Final Exam Study Guide Flashcards
(70 cards)
1
Q
(W1) What are some different understandings of the word “strategy”?
A
- “the use of the engagements for the object of war,” i.e., coordinating various enagements to achieve the object of the war (Clausewitz, On War, W2)
- Strategy is the link between political ends and military means, the scheme for how to make one produce the other; a plan for using military means to achive political ends (Richard K. Betts, Is Strategy an Illusion?, W1)
- Strategy is the composite of the ends (objectives), ways (approach), means (resources), and risk (imbalance amongst ends, ways, and means) (Arthur F. Lykke Model; not covered in class, but easy to find online; taught widely in the military)
2
Q
- (W4) Is the strategic theory of either Mahan or Corbett more pertinent to contemporary and future military affairs?
A
- (W4) Is the strategic theory of either Mahan or Corbett more pertinent to contemporary and future military affairs?
Corbett currently is more pertinent, e.g., FDJM in context of Iraq, Afghanistan; however, Mahan’s emphasis on using navies to ensure access to global markets could become more imporant as the US dominance at sea is contested, e.g., increasing Chinese influence in the SCS (2nd most used global sea lane, about 10 million barrels of crude oil shipped through Strait of Malacca daily).
- Focus:
- Mahan views sea power as focused on itself, i.e., great battles between navies to ensure access to global markets
- Corbett views sea power as more integrated into and supportive of land warfare
- Decisiveness:
- Mahan: sea power is the essential element of national greatest; command of the sea required to protect international trade
- Corbett: sea power important, but not decisive; rarely wins wars on its own
- Joint Operations
- Mahan: disliked joint operations; thought they were a waste of resources
- Corbett: firmly believed in joint operations
- Mass
- Mahan: never divide the fleet, always remain close enough to provide mutual support and mass when needed
- Corbett: more willing to divide the fleet and to cover a wide expanse of sea without sacrficing mutual support
3
Q
- (W3) What is net assessment? What is the difference from systems analysis?
A
11. (W3) What is net assessment?
- Net Assessment (Eliot Cohen, 1990 JCSS Memo, Net Assessment)
- Net assessment is the craft of analyzing military balances
- Comparison of belligerents strengths/weaknesses in relative terms
- Sun: “know the enemy and know thyself,”
- FTCAS
- Framing the balance:
- Geography
- Objectives
- Constraints
- MOEs
- Trends:
- Study long-term patterns of behavior
- Equipment stocks
- Concepts of operations:
- How do the two sides fight? Current doctrine?
- History, philosophy of war?
- Asymmetries:
- What asymmetries exist between the two sides?
- How do those asymmetries change over time?
- How does the opponent view the balance?
- Scenarios
- Development of a range of scenarios
- Low-impact high probability (MLCOA)
- High-impact low probability (MDCOA)
- Net assessment is the craft of analyzing military balances
What is the difference from systems analysis?
- Systems Analysis
- Four critical differences: DQAC
- SA relies heavily on deduction, whereas NE is more inductive
- SA rests heavily on quantitative analyses of military balances, whereas NE explores first order questions more deeply, e.g., why would a war start?
- SA tend to break problems down into their component parts, whereas NE interested in understanding how a problem fits into a larger conflict
- SA asks closed questions like “how much is enough?” NE asks more open-ended questions like “what is the nature of current competition?”
4
Q
- (W3/6) What is strategic analysis? What are some of the analytical problems involved in understanding military organizations and their actual or likely performance in war?
A
- (W3/6) What is strategic analysis? What are some of the analytical problems involved in understanding military organizations and their actual or likely performance in war?
- Strategic analysis
- Analysis to inform strategy
- Collection, processing, exploitation, and disemination of information to enable the development, execution, and assessment of war plans
- Provide perspective on current situation, endstate, and obstackles
- Provide perspective on adversary’s ends, ways, means, risk tolerance
- Typically all-source analysis (MISHO), e.g., MASINT, IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and OSINT (Harry Hinsley, Intelligence Revolution)
- Clauswitz
- Paradoxical trinity
- Center of gravity
- Net Assessment (Eliot Cohen, 1990 JCSS Memo, Net Assessment)
- Net assessment is the craft of analyzing military balances
- Comparison of belligerents strengths/weaknesses in relative terms
- Sun: “know the enemy and know thyself,”
- FTCAS
- Framing the balance:
- Geography
- Objectives
- Constraints
- MOEs
- Trends:
- Study long-term patterns of behavior
- Equipment stocks
- Concepts of operations:
- How do the two sides fight? Current doctrine?
- History, philosophy of war?
- Asymmetries:
- What asymmetries exist between the two sides?
- How do those asymmetries change over time?
- How does the opponent view the balance?
- Scenarios
- Development of a range of scenarios
- Low-impact high probability (MLCOA)
- High-impact low probability (MDCOA)
- Net assessment is the craft of analyzing military balances
- IPB
- Define the OE, desribe OE effects on operations, evaluate the threat (COG analysis), determine threat COAs (MLCOA, MDCOA)
- Analysis to inform strategy
- Intelligence challenges - S D C Q F P
- Richard K. Betts, Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable
- Secrecy
- Deception
- Counterintelligence
- Qualitative vs quantiative aspects of intelligence, i.e., more intel isn’t always better: better intel is better
- Fog of war persists, i.e., intel can provide probability, not predition
- Performance in war clouded by access to data, reliability
5
Q
- Does technological change undermine Clausewitz’s theory? What about Sun Tzu’s?
A
- Does technological change undermine Clausewitz’s theory? What about Sun Tzu’s?
