Flashcards in Final Deck (43):
A strong state interest in protecting women's health justified state limits on the working hours of women. Expert reports on the harmful physical, economic, and social effects of long working hours on women heavily influenced Brewer's ruling that physical and social differences between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Female inequality and inferiority to men demanded legislative protection that superceded distinctions of gender that could have been deemed unconstitutional.
Muller v. Oregon (1908)
Minimum wage law for women violates the due process right to contract freely.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923)
Bakers. The state's regulation of the working hours of bakers was not a justifiable restriction on the right to freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty. Police powers have been overstepped because it must be in the name of public safety or public good.
Lochner v. New York (1905)
State establishment of a minimum wage law for private employees is constitutional. Employers and women employees, in particular, are unequal in their negotiation of contract. States must regulate these contracts in the name of public welfare.
West Coast Hotel v. Parish (1937)
A woman's right to practice law is not protected under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. While the Court agreed that all citizens enjoy certain privileges and immunities which individual states cannot take away, it did not agree that the right to practice law in a state's courts is one of them. There was no agreement, argued Justice Miller, that this right depended on citizenship. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley went above and beyond the constitutional explanations of the case to describe the reasons why it was natural and proper for women to be excluded from the legal profession. He cited the importance of maintaining the "respective spheres of man and woman," with women performing the duties of motherhood and wife in accordance with the "law of the Creator."
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873)
A state law prohibiting women from being licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the bar owner did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Constitution does not prevent the States from distinguishing between the sexes or to utilize sociological insight anymore than it prevents them from using scientific insight. The Court cannot influence Michigan legislators in their use of police power.
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948)
A state statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists, however women could register and volunteer for jury duty. The Court found this statute constitutional since women were still the center of home and family life, and should not be prevented from their domestic responsibilities in favor of their civic ones. This was distinguished from Strauder v. West Virginia using a different level of scrutiny, and claiming that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance.
Hoyt v. Florida (1961)
A state statute preferencing males over females in the administrators of estates is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.
Reed v. Reed (1971)
Government statutes that subject husbands of servicewomen to evaluations as to military spousal benefits, but do not subject the wives of servicemen to the same evaluations are unconstitutional. Any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience necessarily commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated. Majority included gender as a suspect class subject to strict scrutiny. The concurrence introduced the concept of intermediate scrutiny, disagreeing that sex should join race and national origin as a suspect class subject to intermediate scrutiny, and warned prudentially against the ruling at the time the ERA was up for state ratification.
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)
A state law that established different drinking laws for men and women violated the Equal Protection Clause because it failed to demonstrate that its use of sex-based criteria was substantially related to the achievement of important government objectives. In their ruling, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases known as intermediate scrutiny that was more demanding than rational basis, but less demanding than strict scrutiny.
Craig v. Boren (1976)
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over individual challenges to state statutes that make gender distinctions. Statutes that grant alimony only to women violate the Equal Protection Clause because classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives, and gender was not an accurate proxy for financial need.
Orr v. Orr (1979)
Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors through peremptory strikes in jury selection violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Parties may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., T.B. (1994)
A state's male-only admissions policy did not satisfy the equal protection clause because it failed to show exceedingly persuasive justification for the school's gender-biased admissions policy. It failed to show that the school's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Additionally, their all-female alternative did not offer women the same benefits as men. Thirdly, the Court found that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard that required that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny" and that when evaluating it with "heightened scrutiny" the state's plan to provide women with the same opportunities would fail to meet the requirements. Use of intermediate scrutiny with teeth.
United States v. Virginia (1996)
A state statute that prevented men from enrolling in a state nursing school violated the equal protection clause. The state failed to provide exceedingly persuasive justification for the gender-based distinction and was unpersuasive in their argument that it provided affirmative action for women. The majority argued that the statute, rather than equalizing educational opportunities for women, perpetuated stereotypes of women in the field of nursing.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982)
A state statute which allowed for sexual sterilization of inmates did not violate the constitution since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred and after the Circuit Court of the County and of the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case. The Court deferred to the best interests of the state in stating that these laws prevent the nation from being swamped with incompetence.
Buck v. Bell (1927)
A state law that prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to grade school children violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It violated the liberty that exceeded freedom of bodily restraint, and included liberty to teach or employ a teacher during a time of "peace and domestic tranquility". The state claimed that the legislative purpose of the law was to promote assimilation and civic development, but this was not compelling enough to interfere with the liberty of the persons involved. Since there was no reasonable relation to a proper state objective in prohibiting the teaching of the language, it was ruled unconstitutional.
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
A state's compulsory education act that required attendance at public schools, forbidding private school attendance, was held unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)
A state's sterilization act allowed the sterilization of a person who had been convicted three or more times of immoral crimes. The court held that the judgement on certain felonies over others violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and that procreation is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.
Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)
A challenge to a state's law that criminalized the use of contraceptives. The Court dismissed the case since it involved threatened application rather than actual application. Since the law had never been enforced, the court found no immediacy to warrant constitutional adjudication.
Poe v. Ullman (1961)
A state's law banning the distribution of contraceptives by doctors who were not authorized distributors of contraceptives. This law did not violate the fourteenth amendment under right to privacy, but rather the distinction between married and single persons within the law that failed to pass rational basis review.
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971)
Privacy is a fundamental right, which protects women’s right to an abortion before fetal viability without undue interference from the state. The state may restrict abortions after viability, with exceptions regarding the life and health of the woman. The state has a legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in both the health of the woman and the viability of the fetus. Texas law making it a crime to assist a woman to get an abortion violated her due process rights.
