Final Review (Equal Protection) Flashcards
(16 cards)
Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)
(Equal Protection) San Francisco required laundries operating in wooden buildings to obtain a permit, but although Chinese applicants overwhelmingly applied, all were denied while virtually all white applicants were approved.
1. The Court held that facially neutral laws applied with discriminatory enforcement violate the Equal Protection Clause.
2. A law that is neutral on its face but administered with an evil eye and unequal hand amounts to unconstitutional discrimination.
3. Equal Protection applies to all persons, not just citizens — thus protecting non-citizen Chinese immigrants.
4. Use when showing that purposeful discriminatory enforcement, even under a facially neutral law, triggers strict scrutiny and Equal Protection violations.
United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938)
(Equal Protection)In upholding an economic regulation under rational basis review, the Court suggested that certain laws may require more careful judicial scrutiny.
he Court hinted that heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in three situations:
1. When laws appear to conflict with specific constitutional prohibitions
* (e.g., restrictions on explicit rights in the Bill of Rights — freedom of speech, religion, etc.)
2. When laws restrict the political process itself
* (e.g., restrictions on voting, running for office, access to the courts)
3. When laws target “discrete and insular minorities”
* (i.e., groups that lack the normal protections of the political process and are vulnerable to majoritarian oppression — racial minorities, religious minorities, etc.)
4. Main holding was that economic regulations are reviewed under rational basis.
Korematsu v. United States (1944)
(Equal Protection / National Security) Fred Korematsu challenged the constitutionality of a federal military order that excluded Japanese Americans from designated West Coast areas during World War II.
1. The Court upheld the exclusion order under strict scrutiny, accepting the government’s claim of pressing public necessity due to national security concerns.
2. Racial classifications are “immediately suspect” and subject to the most rigid scrutiny; however, in this case, the Court deferred heavily to the military’s judgment.
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
(Equal Protection / State Action Doctrine) A Black family purchased a home in Missouri in violation of a racially restrictive covenant, and the white neighbors sought judicial enforcement of the private covenant to prevent them from taking possession.
State Action Doctrine: The Constitution only restricts government action, not purely private behavior.
1. The Court held that while private racially restrictive covenants are not themselves unconstitutional, state judicial enforcement of such covenants constitutes state action and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Shelley 1 (Equal Protection Hierarchy Theory): Equal Protection prohibits the government from ratifying or reinforcing private social hierarchies based on race or other classifications — the government must remain neutral and cannot prop up private discrimination.
3. Shelley 2 (Individual Equal Citizenship Theory): Equal Protection protects individuals from government actions that deny their full membership in the political community, even when government involvement is indirect (such as courts enforcing private agreements).
4. Use when analyzing state action questions — cite Shelley to argue that judicial involvement in enforcing private discrimination triggers constitutional scrutiny and violates Equal Protection.
5. Shelley v. Kraemer laid the groundwork for the state action doctrine in Equal Protection law, recognizing that judicial enforcement of private racial discrimination implicates constitutional guarantees against racial hierarchy and individual discrimination.
(Major) Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
(Equal Protection) Black students challenged segregated public schools, arguing that racial separation, even with formally equal facilities, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
1. The Court unanimously held that separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Segregation generates a sense of inferiority in minority children that affects their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. (the Court emphasized the importance of intangible social harms beyond physical or material equality)
3. Overruled Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) insofar as it sanctioned segregation in public education.
4. Use whenever racial classifications in education, public services, or fundamental rights are challenged — strict scrutiny will apply to state-sponsored racial segregation.
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)
(Equal Protection / Substantive Due Process) Black students challenged racial segregation in Washington, D.C. public schools, raising the question whether the federal government, not a state, could be barred from racial segregation.
1. The Court held that racial segregation by the federal government violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applying a concept similar to Equal Protection.
2. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, discrimination so unjustifiable as to violate equal protection principles is forbidden by the guarantee of due process.
3. The Court used the idea of reverse incorporation, effectively applying Equal Protection norms to federal action through the Due Process Clause.
4. Use when addressing racial classifications by the federal government — strict scrutiny applies even without a formal Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment.
Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
(Equal Protection / Voting Rights) Voters challenged malapportioned state legislative districts in Alabama where rural votes were weighted far more heavily than urban votes.
1. The Court held that state legislative districts must be roughly equal in population to comply with the Equal Protection Clause — establishing the principle of “one person, one vote.” (“as nearly as practicable”)
2a. Votes must be equally weighted across districts
2b. Large deviations between districts presumptively violate Equal Protection
2c. Deviations must be justified by a compelling state interest.
3. Voter equality is a fundamental right, triggering strict scrutiny when infringed through districting disparities.
4. Use when analyzing challenges to voting districts, apportionment plans, or laws burdening equal political representation — courts will apply a strict standard of population equality.
(Major) Loving v. Virginia (1967)
(Equal Protection / Substantive Due Process) An interracial couple challenged Virginia’s laws banning interracial marriage after being criminally convicted for marrying across racial lines.
1. The Court held that laws prohibiting interracial marriage violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Racial classifications receive strict scrutiny — the state must show a compelling governmental interest and that the law is narrowly tailored, which Virginia failed to do.
3. The freedom to marry is a fundamental liberty, and state interference with it triggers heightened constitutional protection under substantive due process.
4. Use when analyzing racial classifications (automatic strict scrutiny) and when dealing with fundamental rights like marriage — government restrictions must survive the highest level of constitutional review.
(Major) Palmer v. Thompson (1971)
(Equal Protection) Jackson, MS: Closing public swimming pool rather than integrating them.
1. Facially equal treatment is not unconstitutional solely due to discriminatory motive. Law facially neutral + no racial classification + no disparate burden = constitutional, even with bad motive.
2. I.e., a government action that is facially neutral and equally applied to all races does not violate Equal Protection, even if allegedly motivated by discriminatory intent.
3. Unless it imposes a disparate burden or classification based on race.
4. Use when analyzing facially neutral government decisions that may have been strategically designed to avoid integration or access, but do not on their face draw racial lines.
Palmer teaches that Equal Protection analysis requires more than subjective bad faith; courts demand proof of discriminatory treatment or disparate impact, not just discriminatory intent.
(Major) Reed v. Reed (1971)
(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) An Idaho law automatically preferred men over women when appointing administrators of estates, and a woman challenged the law after being passed over in favor of her ex-husband.
1. The Court struck down the law under the Equal Protection Clause, holding that arbitrary gender-based classifications are unconstitutional.
2. This was the first time the Supreme Court formally invalidated a law for discriminating based on sex.
3. Applied rational basis review (not yet heightened scrutiny), but emphasized that gender classifications must be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and cannot rest on archaic generalizations.
4. Use when analyzing gender classifications — cite Reed as the beginning of modern sex discrimination doctrine, paving the way for intermediate scrutiny.
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)
(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) A female Air Force officer challenged a federal law requiring women to prove their husbands were financially dependent to qualify for military spousal benefits, while male officers automatically received benefits for their wives.
1. The Court struck down the law under the Equal Protection principle (applied through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) because it discriminated based on sex.
2. A plurality argued that gender classifications should be treated as inherently suspect and should trigger strict scrutiny (although no majority adopted that standard formally).
3. Use when showing that sex-based classifications are constitutionally suspect and require heightened scrutiny, laying the groundwork for later formal adoption of intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.
(Major) Washington v. Davis (1976)
(Equal Protection) D.C. Metro Police used “Test 21” for hiring and it had racial impact.
1. Disparate impact alone is insufficient; must show discriminatory purpose to trigger strict scrutiny.
2. I.e., need purpose + impact
3. Use when analyzing any state statute that disproportionally affects minorities but lacks overt racial classification.
4. the Court distinguished between constitutional claims (which require proof of discriminatory intent) and statutory claims (like Title VII, which can impose liability based on disparate impact alone).
(Major) Craig v. Boren (1976)
(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) A law in Oklahoma allowed women to buy low-alcohol beer at age 18 but prohibited men from buying it until age 21, and a male college student challenged the law.
1. The Court struck down the law and formally established “intermediate scrutiny” for gender classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Gender-based classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieving those objectives.
(Major) Village of Arlington Heights v. MHDC (1977)
(Equal Protection) Denial of zoning request from single-family to multi-family for the purpose of building low income, racially integrated housing in a Chicago suburb.
1. For Mixed-Motive cases.
2. P must show that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor; then the burden shifts to the government to show that the same action would have occurred without that purpose.
3. Use Arlington Heights to evaluate facially neutral laws with racial or gender impact where there may be subtle or indirect discriminatory purpose.
4. Also, Arlington Heights listed specific evidentiary factors for proving discriminatory intent (impact, history, procedural departures, substantive departures, legislative history
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979)
(Equal Protection) MA law gave absolute lifetime hiring preference to veterans for civil service jobs (thus, overwhelming favoring men).
1. Law msut be enacted ‘because of,’ NOT MERELY ‘in spite of,’ its disparate impact to violate.
2. Use Feeney to push back on Equal Protection claims that are based purely on impact, especially where the law doesn’t overtly classify by gender or race.
2a. Example: “Although the law had a disparate impact on women, under Feeney, the plaintiff must show it was passed because of that impact — not just that it disproportionately harms women.”
Trump v. Hawaii (2018)
(Equal Protection) Plaintiffs challenged President Trump’s “travel ban” executive order restricting entry from several majority-Muslim countries, alleging unconstitutional religious discrimination.
1. The Court upheld the travel ban, applying a highly deferential standard of review (rational basis-like) because the case involved the President’s authority over immigration and national security.
2. The Court distinguished from Korematsu, stating that while Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, the travel ban was based on national security concerns, not race or religion per se.
3. When immigration and national security are involved, courts give broad deference to the executive unless there is clear evidence of unconstitutional purpose with no legitimate justification.
