Exam 3 Flashcards
(201 cards)
1
Q
What is the definition of sovereignty?
A
Supreme authority within a territory
2
Q
What are the early modern origins of sovereignty?
A
Monarch as the sovereign, with the subordination of noble magnates, Catholic Church, and the Holy Roman Empire, with each country having its own Catholic Church, but they are not all powerful
3
Q
What does mutual respect for sovereignty imply?
A
Non-intervention and right of self-defense, as established at Westphalia. This actually happened gradually over time, and doesn’t always happen.
4
Q
What do constructivists say about sovereignty?
A
It is unobservable, so a social construct, and it is structural, part of the culture of anarchy. It depends on mutual recognition, and meaning changes over time due to co-constitution
5
Q
What is the realist equilibrium outcome on sovereignty?
A
Sovereignty is a two player game between states (not always neighboring)
6
Q
What is the realist cartel of states from Acharya and Lee?
A
Sovereignty is a protection racket that limits subject’s choices. They monopolize provision of governance, raise taxes.
7
Q
What does Arachne and Lee’s cartel of states do?
A
Deters entry by non-state competitors into market for governance, create international institutions to set cartel rules, and promote nationalism as brand loyalty: which is an effect, not the cause of the change in the meaning of sovereignty
8
Q
What is Krasner’s version of sovereignty?
A
Sovereignty is organized hypocrisy: cheap talk that is often violated
9
Q
What is the realist view on meaning changes?
A
Meaning changes as the result of material change, balance of power and interests, technology of war and trade,
10
Q
What does pluralism say?
A
Positive law, which prioritizes consent, moral relativism, which respects diversity and parochialism, and a thin normative order that insists on the right to be left alone. In short, states rights trump individual rights
11
Q
What does solidarism say?
A
Natural law, which values human rights (could be some other common value), universalism, which insists on common values and cosmopolitanism, and a thick normative order: which demands social conformity. Ins short, individual rights trump states rights.
12
Q
Was pluralism or solidarism favored between 1945-1989, and why?
A
Pluralism, because of the need for US-USSR coexistence and decolonization leading to the rise of the third world and non-aligned bloc (Jackson), with an exception in anti-aparteid
13
Q
Was pluralism or solidarism favored between 1989-2001 and why?
A
Solidarism, because the US was more powerful, willing to throw its weight around, leading to the Right to Democracy in the 90s, the International Criminal Court in 2002, and R2P in 2005
14
Q
Was pluralism or solidarism favored between 2001-present?
A
Pluralism (partially), shown in the unilateralism of Bush Jr and Trump (minus Iraq) and the rise of counter hegemonic authoritarian bloc led by China and Russia
15
Q
What is responsibility to protect?
A
A set of principles officially adopted by the UN in 2005 which was a response to a controversy over humanitarian intervention in the 90s, especially over the former Yugoslavia
16
Q
What are the 3 pillars of R2P?
A
The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations, the international community has a responsibility to assist states in this, and if a state fails to protect, the international community must take stronger measures (but it isn’t easy to get the UNSC to agree)
17
Q
How did R2P shift the terms of the debate?
A
It moved the debate from “right to intervene” which violates sovereignty to responsibility to protect, which aids victims
18
Q
What does R2P attempt to do?
A
It attempts to depoliticize and reframe the debate in terms of a moral consensus that never existed, which doesn’t solve the problem
19
Q
What does Grigoryan say about R2P?
A
There are problems that are always going to be there, and won’t go away by shifting language
20
Q
What happened in Libya in 2011?
A
During the Arab Spring of 2011, there were protests against the Gadaffi in Libya, Gadaffi’s forces marched to stop them from Tripoli, and many were worried that they would commit crimes against civilians. The UNSC approved intervention, but the force exceeded their mandate, and coordinated with rebels, bombed government facilities, and regime targets. This led to no intervention in Syria and Myanmar
21
Q
What is a peacekeeping observational mission?
A
An unarmed mission. During the CW, both countries agree to ceasefire and ask for 3rd party to deter.
22
Q
What is traditional peacekeeping (interposition)?
A
A lightly armed mission. Also common during the CW, in the middle of a conflict, at a DMZ, armed to protect themselves
23
Q
What is multidimensional peacekeeping?
A
Lightly armed and civilian experts. Post Cold War, brings in civilian experts to try to reconstruct societies to keep the peace once they’ve agreed to stop fighting
24
Q
What is peace enforcement/peace building?