Roe v. Wade (1973)
There is no constitutional right to an abortion, Roe articulates a constitutional right for the woman’s decision to have an abortion to be made without the interference of the state. Thus, the state is not held responsible for the funding of abortions, and it is constitutional for the state to limit Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that are medically necessary. This Connecticut State law does not place an obstacle in the pregnant woman’s path to receiving an abortion, and does not impinge on the fundamental right to privacy articulated in Roe v. Wade. There is a distinction between direct state interference and state encouragement. Financial need does not identify a suspect class, thus the law is subject to rational basis review, and the Court held that the law is rationally related to a governmental interest.
Maher v. Roe (1973)
Congressional amendments to Medicaid (the Hyde Act) that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions are not in violation of privacy, due process, or religion clauses. Women's freedom to choose abortion that is derived from the fundamental right to privacy does not compel the states to fund medically necessary abortions. Poverty does not qualify as a suspect classification, thus the Equal Protection Clause does not need to be invoked. The fact that the funding restrictions of the statute mirror tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not constitute an establishment of religion, and is thus not in violation of religion clauses.
Harris v. McRae (1980)
Missouri's legislative articulation in a preamble that viability begins at conception does not violate the fundamental right to privacy or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that the preamble itself did not concretely restrict abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. The Court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the law's preamble, as it is not used to justify any abortion regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade. The prohibitions on the use of public employees, facilities, and funds did not violate any of the Court's abortion decisions, as no affirmative right to the use of state aid for nontherapeutic abortions existed. The state could allocate resources in favor of childbirth over abortion if it so chose. Provisions requiring testing for viability after 20 weeks of pregnancy were constitutional, but those limiting abortions in the second trimester of pregnancy were unconstitutional.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)
A Massachusetts law that required minors to receive parental consent or judicial approval to receive an abortion was unconstitutional. Firstly, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor mature and competent enough to make an independent decision. Secondly, it required parental notification without allowing an independent judicial assessment. A minor’s right to an abortion may be conditioned on parental consent, but there has to be an alternative option given to the minor.
Belloti v. Baird (1979)
The Court upheld requirements for parental consent, informed consent, and 24-hour waiting period provisions in a Pennsylvania law, but struck down spousal notification on the basis that it created an undue burden on married women seeking an abortion. An undue burden is defined as a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)
Laws banning partial-birth abortion are unconstitutional if they do not make an exception for the woman's health, or if they cannot be reasonably construed to apply only to the partial-birth abortion (intact D&X) procedure and not to other abortion methods.
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)
Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion is not unconstitutionally vague and does not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion.
Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)
A publishing company that published LGBTQ magazines is not obscene. Homoerotic content is protected by the first amendment and is allowed to be consumed under freedom of expression.
One Inc v. Oleson (1957)
Homosexuality is a character trait, rather than an act. It cannot be distinguished from a person. The law banning homosexuals from entry into the US is not vague because it bans homosexual persons rather than homosexual behaviors. Homosexuality is to be understood as a status, condition, or character rather than a sexual behavior.
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1967)
There is no fundamental right or constitutional protection for sodomy, thus states have the right to outlaw them. Sodomy is neither necessary to the maintenance of ordered liberty, nor is it deeply rooted in history and tradition.
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
State Court's mandate to a Veteran's Council to include a homosexual group under a state law that prohibits discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations violated the Council's free speech rights as protected in the 1st and 14th amendment's. The public accommodation requirement cannot supersede the right to private speech.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995)
State anti-discrimination law cannot require private organizations to admit homosexuals because it prevents their right of expressive association. This private organization can explicitly ban homosexuals from working in leadership positions.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)
The bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest and does not pass rational basis review.
Romer v. Evans (1996)
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick to hold that the criminalization of sodomy violates due process rights of privacy and liberty. Sodomy is legal.
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
The state must demonstrate a compelling interest if it is to deny marriage recognition to same-sex couples. Denial of same-sex marriage is considered a matter of sex discrimination, HOWEVER IT WAS subject to strict scrutiny.
Baehr v. Lewin (Hawaii, 1993)
Used the dignity claim Justice Kennedy made in Lawrence v. Texas to apply rational basis review to the gay marriages. Ruled that due to the fact that same sex marriage is not necessary to the maintenance of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in history or tradition, the court has to decide if there is unequal treatment and which class of review it is subject to. It is subject to RBR because LGBTQ are not a suspect class and there is not a fundamental liberty at stake, however because the state is unable to rationally justify their ban on same sex marriage the statute is struck down.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (Massachusetts, 2004)
The refusal of the state to designate same-sex couples as married (as opposed to domestically partnered) violated a fundamental right to marry and the current law also violates equal protection. Allegory of miscegenation and same-sex marriage. See Loving.
In re Marriage Cases (California 2008)
Civil unions are not separate but equal. LGBTQ citizens qualify as a suspect class, and in applying intermediate scrutiny, the statute fails. Excluding gays and lesbians from marriage recognition is not substantially related to a government interest.
Varnum v. Brien (Iowa 2009)
Federal definitions of marriage as being between one man and one woman violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause equal protection. States have the authority to define marital relationships, and the statute at hand goes against legislative and historical precedent in undermining that authority. The federal government must recognize same-sex marriages that have been recognized by the states. The Defense of Marriage Act is overturned.
United States v. Windsor (2013)
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause guarantees the right to marry as a fundamental liberty for both same-sex and heterosexual couples. There is no difference between same-sex and heterosexual couples with regards to the essential aspect of marriage to the maintenance of individual autonomy, protection of intimate association, and the protection of the family and maintenance of social order.
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
Preferences for veterans even though there was a discriminatory impact are constitutional. A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores. Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefited from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney