Final test GET IT

Question 1

Definition of Counterespionage

Answer 1

Detects and disrupts espionage usually secretly

Question 2

Two basic elements of CE.

Answer 2

Protecting secrets from disclosure.

Thwarting foreign intelligence ops.

Question 3

Difference between “security” and “CE”

Answer 3

“S”- minimizes vulnerability to espionage some relatively overt. Government wide.
CE- Detects and disrupts espionage usually secretly

Question 4

Basic functions of security

Answer 4

Personnel, physical, information. Common assumption: always a threat

Question 5

Personnel security

Answer 5

Background. polygraph. update checks.

Question 6

Security information

Answer 6

seeks to protect.
Confidentiality of US policy.
Information giving US potential advantage.
Sources methods for future use.

Question 7

Information Security

Answer 7

restrict access based on a need to know basis. Like classified. On clearance system.. Compartmentalization

Question 8

New challenge of information security

Answer 8

need to share

Question 9

The classification system does what

Answer 9

Compartmentation.
Unclassified. Confidential. secret. top secret.
Damage. Serious damage. Grave damage.

Question 10

Secrets as a public issue

Answer 10

open to stay accountable. Secret to keep info safe.

Overclassification. classification time limits.

Question 11

Challenge of leaks

Answer 11

unapproved disclosure of secret information. can also be unclassified.

Question 12

Challenge of CI

Answer 12

Finding people who are trained to stay hidden.
Time foe and helpful.
overlap with HUMINT.
Suspicions into investigations.
Lots of personnel with access to information.
gains as a spy.
Moles double agents.

Question 13

CI defense

Answer 13

Personnel security.
Assessment of HUMINT sources.
Training and retraining of personnel.

Question 14

CI offense

Answer 14

Gaining knowledge of other countries intel services. difficult collect analysis challenges.
Trying to disrupt espionage before anything large happens

Question 15

People of CI

Answer 15

Ames, Hanssen, Walker family. all spies.

Question 16

Importance of CI

Answer 16

Human nature is always a factor.
Foreign gov capabilities unlikely to decline.
Multinational sharing.
Technology risk of putting too much out there and then not enough, balancing.

Question 17

Reason for Congressional oversight

Answer 17

same for rest of gov. external monitoring of intelligence done mainly by congress.
Accountability.
Investigate.

Question 18

CONG oversight since 1970’s

Answer 18

Revolution church and pike.
Bried of Allende made congress feel misled.
Hughs Ryan amendment for CA

Question 19

Revolution

Answer 19

1970’s Church- senate, Pike- house.
time of troubles and crown jewels.
resulted in permanent oversight committee.

Question 20

SSCI

Answer 20

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Question 21

HPSCI

Answer 21

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Question 22

Key hill Committees

Answer 22

House and Senate Appropriations Committees(Authorizers vs. Appropriators) Armed Services Committees.
House and Senate leadership.

Question 23

Means of Oversight.
See this and it equals what?
Also for who?
THrough what>

Answer 23

Budget Process. Review programs. 
Review of specific programs
•Including covert action
•Special investigations
•Nomination confirmations
•Regular receipt of intelligence

Question 24

Budget process
For?
THrough?
Why?
Does what and what?
To promote what?
Bad to others when?
A part of?
Random thing to remember?
Action?

Answer 24

Principal means for review
•Hearings, briefings, and “QFR’s”
•How funds being spent
•Direction and management of programs
Principal means for leverage
•Changing budget allocations
•To promote particular programs, ideas
•As penalty for not listening to Hill advice
•Congressionally Directed Actions
•“Fencing” funds
•Holding up funding action

Question 25

Review of specific programs Prompted by what? Through what techniques? Cases?

Answer 25

Done as part of--or outside--budget process •Often prompted by specific issues •E.g., 9-11, Iraq WMD; NSA domestic programs •Staff investigations •Hearings •Reports/recommendations

Question 26

Review of covert action a part of what? A key what? What happened in 1991?

Answer 26

Part of budget process, but also done on regular basis •Key role of notification process •Since 1991, tougher standards for justification, obeying law

Question 27

What is Receipt of finished intelligence? To Who? Example?

Answer 27

``` Congress a major intel consumer: •Finished intelligence •Regular briefings to key members •Ad hoc briefings for other members •Annual reports and briefings •E.g., DNI “Worldwide Threat Briefing” ```

Question 28

Issues -- Congressional side | the issue. The politics of it.

Answer 28

``` Absorbing information •The monitoring function •Understanding the issues •Staying on top of developments •Seeking a more thorough approach •Efforts to improve Keeping politics in its appropriate place: •Proper vs. improper use of intelligence •Issue for both Administration, Congress •Preventing unauthorized release of data •Impact of the media ```

Question 29

Strategic intelligence defined

Answer 29

A subset of “national-level” intelligence •“Strategic” often confused with “national” •All-source assessment of trends or developments of major importance to US security

Question 30

“Mysteries”

Answer 30

“Mysteries” -- questions having no definite answer (yet) •Developments that may or may not occur •Foreign actors may not yet know the answer

Question 31

“puzzles”

Answer 31

Puzzles: questions requiring hard info •Secrets sometimes provide “missing piece” •Might be more tactical, short-term

Question 32

``` History of national estimates (NIE) process origin Molded by Created the what from it attached to who? Developed what? ```

Answer 32

Origins: 1948 Berlin crisis •Molded by warning failures in Korea •Creation of the Office of National Estimates (O/NE) •Attached to CIA/Directorate of Intelligence •Developed the “art form” that exists today

Question 33

who produces NIE's

Answer 33

``` National Intelligence Council. Chairman reports to the DNI •National Intelligence Officers (NIO’s) •Specific regions or functional topics •Lead drafting, coordination •Major link with non-government experts ```

Question 34

The estimates process

Answer 34

``` Initiation of NIE •Usually requested by senior policymaker or intelligence official •Some are part of recurring series •Chairman/NIC selects NIO to chair •NIO selects a drafter ```

Question 35

What is NIE's?

Answer 35

``` Estimate” not same as “hard evidence” •Often focuses on mysteries •Pushes judgments beyond known facts •Need caution in how estimates used •“Assess” vs. “indicate” •Clearly show how available information leads to informed speculation ```

Question 36

Degree of Certainty

Answer 36

Remote Unlikely Even chance Probably, Likely Almost certainly

Question 37

Challenges of producing NIE's

Answer 37

Process pitfalls •Policymaker disinterest •Policymaker resistance

Question 38

Process challenges NIE

Answer 38

Best judgment, or group think? •Most common denominator •Less creativity, alternative analysis? •Compromises, log rolling •Bureaucratic interests can be at stake •Competing agendas, philosophies Defending positions taken in previous estimates •Potentially a problem in serial estimates •Process often not good for fast-breaking or rapidly changing events

Question 39

Getting policymakers’ attention NIE

Answer 39

Often hard to get key officials to pay attention •Especially if focused on longer-term issues •Estimates often lengthy •Not tailored for specific officials •Valuable for working-level staffs

Question 40

Adverse policymaker reaction resistance

Answer 40

Estimates can arouse negative response •If high-visibility issues or major programmatic decisions involved •Political pressure possible •Can be blunted by IC process . . . • . . . but not always •Approach taken by DCI (now DNI) is thus crucial

Question 41

Warning def. ish.

Answer 41

most important of intel. Two warning types: strategic and tactical •Both help policymakers take effective steps to avert harm to US security

Question 42

Strategic (warning)

Answer 42

Strategic warning: alert regarding potential threat | •Varying degrees of probability

Question 43

tactical warning

Answer 43

Tactical warning: alert regarding specific threat | •Focus on who, what, when, where, how

Question 44

“Intelligence failure” (Warning) is what? Whos fault? Strategic surprise? Tactical Surprise?

Answer 44

Organizational surprise •Gov't lacks awareness; intelligence at fault •Strategic surprise: being unaware that potential threat to US security exists •Tactical (“incident”) surprise -- being unaware that harmful action will occur at specific time, location, and manner

Question 45

Warning vs. strategic analysis

Answer 45

Strategic analysis (including NIEs) often identifies threatening trends, situations •But not as concrete as warning •Much warning comes from individual IC agencies •Particularly tactical warning •NIE process too slow for imminent events

Question 46

Strategic warning objectives - I

Answer 46

Alert re: existence and likelihood of potential foreign action that could harm key US interests •Alert regarding changes in such a threat •In nature of threat (ability to cause harm) and its likelihood

Question 47

Strategic warning objectives - for US leaders

Answer 47

Help US leaders compare relative seriousness and probability of different threats •E.g., “high impact, low probability” •Help them prepare for range of possibilities, including tactical surprise •E.g., defense systems, emergency planning

Question 48

Tactical warning objectives emphasis on what? For US leaders?

Answer 48

Alert re: impending--possibly imminent--foreign action to harm US security •Emphasis on specifics: when, against what target, by whom, and by what means •Give US leaders some time to take countermeasures

Question 49

strategic up to 9/11

Answer 49

Strategic intelligence indicated an attack was coming, somewhere •Threat information rises in Spring 2001 •Series of intelligence warnings

Question 50

``` 9-11: Tactical warning lessons Failure to what? The problem? The issue? How did this happen? Second issue? Barriers? Others? ```

Answer 50

Failure to link strategic-level indications with tactical intel inside US •“Connecting the dots” problem •Often an “assembling the dots” issue •Leads not pursued consistently, rigorously Information not always shared or given proper attention •Issue: law enforcement - intel cooperation •Legal and bureaucratic barriers •“Noise” level very high •Tactical indicators a challenge

Question 51

Tactical warning challenges

Answer 51

“Noise factor” | More difficult if lacking strategic warning

Question 52

Efforts to improve tactical warning

Answer 52

NIO for Warning Increased importance of information sharing •“Fusion” centers: e.g.,

Question 53

``` Strategic warning challenges of what? Through? Why? Pitfalls? Policymakers play into this? ```

Answer 53

``` A mix of mysteries and puzzles •Collection •Uncertainty, incomplete information •Always a problem, but worse re: warning •“Mindset” and “extrapolation” pitfalls •Getting policymakers to pay attention •“Over-the-horizon” or “not convincing” ```

Question 54

Drug terror networks challenges more technical Created for what? Difficult because?

Answer 54

Broad IC technical capabilities •Created for Cold War •How appropriate for new types of challenges? •Illicit groups increasingly sophisticated •Technology: new challenges for IC •E.g., internet, commercial encryption

Question 55

Drug terror networks challenges more HUMINT Difficult against who? Why? The Q?

Answer 55

``` HUMINT difficult against small groups •Working with “disreputable” sources •Interrogation •How critical as a source of information? •What methods are appropriate? •Question of US civil liberties ```

Question 56

``` The analytic challenge of D and T The focus? On who? Assess what? Problem? Time? ```

Answer 56

``` Focus on identifying, assessing networks •Identify members, potential members •Assess relationships, roles, abilities •A bigger “noise” problem •Increasing volumes of raw information •Yet less time available? ```

Question 57

IC response: history to D and T

Answer 57

Transnational threats first handled by regionally-focused intel organizations •Beyond mid-1980s, the rise of the DCI centers

Question 58

Centers for D and T

Answer 58

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) •Counternarcotics Center (CNC) •Merging of collection, analytic, and covert action disciplines; coordination of IC efforts National CT center

Question 59

National CT Center D and T created when? What is it? What does to do?

Answer 59

``` Created in 2004 •National-level “fusion” •Brings CIA, FBI together in one place •Also brings in other IC, law enforcement personnel, data •Full coverage across US borders ```

Question 60

Law enforcement partners D and T

Answer 60

FBI -- IC member: domestic lead on countering terrorist operations •Also conducts overseas investigations •DEA -- IC member: domestic lead on counterdrug activity •But also overseas presence

Question 61

``` Continuing challenges D and T Success does what? Drugs- Terror- Together? where? Still a problem? next challenge? ```

Answer 61

Success against larger groups creates smaller, more dispersed networks •Drugs--greater specialization •Terror--more independence from al Qaeda? •A drug-terror linkage? •Colombia, Afghanistan How to recognize, thwart network adaptability? •Still need greater sharing of intelligence •How far to break down “the Wall” between intelligence and law enforcement? •A longer-term challenge: multinational intelligence sharing

Question 62

Proliferation: areas of focus questions

Answer 62

Intentions-- what weapons sought? •Capabilities-- what weapons can foreign actors produce? •What efforts to acquire weapons or related technology? •What role for proliferation networks?

Question 63

Proliferation networks questions

Answer 63

How structured? •Who runs them? •How do they operate? •How are weapons, technology acquired?

Question 64

Intelligence challenges W P

Answer 64

``` Proliferation activity often kept hidden •Some weapons activities hard to detect •Level of activity hard to pin down •Multiple interpretations •Dual-use technology ```

Question 65

Denial and deception (D&D)

Answer 65

Keeping other countries from acquiring specific information

Question 66

Denial

Answer 66

Keeping information, activities hidden or otherwise restricted

Question 67

Deception

Answer 67

Directing intelligence away from information or activities | •E.g., use of disinformation

Question 68

D&D problem

Answer 68

A growing challenge for both collection and analysis •Countries use D&D to keep weapons programs from observation •For some countries, a long-standing practice

Question 69

Bottom line: of proliferation of collection? For analysis? The information?

Answer 69

``` Proliferation intel a difficult job •Collection not always easy to get •Analysis can make mistakes: e.g., •Not see it at all •Misinterpret what it is •See something that is not there ```

Question 70

Iraq WMD: the 1991 prologue What they did? What we did?