A
Heavily armed troops, used post-1999, when the conflicting groups don’t want peace, or there is only a tenuous peace
25
What questions still remain about peacekeeping?
There are still questions of sovereignty and the UN taking sides
26
What was Ausessterre's argument about peacekeeping, and what are its problems?
We need to get more local. The problem is that locals can take sides, bureaucrats don't want to give up authority, and locals may be committing human rights violations
27
Who pays for peacekeeping?
Great powers
28
Who's manning peacekeeping missions?
Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and India, in general, poorer countries
29
Why are peacekeeping missions manned by poorer countries?
The UN hires forces from other countries, and they respond to commanders from their own country, so rented troops. The troops are cheap to rent, and poor countries get the money
30
What is the definition of collective security?
An attack on one member is an attack on all members. A multilateral obligation to oppose aggression
31
What is the logic of a collective security organization?
If everyone knows that aggression will be opposed by all, then no one will be an aggressor.
32
How is cooperation sustained in a collective security organization?
By a high discount parameter, contribute to enforcement today because you may be a target tomorrow. It ameliorates the security dilemma, therefore creating security community.
33
What type of good is a collective security organization?
Ideally, it is a public good because of universal membership (nonrival and nonexcludable). But this is only an ideal, states can be excluded (see Ukraine), and security is rivalrous (multiple countries invaded at once)
34
How is collective security enforced?
Usually: it is a multilateral, iterated prisoner's dilemma
Under unlimited great power aggression (Hitler): Multilateral, iterated chicken, buckpassing, everyone wants everyone else to fight Hitler.
35
What is the aggregation technology of a collective security organization?
Threshold. Need just enough of the good to prevent or override aggression, more is useless
36
What is the collective security dilemma when aggression comes from a great power?
Opposition is too costly or impossible (ex: US vs Iraq, Russia vs. Ukraine)
37
What is the collective security dilemma about cost?
Overturning aggression is costly especially without joint products (ex. territorial compensation). Defense is easier than offense (liberating vs helping defend)
38
What is the problem about enforcement of collective security through sanctions?
They are less costly, but the temptation to defect increases as sanctions increase in breadth and effectiveness (India buying Russian oil), this is not renegotiation proof (eventually people grow tired of sanctions), and the aggressor knows this, and economic sanctions become less of a deterrent
39
What is the second order enforcement problem of collective security?
Punishing non-enforcers is costly. How to enforce non-enforcers? We almost never punish non enforcers, so countries know they don't have to live up to commitments
40
How does aggression pose verification problems for collective security?
It can be hard to tell who is at fault
41
How are there negative externalities of sanctioning an aggressor?
Small conflicts will draw in great powers, and can push away other countries
42
What is the moral hazard involved in collective security organization?
The provision of insurance incentivizes risk taking, so false confidence in collective security may lead some states to disarm, creating incentives to attack
43
What is the adverse selection problem involved in collective security organization?
Threatened states will be eager to join CS pacts, whereas unthreatened states will not join
44
How was the Persian Gulf War of 1991 an example of collective security?
It was a privileged group because the hegemon was a member, there were joint products for the US (cheaper oil), and there were selective incentives for the Arab League
45
What are the basics of the UN General Assembly?
One country, one vote. Manages membership and operations. Resolutions have symbolic significance but they are not binding on member states and no enforcement.
46
What's the problem with votes ing the UN general assembly being weighted by population?
China and India would dominate
47
What's the problem with general assembly reform where votes are weighted by GDP?
The US and China would dominate
48
What's the problem with general assembly reform where votes are weighted by contribution to UN budget?
It would lead to up bidding or down bidding (oligarchy or bankruptcy)
49
What are the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council?
US, UK, France, Russia, and China
50
What were the two scenarios where membership in the UN permanent 5 changed?
1. The UN GA voted to take China's seat from the Republic of China and gave it to the Chinese Communist Party in 1971
2. USSR designated Russia as its successor in 1991, with no objection by the UN GA
51
What are the basics of the non-permanent 10?
2 year terms, staggered so half change each year, elected by regional voting blocs
52
What does it take to pass a UN Security Council resolution?
9 affirmative votes with no vetoes, and a vote of no from a permanent member is a veto
53
How does decision making work in the UNSC?
