Final Review (Complete)

Question 1

(Major) McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Answer 1

(Commerce Clause) Congress chartered a national bank and Maryland tried to tax it.
1. Congress has implied powers to create institutions to carry out enumerated powers.
2. States may not interfere with or tax valid federal operations.
3. Test: Law must be plainly adapted to a legitimate constitutional end.
4. Use to support broad congressional authority under Necessary & Proper Clause.
5. “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”

Question 2

United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895)

Answer 2

(Commerce Clause) Federal government attempted to regulate sugar refining monopoly.
1. Manufacturing is a local activity, not interstate commerce.
2. Limits Congress’s commerce power to actual trade or exchange.
3. Part of pre-New Deal narrow view of commerce power.
4. Use as early example of judicial limits on Commerce Clause before expansion in New Deal era.

Question 3

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)

Answer 3

(Commerce Clause) Federal law (Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916) prohibited interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor (in textile mills).
1. Production is local, not commerce; thus, beyond federal power.
2. Distinguished between harmful goods themselves and how they were made.
3. Later overruled by Darby.
4. Use when discussing dual federalism and limits on early commerce power.

Question 4

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture (1922)

Answer 4

(Commerce Clause) Congress imposed a tax on companies using child labor.
1. Law struck down because it was a regulatory penalty disguised as a tax.
2. Test: Distinguish legitimate taxes from penalties aimed at regulating conduct.
a. Cost: Is the price punitive in nature (I.e., the same for all levels of offense).
b. MR: Does it have a MR or Scienter requirement.
c. Is it enforced by the IRS (Treasury) or some other agency (here, the Dept. of Labor).
3. Reinforces that Congress cannot use tax power to regulate areas reserved to states.
4. Use when evaluating whether a ‘tax’ is actually a penalty requiring closer scrutiny.

Question 5

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935)

Answer 5

(Commerce Clause) New Deal regulations challenged for controlling intrastate poultry sales.
1. Local business with indirect effects on interstate commerce is beyond federal reach.
2. Congress cannot regulate purely intrastate activity unless directly tied to commerce.
3. Precursor to modern substantial effects test.
4. Use to show pre-Wickard limits on federal regulatory power during the New Deal era.

Question 6

United States v. Butler (1936)

Answer 6

(Commerce Clause / Spending Power) Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, attempting to regulate agricultural production (of staple crops like cotton and wheat) by offering subsidies funded through a tax on processors.
1. The Court struck down the Act, holding that Congress cannot use its taxing and spending power to invade areas of regulation reserved to the states.
2. Recognized that the Spending Clause allows Congress to spend for the “general welfare,” but distinguished between spending power and regulatory power.
3. Test: Congress may spend for the general welfare, but spending conditions or taxes cannot be coercive or regulate matters purely reserved to the states.
4. Use when analyzing limitations on the Spending Clause, especially when federal programs look like disguised regulation of local matters.

Question 7

United States v. Darby (1941)

Answer 7

(Commerce Clause) Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, setting national minimum wage and maximum hour requirements for workers involved in producing goods for interstate commerce.
1. Upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power; Congress can regulate intrastate activities when they have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
2. Overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, rejecting the idea that manufacturing is a purely local activity immune from federal regulation.
3. In order to enforce commerce, Congress must enforce manufacture (To prevent a race to the bottom).
4. Use when establishing Congress’s post-New Deal broad authority to regulate labor standards and local activities substantially affecting interstate commerce.

Question 8

(Major) Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

Answer 8

(Commerce Clause) A farmer, Filburn, grew more wheat than federally permitted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but claimed it was for personal consumption and never entered interstate commerce.
1. The Court upheld federal regulation, holding that even personal, non-commercial activities can be regulated if, in the aggregate, they substantially affect interstate commerce.
2. Aggregation Principle: When individual instances of local, non-economic activity, taken together, would have a significant economic effect on interstate commerce, Congress can regulate.
3. Emphasized that the Commerce Clause power extends to activities which, viewed in the aggregate, threaten national markets (here, the wheat market).
4. Use to support broad congressional power to regulate purely local activities when Congress can show their cumulative impact would undermine a larger regulatory scheme.

Question 9

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)

Answer 9

(Commerce Clause) A large motel in Atlanta refused to accommodate Black guests and challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arguing Congress could not prohibit racial discrimination in private businesses.
1. The Court upheld the Act, holding that Congress could regulate private discrimination in public accommodations if it substantially affects interstate commerce.
2. The motel served interstate travelers, advertised nationally, and was located near major highways — making its operations intertwined with interstate commerce.
3. Congress may use the Commerce Clause to eliminate barriers to interstate travel and economic participation, including racial segregation in businesses serving the public.
4. Use when Congress regulates economic conduct in public-facing businesses, especially where discrimination inhibits interstate movement or commerce.

Question 10

Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)

Answer 10

(Commerce Clause) Ollie’s Barbecue, a local restaurant in Alabama, refused to serve Black customers and challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
1. The Court upheld the Civil Rights Act as applied to local businesses, finding that racial discrimination in restaurants substantially affects interstate commerce, even if the business itself is small and local.
2. Congress may regulate local activities if they have a substantial and cumulative effect on interstate commerce (reaffirming Wickard aggregation principle).
3. Congressional factual findings supported that racial discrimination burdened interstate travel, tourism, and commerce, justifying national regulation.
4. Use when showing that even small, local businesses can be federally regulated if their practices collectively undermine national economic interests (especially involving civil rights).