Answer 70

``` Discovery after Gulf War that Iraq was much closer to developing a nuclear weapon than IC had thought •Iraq had used sophisticated D&D •False procurement destinations •Hiding or disguising facilities •Misdirecting inspectors ```

Question 71

leading form of strategic intelligence

Answer 71

NIE's

Question 72

Key IC players W P

Answer 72

The usual suspects, with strong analytic input from CIA and DIA •Department of Energy •The national labs •Highly technical analysis required

Question 73

``` IC problems highlighted by 9/11, Iran WMD failures. Through who? Why? The Information? Merging? ```

Answer 73

Per 9-11 Commission: •Intelligence agencies’ counterterrorism (CT) efforts largely uncoordinated •Allocation of resources to CT uneven •Information not routinely or quickly shared •Domestic, foreign intel not easily merged

Question 74

``` Reform: basic objectives Echoes? Need of what> Need to what? Through what? ```

Answer 74

Echoes of 1945-1947 debate •Need greater operational coordination among intelligence agencies •Need to share information more effectively •Need to manage IC resources more effectively

Question 75

``` Key debate (again): centralization reform ```

Answer 75

Whether someone has to be truly accountable for IC performance . . . •And thus have much stronger authority over all intelligence agencies •Key personnel, budgets, programs •. . . or whether there is a less organizationally drastic approach to improving IC synergy

Question 76

Three models in 2004 debate of reform

Answer 76

Weak centralization •Moderate centralization •Strong centralization

Question 77

``` 9-11 Commission: strong centralization Who oversees? Change who? control over? Accountable for? Is a part of what? ```

Answer 77

A “National Intelligence Director” (NID) to oversee the Community •(“NID” later changed to “DNI”) •Would have control over budgets, programs •Would have control over key hiring/firing, info sharing •Would be ultimately accountable for IC performance •Would be part of President’s White House team

Question 78

``` Counter-arguments: case for moderate centralization Means? Against strong? first argument of leader? The leaders authorities? What coordinates? can change what? ```

Answer 78

New DNI layer means more bureaucracy •Strong centralization could reduce diversity of effort, increase “group think” •Don’t separate IC leader from direct touch with personnel, programs Existing federated structure can be improved •Enhance DCI authorities--what 1947 law should have done •DCI can coordinate programs if has budget, personnel authority •An empowered DCI can change policies and IT systems to enhance info sharing

Question 79

``` Defense of weak centralization why? need what? first argument against? what should dominate? ```

Answer 79

Loose federation promotes competition of ideas and analysis •Less chance for “politicization” •Various agencies need more, not less, specialized intel support •Bigger national-level intelligence system not flexible enough for that •Departmental intelligence should dominate

Question 80

A pitch for “weak centralization-plus” What leader does? Where does the budget get through? Allocations?

Answer 80

``` Let DCI (or DNI) present budget to President, Congress •But budgets, major resource decisions affecting DoD intel agencies should still come up through SecDef to DCI •Allocations would go back down through SecDef as well ```

Question 81

``` Result: of model of reform: compromise legislation Senate version? Who has control? House version? Final bill? This created? Power to what? ```

Answer 81

Senate version held closer to 9-11 recommendations •DNI would have major control of many parts of IC budgets, personnel •House version gave DNI much less resource authority In conference, both sides yielded ground •Final bill: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 •Created NCTC •Gave DNI new power in managing the IC, but not all that 9-11 Commission had proposed

Question 82

``` Key authorities of DNI manages who? not head of who? Cannot do what? controls? stronger control of what> Funds? Budget for who? Program? People? Manages> Controls who> but not.. Gives DNI what? Cannot do what? ```

Answer 82

Manages IC •Does not head the CIA •Cannot “abrogate the statutory responsibilities” of other IC members •Budget •Stronger control of pace of spending •Can allot funds directly to sub-cabinet units •Does not control budgets for intelligence support to military Can reprogram up to $150 million of an IC member’s intel budget •Can transfer IC personnel for two years •Concurs in selection of key personnel •Manages all aspects of intel process •Controls National Counterterrorism Center budget and programs •But not joint counterterrorism operations Clarifies when DNI can make IC members share •Gives DNI clearer power to decide major purchases •But DNI cannot “interfere” in DoD chain of command

Question 83

If have loose DNI control . . . The questions? Why?

Answer 83

Should the current system of stovepipes predominate? • Or should the system decentralize further? •More collection and analytic resources from current big agencies allocated to directly serve policy departments

Question 84

If strong DNI control . . . The questions? WHy?

Answer 84

Keep current system of large agencies, reporting to deputy DNI’s? •Or reorganize, putting all similar programs into new agencies? •HUMINT agency, technical collection agency, analysis agency, etc.

Question 85

``` Management problems of DNId- the big issue- limited what? How they look at the Problem? Key? Difficulty doing what? Who's growing? Demands? Other growing? ```

Answer 85

Difficulty in coordinating resources on specific intelligence issues •Limited “synergy” in application of various collection systems to a particular target •Potentially divergent approaches to same intelligence problem • sharing information Difficulty developing IC-wide resource allocation to future development •Military a growing source of demand •Yet demands also increasing to provide better, more rapid intelligence to national consumers •Growing strain on overall IC programs