Permanent members often negotiate outside the council, then present agreements as a fiat. Council deliberations are more theater than deliberation
54
What does Chapter V of the UN Charter say about the security council?
The Security Council is the executive body of the UN, and the rest of the community commits to doing what the SC says
55
What was FDR's vision of the permanent members?
FDR wanted 4 permanent members (De Gaul insisted France be included after). He envisioned 4 policemen, envisioning the permanent members to enforce the order in its sphere of influence. The US would assume temporary responsibility for Asia Pacific, due to China's weakness
56
What is Bosco's concert of power?
The UNSC promotes management of conflict between great powers. Promotes restraint between them, not governance
57
What does Chapter VI of the UN Charter say?
Diplomacy is pursued first, but also you can do what you want
58
What does Chapter VII of the UN Charter say?
The UNSC can determine a response to aggression. Interruption of economic relations, action of air, sea, or land forces. The existence of any threat is determine by the SC. This was rarely invoked during the CW, because the US and USSR have to agree. This action most often involves sanctions
59
What is the controversy over the UNSC resolutions on suppression of terrorist funding and export controls for weapons of mass destruction?
These acts establish new binding rules of international law, rather than commands relating to a particular situation. This avoids input from affected members, usurps the requirement of consent, and implementation still depends on member states, so limited power
60
What is the debate on security council reform?
Japan, India, Brazil, and Germany want permanent membership, and small countries want an enlargement of non-permanent membership. Permanent members want to preserve the status quo, so don't hold your breath for reform
61
What is the standard principal agent relationship in IO?
States are principals and IOS are agents.
62
What is Thompson's conception of the Principal-Agent relationship?
The IO (UNSC) is the principal. The state (US) is agent, because the UN doesn't have its own army
63
What is Thompson's model of screening?
The UN SC has no military, therefore it must delegate enforcement of resolutions to individual states
64
What are the types that agents (enforcers) can be in models?
Law abiding vs law exceeding
65
How can the principal figure out agent type?
Ask the agent to send costly signals of its type and subject itself to multilateral constraints on its action. This screens out the law exceeding types, who would be unwilling to pay the cost of restraint.
66
How did Thompson's principal agent work out in Iraq in 2003?
In 2003, Iraq might have been violating UN SC resolutions from 1991. The US volunteers to enforce resolutions, but the UNSC required evidence of violations before authorizing action. Inspections failed to produce evidence, US invades anyways
67
What the conventional wisdom of the US in Iraq 2003?
The UNSC failed to prevent the US invasion of Iraq, therefore, the UN SC is useless.
68
What is Thompson's theory about the US in Iraq in 2003?
The UN SC revealed that the US was a law-exceeder. The US was revealed to be untrustworthy, and the US lost support/allies, which raised the costs of the invasion and subsequent occupation. This may constrain the US from law exceeding actions in the future
69
What is the forum shopping that can take place at the UN?
The UN's wide heterogenous membership has resolutions send a strong signal, while regional organizations have a narrower, more homogenous membership that sends a weaker signal
70
What do enforcers do when forum shopping?
Enforcers will find an IO that achieves the right balance of sufficiently few constraints, but providing some multilateral cover
71
What do constructivists say about the US attempt to get UN support in Iraq?
They did this because legitimacy matters
72
What does Thompson say about the US attempt to attract UN support in Iraq?
The US seeks UN support to attract allies, allies care about UN decisions because they lack information about US motives/type
73
What is the first step in the anarchy-hierarchy continuum?
International regime. Implicit principles and norms, and mutual expectations creating behaviors, and comity (existing near each other without invading)
74
What is the second step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
Also international regime, but there are explicit rules. They are unmodified, and based on consent
75
What is the third step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
International institution. Explicit arrangements negotiated among actors
76
What is the fourth step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
International organization. Actors that implement policy decisions
77
What is the fifth step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
Supranationalism. A constitutional union of sovereign states. EX: European court decisions are superior to all the nation's courts, and other courts have to abide by their rulings. States sign a treaty that creates organizations that can tell states what to do. There is nothing stronger than this right now.
78
What is the sixth step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
Constitutional union of semi-sovereign political union (not states anymore). EX: Articles of Confederation. Greater rights than under a federal system, but less than supranationalism. Common foreign policy, maybe common army
79
What is the seventh step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
Federation. Constitutional union of non-sovereign political units, with division of powers. EX: United States, Switzerland
80
What is the eighth step on the anarchy hierarchy continuum?
