?
Short term memory bottlenecks prevent use of all new info, there is an inability to assign probabilities (Bayesian update), cognitive biases in processing information, an unwillingness to perform complex analysis and plan for the future, satisfying (settling for what's good enough rather than strive for the best possible outcome),
46
What is another flaw in rational choice specific to governments?
Governments are large complex organizations composed of human beings with the cognitive flaws.
47
What does bounded rationality mean for actors?
Actors need to simplify their decision making process and adhering to regime rules simplifies. There really isn't a choice whether to adhere to regimes at the expense of maximizing utility by making every little decision, but rather which rules of thumb you use, regimes substitute multilateral rules of thumb for your unilateral ones, and you get the added bonus that the other actor's behavior becomes more predictably cooperative.
48
What is the range of substantive content?
From shallow to deep
49
What is the range of participation?
Limited to broad
50
What is the range of legalization?
Anarchy to hard law hierarchy
51
What are the three components of legalization?
Nonlegal to jus cogens norms, precision of commitments (vague to clear) and delegation of authority (ad hoc diplomacy to autonomous agents)
52
What is a framework convention?
Promoting dialogue, persuasion, and learning (via research and information sharing). Creates legitimacy via broad participation and sovereign equality. Starts with shallow cooperation then deepens over time. Example- Kyoto protocol
53
What is plurilateralism?
States with shared, intense preferences create highly legalized organizations with strong enforcement. Participation expands over time with accession protocols. Examples- EU and NAFTA
54
What is soft law?
Expecting compliance failures early on, use incentives to encourage increasing compliance, increases legalization over time. Examples- Regulatory agencies, human rights regimes
55
What is delegation?
A conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent
56
What is a principal?
An actor who is able to both grant authority and rescind it
57
What is agency slack?
Independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal
58
What is agent autonomy?
The range of potential independent action available to an agent within established mechanisms of control
59
What are police patrols?
Direct monitoring of agents
60
What are fire alarms?
Affected parties bring evidence of agency slack to the attention of principals
61
What is forum shopping?
States delegate authority to the most favorable IO
62
What is the central insight of Neo-functionalism?
IO agents use their autonomy to influence principals
63
What are the benefits of delegation?
Specialization, policy externalities, collective decision making, dispute resolution, credibility, lock in
64
What happens to delegation when there is greater preference heterogeneity among members?
There will be a reduced likelihood of delegation to the IO, because they are likely to disagree
65
What happens to delegation when a greater number of states is required to approve an action?
There is a greater autonomy of the IO
66
What happens to delegation when there are powerful states?
They are less likely to delegate because they have good BATNAs
67
What happens in delegation when there is greater specialization of an agent?
Increased opportunity for agency slack
68
What happens in delegation when there is a greater difficulty of controlling agents?
There is an increased use of rule based delegation
69
What happens in delegation when there is greater uncertainty or technical complexity?
Increased use of agent discretion
70
What did Ikenberry do in After Hegemony, After Victory, and Back to Hegemony?
He looked back to foundational moments of IR
71
What does Ikenberry say are the strategic options of a victor after a major war?
Abandonment, coercive hegemony, hub and spokes bilateralism, and constitutional order
72
What is coercive hegemony?
Dominance over all other states. What Nazi Germany would've done if they had won WWII
73
What is hub and spokes bilateralism?
Bilateral treaties with separate states, so the states are not connected with each other, only the hub, so the hub gets much more influence.
74
What is constitutional order?
NATO and Bretton Woods. Involves multilateral bargaining and the creation of binding institutions. It is not just the puppet of the hegemon (the US). It has democracy effects: internal trransparency, openness, and decentralization, which is why it's important that the hegemony is a democracy. There are checks and balances
75
Why do hegemony want a constitutional order?
So they can institutionalize their advantages over weaker states. Consent creates legitimacy, therefore voluntary cooperation and lower enforcement costs. Institutionalization reduces transaction costs and favors diffuse reciprocity (reciprocity diffused over time). Institutions will lock in gains in the event of their decline
76
Why do small states want a constitutional order?
