Final

Question 1

valid argument

Answer 1

if and only if whenever the premises are all true, then conclusion is true

Question 2

sound argument

Answer 2

if and only if it is valid and all its premises are true.

Question 3

a “criterion” or practical test for X (the epistemology of X) vs. a definition or analysis of what we mean by X (the metaphysics of X) vs. a stipulative definition of X

Answer 3

metaphysics of x: what is a thing?; relationship to physical world; what makes x a thing?; what’s the nature of x
epistemology of x: How can you tell?; When do you know? when do you have reason to believe?

Question 4

thought experiment

Answer 4

an experiment carried out only in the imagination.

Question 5

equivocation

Answer 5

the use of ambiguous language to conceal the truth or to avoid committing oneself; prevarication

Question 6

substance v. property

Answer 6

Substance dualism claims that the the mind (soul) is a separate identity than the physical human being that will live on past their deterioration of our bodies, while Property dualism claims that the mind, although different than the physical human frame, is still linked and thus will end with our death.

Question 7

process-based definitions of life vs. ingredient-based definitions

Answer 7

being alive is about being able to do things/ functions

vs.
x is alive at t iff x produces vital fluid continually

Question 8

Begging the question

Answer 8

Flaw in argument where you assume the conclusion is true and/or have it in premise and the conclusion proves it.

Question 9

“the mind is the brain” vs “the mind is the brain’s software”

Answer 9

Physicalism which states that all mental states only happens in physical brain vs mental states can happen by a specific program or process

Question 10

Privileged access

Answer 10

Having special access to your mind, where only you are able to access the mind

Question 11

What is a functional state? For instance, what makes something the ZERO state of a Coke machine

Answer 11

functionalism is the doctrine that what makes something a thought, desire, pain (or any other type of mental state) depends not on its internal constitution but solely on its function, or the role it plays, in the cognitive system of which it is a part

if something acts likke a particular mental state, then it is that mental state

mental states can be “realized” by different physical states”

Question 12

Causal Theory of Mind, functionalism

Answer 12

mind = “brain software”

mind is composed of programs that operate mental states

Question 13

examples of using Leibniz’s Law to argue for dualism; examples using it to argue against dualism

Answer 13

If A & B are one + the same thing –> have all the same properties

The brain/body can come in different degrees, but the mind does not. Therefore the mind is not the brain

Question 14

The “epistemic objections” to various proposals about personal identity

Answer 14

Argument against soul theory of personal identity. We can’t see the soul, how do you know you are the same person as the same soul (soul could change, could have many souls, or no soul at all)

Question 15

Hedonism

Answer 15

theory that what is valuable (pleasure) and not valuable (pain) are what is important

Question 16

Psychological Continuity

Answer 16

Concept that our memories, behavior, characteristics, and thoughts continue throughout one’s existence, a key concept in personal identity

Question 17

Reductio

Answer 17

An argument whose conclusions seem too absurd to be true

Question 18

Examples of claims which are necessary but such that someone might be able to conceive or imagine them false

Answer 18

A right triangle has to be a2 + b2 = c2, but you can conceive of a triangle where this isn’t true even though the Pythagorean theorem has to be metaphysically possible; the amnesiac professor wanting to kill the professor

Question 19

the “psychological continuity + no competitors” view of personal identity

Answer 19

The theory that if you are psychologically continuous with yourself and no one else is, then you are yourself. Meant to avoid the problem that in a fission case if two duplicates arise

Question 20

Mediation 6 argument that my mind is separate from my body

Answer 20

I can imagine my mind being possibly separate from my body, thus my mind has to be separate. Thus I am “metaphysically” distinct

Question 21

Surviving in the strict philosophical sense vs. surviving in Parfit’s sense (that is, having someone around who is psychologically continuous with you)

Answer 21

Surviving in the strict philosophical sense usually involves just myself, and when I die, I no longer survive. For Parfit, surviving can happen after my own physical death. If someone else is psychologically continuous with myself, I will continue to survive.

Question 22

Representational states, intentionality

Answer 22

All mental states are “about” something. Mental states are intentional and are a thought or something about an object or something

Question 23

Acting for your own purposes vs. acting for selfish purposes

Answer 23

?

Question 24

the Deprivation Account of the badness of death

Answer 24

According to the deprivation account, what is bad about death is the fact that because one ceases to exist, one becomes deprived of the good things in life. Being dead is not intrinsically bad; it is comparatively bad and one is worse off only by virtue of not being able to enjoy the things one enjoyed while alive, such as watching the sunset, listening to music, and discussing philosophy.

Question 25

Dispositions

Answer 25

related notion properties like being crushable, fragile, soluble "would be"

Question 26

The "soul theory" of personal identity

Answer 26

Theory that you are the same soul.

Question 27

Difference between the process of dying, the event of death, the state of being dead

Answer 27

?

Question 28

Behaviorism

Answer 28

All there is to having some mental state is being disposed to believe a certain way

Question 29

Numerical identity vs qualitative identity

Answer 29

being one and the same thing as x vs sharing intrinsic features

Question 30

the "system's reply" to Searle

Answer 30

Argument against Searle, which states that a part of a program does not know the whole program. The whole room may understand Chinese even though the person does not

Question 31

Feldman's "Jonah objection" to vitalism

Answer 31

??

Question 32

Epistemic possibility

Answer 32

express claims about evidence or knowledge "for all i know"

Question 33

"Personal identity isn't what we care about!"

Answer 33

Parfit's view on personal identity, that we actually care more about psychological continuity than we do about personal identity

Question 34

Mind vs. Soul

Answer 34

``` soul= spiritual nature of man; essence; desires mind= man's faculty of thinking about reasoning; in charge of man's consciousness and thoughts; desire what actions to take in order to achieve our desires ```

Question 35

Manifestation of a disposition

Answer 35

actually being crushed, broken, or dissolved

Question 36

Turing Test: what is it? what is passing it supposed to show?

Answer 36

Can machines think/intelligent. If computer can pass turing test, then it is "intelligent"

Question 37

"Genuine memory presupposes identity" - Circularity objection to Proposal #3

Answer 37

The problem with genuine memory is that in order for one to remember something, an event has to occur and you have to remember the event.

Question 38

Leibniz's Law

Answer 38

if x=y, then for any property F that x has, y will also have it. Also, if x has property F that y does not have, then x=/y

Question 39

Saying one's fist is not identical to one's hand vs. saying that the fist is separate from, and can exist without, the hand

Answer 39

A counterargument to the dualist claim that because my mind is not identical to my brain, the mind and brain are separate. Because my fist and hand are not identical does not mean that my hand and fist are separate (it is impossible for this to be so) or the fist can exist without my hand

Question 40

Descartes' Dreaming Argument

Answer 40

?

Question 41

Searle's Chinese Room Argument

Answer 41

Argument against functionalism, which states that if you had a person in a room who had a dictionary and what input in Chinese he receive, he would look it up in dictionary and then reply with an appropriate output, the person inside would not necessary know Chinese even though the program running does

Question 42

Derivative vs. intrinsic (original) intentionality

Answer 42

While a book can be "about" something, it would have no meaning if there was no one to create meaning for it (derivative intentionality). Original intentionality, as it occurs in the mind, can have meaning and be about something without other minds existing.

Question 43

Necessary facts vs contingent facts

Answer 43

Necessary facts have to be true (they are categorically true and possible in all possible worlds). Contingent facts might be true or might not be true (can be true in a hypothetical world)

Question 44

the "remote control" argument against dualism

Answer 44

?

Question 45

Sufficient Condition vs Necessary Condition

Answer 45

A sufficient condition is that A is sufficient for B if A guarantees B (having 4 equal sides is sufficient for a shape being a square). A necessary condition is that A is necessary for B if B guarantees , or must include A (having 4 sides is necessary for a shape being a square, but not the only condition).

Question 46

"Not every noun names a substance"

Answer 46

A hike is a noun but not a substance; an anti-dualist argument to say that because the soul is a noun does not mean it is a substance

Question 47

Epicurus' argument that your own death isn't bad for you

Answer 47

For Epicurus, if no one feels pain while being dead, then being dead is not a painful experience, and thus not bad for one who is dead. Thus, being dead is not bad for you.

Question 48

Relation between Leibniz's Law and qualitative change

Answer 48

??

Question 49

?

Answer 49

Lucretius' argument that it's unreasonable to regard no longer being alive as worse than not yet being alive

Question 50

Difference between intrinsic properties and important properties

Answer 50

Intrinsic properties are ones that make us up while important properties are ones we care about (memory, personality, etc)

Question 51

supervenience

Answer 51

where the A facts are claimed to settle the B facts

Question 52

causal "overdetermination"; why is it unattractive to say this happens everytime the mental causes a physical effect?

Answer 52

Overdetermination is when multiple causes cause a single event even though 1 cause is sufficient (firing squad, multiple bullets killed man even though 1 is sufficient). Seems very unlikely for this happen all the time. To say this happens everytime with a physical cause and a mental cause causing a physical event is that the mental state feels unnecessary for the cause of the physical event.

Question 53

Feeling good because you got what you aimed for vs. aiming for feeling good

Answer 53