- No
- Discuss nature of war (enduring characteristics of war) vs character of warfare (manner in which different wars are fought; manner in which war’s nature manifests itself in different circumstances)
- Many of Clausewitz’s key ideas still apply today, e.g., SCOPTIC FFAWG CCCP
- Many of Sun Tzu’s key ideas still applly today, e.g., DISH-TV
6
Q
- What effects did the “railroad, rifle, and telegraph” have on warfare (including military organizations and the societies that waged war)? Is there a contemporary parallel?
A
- What effects did the “railroad, rifle, and telegraph” have on warfare (including military organizations and the societies that waged war)? Is there a contemporary parallel?
- Source: William McNeill, Pursuit of Power
- New technologies that altered the character or warfare
- Technological parity between belligerents began to have a more profound impact than during earlier phases of history
- Railroad (1830s) - MML
- Enabled faster mobilization, i.e., get troops to the front faster
- Enabled strategic and operational mobility, i.e., ability to move troops around the battlefield
- nabled faster logistics, i.e., ability to rapidly transport tremendous amounts of supplies from the rear to the front lines
- Rifle (1850s)
- Increased range and accuracy of line troops, e.g., ability to range enemy’s short-range artillery
- Made tactics using less advanced equipment obsolete, led to mass casualties until tactics changed
- Spawned new tactics and challenges based on rifle’s capabilities, e.g., personnel could spread out, but leadership and communication increasingly difficult
- Telegraph (1830s)
- Ability to conduct real-time or NRT comms between HQs
- Increases knowledge at the center
- Enables coordination
- But useless on the move and vulnerable to attack
- Contemporary Parallel
- Emergence of AI as potentially disruptive category of miltiary technology (Military Trends and the Future of Warfare, RAND, 2020)
- AI military applications could change character of war
- Autonomous weapons that loiter longer, respond faster, and strike targets as they appear
- Big data analysis of volumes of information that would be impossible for humans
- AI carry’s risks as well
- Vulnerable to enemy exploitation
- Strike wrong targets or at wrong time
- Social media
7
Q
- What were some of the key operational problems in waging war, 1914-1945?
A
- What were some of the key operational problems in waging war, 1914-1945?
Some of the key operational problems related to waging war between 1914-1945 related to technology, mobilization, intelligence, and coalition warfare.
TMIC
- Technology
- William McNeill, Pursuit of Power
- Developments such as the rifle, railroad, and telegraph changed warfare during the late 19th century
- Enabled the mobilization of mass manpower and firepower
- But operations and tactics in WWI lagged behind technological change
- Led to mass stalemate, trench warfare, and mass casualities
- Interwar period sought to devise new operational approaches to harness new technologies
- Germany demonstrated a willingness to study the past and change what didn’t work
- British and French developments lagged behind
- Mobilization
- Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won?
- Mobilizing sufficient people, materiel, and talent for the long war
- How to maintain popular support for an extended period of time?
- How to raise, train, and equip large standing arms?
- How to develop supperior technology and weapons systems, e.g., tanks, fighters/bombs, aircraft carriers?
- Intelligence
- High stakes war points to an increasing need for accurate understanding of adversary’s capabilities and intentions, e.g., Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
- Leads to the development of new types of intelligence, such as SIGINT (Harry Hinsley, The Intelligence Revolution)
- However, intel doesn’t become a profession under after WWII
- Limits of intelligence during war, i.e., SDC QFP
- Alliances
- Gerhard Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II
- Developing and maintaining alliances capable of fighting together during war
- Not enough to simply have security agreements with other states
- States have to be willing and able to operate together
8
Q
- What made the German military so effective on the operational and tactical levels from 1866 to 1945, and yet, in some ways, strategically so ineffective?
A
- What made the German military so effective on the operational and tactical levels from 1866 to 1945, and yet, in some ways, strategically so ineffective?
- Organizations are influenced and shaped by many factors, including leadership, technology, and culture
- One fo the factors that made the German military especially effective was the German General Staff (Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy)
- Who? What? staff comprised between 100-250 personnel who were trrained as division or corps chiefs of staff
- When? first used during the German Wars of Unification in the mid 1800s
- Why? developed to support incompetent generals who obtained their roles because of nobility, e.g., princes
- Where? half in Berlin, half with the troops; reported back to Berlin via an informatl chief of staff chain of command
- Key elements included
- Rigorous military education at the Kriegsakademie
- Professional development through the study of military history
- Wargaming
9
Q
- What led to conflict outcomes during the era of total war? Were outcomes decided chiefly by resources, by the adroit mobilization of those resources, or something else?
A
- What led to conflict outcomes during the era of total war? Were outcomes decided chiefly by resources, by the adroit mobilization of those resources, or something else?
- Conflict outcomes in the era of total war resulted from numerous factors
- 2 important drivers that Richard Overy explores in his book Why the Allies Won are the material dimensions and the moral dimensions
- Material dimensions
- Speed and scale of US armament and assistance to Allies
- Improving quality of Allied weapons throughout the war
- Moral dimensions
- Allied populations sustained by the moralty of self-defense
- Axis populations knew they were the aggressors
10
Q
- What are the most important legacies of the world wars?
A
- What are the most important legacies of the world wars?
DWP
- Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945
- John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War
- Death and destruction
- Europe was devastated, millions killed, economies destroyed; nobody wanted a return of war
- Populations open to new ideas about how to organize societies, e.g., Communism
- Winners and losers
- Winners established a new global order of institutions
- Losers forced to abide by that global system
- Losers states remade in the image of the victors
- Political revolution
- Rise of the superpowers
- End of empires and rise of new states
11
Q
(W1) Why might strategy be an illusion? Is it?