Question 11

(Major) United States v. Lopez (1995)

Answer 11

(Commerce Clause) Did Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized possession of a gun near a school, exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power?
1. Mere possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity. (Gov. argued that guns affected education , which affected economic productivity, and thus, commerce). (First time something that was beyond the enumerated powers since pre-New Deal)
2. Congress can regulate:
(a) Channels (e.g., highways, airways, internet)
(b) Instrumentalities (person or things in interstate commerce)
(c) Activities that substantially effect interstate commerce (Must be economic in nature or aggregate to a substantial effect, per Wickard).
3. NFIB: Cannot compel market participation; i.e., cannot compel INACTIVITY (e.g., forcing individuals to buy insurance).
4. Use whenever Congress regulates non-economic behavior and claims it affects commerce.

Question 12

United States v. Morrison (2000)

Answer 12

(Commerce Clause) Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided federal civil remedy for gender motivated violence.
1. Like Lopez, the Court rejected that non-economic conduct with aggregated national effects can be regulated under the Commerce Clause (“too atenuated” from IC); Allowing this would give Congress a general police power.
2. Congress argued gender violence affects interstate commerce by impacting victims’ participation in the workforce, health, and education.
3. Use when analyzing federal attempts to legislate noneconomic private conduct.

Question 13

(Major) Gonzales v. Raich (2005)

Answer 13

(Commerce Clause / Necessary & Proper) California permitted the medical use of marijuana, but federal DEA agents seized and destroyed Raich’s homegrown marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Aggregation that affects an illegal national market; part of broader regulatory scheme
1. The Court upheld Congress’s authority to prohibit even local, non-commercial cultivation and use of marijuana under the Commerce Clause.
2. Congress can regulate local activities if, in the aggregate, they substantially affect interstate commerce (Wickard v. Filburn principle).
3. Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to regulate intrastate activities if doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme (i.e., drug trafficking regulation).
4. Use when Congress is regulating noneconomic local conduct that could undermine a larger economic regulatory scheme — especially when applying aggregation logic.

Question 14

(Major) NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)

Answer 14

(Commerce Clause / Taxing Power / Spending Power) Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which included an individual mandate (For “minimum essential” coverage) requiring most Americans to purchase health insurance, and expanded Medicaid funding with conditions for states.
1. Commerce Clause: IM cannot be justified under Commerce or N&P — Congress cannot regulate inactivity; forcing people into commerce exceeds its power (building on Lopez and Morrison limits).
1a. “Power to regulate commerce, not compel it.”
2. Taxing Power: The Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power — because the penalty functioned like a tax (produced revenue, collected by IRS, no criminal punishment).
3. Spending Clause: The Court struck down part of the Medicaid expansion as unconstitutionally coercive — Congress cannot threaten existing state funding to force compliance with new conditions (refining the Dole framework).
3a. Test: Is the federal offer so coercive that it leaves states with no genuine choice?
3b. Magnitude of threatened loss (States stood to loose all existing funding, 10% of their budget, “a gun to the head”)
3c. Relationship between New Conditions and existing program (Medicaid ecpansion altered its nature).
4. Use when analyzing limits on the Commerce Clause (cannot compel participation), when defending recharacterization of a penalty as a tax, and when evaluating whether federal conditions on spending programs are coercively imposed on states.
5. NB. In analysis, first look at commerce, then Taxing.

Question 15

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

Answer 15

(Equal Protection) San Francisco required laundries operating in wooden buildings to obtain a permit, but although Chinese applicants overwhelmingly applied, all were denied while virtually all white applicants were approved.
1. The Court held that facially neutral laws applied with discriminatory enforcement violate the Equal Protection Clause.
2. A law that is neutral on its face but administered with an evil eye and unequal hand amounts to unconstitutional discrimination.
3. Equal Protection applies to all persons, not just citizens — thus protecting non-citizen Chinese immigrants.
4. Use when showing that purposeful discriminatory enforcement, even under a facially neutral law, triggers strict scrutiny and Equal Protection violations.

Question 16

(Major) Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Answer 16

(Equal Protection) Black students challenged segregated public schools, arguing that racial separation, even with formally equal facilities, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
1. The Court unanimously held that separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Segregation generates a sense of inferiority in minority children that affects their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
3. Overruled Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) insofar as it sanctioned segregation in public education.
4. Use whenever racial classifications in education, public services, or fundamental rights are challenged — strict scrutiny will apply to state-sponsored racial segregation.

Question 17

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)

Answer 17

(Equal Protection / Substantive Due Process) Black students challenged racial segregation in Washington, D.C. public schools, raising the question whether the federal government, not a state, could be barred from racial segregation.
1. The Court held that racial segregation by the federal government violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applying a concept similar to Equal Protection.
2. Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, discrimination so unjustifiable as to violate equal protection principles is forbidden by the guarantee of due process.
3. The Court used the idea of reverse incorporation, effectively applying Equal Protection norms to federal action through the Due Process Clause.
4. Use when addressing racial classifications by the federal government — strict scrutiny applies even without a formal Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment.