The first is that feeling good is a side effect (Abe Lincoln pig case, felt good for helping pig out), while the second is that feeling good is the primary motive (Abe Lincoln, like an itch, wanted to feel good regardless of pig)

Question 54

Quasi-memory

Answer 54

A solution to the problem of personal identity with psychological continuity -- it avoids the circularity argument that comes with genuine memory

Question 55

Interactionism

Answer 55

Theory that physical states and mental states interact with one another (mental states can cause physical states and vice versa; also both mental and physical states can cause a physical state)

Question 56

"I have no doubts about my own existence. I do have doubts about whether my body really exists. Hence I am not my body."

Answer 56

Argument of Dualism. Bad example of Leibniz's law in the sense that it uses a perspective as a property

Question 57

Essential properties vs. accidental properties

Answer 57

Essential properties are properties necessary for an objects existence (a triangle has three sides is essential because a triangle is metaphysically defined to have 3 sides). Accidental properties are properties that an object

Question 58

Ship of Theseus

Answer 58

Ship of Theseus, original ship eventually starts to deteriorate and pieces of it have to be replaced slowly (though it still looks the same but it has different pieces). Also, someone collects all the original pieces and creates a new Theseus. Which one is still the Ship of Theseus.

Question 59

causal "overdetermination"; why is it unattractive to say this happens everytime the mental causes a physical effect?

Answer 59

Overdetermination is when multiple causes cause a single event even though 1 cause is sufficient (firing squad, multiple bullets killed man even though 1 is sufficient). Seems very unlikely for this happen all the time. To say this happens everytime with a physical cause and a mental cause causing a physical event is that the mental state feels unnecessary for the cause of the physical event.

Question 60

causal "overdetermination"; why is it unattractive to say this happens everytime the mental causes a physical effect?

Answer 60

Overdetermination is when multiple causes cause a single event even though 1 cause is sufficient (firing squad, multiple bullets killed man even though 1 is sufficient). Seems very unlikely for this happen all the time. To say this happens every time with a physical cause and a mental cause causing a physical event is that the mental state feels unnecessary for the cause of the physical event.

Question 61

the "divisibility" argument for dualism

Answer 61

The brain can be divided into parts and the mind cannot be divided. Thus the brain is not the mind

Question 62

Physical Possibility - nomological possibility

Answer 62

If something is compatible with Laws of Physics--> both metaphysically possible and physically possible if guaranteed by laws of physics --> physically necessary

Question 63

The Termination Thesis

Answer 63

when a person dies, she ceases to exist (after a person dies, she has no further sensation).

Question 64

Inverted color spectrums

Answer 64

It allows a case where two individuals who are physically the same but have two different mental experiences. An argument against physicalist which states mental experiences should supervene on the physical (if two twins who are physically experience something differently)

Question 65

What does it means for a relation to be transitive

Answer 65

?

Question 66

Multiple realizability

Answer 66

Like a car can have different types of engines, a mental state can be realized in different ways (mind can be an organic brain or set of popsicle sticks, an argument for functionalism)

Question 67

Direct psychological connections vs. chains of psychological connections

Answer 67

Direct psychological connection has problem that you have to remember every single memory prior while chain of psychological connection states that if you remember a previous state who remembers your 5-year-old state

Question 68

"Identity should be an intrinsic matter, that is, intrinsic facts should settle how many people there are. It shouldn't depend on extrinsic facts!"

Answer 68

Strong idea that identity is intrinsic, because it seems absurd that one's idea is based on convention (if a committee of people decided you were no longer you, you would still feel you exist)

Question 69

Descartes' Cogito Argument

Answer 69

2nd meditation "I think, therefore I exist" -a person always knows he is thinking --> is a thinking thing

Question 70

Epiphenomenalism

Answer 70

Physical states produce mental states and physical states, but mental states are causally inert (nothing happens to them). Mental realm still exists and allows one to be a dualist without challenging causually closure

Question 71

"the physical world is causally closed"

Answer 71

Every physical event has a physical cause. Does not state every physical cause ONLY leads to 1 physical event

Question 72

Categorical basis of a disposition

Answer 72

The way an object is structured or composed is what is causes that disposition. A bubble can have disposition to break because it is fragile, and its categorical basis for its fragility is the surface tension; It is the intrinsic property that leads to that disposition

Question 73

counterfactual claim

Answer 73

claim about what would have happened IF the world had been different example: if i had dropped the chalk out the window it would have fallen to the ground and shattered false counterfactual claim: if i had dropped the chalk out the window, it would have turned into an angel and flown to heaven