A
- Real-world is too chaotic to be manipulated with confidence; too many intervening variables
- “To skeptics, effective strategy is often an illusion because what happens in the gap between policy objectives and war outcomes is too complex and unpredictable to be manipulated to a specified end.” (Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion?, W1)
- Strategy is an illusion because:
- LRCCH
- Leaders don’t know their true motives
- Results do not follow plans (difficult to prove empirically)
- Clausewitzian concepts, e.g., fog, friction, interaction
- Cultural differences prohibit strategic communication between different states
- Human cognitive limitations preclude wholistic, unbiased thinking/planning
- See Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion? from W1 for more details
- “If effective military strategy is to be real rather than illusory, one must be able to devise a rational scheme to achieve an objective…implement the scheme..in the face of enemy reactions…and achieve something close to the objective.” (Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion?, 6, W1)
12
Q
- Did the intelligence revolution of the first half of the twentieth century fundamentally alter the difficulty of knowing one’s enemy?
A
- Did the intelligence revolution of the first half of the twentieth century fundamentally alter the difficulty of knowing one’s enemy?
- Intelligence revolution = proliferation of ints (MOSHI)
- MASINT
- OSINT
- SIGINT
- HUMINIT
- IMINIT
- Enables increased understanding of the enemy
- Harry Hinsley, The Intelligence Revolution
- Role of Enigma in understanding Axis war plans
- But fundamental challenges remain and the fog of war persists (SDC QFP)
- Richard K. Betts, Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable
- Secrecy
- Deception
- Counterintelligence
- Quantiative vs qualitative
- Fog of war persists
- Professionalization
13
Q
- (W6) What is attrition? Is it a strategy? When might it be logical to pursue it?
A
23. (W6) What is attrition?
- Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won
- Attrition is an approach (often referred to as a strategy) based on wearing down an adversary’s capability to wage war over an extended period of time
- Sometimes also referred to as a strategy to degrade an adversary’s will to fight over time; however, current joint military doctrine refers to such a strategy as erosion to contrast the two strategies (JP 1)
- Attrition often is contrasted with annihilation, which often is described as seeking to destroy enemy forces in a single decisive battle
Is it a strategy?
- Depends on your definition of strategy
- Yes, from a Clausewitzian perspective
- No, from a Lykke perspective
When might it be logical to pursue it?
- Might be logical to pursue a strategy of attrition because of neccessity: WNS
- Weakness - weakness prevents destroying the enemy in decisive battles (Iraq, Afghanistan)
- Qualitative weakness, but quantitative superiority (WWII)
- Nature - nature of the conflict prohibits decisive military battles (WWI)
- Size - size of the conflict makes a single decisive battle unrealistic (WWII)
- Weakness - weakness prevents destroying the enemy in decisive battles (Iraq, Afghanistan)
14
Q
- (W7) What are some of the pitfalls of coalition warfare?
A
- (W7) What are some of the pitfalls of coalition warfare?
- Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms
- Explores some of the pitfalls of coalition warfare
- States tend to have different ends, ways, and means
- Ends: different threat perceptions and political objectives, e.g., US concerns with Germany, UK concerns with imperial
- Ways: different operational approaches and tactical doctrine, e.g., disagreement amongst the allies over relative importance of the wars in Europe vs Pacific, where to attack, when, and how? Southern Europe vs Western Europe?
- Means: different types of equipment
- Coordinating those ends, ways, and means is a challenge
- Individual state desires don’t always align with the coalition
15
Q
- (W7) What are the challenges of supreme command, the higher direction of war?
A
- (W7) What are the challenges of supreme command, the higher direction of war?
* Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command
* Provides portraits of senior leaders during wartime, such as Lincoln and Churchill
* GUAPO- Grieving: leaders dealing with personal loses and personalizing loses under their command
- Uncertainty: never knowing whether you’re doing the right thing
- Alliances: maintaining working relationships with allies
- Physical exhaustion: leaders never get a break
- Organizational management: managing large, diverse organizations
16
Q
- (W8) Can the key concepts of nuclear strategy (e.g., mutual assured destruction, countervalue, counterforce, massive retaliation) be fitted into a Clausewitzian framework?
A
- (W8) Can the key concepts of nuclear strategy (e.g., mutual assured destruction, countervalue, counterforce, massive retaliation) be fitted into a Clausewitzian framework?
- Yes; use or threat of nuclear weapons to achieve political objectives
- Tami Davis Biddle, “Coercion Theory”
- Deterrence: threat to prevent an action
- Compellence: threat to cause an action, or to stop an ongoing action
- Need a range of capabilities to maintain credible deterrence, e.g., threatening to use nukes in every scenario is not credible
- MAD: sufficient capability to absorb a first strike and respond with overwhelming force against an enemy population
- Massive retaliation: retaliate with greater force
- Countervalue: targeting population centers
- Counterforce: targeting military bases or assets
17
Q
- (W8) Why might “more be better” when it comes to nuclear proliferation? What are the arguments for and against proliferation?
A
- (W8) Why might “more be better” when it comes to nuclear proliferation? What are the arguments for and against proliferation?
Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” (W8)
For Proliferation
o Nukes make the cost of war seem frighteningly high, which discourages states from starting wars that might lead to the use of such weapons
o Nukes can create an impenetrable defense, and no one wants to start a losing war
Against Proliferation
o Potential for nuclear war increases as the number of nuclear states increases
o Potential for nuclear war increases as states of questionable character obtain nukes
o If weak governments acquire nukes and then collapse, nonstate actors can acquire loose nukes
18
Q
- Have the dynamics of nuclear deterrence changed since 1989? How and why?
A
- Have the dynamics of nuclear deterrence changed since 1989? How and why?
- Source: Rebecca Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age” (W8)
- Yes; Hersman says the dynamics have changed.
- How?
- Previous conflict escalation models, such as Herman Kahn’s 44-run ‘escalation ladder,’ depicted conflict escalation in a linear manner from low-level crisis to all-out strategic conflict
- Crises today are more likely to follow a “wormhole” dynamic
- Holes may suddenly open in the fabric of deterrence through which competing states rapidly traverse between different levels of conflict in accelerated and non-linear ways
- Why?
- US very successful at old model of deterrence
- Rivals have adapted because the risk of vertical escalation is too great
- Resulted in a new era of strategic competition that is different from the Cold War era.
- Blurring of conflict across sub-conventional, conventional, and strategic levels of war, e.g., gray-zone conflict, hybrid war, etc.
- Proliferation of actors across the strategic landscape that lack shared concepts of deterrence
19
Q
What does it mean to think strategically?
What are some obstacles to stratgeic action?
A
Having a plan (to use force) that maximizes benefits (achieves ends) while minimizing costs (blood and treasure)
- Thinking strategically is about having a “rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure. Without strategy, power is a loose cannon and war is mindless.” (Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion?, 6, W1)
- “Strategy is most important when it provides value added to resources, functions as a force multiplier and offers a way to beat an adversary with equivalent resources or to minimize the cost of defeating an inferior.” (Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion?, 6, W1)
Obstacles to strategic action include: BLECC
- Bias - Good strategies can seldom be formulated because of policy makers’ biases
- Limitations – Good strategies cannot be implement because of organizations’ limitations
- Evidence – Little demonstrable relationship between strategies and war outcomes
- Clausewitzian concepts, e.g., fog, friction, interaction
- Criteria – Lack of agreed criteria for what constitutes good strategy
- See Betts, Is Strategy and Illusion? from W1 for more details
20
Q
- (W9) How does revolutionary warfare differ from traditional colonial conflicts or from guerrilla warfare?
A
- (W9) How does revolutionary warfare differ from traditional colonial conflicts or from guerrilla warfare?
Source: John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War”
o Revolutionary warfare
· Defined by its purpose
· Use of armed force to seize political power
· Occurs within a state
· Revolutionary warfare can include guerrilla warfare tactics, but it doesn’t have to
· e.g., American Revolution, used both traditional and irregular warfare
o Guerrilla warfare
· Defined by its approach
· Collection of tactics characterized by small unit operations, hit-and-run attacks, and mobile tactics
· Guerrilla warfare tactics can be used in any kind of war, inter-state or intra-state
· e.g., Soviets used guerrilla warfare tactics against Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe; Wolverines used guerrilla warfare tactics against the Soviet invasion of Colorado in 1984 as captured in the excellent documentary “Red Dawn”
Source: Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War
o Revolutionary warfare
· RW = G + P
· Revolutionary warfare = guerrilla warfare + political action
Source: Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare
o Considered political action a vital component of guerrilla warfare
o Political action was necessary to mobilize popular support for the guerrilla war
21
Q
- (W9) Is irregular warfare a counter to conventional military superiority?
A
32. (W9) Is irregular warfare a counter to conventional military superiority?
Source: Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War
o Weak actors often turn to irregular warfare to counter conventional military superiority
o Mao provides a template in On Protracted War based on his plan to defeat the Japanese
o Rely on domestic popular support to defeat a superior adversary, quantity vs quality
o Phases: defense, parity, counter-offensive
Source: T.E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
o Emphasizes the use of military force to defeat the enemy’s will to fight
Source: Clausewitz, On War
o Using military force to break the bond between the people and the government, rather than the military and the government
22
Q
- (W9) In what ways are contemporary counterinsurgency ‘best practices’ the same as, or different from, what they have been in the past?
A
33. (W9) In what ways are contemporary counterinsurgency ‘best practices’ the same as, or different from, what they have been in the past?
JMTB-F
Source: John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War”
o Revolutionary warfare is armed force to seize political power
Source: Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted Warfare
o Considered political action a vital component of protracted warfare
Source: T.E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
o Emphasizes the use of military force to defeat the enemy’s will to fight
Source: Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War
o RW = G + P
o Revolutionary warfare = guerrilla warfare + political action
o Political action is key to a successful insurgency / counterinsurgency
o “When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered.” (p. 220)
Source: FM 3-24
o Emphasizes population-centric approach, i.e.,
o Insurgency is fundamental a political stuggle
o Isolate & protect the popuation for insurgent influence
o Address root causes of insurgency and outgovern the insurgency
23
Q
- (W9) Are regular and irregular forms of warfare blending into one another?
A
34. (W9) Are regular and irregular forms of warfare blending into one another?
Source: RAND, Military Trends and the Future of Warfare
- Identifies two trends that suggest states are blending regular and irregular warfare in the modern era
- Trend 1: development of asymmetric strategies by second-tier powers (IRN, DPRK)
- Trend 2: potential adversaries’ increasing use of gray zone tactics (CHN, RUS, IRN, DPRK)
- Key point: different actors pursue different types of asymmetric strategies and use different types of gray-zone tactics
- Examples: blending regular and irregular warfare is a common theme, e.g., CHN in South China Sea, RUS in Ukraine, IRN in the Middle East, and DRPK in Korean Peninsula
- However, this isn’t new.
- States have used variations of hybrid warfare for centuries
- Source: Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor (editors), Hybrid Warfare
- Case studies spanning Ancient Rome in Germania to US in Vietnam
- Actors always will adapt and use all means to defeat enemies
- Clausewitz’s concept of strategic interaction
- Sun Tzu’s concept of shih (strategic advantage)
- JFC Fuller, constant tactical factor
- William S. Lind, “Changing Face of War” 5GW
- Examples:
- China’s use of Unrestricted Warfare
- Russia’s use of active measure, new generation warfare, or Gerasimov Doctrine
- States have used variations of hybrid warfare for centuries
24
Q
- (W9) Is the conflict between the United States and other countries on the one hand, and Islamic extremists on the other a war, or something else?
A
- (W9) Is the conflict between the United States and other countries on the one hand, and Islamic extremists on the other a war, or something else?
o Yes; meets all of the criteria for war -> PLUTH-V
o Sources: Clausewitz, On War; Sun Tzu, Art of Warfare
o Nature of war = enduring characteristics of warfare
· War is political: war is a continuation of politics by other means
· War is limited in practice: friction, unlimited ways and means
· War is uncertain: fog, intelligence can’t overcome everything
· War is a trinity: passion, reason, and chance; people, government, and military
· War is a human endeavor of interaction: enemy gets a vote, everybody’s got a plan until they get punched in the mouth
· War is violent: centrality of combat (bloodiest solution)
25
37. (W10) What are the key differences between “objective” and “subjective” control of the military? Which theory is correct, and why?
**37. (W10) What are the key differences between “objective” and “subjective” control of the military? Which theory is correct, and why?**
**Source: Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command**
· Objective control / normal theory:
o Clear distinctions between military and civilian roles
o Civilians decided when and how to use force
o Military leaders decided how to plan and execute military operations
o Professional officer corps that is neutral in political affairs
o Military officers operate in a sphere of action independent of politics
o Purely military matters are left to the military
· Subjective control
o Fusionist view of military and civilian roles
o Professional officer corps that is civilianized and politically aware
o Perhaps controlled from within by transplanted civilian elites
26
38. (W11) Was the 1991 Gulf War a turning point in the history of warfare? Why or why not?
38. (W11) Was the 1991 Gulf War a turning point in the history of warfare? Why or why not?
· Source: Unrestricted Warfare (Chinese)
· Source: Gerasimov Doctrine (Russia)
· Source: RAND, Military Trends and the Future of Warfare
· Source: William S. Lind, "The Changing Face of War"
· The Gulf War was a turning point in the history of warfare because US adversaries perceived it to be and sought new ways of countering US strengths, e.g., 4GW, gray-zone conflict, hybrid warfare, unrestricted warfare.
· However, in reality, the US way of warfare varied very little from how the US operated during WWII, e.g., combined arms approach highly characteristic of 3GW.
· The main difference was the US heightened ability to execute 3GW as compared to WWII.
27
39. (W12) Is the United States in military decline relative to China? If so, how? If not, why not?
**39. (W12) Is the United States in military decline relative to China? If so, how? If not, why not?**
The US is in relative decline. Although the US continues to maintain advantages over China, China has been closing the gap for the last 20 years.
Source: RAND, *Military Trends and the Future of Warfare* (2020)
* Decreasing US conventional force size
* Less personnel, equipment (tanks, ships, a/c) than 20 years ago
* RUS and PRC may think the US lacks capacity to respond
* Increasing modernization and professionalization of near-peer forces
* US demonstrated qualitative edge in Iraq
* RUS and PRC begn reforming antiquated forces
* PRC developed A2AD capabilities to keep the US out of the western Pacific, including a variety of modern air and naval assets, such as 5th-gen fights, ASBM, and aircraft carriers
* Development of asymmetric strategies by second-tier powers
* IRN and DPRK cannot match US capabilities
* Developing AW capabilities and strategies to achieve objectives
* Potential adversaries’ increasing use of “gray zone” tactics
* Achieve warlike objectives without full-scale war
* Fighting in the space between war and peace
* Using strategies that stay below the US threshold of conflict, e.g., NATO Article 5, UNSC mandates
* AI as a class of potentially disruptive technologiesAI military applications could change character of war
* Autonomous weapons that loiter longer, respond faster, and strike targets as they appear
* Big data analysis of volumes of information impossible for human
28
4. What are some of CVC's key ideas?
SCOPTIC FFAWG CCCP
Strategy vs tactics
Combat
Offensve and defense
Paradoxical trinity
Theory
Interaction
Center of gravity
Fog
Friction
Absolute war (war in theory)
War and politics
Genius
Culminating point of attack /victory
Cunning
Coup d'oeil
Polarity
29
40. (W13?) Are there new forms of asymmetric conflict available to political entities (e.g., “information warfare,” “hybrid warfare,” terrorism)? Do they depart from the Clausewitzian framework?
40. (W13?) Are there new forms of asymmetric conflict available to political entities (e.g., “information warfare,” “hybrid warfare,” terrorism)?
* The strategic studies community has noted the emergence of several supposedly new forms of war in the past few decades.
* Notable concepts include cyber warfare, information warfare, grayzone confict, and hybrid warfare (as well as related ideas, such as unrestricted warfare and new generation warfare).
* With the exception of perhaps cyber warfare, most of these "new" concepts are new terms for old concepts or variations on a old theme, rather than truly new forms of warfare.
Do they depart from the Clausewitzian framework?
* Most do not, except perhaps cyber warfare.
* The key question relates to what extent do they differ from the nature of war: PLUTH-V?
* War is political, limited, uncertain, trinity, human endeavour, and violent.
* Violent is sticking point for cyber-warfare.
30
41. How successful have been various arrangements and measures to limit war by international agreement?
41. How successful have been various arrangements and measures to limit war by international agreement?
· The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) attempted to outlaw war.
· It was a treaty between the United States and other powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.
· 63 countries signed the pact
· Although the pact did not prevent the outbreak of WWII or any subsequent wars, its existence has correlated with a general reduction in the occurrence of wars of conquest.
· A 2017 Yale study found that wars of conquest since 1928 have fallen from an occurrence of 1 war per 10 months on average to 1 war per 4 years.
· Research aligns with findings from Pinker’s “The Better Angels of Our Nature” that claims “our era is less violent, less cruel and more peaceful than any previous period of human existence.”
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42. (W11) What are the future prospects for war? Are humans leaving the habit of war behind?
42. (W11) What are the future prospects for war? Are humans leaving the habit of war behind?
· Pinker’s “The Better Angels of Our Nature” claims “our era is less violent, less cruel and more peaceful than any previous period of human existence.”
· Pinker’s study is about what has happened. Not about what will happen.
· The past can help us understand to the present and think about the future.
· But it can’t predict the future. Assuming that past patterns hold true into the future is not always a valid assumption.
· We have no way of knowing what challenges await us and the extent to which those challenges could result in the increased occurrence of war.
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43. (W10) How and in what ways do civil-military relations influence conflict
43. (W10) How and in what ways do civil-military relations influence conflict?
**Source: Samuel Huntingdon, Soldier and the State**
· Objective control / normal theory:
o Clear distinctions between military and civilian roles
o Civilians decided when and how to use force
o Military leaders decided how to plan and execute military operations
o Professional officer corps that is neutral in political affairs
o Military officers operate in a sphere of action independent of politics
o Purely military matters are left to the military
· Subjective control
o Fusionist view of military and civilian roles
o Professional officer corps that is civilianized and politically aware
o Perhaps controlled from within by transplanted civilian elites
· Influences the ends sought, the ways employed, and the means used
· It might be helpful to try and compare/contrast historical examples, such as Vietnam with Desert Storm.
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44. Is conventional military power being undermined by “asymmetric” modes of violence?
44. Is conventional military power being undermined by “asymmetric” modes of violence?
* Talk about the RAND report findings, i.e. RAND study found that adversaries are using asymetric strategies to couter US strengths
* But, asymmetry is a concept, not a particular warfighting methodology.
* Clausewitz & strategic interaction
* Sun Tzu & strategic advantage (shih)
* JFC Fuller, constant tactical factor
* Conrad Crane, U.S. Army War College “there are two types of warfare: asymmetric and stupid.
* Asymmetry can exist in traditional warfighting as much as it can exist in irregular warfighting.
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45. (W11) What are the key legacies of the post-9/11 wars?
45. (W11) What are the key legacies of the post-9/11 wars?
* US legacies
* Crisis of confidence: Can the US still win wars?
* Crisis of caring = public disinterest
* Crisis of civilian control = military gone wild?
* Systemic legacies
* RAND report on military trends
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46. What will be the permutations of great power conflict in the future?
46. What will be the permutations of great power conflict in the future?
· RAND study
· Depends on the nature of the conflict, i.e., Clausewitz’s trinity, Cohen’s NET assessment
· Ends, ways, means
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47. How and in what ways might “new” domains like space and cyber shape future conflict?
47. How and in what ways might “new” domains like space and cyber shape future conflict?
· RAND study
· Depends on the nature of the conflict, i.e., Clausewitz’s trinity, Cohen’s NET assessment
· Ends, ways, means
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48. (W12) What are the challenges to effective strategy and planning?
48. (W12) What are the challenges to effective strategy and planning?
What does it mean to thinking strategically?
o Aligning ends, ways, and means while mitigating risk (Lykke)
o Knowing where you are, where you want to be, and overcoming obstacles in the middle
Talk about Is Strategy an Illusion?
o Limitations of Strategy – LRCCH
· Leaders don’t know their true motives
· Results don’t follow plans
· Clausewitzian concepts, e.g., fog, friction, strategic interaction
· Cultural differences that prohibit strategic communication
· Human cognitive limiations
o Obstacles to strategy – BLECC
· Bias
· Limitations of organizations
· Evidence (lack of) connecting strategies to war outcomes
· Clausewitzian concepts, e.g., fog, friction, strategic interaction
· Criteria (lack of) related to good strategy
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49. (W12?) What tools are available to help confront biases when engaging in strategic planning?
49. (W12?) What tools are available to help confront biases when engaging in strategic planning?
· Red-teaming
· Devil’s advocacy
· Wargaming
· Reading your daily intelligence brief 😊
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5. (W2) Is there a Clausewitzian theory of civil-military relations?
5. (W2) Is there a Clausewitzian theory of civil-military relations?
* Yes;
* Clausewitz embraced something similar to Huntington’s concept of subjective control and with it a fusionist model of civil–military relations.
* This likely was a result of his main object of study, Napoleon, who was both absolute political ruler and supreme military leader.
* CVC ideas
* War is subordinate to politics
* War is a continuation of policy by other means
* SCOTPIC FFAWG CCCP
* Strategy vs tactics
* Combat
* Paradoxical trinity
* War and politics
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50. Is the global security system undergoing a paradigm shift? If so, why? If not, why not
50. Is the global security system undergoing a paradigm shift? If so, why? If not, why not?
· Potential changes to the character of warfare
o RAND report findings
· Nature of war remains constant
o Nature of war PLUTH-V
o Clausewitz and Sun Tzu
· Strongest competitors
o Cyberwarfare
o Information warfare
o Key question: extent to which states can use non-violent methods to achieve warlike objectives
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What are the key concepts that Sun Tzu offers?
DISH-TV
deception
intelligence
shih (strategic advantage)
hsing (positioning / manuever)
tao (the way)
victory without bloodsheed (minimal effort)
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7. (W2/3) How does Sun Tzu differ from Clausewitz?
FDIC FAC
* First Question: CVC asks, what are the politics? Sun asks, who is the enemy?
* Definition of Success: CVC success is understanding the trinity; Sun success is operational virtuosity
* Intelligence: CVC skeptical about intelligence; Sun believed to value it more
* Cunning: CVC skeptical about cunning (but values tactical surprise); Sun highly values operational deception, e.g., warfare is the art of deceit, e.g., appear weak when strong, appear unable when able, appear far when near
* Focus of Military Operations: CVC focuses on destroying enemy forces; Sun attack strategy, alliances, then army (victory without bloodshed)
* Approach to Victory: CVC seek decisive victory vs Sun victory without bloodshed
* Civ-Mil Relations: CVC war subordinate to politics; Sun wants to put the ruler in a box
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8. (W3/4) How does the environment (e.g. maritime vs. land) shape strategy?
8. (W3/4) How does the environment (e.g. maritime vs. land) shape strategy?
Strategy means different things depending on the domain.
Environment influences the ends that can be achieved, the ways in which war is fought, and the means available to fight.
Discuss environmental influenes in terms of different understandings of strategy, e.g., Clausewitz (strategy vs tactics), Betts (plan to use military means to achieve political objectives), and Lykke (ends, ways, means)
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9. (W4) What are the key points of departure between Mahan and Corbett?
9. (W4) What are the key points of departure between Mahan and Corbett?
FDJM
Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*
Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*
* Focus:
* Mahan views sea power as focused on itself, i.e., great battles between navies to ensure access to global markets
* Corbett views sea power as more integrated into and supportive of land warfare
* Decisiveness:
* Mahan: sea power is the essential element of national greatest; command of the sea required to protect international trade
* Corbett: sea power important, but not decisive; rarely wins wars on its own
* Joint Operations
* Mahan: disliked joint operations; thought they were a waste of resources
* Corbett: firmly believed in joint operations
* Mass
* Mahan: never divide the fleet, always remain close enough to provide mutual support and mass when needed
* Corbett: more willing to divide the fleet and to cover a wide expanse of sea without sacrficing mutual support
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Essay 1: How would you use the key concepts and theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to understand historic and contemporary conflicts?
Essay 1: How would you use the key concepts and theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to understand historic and contemporary conflicts?
* Clausewitz: SCOPTIC FFAWG CCCP
* Focus? Paradoxical trinity, center of gravity, interaction
* Sun Tzu: DISH-TV
* Focus? shih (strategic advantage), hsing (positioning),
* Conflicts: Libya, Vietnam, Iraq '91, Afghanistan '20
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Essay 2) How would you examine patterns of conflict and think rigoursly about them across history?
* Patterns of conflict
* Nature of war vs the character of war
* How do wars start?
* How are wars fought?
* How does warfare change over time?
* Nature of war vs character of war - PLUTH-V
* Clausewitz, *On War*; Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*
* War is political: war is a continuation of politics by other means
* War is limited in practice: fog and friction
* War is uncertain: intelligence can’t overcome everything
* War is a trinity: passion, reason, and chance; people, government, and military
* War is a human endeavor of interaction: enemy gets a vote
* War is violent: centrality of combat (bloodiest solution)
* How do wars start?
* Donald Cameron Watt's article: "1939 Revisited: On Theories of the Origins of War"
* War by decision / policy, i.e., deliberate decision (Iraq '91)
* Levels of analysis, i.e., individual, organization (military), state ambitions, systemic factors (neorealism)
* War by accident, i.e., WWI slide into war
* How are wars fought?
* Theorists, e.g., Clauswitz (SCOPTIC FFAG CCCP) and Sun-Tzu (DISH-TV)
* Domains, e.g., land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace
* Decisive weapons (all others obsolete), dominant weapon (construct doctrine around it), and combined-arms approach
* How does warfare change over time?
* J.F.C. Fuller, *Armament and History*: constant tactical factor
* William S. Lind, "The Changing Face of War": Technologicaly and socio-political changes
* 1GW: massed manpower (shock); linear tactics; rigid C2; victory achieved through annihilation of enemy force (Napoleon)
* 2GW: massed firepower, particularly indirect fire weapons to support shock forces; linear tactics; rigid C3; victory achieved through attrition (WWI)
* 3GW: maneuver; speed, mobility, surprise combined with massed shock weapons and indirect fire; mobile tactics involving indirect approach (Hart); loose C3, e.g., mission command; victory through physical and cognitive dislocation (WWII)
* 4GW: light irregular forces; clandestine tactics; highly decentralized C4I; networks of autonomous actors; victory through socio-economic paralysis (Taliban, AQ)
* 5GW: return of classical warriors; unrestricted warfare; victory through perpetuating the condition of war/ungoverned space (but other definitions)
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Essay 3: How would you apply tools for understanding and assessing contemporary conficts?
Essay 3: How would you apply tools for understanding and assessing contemporary conficts?
* Historical theorists approach to understanding the character of war
* Clausewitz: SCOPTIC FFAWG CCCP
* Sun Tzu: DISH-TV
* Net Assessment (Eliot Cohen, 1990 JCSS Memo, *Net Assessment*)
* Net assessment is the craft of analyzing military balances
* Comparison of belligerents strengths/weaknesses in relative terms
* Sun: "know the enemy and know thyself:
* Ends: what objectives do the two sides have?
* Ways: how do the two sides fight? history, philosophy of war?
* Means: DIME; functional and geographic terms, i.e., composition (types and capabilities), disposition (location), strength, and training; alliances? COG?
* Risk tolerance?
* Asymmetries?
* Constraints?
* Contemporary military approaches
* IPB: define the OE (PMESII-ASCOPE) / describe the OE effects on operations / evaluate the threat (COG analysis) / determine threat COAs (MLECOA / MDECOA)
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Essay 4: How would you assess the future of war--with attention to both its potential contours and how to examine it?
**6 Potential Countours**
* RAND, *Military Trends and the Future of Warfare* (2020)
* Decreasing US conventional force size
* Less personnel, equipment (tanks, ships, a/c) than 20 years ago
* RUS and PRC may think the US lacks capacity to respond
* Increasing modernization and professionalization of near-peer forces
* US demonstrated qualitative edge in Iraq
* RUS and PRC begn reforming antiquated forces
* PRC developed A2AD capabilities to keep the US out of the western Pacific, including a variety of modern air and naval assets, such as 5th-gen fights, ASBM, and aircraft carriers
* RUS instituted reforms to streamline and modernize its forces
* RUS and PRC may think they have enough capabilty to achieve limited objectives
* Development of asymmetric strategies by second-tier powers
* IRN and DPRK cannot match US capabilities
* Developing AW capabilities and strategies to achieve objectives
* Potential adversaries’ increasing use of “gray zone” tactics
* Achieve warlike objectives without full-scale war
* Fighting in the space between war and peace
* Using strategies that stay below the US threshold of conflict, e.g., NATO Article 5, UNSC mandates
* Weakening of the state’s monopoly on violence
* Failed and failing states provide operating space for militant groups, transnational terrorism, etc.
* Availability of advanced weapons to individuals and small groups enables spread of warfare
* AI as a class of potentially disruptive technologies
* AI military applications could change character of war
* Autonomous weapons that loiter longer, respond faster, and strike targets as they appear
* Big data analysis of volumes of information impossible for humans
* Carry serious risks
* Strike the wrong targets or at the wrong time
* Vulnerable to enemy exploitation
**How to Examine?**
* Likelihood examined / evaluated in terms of ends, ways, and means
* Ends
* A war must always involve important national security interests
* Ways
* Threat must always be plausible and representative, i.e., IAW threat models of what an adversary *_could*_ do and _*would_* do
* Consider a range of possible scenarios, e.g., high-impact/low probability (MDCOA) vs low-impact/high probability (MLCOA)
* Covert vs overt?
* Means
* Threat must reflect adversary's actual capabilities
* What technologies will be used? Will they prolong or shorten warfare?
* Who fights? Conscripts, volunteers, mercenaries?
*
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How does CVC define combat?
Combat:
battle is the bloodiest solution,
its effect is “rather a killing of the enemy’s spirit than of his men;”
act of force to compel the enemy to do your will
whole of military activity must relate directly to the engagement
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How does CVC describe absolute war (war in theory)?
Absolute war (war in theory):
war of extremes in which the greatest effort is exerted to obtain an objective, e.g., unlimited ends, ways and means
however, war in practice does not follow absolute war in theory, i.e., many “modifications in practice” because of the trinity, fog, friction, etc.
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How does CVC describe coup d'oeil?
Coup d’oeil: “inward eye,” “quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection,” related to the concept of genius (p.102)
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How does CVC describe cunning?
Cunning: “secret purpose;” despite its appeal, “craft, cleverness, and cunning...do not figure prominently in the history of war;” successful deception requires too many assets, which endangers mass; can be a useful tool for the weak (p. 202-203)
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How does CVC describe friction?
Friction: countless minor incidences that are difficult to foresee and combine to lower performance, i.e., anything that can go wrong will; “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” (I,7)
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How does CVC describe genius?
Genius: element of character, intellect, and willpower needed for success in military commanders, e.g., ability to overcome fog and friction, courage to act, determination with insight
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How does CVC describe offensve and defense?
Offense vs defense:
offense (attack) is the decisive form of war
defense is the stronger form or war (p.84, 484, 524, 644)
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How does CVC describe polarity?
Polarity: “positive and negative interests [interact to] exactly cancel one another out”’ a context in which the gain of one is directly proportional to the loss of the other, i.e.., zero-sum game; many war situations do not fit this pattern (p.83, 644)
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How does CVC describe strategic interaction?
Interaction: “war is not the act of a living force upon a lifeless mass but always the collision of two living forces.” (p.77)
the enemy gets a vote
everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth - Mike Tyson
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How does CVC describe the center of gravity?
Center of gravity: “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point against which all our energies should be directed” (p.595)
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How does CVC describe the culminating point of victory / attack?
Culminating point of attack/victory: point beyond which the attack cannot proceed, i.e., point where “remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace;” offensive power reduces as it advances because of need to hold territory, long supply lines, etc. (p. 528, 566-573)
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How does CVC describe the fog of war?
Fog: war is the realm of uncertainty; intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain (I:6)
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How does CVC describe the paradoxical trinity?
Paradoxical trinity:
Used to understand the character of a particular war, i.e., war is a chameleon that adapts its characteristics to the given case
[1] PASSION - primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [irrational element; mainly concerns the people]
[2] REASON - element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” [rational element; mainly concerns the gov't] (pI:1)
[3] CHANCE - the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam [nonrational element; mainly concerns the military/commander]
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How does CVC describe theory?
Theory: theory educates and guides the education of the commander, but it cannot provide formulas for problem solving (VIII,1)
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How does CVC relate war to politics?
War and politics: “war is a continuation of politics by other means...it is in no sense autonomous.” (VIII.6B)
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How does Sun Tzu describe deception?
warfare is the art of deceipt, e.g., appear weak when strong, appear unable when able, appear far when near
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How does Sun Tzu describe hsing?
hsing = positioning / manuever
compares the positioning of troops to water
just like water avoids high ground and rushes to the lowest point, the path to victory avoids the enemy’s strengths and strikes where he is weak (92)
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How does Sun Tzu describe intelligence?
intelligence = foreknowledge that comes from people who know the enemy's situation
KCA
KNOW SELF AND ENEMY - emphasizes the importance of knowing yourself and the enemy, e.g. “if a commander does not know the enemy’s situation, his is the height of inhumanity
COMPARE STRENTHS/WEAKNESS - comparing both sides’ relative strengths and weaknesses
ASSESS SITUATION - assessing the situation based on defined criteria
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How does Sun Tzu describe shih?
shih is strategic advantage
"expert at battle seeks his victory from strategic advantage and does not demand it from his men"
attacking at the right time and place (rather than just using brute force)
combining ordinary (cheng) ordinary operations with extraordinary/suprise (ch'i) operations to achieve victory
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How does Sun Tzu describe tao?
tao = the way, the art of leadeship
bringing the people’s thinking in line with their superiors
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How does Sun Tzu describe victory without bloodshed?
highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting, not to win a hundred victorys in a hundred battles
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How does CVC describe the difference between strategy and tactics?
Strategy vs tactics:
tactics = planning and executing an engagement/battle
strategy = coordinating various engagements to achieve the object of the war (strategy) (p. 128)