Question 18

Reynolds v. Sims (1964)

Answer 18

(Equal Protection / Voting Rights) Voters challenged malapportioned state legislative districts in Alabama where rural votes were weighted far more heavily than urban votes.
1. The Court held that state legislative districts must be roughly equal in population to comply with the Equal Protection Clause — establishing the principle of “one person, one vote.”
2a. Votes must be equally weighted across districts
2b. Large deviations between districts presumptively violate Equal Protection
2c. Deviations must be justified by a compelling state interest.
3. Voter equality is a fundamental right, triggering strict scrutiny when infringed through districting disparities.
4. Use when analyzing challenges to voting districts, apportionment plans, or laws burdening equal political representation — courts will apply a strict standard of population equality.

Question 19

(Major) Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Answer 19

(Equal Protection / Substantive Due Process) An interracial couple challenged Virginia’s laws banning interracial marriage after being criminally convicted for marrying across racial lines.
1. The Court held that laws prohibiting interracial marriage violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Racial classifications receive strict scrutiny — the state must show a compelling governmental interest and that the law is narrowly tailored, which Virginia failed to do.
3. The freedom to marry is a fundamental liberty, and state interference with it triggers heightened constitutional protection under substantive due process.
4. Use when analyzing racial classifications (automatic strict scrutiny) and when dealing with fundamental rights like marriage — government restrictions must survive the highest level of constitutional review.

Question 20

(Major) Palmer v. Thompson (1971)

Answer 20

(Equal Protection) Jackson, MS: Closing public swimming pool rather than integrating them.
1. Facially equal treatment is not unconstitutional solely due to discriminatory motive.
2. I.e., a government action that is facially neutral and equally applied to all races does not violate Equal Protection, even if allegedly motivated by discriminatory intent.
3. Unless it imposes a disparate burden or classification based on race.
4. Use when analyzing facially neutral government decisions that may have been strategically designed to avoid integration or access, but do not on their face draw racial lines.

Question 21

(Major) Washington v. Davis (1976)

Answer 21

(Equal Protection) D.C. Metro Police used “Test 21” for hiring and it had racial impact.
1. Disparate impact alone is insufficient; must show discriminatory purpose to trigger strict scrutiny.
2. I.e., need purpose + impact
3. Use when analyzing any state statute that disproportionally affects minorities but lacks overt racial classification.

Question 22

Personnel Administrator v. Feeney (1979)

Answer 22

(Equal Protection) MA law gave absolute lifetime hiring preference to veterans for civil service jobs (thus, overwhelming favoring men).
1. Law msut be enacted ‘because of,’ NOT MERELY ‘in spite of,’ its disparate impact to violate.
2. Use Feeney to push back on Equal Protection claims that are based purely on impact, especially where the law doesn’t overtly classify by gender or race.
2a. Example: “Although the law had a disparate impact on women, under Feeney, the plaintiff must show it was passed because of that impact — not just that it disproportionately harms women.”

Question 23

(Major) Village of Arlington Heights v. MHDC (1977)

Answer 23

(Equal Protection) Denial of zoning request from single-family to multi-family for the purpose of building low income, racially integrated housing in a Chicago suburb.
1. For Mixed-Motive cases.
2. P must show that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor; then the burden shifts to the government to show that the same action would have occurred without that purpose.
3. Use Arlington Heights to evaluate facially neutral laws with racial or gender impact where there may be subtle or indirect discriminatory purpose.

Question 24

(Major) Reed v. Reed (1971)

Answer 24

(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) An Idaho law automatically preferred men over women when appointing administrators of estates, and a woman challenged the law after being passed over in favor of her ex-husband.
1. The Court struck down the law under the Equal Protection Clause, holding that arbitrary gender-based classifications are unconstitutional.
2. This was the first time the Supreme Court formally invalidated a law for discriminating based on sex.
3. Applied rational basis review (not yet heightened scrutiny), but emphasized that gender classifications must be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and cannot rest on archaic generalizations.
4. Use when analyzing gender classifications — cite Reed as the beginning of modern sex discrimination doctrine, paving the way for intermediate scrutiny.

Question 25

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973)

Answer 25

(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) A female Air Force officer challenged a federal law requiring women to prove their husbands were financially dependent to qualify for military spousal benefits, while male officers automatically received benefits for their wives. 1. The Court struck down the law under the Equal Protection principle (applied through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) because it discriminated based on sex. 2. A plurality argued that gender classifications should be treated as inherently suspect and should trigger strict scrutiny (although no majority adopted that standard formally). 3. Use when showing that sex-based classifications are constitutionally suspect and require heightened scrutiny, laying the groundwork for later formal adoption of intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.

Question 26

(Major) Craig v. Boren (1976)

Answer 26

(Equal Protection / Gender Discrimination) A law in Oklahoma allowed women to buy low-alcohol beer at age 18 but prohibited men from buying it until age 21, and a male college student challenged the law. 1. The Court struck down the law and formally established “intermediate scrutiny” for gender classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. 2. Gender-based classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieving those objectives.

Question 27

Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)

Answer 27

(Equal Protection / State Action Doctrine) A Black family purchased a home in Missouri in violation of a racially restrictive covenant, and the white neighbors sought judicial enforcement of the private covenant to prevent them from taking possession. ***State Action Doctrine: The Constitution only restricts government action, not purely private behavior.*** 1. The Court held that while private racially restrictive covenants are not themselves unconstitutional, state judicial enforcement of such covenants constitutes state action and violates the Equal Protection Clause. 2. Shelley 1 (Equal Protection Hierarchy Theory): Equal Protection prohibits the government from ratifying or reinforcing private social hierarchies based on race or other classifications — the government must remain neutral and cannot prop up private discrimination. 3. Shelley 2 (Individual Equal Citizenship Theory): Equal Protection protects individuals from government actions that deny their full membership in the political community, even when government involvement is indirect (such as courts enforcing private agreements). 4. Use when analyzing state action questions — cite Shelley to argue that judicial involvement in enforcing private discrimination triggers constitutional scrutiny and violates Equal Protection.

Question 28

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

Answer 28

(Equal Protection / National Security) Fred Korematsu challenged the constitutionality of a federal military order that excluded Japanese Americans from designated West Coast areas during World War II. 1. The Court upheld the exclusion order under strict scrutiny, accepting the government’s claim of pressing public necessity due to national security concerns. 2. Racial classifications are “immediately suspect” and subject to the most rigid scrutiny; however, in this case, the Court deferred heavily to the military’s judgment.

Question 29

Trump v. Hawaii (2018)

Answer 29

(Equal Protection) Plaintiffs challenged President Trump’s “travel ban” executive order restricting entry from several majority-Muslim countries, alleging unconstitutional religious discrimination. 1. The Court upheld the travel ban, applying a highly deferential standard of review (rational basis-like) because the case involved the President’s authority over immigration and national security. 2. The Court distinguished from Korematsu, stating that while Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, the travel ban was based on national security concerns, not race or religion per se. 3. When immigration and national security are involved, courts give broad deference to the executive unless there is clear evidence of unconstitutional purpose with no legitimate justification.

Question 30

United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938)

Answer 30

(Equal Protection)In upholding an economic regulation under rational basis review, the Court suggested that certain laws may require more careful judicial scrutiny. he Court hinted that heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in three situations: 1. When laws appear to conflict with specific constitutional prohibitions • (e.g., restrictions on explicit rights in the Bill of Rights — freedom of speech, religion, etc.) 2. When laws restrict the political process itself • (e.g., restrictions on voting, running for office, access to the courts) 3. When laws target “discrete and insular minorities” • (i.e., groups that lack the normal protections of the political process and are vulnerable to majoritarian oppression — racial minorities, religious minorities, etc.)

Question 31

What is the test for a Fundamental Right?

Answer 31

(Substantive Due Process) First seen in Palko v. Connecticut (1937), but formally adopted in Glucksberg v. Washington (1997). 1. Is the asserted right deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition? 2. Is the right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist without it?

Question 32

What are the Equal Protection Scrutiny Tiers?

Answer 32

(Equal Protection) 1. Rational Basis: Legitimate Interest; Rationally Related (Not patently arbitrary); Burden on Challenger; Context-Economic Regulation, Age, Wealth 2. Intermediate: Important Interest; Substantially related; Burden on Gov./Shared; Context-Sex 3. Strict: Compelling Interest; Narrowly tailored, least restrictive means; Burden on Gov.; Race, national origin, alienage, fundamental rights, one person one vote.

Question 33

(Major) Garcia v. San Antonia Metro Transit Authority (1985)

Answer 33

(Federalism / Tenth Amendment / Commerce Clause) A public transit authority challenged the application of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to its employees, arguing that regulating a traditional state function violated state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. 1. The Court upheld the application of the FLSA, holding that the Tenth Amendment does not protect states from generally applicable federal laws regulating commerce. 2. Overruled National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), rejecting the idea that the Court could define “traditional government functions” immune from federal regulation. 3. Introduced the Political Safeguards of Federalism Theory: protection for state sovereignty comes primarily through the national political process (representation in Congress), not through judicially enforced limits.

Question 34

(Major) New York v. United States (1992)

Answer 34

(Anticommandeering) New York challenged federal provisions requiring states to either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to federal instructions or take ownership of the waste themselves. 1. The Court held that Congress cannot compel states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, striking down the “take title” provision as a violation of the Tenth Amendment. 2. Congress may incentivize state cooperation through conditional funding (Spending Clause, South Dakota v. Dole) or offer states a choice between regulating under federal standards or leaving regulation to the federal government itself. 3. Anticommandeering Principle: The federal government may encourage but may not directly force state legislatures to govern according to federal instructions.

Question 35

(Major) Printz v. United States (1997)

Answer 35

(Anticommandeering) Local sheriffs challenged a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 1. The Court struck down the federal mandate, holding that Congress cannot commandeer state or local executive officials to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program, even temporarily. 2. The Anticommandeering Principle protects state sovereignty by prohibiting the federal government from directly conscripting state executive officers to execute federal laws. 3. Distinguished from permissible federal actions: Congress can regulate private actors directly or offer incentives to states, but it cannot force state officers into federal service.

Question 36

Reno v. Condon (2000)

Answer 36

(Anticommandeering) South Carolina challenged the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), which restricted how states could disclose personal information gathered by their Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs). 1. The Court upheld the DPPA, holding that Congress may regulate states as owners of databases or market participants, without violating the Anticommandeering Doctrine. 2. Laws that regulate states as participants in commerce (rather than compelling them to legislate or enforce federal programs) are constitutional. 3. The DPPA regulated states’ conduct in the market (selling drivers’ personal data), not the states’ sovereign lawmaking or enforcement capacities.

Question 37

(Major) Murphy v. NCAA (2018)

Answer 37

(Anticommandeering) New Jersey challenged the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a federal law prohibiting states from authorizing or licensing sports gambling. ***Extended the Anticommandeering Doctrine beyond just positive commands (New York, Printz) to prohibitions.*** 1. The Court struck down PASPA’s prohibition on state authorization of sports betting, holding that Congress cannot commandeer the states by telling them what laws they must or must not enact. 2. Anticommandeering Principle applies equally to commands to legislate (New York), commands to executive officials (Printz), and prohibitions on state lawmaking (Murphy). 3. If Congress wants to regulate private conduct (e.g., sports gambling), it must regulate private actors directly, not tell the states what to do.

Question 38

(Major) Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966)

Answer 38

(§5 XIV AMD) New York challenged a provision of the Voting Rights Act that prohibited states from denying the right to vote to citizens educated in Puerto Rican schools who could not pass English literacy tests. 1. The Court upheld the federal law under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that Congress may prohibit state practices that it reasonably believes infringe constitutional rights, even if courts had not independently found a violation. 2. Introduced the under-enforcement theory: Judicial interpretations of constitutional rights are not necessarily the maximum limit — Congress can act to proactively enforce or expand protections against constitutional violations. 3. Congress’s Section 5 power is remedial and preventive — it may enact laws to deter or remedy threats to constitutional rights before courts find an actual violation.

Question 39

(Major) City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

Answer 39

(§5 XIV AMD) A Catholic Archbishop challenged a local zoning authority’s denial of a permit to expand a church, arguing that it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal statute passed to protect religious exercise beyond prior judicial interpretations. 1. The Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, holding that Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is remedial, not the power to define or expand substantive constitutional rights. 2. Introduced the “congruence and proportionality” test: Congress’s enforcement legislation must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or remedied — a tight fit is required between the law and proven constitutional violations. 3. Limited the under-enforcement theory from Katzenbach v. Morgan by holding that courts, not Congress, define the scope of constitutional rights; Congress can only enforce those judicially defined rights.

Question 40

United States v. Morrison (2000)

Answer 40

(§5 XIV AMD) Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided federal civil remedy for gender motivated violence. 1. (Boerne applied) Congress may only enforce rights against state action, NOT private actors. 2. VAWA addressed private violence, not state failures, and thus was not CONGRUENT and PROPORTIONAL enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment.

Question 41

(Major) Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

Answer 41

(Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments / Section 5 and Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act) Shelby County, Alabama challenged the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula, which required certain jurisdictions to obtain federal approval before making changes to voting laws. 1. The Court struck down Section 4(b)’s coverage formula as unconstitutional, holding that it was based on outdated data and violated the principle of equal sovereignty of the states. 2. Although Congress has broad enforcement power under Section 5, that power must be congruent and proportional to current conditions — laws must reflect current needs, not merely past discrimination. 3. Reinforced that federal intrusion into traditional state functions (like elections) must be justified by evidence of ongoing violations, consistent with City of Boerne’s Congruence and Proportionality Test.

Question 42

Trump v. Anderson (2024)

Answer 42

(Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments / Section 5 and Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act) Shelby County, Alabama challenged the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula, which required certain jurisdictions to obtain federal approval before making changes to voting laws. 1. The Court struck down Section 4(b)’s coverage formula as unconstitutional, holding that it was based on outdated data and violated the principle of equal sovereignty of the states. 2. Although Congress has broad enforcement power under Section 5, that power must be congruent and proportional to current conditions — laws must reflect current needs, not merely past discrimination. 3. Reinforced that federal intrusion into traditional state functions (like elections) must be justified by evidence of ongoing violations, consistent with City of Boerne’s Congruence and Proportionality Test.

Question 43

Lochner v. New York (1905)

Answer 43

(Substantive Due Process)A bakery owner challenged a New York law that limited bakers to working no more than 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week, arguing it violated the liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 1. The Court struck down the law, holding that it unconstitutionally interfered with the freedom of contract, a fundamental right under substantive due process at that time. 2. Introduced heightened scrutiny for economic regulations: government restrictions on liberty of contract must serve a legitimate and direct public interest, not just any conceivable purpose. 3. The Court treated economic liberty — particularly the right to freely negotiate labor conditions — as a fundamental liberty requiring strong justification for interference. • Widely criticized today for imposing the Court’s own views of economic theory over the democratic process. • Later rejected by cases like West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) and Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955), which restored judicial deference to economic regulations under rational basis review. • Lochner is now mainly cited as an example of the dangers of judicial activism in striking down economic legislation.

Question 44

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937)

Answer 44

(Substantive Due Process) A hotel maid challenged her employer’s failure to pay the minimum wage required by Washington state law, arguing that the employer violated the state’s wage standards. 1. The Court upheld the minimum wage law, rejecting Lochner-era substantive due process protections for economic liberty and affirming that the Constitution does not recognize freedom of contract as an absolute fundamental right. 2. Established that reasonable government regulation of economic matters is constitutional if it is rationally related to protecting health, safety, or welfare (early form of rational basis review). 3. Shifted the focus from protecting economic “liberty of contract” toward greater deference to legislative judgment, especially for labor and welfare regulations.

Question 45

Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955)

Answer 45

(Substantive Due Process) An Oklahoma law prohibited opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist, and opticians challenged it as arbitrary and irrational. 1. The Court upheld the law, applying extremely deferential rational basis review — a law regulating business practices is constitutional as long as there is any conceivable legitimate purpose, whether or not the legislature articulated it. 2. Courts will not strike down economic regulations simply because they seem unwise, inefficient, or unnecessary — it is enough that the legislature might have thought the law would promote public health or welfare. 3. Strengthened the principle that economic and social regulations are presumed valid and that judicial deference to legislative judgment is nearly absolute for non-fundamental rights.

Question 46

(Major) Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Answer 46

(Substantive Due Process / Privacy Rights) A Planned Parenthood director and a physician were convicted under a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married couples. 1. The Court struck down the law, holding that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to marital privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. The Court located this right through the concept of “penumbras” and “emanations” from various Bill of Rights guarantees (e.g., First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments) creating a zone of privacy. 3. Marked a shift in substantive due process from protecting economic liberties (Lochner Era) to protecting personal, intimate rights related to autonomy, dignity, and family life.

Question 47

Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Answer 47

(Substantive Due Process) A professor was convicted under a Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals, even though married couples could legally obtain them. 1. The Court struck down the law, holding that denying unmarried individuals access to contraception violated the Equal Protection Clause by irrationally treating married and unmarried people differently. 2. Expanded the right to privacy recognized in Griswold — the right to make decisions about contraception belongs to the individual, not just within the marital relationship. 3. Established that privacy and liberty interests in intimate decisions extend beyond marriage, emphasizing personal autonomy over government regulation of private matters. 4. Use when analyzing privacy rights outside of marriage — cite Eisenstadt for the proposition that personal autonomy in decisions about reproduction is protected for all individuals, not just married couples.

Question 48

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Answer 48

(Substantive Due Process / Privacy Rights / Abortion Rights) A woman challenged a Texas law that criminalized most abortions, arguing that it violated her constitutional right to privacy. 1. The Court struck down the Texas law, holding that the constitutional right to privacy, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, encompasses a woman’s decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. 2. Created the Trimester Framework: • First trimester: Government may not regulate abortions beyond requiring that they be performed by licensed doctors. • Second trimester: Government may regulate abortions in ways reasonably related to maternal health. • Third trimester (post-viability): State may regulate or prohibit abortion except where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 3. Treated the right to choose abortion as a fundamental right at the time, triggering strict scrutiny — regulations had to be justified by compelling state interests.

Question 49

(Major) Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

Answer 49

(Substantive Due Process / Abortion Rights / Privacy) Plaintiffs challenged multiple Pennsylvania abortion restrictions, including waiting periods, parental consent, and spousal notification requirements, arguing they violated Roe v. Wade’s protections. 1. The Court reaffirmed the core holding of Roe — that women have a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before viability — but modified the legal framework. 2. Rejected Roe’s Trimester Framework and replaced it with the Undue Burden Test: • A state regulation is unconstitutional if it places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion. 3. Affirmed that after viability, the state may regulate and even prohibit abortion, provided there are exceptions for the life and health of the mother.

Question 50

(Major) Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022)

Answer 50

(Substantive Due Process / Abortion Rights / Overruling Precedent) A Mississippi law banned most abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, directly challenging the constitutional viability standard set by Roe v. Wade and reaffirmed by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 1. The Court overruled Roe and Casey, holding that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion — therefore, abortion regulation is left to the states. 2. Rejected the viability line and the undue burden test — returned substantive due process analysis to the Glucksberg framework (history and tradition standard): • A right must be deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition to warrant substantive due process protection. 3. Held that abortion is not a fundamental right because it was not historically protected at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. 4. Use when arguing that substantive due process rights are now tightly limited — courts will apply history-and-tradition analysis (Glucksberg) rather than evolving notions of liberty (Casey/Obergefell framework) to identify fundamental rights.

Question 51

(Major) Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Answer 51

(Substantive Due Process / Equal Protection / Marriage Rights) Same-sex couples challenged state laws and constitutional amendments that denied them the right to marry or refused to recognize their marriages performed elsewhere. 1. The Court held that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Recognized that marriage is a fundamental right grounded in the principles of individual autonomy, personal dignity, family integrity, and social order — not limited to historical definitions. 3. Use when arguing that substantive due process protects evolving understandings of fundamental rights, especially those tied to personal autonomy and equality — Obergefell remains a cornerstone for modern liberty rights analysis.

Question 52

(Major) McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Answer 52

(Necessary & Proper) Maryland tried to tax the federally created Bank of the United States, and the bank’s cashier, McCulloch, challenged the tax and the state’s authority to interfere with federal operations. 1. The Court upheld Congress’s power to create the Bank of the United States, interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly — Congress may use any appropriate means to achieve a legitimate constitutional end. 2. Introduced the “Let the end be legitimate” standard: If Congress pursues a constitutional objective, it may choose any means that are plainly adapted to that end, not prohibited, and consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. 3. Established that Congress’s implied powers are not narrowly confined to those explicitly listed in the Constitution — the Necessary and Proper Clause is expansive, not a restriction.

Question 53

(Major) Gonzales v. Raich (2005)

Answer 53

(Necessary & Proper) California permitted the medical use of marijuana, but the federal government (DEA) seized and destroyed Raich’s homegrown marijuana under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Raich challenged the CSA’s application to her purely local conduct. 1. The Court upheld the federal law, holding that Congress may regulate even purely local, non-commercial activity if it is part of a broader economic regulatory scheme under the Commerce Clause. 2. Applied Wickard v. Filburn’s aggregation principle: individual instances of local marijuana cultivation, when considered in the aggregate, could substantially affect the national illegal drug market. 3. Invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause: regulating local possession and cultivation was necessary to make the national drug control scheme effective, even if the local activity itself was not commercial.

Question 54

United States v. Butler (1936)

Answer 54

(Spending Clause) "(Commerce Clause / Spending Power) Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, attempting to regulate agricultural production (of staple crops like cotton and wheat) by offering subsidies funded through a tax on processors. 1. The Court struck down the Act, holding that Congress cannot use its taxing and spending power to invade areas of regulation reserved to the states. 2. Recognized that the Spending Clause allows Congress to spend for the “general welfare,” but distinguished between spending power and regulatory power. 3. Test: Congress may spend for the general welfare, but spending conditions or taxes cannot be coercive or regulate matters purely reserved to the states. 4. Use when analyzing limitations on the Spending Clause, especially when federal programs look like disguised regulation of local matters."

Question 55

(Major) South Dakota v. Dole (1987)

Answer 55

(Spending Clause) South Dakota challenged a federal law that withheld a portion of federal highway funds from states that did not raise their legal drinking age to 21, arguing it violated the Tenth Amendment and exceeded Congress’s spending power. 1. The Court upheld the law, establishing the modern Spending Clause test — Congress may condition federal funds to the states if certain requirements are met. 2. Four-Part Spending Power Test: • (1) The spending must promote the general welfare. • (2) The condition must be unambiguous, so states can make an informed choice. • (3) The condition must be related to the federal interest in the program funded. • (4) The condition must not violate any other constitutional provisions. 3. Recognized that some pressure to accept conditions is permissible, but outright coercion (essentially leaving states no choice) would be unconstitutional (later clarified further in NFIB v. Sebelius).

Question 56

(Major) NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)

Answer 56

(Spending Clause / Federalism) States challenged the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision, which conditioned receipt of all existing Medicaid funds on compliance with new expansion requirements. 1. The Court held that Congress’s Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive under the Spending Clause — it left states with no real choice but to comply, violating the principle of federalism. 2. Although Congress can encourage states through conditional spending (South Dakota v. Dole), it cannot coerce states by threatening to cut off substantial existing funding if they refuse new conditions. 3. Key Coercion Factors: • The Medicaid program was a large portion of state budgets (over 10% on average). • The expansion fundamentally transformed Medicaid from a limited program into a massive new entitlement. • The threat to withdraw existing funds was described as a “gun to the head”, making compliance not a real choice.

Question 57

United States v. Constantine (1935)

Answer 57

(Taxing Power) Congress imposed a heavy tax ($1000) on liquor dealers operating without compliance with local state laws after Prohibition ended. 1. The Court struck down the tax, finding it was not a genuine tax, but rather a penalty designed to enforce compliance with state liquor regulations. 2. Applied Bailey v. Drexel logic: a tax is unconstitutional if it is actually a penalty intended to regulate conduct that Congress cannot directly regulate. 3. Test: Look to the substance, not the label — if the measure penalizes unlawful behavior, it is not a true tax and exceeds congressional power. 4. Use when arguing that taxes cannot be used to indirectly enforce state law compliance — must be genuine revenue measures, not disguised regulatory penalties.

Question 58

United States v. Kahriger (1953)

Answer 58

(Taxing Power) Congress imposed a federal occupational tax on gamblers and bookmakers, and a bookmaker challenged it as an unconstitutional regulatory penalty. 1. The Court upheld the tax, finding it valid even if Congress knew that paying the tax would likely incriminate individuals under state gambling laws. 2. Reaffirmed that as long as a tax raises revenue and is not purely punitive, it remains constitutional under the taxing power. 3. Use when analyzing federal taxes tied to illegal activities — focus on whether revenue generation is genuine, not whether regulation is intended.

Question 59

(Major) Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)

Answer 59

(Dormant Commerce Clause) North Carolina enacted a law requiring all apples shipped into the state to bear only the USDA grade — thereby prohibiting Washington State’s superior state apple grades from appearing on shipments. 1. The Court struck down the North Carolina law, holding that it discriminated against interstate commerce by burdening out-of-state businesses for the benefit of local economic interests. 2. Dormant Commerce Clause Principle: Even facially neutral laws are unconstitutional if they have the practical effect of discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce. 2a. Is the purpose protectionist? If yes, unconstitutional. 2b. Is the effect protectionist? If yes, does the burden outweight the benefit? 3. Hunt = Facially Neutral Law + Discriminatory Effect = DCC violation (Courts will look past the surface and strike down laws that have discriminatory effect or protectionist motives.

Question 60

(Major) Maine v. Taylor (1986)

Answer 60

(Dormant Commerce Clause) A Maine law prohibited the importation of live baitfish into the state, aimed at protecting local fisheries and ecosystems from parasites and invasive species. 1. The Court upheld the law, despite it being facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, because Maine demonstrated a legitimate local purpose — protecting unique environmental resources — that could not be adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives. 2. Dormant Commerce Clause Rule: Facially discriminatory laws are “virtually per se invalid” but can be upheld if the state shows: • (a) A legitimate and compelling local interest, and • (b) No reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives available to achieve the same goal. 3. Recognized that environmental preservation can sometimes justify discrimination against interstate commerce, but the burden on the state is very high. Taylor = Rare Exception to Dormant Commerce Clause’s Ban on Facially Discriminatory Laws.

Question 61

(Major) West Lynn Creamery v. Healy (1994)

Answer 61

(Dormant Commerce Clause) Massachusetts imposed a tax on all milk sold in the state, including milk from out-of-state producers, and used the revenue to subsidize local Massachusetts dairy farmers. 1. The Court struck down the scheme, holding that even a facially neutral tax violates the Dormant Commerce Clause if it effectively benefits in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. 2. The structure — neutral tax + local subsidy — functioned as a form of economic protectionism, which the Dormant Commerce Clause forbids. 3. Dormant Commerce Clause Rule: States cannot use their regulatory powers to artificially favor in-state businesses or shift economic burdens onto out-of-state producers, even indirectly. West Lynn Creamery = Facially Neutral Law + Hidden Protectionism = Dormant Commerce Clause Violation.

Question 62

Missouri v. Holland (1920)

Answer 62

(Preemption) Missouri challenged the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which implemented a treaty between the United States and Great Britain to protect migratory birds, arguing that regulating hunting was a state power under the Tenth Amendment. 1. The Court upheld the statute, holding that treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land (Article VI), and Congress may pass laws to implement valid treaties even if the subject would otherwise fall within state control. 2. Established that Congress’s power to implement treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause can expand federal authority beyond its ordinary enumerated powers. 3. Tenth Amendment does not limit the federal government’s treaty-implementing power when a valid international agreement is involved — treaty obligations can authorize federal legislation that would otherwise be unconstitutional if done alone.

Question 63

(Major) Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Answer 63

(Judicial Review) Can SCOTUS force Madison to give Marbury his commission? 1. Establishes Judicial Review. SCOTUS is the final interpreter of the Constitution and can declare Congressional legislation unconstitutional. 2. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is." 3. If there were no judicial review, Congress would be too powerful.

Question 64

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

Answer 64

(Judicial Review) After Brown v. Board of Education, Arkansas officials resisted desegregating public schools, and state officials claimed they were not bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. 1. The Court unanimously held that state officials and legislatures are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, reaffirming the supremacy of federal law and the authority of judicial review (Marbury v. Madison). 2. Emphasized that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land (Article VI), and Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution are binding on all states and state officials. 3. Reaffirmed that deliberate resistance to desegregation orders violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause

Question 65

(Major) Baker v. Carr (1962)

Answer 65

(Political Question Doctrine / Equal Protection / Judicial Review) Voters in Tennessee challenged the state’s legislative apportionment, arguing that outdated district lines diluted votes in growing urban areas, violating Equal Protection. 1. The Court held that claims of legislative malapportionment under the Equal Protection Clause are justiciable — they present a constitutional question that courts can decide, not a political question reserved for other branches. 2. Introduced the Political Question Doctrine factors — courts must decline to decide cases only when specific circumstances suggest a nonjusticiable political question. 1. Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another branch. 2. Lack of judicially manageable standards. 3. Impossibility of deciding without policy determinations unsuitable for courts. 4. Lack of respect for coordinate branches. 5. Unusual need for adherence to political decisions. 6. Risk of multifarious pronouncements by various departments. 3. Distinguished between political cases (which courts can hear) and political questions (which courts must avoid if certain factors are present).

Question 66

Nixon v. United States (1993)

Answer 66

(Political Question Doctrine / Impeachment Process) A federal judge (Walter Nixon) challenged his removal from office after the Senate used a committee to gather evidence in his impeachment trial, arguing that the full Senate was constitutionally required to “try” him. 1. The Court held that challenges to the Senate’s procedures in impeachment trials present a nonjusticiable political question, meaning courts cannot review them. 2. Impeachment proceedings are textually committed to the Senate by the Constitution (Article I, Section 3, Clause 6), and thus outside the competence of judicial review. 3. Reinforced that where the Constitution assigns a power to another branch with explicit discretion (like “the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments”), courts must defer and not second-guess the process.

Question 67

(Major) Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)

Answer 67

(Political Question Doctrine / Equal Protection / Elections) Voters challenged extreme partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina and Maryland, arguing that the district maps violated the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment rights. 1. The Court held that claims of partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable political questions, meaning federal courts cannot adjudicate them. 2. Found no judicially manageable standards for determining how much partisanship in districting is too much — without clear constitutional rules, courts must defer to the political process. 3. Distinguished from racial gerrymandering and malapportionment claims (Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims), where manageable judicial standards exist; pure partisan gerrymandering is seen as a political question.

Question 68

What is the Political Question Doctrine

Answer 68

(Political Question) The courts will not rule on questions where the remedy is political, not legal. Only applies to conflicts with fed. branches, not with states (i.e. separation of powers concern). Use Baker test. 1. Is there a textually demonstrable commitment (does the Constitution give this authority to another federal branch)? (E.g., impeachment trials assigned to Senate). Enforcing departmentalism – there are questions that only Congress/Exec. should interpret. 2. Could there be judicial standards for evaluating it? 3. Is there a need for deference to a decision already made elsewhere?