The binding institutions constrain the hegemon to act consistently toward weaker states, so they can plan for the future. It provides stability and a voice. It avoids a coercive hegemony and avoids abandonment
77
What is some criticism of Ikenberry's constitutional order?
Is the US really bound? The US also did not want to be a coercive hegemon
78
What happened in 2003 to Ikenberry's constitutional order?
He rethinks his hypothesis post Iraq
79
What was Ikenberry's revised hypothesis?
The US from 1945-1991 was a regional hegemon in the west, so the system was bipolar and the US was constrained by insecurity. To retain allies in this threat, the US had to provide public goods and act multilaterally. But since then, the US has been a global hegemon, and is unconstrained by security. Even with the rise of new threats, there is a differential impact on allies, so the US has incentives to restructure the constitutional order.
80
What were the US incentives to restructure the constitutional order?
Alter the distributive bargain by threatening abandonment (you pay your fair share or we're out), take advantage of increased power differential by becoming more of a coercive hegemon (we can get rid of Saddam Hussein in this window of opportunity), shift to hub and spokes bilateralism (divide and rule, reduce free riding, improve enforcement.
81
What does Ikenberry say to expect from the rise of BRIC and other powers?
There could be socialization of new powers into the CO (which Ikenberry favors, they rose under the CO, so why change?), there may be mutual adaption by new powers and the US (also favored by Ikenberry, the new powers have different preferences, so we should accommodate them), decline of the hegemon causes the collapse of the CO, and the shift to regionalism (avoid this), and rejection of CO by new powers and hegemonic war (worst of all)
82
What is Krisch's argument?
Sovereign equality is breaking down and the US is breaking it down for various self-interested reasons.
83
What is natural law?
Certain truths or right vs wrongs, it just is, and is not based on anything
84
What is positivism?
To be bound by an aspect of international law, states need to consent
85
Why does the US prefer natural law to positivism?
Preferring natural law allows the US to make claims about what law is to throw their weight around, and violate sovereign equality, small states can't do this
86
How does the US seek to constrain others while limiting constraints on itself?
By inserting language from the Monroe Doctrine into treaties and adding individual conditions and reservations after, which isn't allowed
87
How has the US institutionalized its advantages in IOs and claimed exceptions when disadvantaged?
The UNSC, where they hold veto power, and other organizations with higher contributions leading to a higher share of votes
88
How does the US externalize its domestic law?
Treaties have to be consistent with the constitution, the US inserts its law in treaties, in BITs, provisions from US law are used, and so many BITs exist, they have basically become international law, sometimes, private parties can sure foreign countries for violation of international law, and that foreign countries investments can be seized
89
How does Krisch characterize the US as a world government?
The US legislates (by pushing its laws on the rest of the world), executes (no UN approval, we're just invading Iraq), and adjudicates (nat. law vs positivism)
90
What is Chimni's transnational capitalist class?
Owners of transnational capital
91
What are the carriers of TCC?
Corporate executives, bankers, brokers, financial management experts, media managers
92
What is the goal of the TCC?
Globalization (getting rid of remaining barriers between the developed and the developing world)
93
What is globalization?
Creation of uniform global standards to remove barriers to capital accumulation
94
Why are there barriers to trade in the less developed world?
To protect against foreign corporations
95
What is the function of IOs in Chimni's characterization?
IOs constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of the TCC and powerful states to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples. They serve capital and they come together as a global state
96
What is the difference between Kirsch's argument and Chimni's?
Kirsch says the US is acting for itself, Chimni says capital is acting for itself. Both say the world attacks the sovereignty of poor states
97
What is Ikenberry's characterization of the current order?
US-led, unipolar, constitutional but shifting, goal: US interests
98
What is Kirsch's characterization of the current order?
Us led, unipolar, hierarchical (vs sovereign equality), goal: US interests
99
What is Chimni's characterization of the current order?
TCC led, imperial global state consisting of international institutions, goal: globalization
100
What is Stone's idea of a market superpower?
Control over market access is a source of power. The most important thing in IPE, can other countries export to you? Everyone wants to export to the large US market, so the threat the US could shut off their access gives the US real power
101
Why doesn't Stone consider China a market superpower?
The import relatively few goods and services from industrialized countries because of their own limits, so they are limiting their influence as a market power
102
What is Stone's theoretical background?
He is critical of functionalist regime theory: power matters in institutional design and after institutional design (rules don't reflect behavior). Also critical of realism: we need to take IOs seriously, not assume they are epiphenomenal (a side effect without any effect of their own) to power politics
103
Why does Stone say there are formal rules?
For legitimacy and protection of small states, voluntary participation and joining is better than not joining.
104
Why does Stone say there are informal "rules"?
For greater power interests, especially in exceptional circumstances (Ex- IMF getting its information from the US and the Fed, and by giving and withholding info, the US can skew reality.)
105
What is the conventional wisdom about whose side the IO staff and judges are on?
IO staff are socialized and tasked to respect international law and sovereign equality, and therefore defend small states
106
What does Stone say about whose side IO staff and judges are on?
IO bureaucrats have incentives to favor great powers, whose non cooperation would be bad
107
What does Keohane say about who controls information?
IOs lower transaction costs by gathering and distributing info
108
What does Stone say about who controls information?
No IO will have the bureaucratic capacity of the great powers, so they rely on great powers for information. IOS have no independent source of income and rely on great powers
109
What does Stone say about outside options?
Great powers almost always have better BATNAs than small states due to bilateral treaties, forum shopping, and the creation of alternate institutions
110
What does Wendt say about states?
States are "unobservables"- abstract concepts, not tangible objects, they exist as a useful fiction. States consist of occupants of offices, and offices socialize their occupants into the identity of a corporate actor (when someone becomes leader of a country, their interests are set aside for state interests)
111
Why does Wendt say states are people too?
They have identities, they can react, states can act, they form societies, they generate cultures
112
What is coconstitution?
Two factors that cause each other
113
What are agents coconstituted with?
Structures
114
Why do states and the international system coconstitute each other?
Obviously, states change the international system, but if a state has a different opinion than the system, they will go with the system
115
Why do states coconstitute cultures of anarchy?
The international system is anarchic, and a society of states, and societies generate cultures. So, anarchy is what states make of it
116
How do cultures of anarchy socialize states?
States are what cultures of anarchy make of them.
117
What is the Hobbesian culture of anarchy?
Enmity: kill or be killed. Affect: States don't like each other. Pervasive prior to 1648, and recurs during wars, but is beaten back down after by status quo states.
118
What is the Lockean culture of anarchy?
Rivalry: Live or let live (trying your hardest to win the match, but shaking hands afterward). Pervasive post 1648, except during wars
119
What is the Kantian culture of anarchy?
Friendship, security communities. Canada and the US, and Europe post-1945
120
What is a security community?
A transnational region of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change
121
What is the fundamental tendency of culture?
Homeostasis, culture wants to maintain itself and it changes within well-defined parameters
122
What causes the homeostasis of culture?
Habituation (doing the same thing over and over again), persuasion (reasoning its the right thing to do), and socialization (peer pressure)
123
How does culture change?
Through the same mechanisms that cause homeostasis (habituation, persuasion, and socialization)
124
What is persuasion?
Public conformity with private acceptance
125
What is socialization?
Public conformity without private acceptance. Backpatting (carrot, status) and shaming (stick, opprobrium)
126
Who is susceptible to peer pressure?
People, including state leaders
127
Is persuasion and socialization public or private?
Persuasion: public or private, socialization: public
128
What is habitation?
Regular practice becomes imbued with normative value. Influenced by bounded rationality (we are not perfectly rational)
129
How do international regimes facilitate persuasion?
By providing equal status (sovereign equality), shared normative framework, information creation nd sharing, dense network of informal interactions, which generate trust and empathy, and a forum for epistemic communities.
130
What is an epistemic community?
Networks of knowledge based experts with an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge in their domain of expertise. They have shared causal beliefs and notions of validity, shared professional values, principles and goals,.
131
What are the sources of influence for epistemic communities?
Technical expertise, perceived neutrality, relationship to IOs
132
What is the socialization hypothesis?
IOs are a forum for concentrating pressure for social conformity. iOS with broad membership are more effective at socialization than IOs with narrow membership. Status markers are cheap to manufacture, yet they can be effective as material incentives
133
What is some criticism of the socialization hypothesis?
Persuasion mechanisms rely on the idea that great powers lack information (unlikely). Socialization mechanisms rely on the idea that diplomats relevant in group is their international negotiation partners, not domestic colleagues/constituencies (unlikely). Habit is easy to overcome
134
What are norms, according to Finnemore and Sikkink?
Standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. Norms determine content of culture. Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist.
135
What is the first stage of the norm life cycle?
Emergence
136
What are the actors of emergence?
Norm entrepreneurs with NGO platform
137
What are the motives of emergence?
Altruism, empathy, ideational commitment
138
What is the mechanism for emergence?
Persuasion
139
What is the tipping point?
A critical mass or threshold of states adopt new norms. One-third.
140
What is the second stage of the norm life cycle?
Norm cascade
141
What are the actors of norm cascade?
States, IOs, NGO networks
142
What are the motives for norm cascade?
Legitimacy, reputation, esteem
143
What is the mechanism for norm cascade?
Socialization
144
What is contagion?
Rapid spread of rhetorical acceptance of the norm to unpersuaded states
145
What is the third stage of the norm life cycle?
Internalization
146
What are the actors of internalization?
Law, professions, bureaucracy (once the state supports it, the bureaucracy kicks in)
147
What are the motives of internalization?
Conformity
148
What is the mechanism for internalization?
Habituation via institutionalization
149
What happens during internalization?
States start to believe the norm is the right thing to do. Unpersuaded states become persuaded, norms achieve taken for granted status, other actions become unthinkable
150
What causes different norms to become dominant?
Certain issues (bodily autonomy, protection of innocents, legal equality of opportunity), adjacency to existing norms, world time context (ideas of the winning side of a major war, trends, intellectual currents)
151
What is the definition of classical liberalism in IR?
Progress via human agency applied to the problem of war. It's optimistic, idealist, and believes that war can be solved. Democratic peace, economic interdependence, and international institutions
152
What is Moravcsik's liberalism?
An IR paradigm based on the analytic priority of domestic preference. In pursuit of things other than just security. You start with preferences and then figure out how they interact internationally
153
What does Moravcsik mean by primacy of societal actors?
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups who organize to promote differentiated interests. This is methodological individualism. This means there is no single utility and there is a bottom up perspective.
154
What does Moravcsik mean by representations and state preferences?
States (or other institutions) represent some subset of domestic society. This means there is no national interest (no leader just averages everyone's interests) and partisanship might matter
155
What does Moravcsik mean by interdependence and the international system?
States interact and state behavior is determined from interaction. The configuration of interdependent state preference determines state behavior. This means systemic factors constrain the pursuit of preferences and analytic priority of preferences over systemic pressures
156
What is the difference between constructivism and liberalism?
Liberals can also have ideas, but liberals use the foundational assumptions of RC, while constructivism disagrees with every single one of them.
157
What are some national preferences?
Economic system, regime type, national culture/ideology (Rittberger)
158
What are some subnational preferences?
Classes, sectors, state bureaucracies, subnational cultures (Bisbee)
159
What is Rittberger's theory?
The source of power: delegation of power to IOs, national variation, Outcome: legitimacy crisis of IOs. Delegation of authority to IO leads to justification deficit and responsiveness deficit leads to democracy gap. IOs are not thinking about what people want. Endogenous catalysts: crisis of interdependence and legalization/judicialization. This leads to polity contestation.
160
What is Bisbee's theory?
There is a decline of embedded liberalism and there are generations of insufficient redistribution to the global order's material losers. Preferences are based on occupational risk and explicit subnational variation, outcome: attitude towards multilateral institutions. High job mobility leads to support for free trade which leads to support for multilateral institutions. Low job mobility and adverse economic conditions locally leads to hostility towards multilateral institutions.