Unitary state. Central state retains supreme power (but may devolve some competencies). Especially common in smaller states
81
What were the general problems of Europe in the late 1940s?
Economic reconstruction, fears of communism, fears of Germany, decline of France.
82
What were the specific problems of France and West Germany in 1949?
Market balance: shortage of coal, surplus of steel. Joint interest in economic management. German interest in ending Allied economic controls in the Ruhr. French concerns about rapid German economic growth
83
What was the solution that France and Germany came up with in the late 40s to solve their problems?
Supranationalism
84
What was the Schuman Plan?
The French foreign minister proposed Franco-German coal and steel production be put under international authority. Negotiations between France and Germany
85
What was the goal of the ECSC?
Create a common market in coal and steel via reduction of trade barriers. Created predecessors of European Commission, European Parliament, and the Court of Justice
86
What is the European Council?
The Heads of state, an informal organization until 2009, which initiates grand bargains.
87
What is the European Commission?
Commissioners that are appointed by individual governments, but not representative of their interests. They serve as quasi executive, set agenda, make proposals, and implement decisions
88
What is the Council of Ministers?
Composed of foreign ministers, approve or reject commission proposals
89
What is the European Parliament?
Not directly elected at first. Intended to conduct oversight of the first two bodies, with little legislative power
90
What is the European Court of Justice?
The Supreme Court of the EU
91
What was the journey of the UK in the EU?
1961: Applied for membership, rejected by France (screened by pluryilateral pathway)
1973: Britain joins EU
2016: Brexit referendum vote (52-48% out)
2020: UK-EU withdrawal agreement
92
Why is a liberal explanation used in the EU (moravscik)?
Fundamental actors are individuals, states represent actors, and there is interdependence in the international system
93
Why is an intergovernmental approach used in the EU (Moravscik)?
What drives integration is national governments (which represent the preferences of their partisan coalitions), European integration is best understood through IR, not comparative politics, and the EU is an IO, not a nascent state
94
What is the first stage of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik)?
Economic interdependence creates business demand for integration. Sectors with competitive advantages favor liberalization, sectors that are import competing oppose liberalization
95
What is the second stage of liberal intergovenrmentalism (Moravscik)?
Business demand for integration leads politicians to create the ECSC. State leaders control the supranational institutions, European council is key, and state leaders drive the bargains. State leaders increase their own autonomy by bypassing their legislatures, which is the origin of the democracy gap
96
What is this modeling?
Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism
97
What is the third stage of liberal intergovernementalism?
Supranationalism expands. Integration increases interdependence, which increases demand for integration, because there is more export-competing. Occurs through occasional grand bargains, which reflect the compromise between different state preferences
98
What is the fourth stage of liberal intergovernmentalism?
Progress slows. States delegate to supranational bureaucrats only when stakes are low, credible commitments are needed to prevent defection (see deeper interaction). Business has little interest in non-economic issues, hence, little political integration
99
What are the implications of liberal intergovernmentalism?
National governments are proactive, integration strengthens state leaders (vis a vis legislatures). Neutral about continued integration. Study of the EU as IR, specifically IO
100
What was Moravscik's prediction on Brexit, following the referendum?
90% of policies will stay the same, just a name change or PR exercise
101
Why do Stone Sweet and Sandholtz use neofunctionalism to explain the EU?
Neofunctionalism is dynamic functionalism, intended to explain increasing cooperation over time. Cooperation is self-reinforcing (positive feedback loop)
102
What's the first stage of neofunctionalism (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz)?
Transnational exchange creates societal demand for integration. This is wider than liberal intergovernmentalism. Transnational exchange can be economic interdependence or individuals' communication and movement across borders.
103
What is the second stage of neofunctionalism (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz)?
Societal demand for integration leads politicians to create ECSC. State leaders cede control to supranational institutions, European Commission is the key actor. Supranational institutions are autonomous actors in economic issue areas
104
What is the third stage of neofunctionalism (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz)?
Supranationalism expands. Societal groups connect to supranational institutions, creating a new supranational level of lobbying and contestation. Economic integration creates new policy problems: externalities, elimination of tariffs leads to non-tariff barriers. Economic integration creates openings for new supranational initiatives to address them: spillover. Where spillover is blocked by states, externalities pile up, leading to an integration crisis, which is resolved under a new grand bargain
105
What is this modeling?
