FINAL EXAM Flashcards
(40 cards)
Making decisions under conditions of uncertainty
Uncertainty: lacking knowledge about which events will occur
To make decisions under this condition requires that people estimate the probability that an event will occur
Probabilistic reasoning.
Heuristics:
: informal, intuitive, speculative strategies for making a decision.
Makes decision-making more efficient but can lead to errors.
evaluating the probability of an event by judging the ease with which relevant instances come to mind.
Availability heuristic:
Evaluating the probability of an event In terms of how well it represents or matches a prototype
Representativeness heuristic:
the relative proportion of different classes in the population.
is Base rates
Should rely on things with higher base rates.
Conjunction rule:
Conjunction rule: the probability of a conjunction between two events can not be greater than the probability of one event alone.
incorrect assumption that two+ specific conditions are more likely than one general condititon
Conjunction fallacy:
Randomness.
It has clumpiness.
Contributes to the Gamblers fallacy.
Randomness.
It has clumpiness.
Contributes to the Gamblers fallacy.
Gamblers fallacy:
the probability of a hit is a greater after a string of misses.
People are predisposed to try to impose patterns on random events.
Contributes to the hot hand fallacy.
the probability of a hit is greater after a hit than after a miss.
Hot hand:
The more times that you run an experiment, the closer the average of the results approximates the expected result.
Law of large numbers: . . . Also applies to literal experiments: the larger the number of individuals that are randomnly drawn from a population, the more representative that sample will be of the entire population.
Expected utility Hypothesis.
According to Expected Utility Hypothesis, EU, decision making is based on an outcomes utility and the probability of it being achieved.
EU=P x U
Probability: a person’s belief that an event will occur
Not an objective probability but instead is subjective.
Utility: the subjective value of an outcome
More valuable outcomes have greater utility; they produce great satisfaction.
EU=P x U
Probability: a person’s belief that an event will occur
Not an objective probability but instead is subjective.
Utility: the subjective value of an outcome
More valuable outcomes have greater utility; they produce great satisfaction.
90% chance of winning 3k
EU=.9 x 3k= 2.7k
EU= .45 x 6k= 2.7k
45% chance of winning 6k
90% chance of losing 3k
EU=.9 x 3k= -2.7k
EU= .45 x 6k= -2.7k
45% chance of losing 6k
Notice The EU for gains is identical, the EU for losses is identical, but we show a definite preference for one outcome over another.
Our probabilistic reasoning is not objective.
90% chance of winning 3k
EU=.9 x 3k= 2.7k
EU= .45 x 6k= 2.7k
45% chance of winning 6k
90% chance of losing 3k
EU=.9 x 3k= -2.7k
EU= .45 x 6k= -2.7k
45% chance of losing 6k
Notice The EU for gains is identical, the EU for losses is identical, but we show a definite preference for one outcome over another.
Our probabilistic reasoning is not objective.
Framing:
refers to the perspective from which an outcome is viewed.
An outcome can be viewed as achieving a gain or avoiding a loss.
How a choice is framed coupled with the probability of achieving the outcome determines a person’s decision.
Framing and risk
90% chance is more of a sure thing than 45% which is more risky
Risk-averse: when fraimed as a gain, people are risk averse
Theyd rather take 90% chance over 45% chance of gaining money.
Risk-taking When framed as a loss, people are risk takers
Theyd rather take 45% chance over 90% chance of losing money
These findings also demonstrate that EU doesn’t explain human behavior well.
Framing and risk
90% chance is more of a sure thing than 45% which is more risky
Risk-averse: when fraimed as a gain, people are risk averse
Theyd rather take 90% chance over 45% chance of gaining money.
Risk-taking When framed as a loss, people are risk takers
Theyd rather take 45% chance over 90% chance of losing money
These findings also demonstrate that EU doesn’t explain human behavior well.
The effects of framing
When an outcome is framed as a loss, we become risk takers in decision making
When an outcome is framed as a gain, we become risk averse in our decision making
The effects of framing
When an outcome is framed as a loss, we become risk takers in decision making
When an outcome is framed as a gain, we become risk averse in our decision making
The effects of time.
Delay interval: time between the current behavior and the availability of the future outcome.
As a consequence of this delay, the outcome loses value.
Delay discounting (aka temporal discounting) occurs when a future outcome is represented in the present at a marked-down value.
Delay discounting (aka temporal discounting) occurs when a future outcome is represented in the present at a marked-down value.
Outcomes as losses and gains
Losses loom larger than gains
The loss of an outcome is more dissatisfying than the gain of that same outcome is satisfying
A loss 100 is more dissatisfying than a gain is satisfying.
Outcomes as losses and gains
Losses loom larger than gains
The loss of an outcome is more dissatisfying than the gain of that same outcome is satisfying
A loss 100 is more dissatisfying than a gain is satisfying.
At the same outcome delay interval, the subject value of an outcome loss is greater than the subjective value of an outcome gain.
At the same outcome delay interval, the subject value of an outcome loss is greater than the subjective value of an outcome gain.
People prefer larger outcomes over smaller outcomes
People prefer immediate over delayed outcomes.
People prefer larger outcomes over smaller outcomes
People prefer immediate over delayed outcomes.
Preference reversal
When amount and delay interact: If the delay interval is long, we prefer the larger delayed outcome
As delay interval shortens, we shift preference to smaller immediate outcome.
Preference reversal
When amount and delay interact: If the delay interval is long, we prefer the larger delayed outcome
As delay interval shortens, we shift preference to smaller immediate outcome.
The statistics don’t apply to the individual argument
Because people are unique, statistics don’t directly apply to anyone individually