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz's Neofunctionalism model
106
What is the fourth stage of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz neofunctional model?
Progress on integration becomes self sustaining. Day to day activities expands supranational authority incrementally, supranational bureaucrats and courts expand their issue ambit, while bureaucrats increase their autonomy from states. Societal groups become invested in supranational as a means to resolve day to day problems. Retreat is unlikely because of the creation and accumulation over time of vested interests in societal groups
107
What is the fifth stage of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz neofunctional model?
Social identities change? Will loyalties of actors shift (Stone Sweet doesn't say). Transnational exchange+supranational integration+creation of common symbols= loyalty to the provider of public goods
108
What are some EU symbols
Flag, motto: unity in diversity, anthem: Beathoven's ode to joy, currency: euro
109
What are the implications of neofunctionalism?
National governments are reactive, integration weakens state leaders, and optimistic about continued integration, even in crisis. Study of the EU as comparative politics, specifically state formation
110
What do neofunctionalists say about Brexit?
It was unexpected: retreat is likely. Attention to identity might provide insights on anti-EU backlash, but only post-hoc
111
What is the first stage of Rosario's realism?
Geopolitical threat drives integration. If facing a superior threat, balancing. If facing an overwhelming threat, with a viable coalition, and symmetric power within the coalition, integration. If facing an overwhelming threat with a viable coalition, and asymmetric power within the coalition, unification. If overwhelming power, where a coalition is not possible, bandwagoning.
112
What is the second stage of Rosario's realism?
No societal demand (unitary states, autonomous leaders)
113
What does this model?
Rosario's realism
114
What is the third stage of Rosario's realism?
Supranationalism remains constant as the threat remains constant. ECSC included EC predecessors of the European Commission and European Parliament, as well as the Court of Justice. But what about the Euro, adopted 1993-2002, as the threat was decreasing? Because of prosperous economic conditions (though this is post-hoc)
115
What is the fourth stage of Rosario's realism?
Regression as threat declines
116
What are the implications of Rosario's realism?
National governments are proactive, integration weakens state leaders, pessimistic about continued integration. Study of the EU as IR, specifically international security
117
What does Rosario's realism say about Brexit?
This is exactly what Rosario predicted. Britain gave up its sovereignty, and leaves to get it back
118
What are the two questions that Matli attempts to answer in comparative regionalism?
1. Why have the EU and NAFTA been so successful? Why have other regional organizations accomplished so little?
2. Why have regional integration initiatives come in waves (50s-60s, 80s-90s)
119
What are the two variables Matli uses in comparative regionalism?
1. Potential market gains from integration: Are the countries natural trading partners?
2. Uncontested regional leadership: Are the countries a privileged group
120
If there is uncontested regional leadership and potential market gains, what does Matli say?
High success in regional organizations: US, EU
121
If there is uncontested regional leadership, but not significant market gains, what does Matli say?
Moderate success in regional organizations: CACM pre-1969
122
If there is contested regional leadership and significant market gains, what does Matli say?
Moderate success in regional organizations: APEC, MERCOSUR
123
If there is contested regional leadership and no significant market gains, what does Matli say?
Low success in regional organizations: ASEAN, CACM post-1969
124
What is the first stage of competitive integration (Matli)?
Regional organization forms and successfully promotes economic organization
125
What is the second stage of competitive integration?
Excluded states fear the diversion of trade, investments, and aid
126
What is the third stage of competitive integration?
Excluded states have two options: if possible, join the original organization; if necessary, create a rival organization (first wave followed the creation of the EEC in 1957, second wave followed Schengen Agreement, and the Single European Act (1985 and 1992)0
127
What was the origin of ASEAN?
Formed in 1967 because of anti-communist views and economic developmentalism. The anti communism disappeared post-CW. ASEAN is made of a variety of regime types (democracy, left/right authoritarian, monarchy)
128
What is the ASEAN way?
Respect for sovereignty and consensus decision making
129
Why does Matli say ASEAN didn't, and won't work?
No potential market gains from integration, and no uncontested regional leadership
130
What is Keck and Sikkink's view of NGOs?
They view NGOs as norm entrepreneurs; states engage in principled behavior, are cooperative networkers. This is a constructivist view
131
What is Keck and Sikkink's unit of analysis?
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and their campaigns. I.E. collective social phenomenon. Focus on intended function of NGOs (good deeds), from their perspective ("self conscious and self-reflective nature")
132
What is this?
The TAN boomerang pattern
133
What is information politics in NGOs?
NGOs share information with one another to try to move toward their goal
134
What is symbolic politics in NGOs?
Framing of the issue and selling the issue internationally. EX: Land mine activists showing pictures of children
135
What is leverage politics in NGOs?
NGOs in Europe bringing an issue to their government. Getting other states and intergovernmental organizations involved
136
What is accountability politics in NGOs?
Rhetorical traps, naming and shaming. Pushing an organization from above and below. Constructivist, so pressure doesn't have to be material. It's a rhetorical trap: states accept the framing that this action is bad
137
How do Prakash and Gugerly (and Cooley and Rovi) portray NGOs?
NGOS are firms in a policy market. There is competition for funding (contracts). NGOs don't run on good intentions alone, they need funding, NGOs are oriented toward their own survival. They engage in self-interested behavior, and this is a rational choice theory.
138
Why do Prakash and Gugerly say that NGOs are in a market?
NGOs are competing for donations from the same donors
139
How do Prakash and Gugerly portray NGOs in a principal agent problem?
The donors are principles, and agents are actors. How much accountability is there? Will the donors follow up? There is the principle of upward accountability. They lack downward accountability, and NGOs lose sight of the cause in favor of raising money. NGOs prioritize organization needs over issue efficacy.
140
What is Prakash and Gugerly's unit of analysis?
Individual NGOs (aka methodological individualism)
141
What do Prakash and Gugerly focus on with NGOs?
Collective action problems and agency slack
142
What are the implications of Prakash and Gugerly's view of NGOs?
NGOs are agents of funders: biased as Western, capitalist, and instruments of states. There is market failure, especially under certain conditions (C&R), there is agency slack and inadequate monitoring, competitive bidding and short term renewable contracts (cutting corners and constant short term results, at the expense of long term issues). Multiple competing principals (ex: in Bosnian POW camps, low standards start crowding out high standards)
143
What is Bob's view of NGOs and social movements?
NGOs are suppliers of aid, and social movements are demanders of aid, so a market
144
What are some characteristics of NGOs?
Few have substantial influence (publicly, political standing) and few have substantial capacity (material resources)
145
Why is there an NGO hierarchy?
Because of inequalities
146
What are NGO gatekeepers?
NGOs with strong reputation: credibility, clout; strong organization: global lobbying, public relations. EX: Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund (a big NGO everyone can name)
147
What are NGO followers?
Most other NGOs that are not gatekeepers. Few resources, little publicity. They exist on a national basis and serve niche functions
148
What are the resources of social movements?
Pretty disparate, low capacity, low influence, but limitless number of them
149
What are the types of Social Movements?
1. Mobilized groups: active demand
2. Unmobilized groups: latent demand, nearly infinite number
150
What is the NGO-SM market structure?
NGOs are suppliers of good deeds, SM as demanders of good deeds. Supply is scarce, demand is abundant. Therefore, NGOs can afford to be choosy. SMs become supplicants, trying to frame their cause to attract NGOs
151
What are the substantive issues NGOs use for selection criteria?
SMs frame their cause in simplistic terms (good vs evil), SMs blame known villains (MNCs or rogue states), SMs emphasize trendy causes, SMs emphasize universalistic aspects of their cause (ex: violations of international law), SMs connect their cause to international collective goods
152
What are the organizational needs NGOs use for selection criteria?
NGOs maximize bang for their buck, avoid lost causes, NGOs maximize global impact of local change (mass producing good deeds), NGOs avoid reputational harm, have to vet information from SMs
153
What are the implications of Bob's NGO-SM market?
There is an imbalance of power, and a patron-client relationship, SMs have to try to adapt themselves to Western norms. NGOs have choices (select causes that will raise their profile, increase funding, there is no necessary connection between need and support.
154
What are the nonexcludable benefits of refugee protection (Betts)?
Order: border control and security (rebels and terrorists recruit from refugee camps). Justice: Humanitarianism and human rights
155
What are the non-rival aspects of refugee protection?
Many countries can afford to take refugees and refugee crises are dispersed in time and location, so the system is not overwhelmed
156
What is the prisoner's dilemma involves in refugee protection?
The dominant strategy is to defect, unless the prisoner's dilemma is iterated. But refugee crises are intermittent, unpredictable, and vary in impact: not iterated, which makes us think defection
157
What is the small exploiting the large in refugee protection?
A powerful actor will provide the good if its benefits outweigh its costs. Others will free ride. The US is geographically isolated, therefore unaffected by most refugee crises: unlikely to provide
158
How does Betts take problem with this characterization of RP as a global public good?
RP is not globally nonexcludable: threat to order is regional. It is also not globally nonrival: Many countries lack resources to host refugees (and money will not help), countries that tend to take refugees are poorer. So, refugees have differential impact on the North and the South
159
What is the view of the North in refugee protection?
The North is rich, but has a low incentive to contribute (benefits least from provision)
160
What is the view of the South in refugee protection?
The South is poor, but haas a high incentive to contribute (benefits most from provision)
161
What does the South want in Betts' view of RP?
The South seeks support from the North. They help refugees whether or not North support (no credible threat to do otherwise)
162
What does the North want in Betts view of refugee protection?
Focus on refugee exclusion and deterrence. Help refugees, only if percieving own interest at stake
163
What is the principle of proximity?
Help is owed by those closest to refugees
164
What was Operation Uphold Democracy?
There was a coup in 1991 in Haiti, leading to increasing refugee flows to the US. The US doesn't want a refugee crisis. A 1999 UN SC resolution authorizes intervention, the US intervenes. Here, this is a North response to a refugee crisis
165
What does constructivism say about RP?
Preferences are endogenous to social interaction
166
How does the UNHCR try to pursue RP?
They use persuasion to create issue-linkages that link refugee protection to the self interest of powerful state. Cross issue persuasion. Specifically, convince states that they will benefit from refugee protection, joint products.
167
What are the mechanics of cross-issue persuasion?
Make institutional connections, lead epistemic community, engage in argumentation, and provide information (data)
168
What has happened in RP since Betts (2009)?
The Syrian Civil War (2011-present) and the EU-Turkey Deal (2016), where the EU provided side payments to Turkey, while Turkey prevents refugees from entering the EU via Greece
169
What was the response of the EU to the Ukraine War?
Welcoming, instead of keeping them out
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What is the reason for the different response of the EU to refugees from the Ukraine War to refugees from Syria (and others)?
Maybe race? Could also be the shared threat faced from Russia, cultural similarity, language barriers, material wealth of refugees, and human capital
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What is Harris's structure of the climate change problem?
Collective good: stable climate, achieved via reduction of GHG. This is a public good: nonexclusive and nonrival
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What are the implications of climate change policy being a public good?
Prisoner's dilemma and small exploit the large
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What is the aggregation technology of climate change policy?
Summation, every reduction counts equally
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What is the discount parameter of climate change policy?
Low. Costs of cooperation are immediate, whereas benefits are distant, making cooperation difficult
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What type of group is climate change policy?
Indeterminate. No single actor has perceived sufficiently large benefit from providing the good.
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What is Harris's view of the chances of climate cooperation?
If there is neither a hegemonic leader nor an international regime, prospects for cooperation are bleak (also Keohane)
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What are the distributive questions of the international regime on climate change (burden sharing)?
1. Should contributions be based on current emissions (which would implicate China, the US, the EU, and India, but China ships goods to the US and the EU, and India is poor)?
2. Should contribution be based on cumulative emissions (US, EU, China, Russia. Should you pay for the sins of your father, who didn't even know?)?
3. Contribute based on cumulative efforts (How much effort have they put into reducing emissions? US has paid little, UK has paid a lot through fuel taxes. But these taxes were adopted for reasons other than climate change)
4. Contribute based on wealth (US, EU, Gulf countries)?
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What solution does every country favor?
The one that has them paying the least
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What is vulnerability and readiness?
Are you starting to adapt to climate change, and can you make adaptions?
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What was the Kyoto Protocol?
A 1997 agreement where developed countries agreed to reduce emissions by approximately 5% from 1990 levels. No reductions from developing countries. The US signed on, but did not ratify, and withdrew in 2001. It was a failure, and most countries failed to meet their targets.
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What was the Paris Agreement?
A 2015 agreement where all countries submit nationally determined contribution plans every 5 years and report progress. The US signed, but did not ratify, withdrew in 2020, and rejoined in 2021.
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Do the climate agreements (Kyoto, Paris) matter?
There is no enforcement of targets, and no penalties for broken promises (shallow cooperation). Exogenous factors have affected emissions more than public police: recessions, energy prices, technological change. Might mobilize public opinion, pressure politicians
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What is a liberal theory's sources of US national preferences?
The US has a high reliance on carbon, it is a large country and not population dense, meaning car culture, and there is a high temperature variance, therefore high energy requirements for heating/cooling. Domestic energy production insures against overseas disruptions, therefore disincentivizes conservation (moral hazard), and the US has vested interests, both corporations and producer state voters, oppose decarbonization. There is low vulnerability to climate change, because the US is wealthy, therefore a high capacity to adapt, and its a large country, people can move to avoid problems of heat or flooding.
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What are DeSombre and Aklin/Mildenberger's liberal theory interests against fossil fuel reduction?
Industries: polluters, carbon fuel producers, high energy consumers, concentrated in Republican Party.
Consumers: Long distance drivers, ruralites and suburbanites, concentrated in Republican Party
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How do DeSombre and Allin/Mildenberger say to change US policy?
States are most likely to support international environmental regulation when business supports it (Moravscik). Business supports international environmental regulation when there is a baptist-bootlegger coalition.
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What is a baptist-bootlegger coalition?
Opposite moral positions lead to the same vote. Comes from the US prohibition of alcohol (1920-35) where baptists support prohibition for morality and bootleggers support prohibition for profit.
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What is the baptist bootlegger coalition steps involved in climate change?
1. Environmentalists propose regulation; industry oppose it.
2. Regulation is adopted, which puts industry at a disadvantage vis a vis foreigners.
3. Industry joins environmentalists in support of internalization
4. US uses its market power to pressure the rest of the world into adopting a multilateral agreement
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What are the implications of the liberal view of climate change policy?
Why hasn't the US led on climate change? What would it take for the US to do so? We are wasting effort on international agreements, when we should be working on lobbying the US and the EU
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What are the prescriptions of Mitchell and Carpenter's constructivism for climate change?
Reframe the conversation from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness. Make strong prescriptive claims, along the soft law pathway (start with high standards expecting noncompliance, then use shaming/backpatting to increase compliance). Mobilize transnational networks (use gatekeeper NGOs to develop strong, unifying message, NGOs naturally cooperate). Exclude veto players (establish a group identity to distinguish norm leaders from norm laggards, see land mine treaty)
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What are Sikkink's prescriptions for climate change policy?
Get specific with norms, AFFNs, norm cascade (cross a threshold of critical mass, motivated by legitimacy, reputation, and esteem; focus on real time bodily harm)
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What is threat inflation?
Activists almost always overstate the problem they seek to solve (persuasion by exaggeration: increase public concern to obtain policy action, epistemic bubble: one-sided consumption of information.
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What are some examples of threat inflation?
Right wing inflation of terrorist threat after 9/11 and left wing inflation of climate change
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What are the dangers of climate threat inflation?
Loss of trust from skeptics (causes polarization, which makes compromise difficult, false narratives lead to false counter narratives), counterproductive tradeoffs (nuclear is undervalued, wind and solar is overvalued, focus on reducing emissions results in neglect of mitigation, adaption, and habitat protection), making energy more expensive would hurt food production and worsen rural poverty.
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What is the realist view of IO?
IO is a function of distribution of power, which currently is declining US hegemony and rising China won't unite the West like the USSR did. Return of multipolarity is inevitable, or already here.
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What is the realist prediction of IO?
Decline of IOs and revival or great power competition
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What is the rational choice institutionalism/functionalist regime theory view of IOs?
Demand for IOs increases with issue density and globalization increases issue density.
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What is the rational choice institutionalism/functionalist regime theory predictions of IOs?
If more globalization, growth of global IOs. But we may not see more globalization. If more regionalization, growth of regional IOs. If less of both, IOs decline, unless they are used to revive globalization?
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What is the constructivist view of IOs?
Anarchy is what states make of it, rise of transnationalism, global civil society, IO agency, intergovernmentalism all lead to expansion of norms (R2P, landmines ban)
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What is the prediction of constructivists on IOs?
Continuing values change toward transnationalism. A world state is inevitable, 200 years
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What is the marxist view on IOs?
IOs increase with power of transnational capitalist class. Economic globalization entrenches the power of the TCC.
200
What is the prediction of Marxists on the future of IOs?
Medium term: IOs are a world government.
Long term: collapse of capitalism due to internal contradictions. Strengthening of popular sovereignty, especially in the third world
