Test #2 Flashcards
(117 cards)
1
Q
Intelligence analysis goal
A
obtain new insights about foreign actions, intentions and capabilities
to help the policymaker increase benefit from intelligence collection
2
Q
Reqs for analysis
A
Requires substantive knowledge and knowledge of US policy issues
3
Q
What analysis does to specific pieces of information.
A
Putting specific pieces of information in a broader context to highlight implications:
For US interests
For policy official’s specific responsibilities
4
Q
How analysis connects information.
A
Analysis builds bridge between raw intelligence and national security official
5
Q
3 all source analysis centers
A
CIA, DIA, INR (State)
6
Q
Specialized analysis
A
NGA, DOE labs, Military service units
7
Q
The analyst is oriented toward
A
substantive issues and expertise
Usually strong interest in area of specialization – focus on an “account
8
Q
The analyst has a mind to
A
solving problems, puzzles
curious
skepticism
9
Q
Types of analytic products
A
Basic intelligence
Current intelligence
Ad hoc products
Can be short-term or in-depth
Estimates
In all cases, written products and briefings
10
Q
Analytic Process
What are the steps
A
Identifying the intelligence question Looking for information Evaluating information Analyzing information Producing a finished intelligence report
11
Q
- Identifying the intelligence question
A
Not the same as a broad topic
Focus is real-world issues faced by policymakers
12
Q
- example
A
Topic:
“Country X military development”
Intel question:
“What new weapons systems of Country X could seriously threaten US forces in 3 - 5 years?”
13
Q
- Intel question origins
A
Standing requirements
Questions developed by IC agencies
Specific questions raised by policymakers (ad hoc requirements)
14
Q
- Developing hypotheses
A
Usually an early part of analytic process
Once question understood, basic concept of answer developed
Might be largely “data-driven”
Analyst guided solely by available data
But preconceptions usually at work
E.g., analysts’ expertise, past experience
Presents major analysis benefits, pitfalls
15
Q
- Assessing what is already known
A
Information held by analyst’s agency and by IC generally
Data collections, earlier finished products
Might require lots of research
In some cases, finished report done with information at hand
16
Q
- Seeking new information
A
Requesting new collection
Need understanding of collection systems
New information from open sources
Largely analyst’s responsibility
17
Q
- Selecting information
A
Selecting relevant info
Requires knowledge of the intelligence question
18
Q
- The wheat-from-chaff problem
A
selecting info
“The straw in the haystack”
“Volume problem
19
Q
- Evaluating new information
A
Have to look at information critically
Don’t take at face value
Is it really relevant?
How reliable is it?
Source access, reliability, track record
20
Q
4.
A
Step 4:Analyzing the information
21
Q
- Figuring out what is going on
A
new information together with existing data, knowledge
How significant is the new information?
What is new, changed, or the same
22
Q
- Identifying:
A
Trends, relationships
Patterns in activity; linkages
Discontinuities
Change in existing trend, pattern, or situation
Anomalies
Something at odds with an established pattern, situation, or relationship
23
Q
Example: trends
A
A growing number of governments are expecting increased flexibility from Maricopa at the next round of trade negotiations next month
24
Q
Example: discontinuities
A
Country Y has dropped its prohibition against allowing terrorist organizations to seek sanctuary within its borders
25
Example: anomalies
Country X has announced a practice mobilization of its armed forces, but instead of going through their normal procedures, several key units are heading toward the border of Country Y
26
4. Interpreting what is going on
Explaining “why” something happening
Foreign motivations, objectives behind specific actions or trends
Why trends, relationships, discontinuities occurring
Estimating the future direction
“Forecasts,” not “predictions”
Possible outcomes
27
Interpreting with best possible judgement
based on available information
Despite lots of data . . .
. . . relevant, reliable information is often in short supply
Have to use what is available at the time
Analyst expertise is key factor
28
Step 5
Identifying meaning for policy
29
5 Policy relevance
What does current situation--and its possible future trajectory--mean for US interests, objectives?
What potential opportunities, difficulties or dangers does the US face?
30
5 Finished products ideally:
brief
conclusions first then supporting argument
How we know what we know -- and don’t know
facts to support conclusions
clarity, objectively
31
pitfal using information
Noise, too much info.
uncertainty,
focusing on past events
not getting beyond the data, forests and trees,
Not looking at data or sources critcally
32
Pitfall. Mindsets.
Mental shortcuts, concepts.
a psychological analogy.
33
pitfall mindset stuck
Not looking for alternative explanations
Sticking with a hypothesis that seems to fit
Failure to develop multiple “models”
Ignoring/rejecting information
Looking for/accepting only information that supports favored hypothesis
Difficulty in keeping information in view
Especially if it doesn’t fit with favored explanation
34
pitfall mindsets alot of different
```
Mirror imaging
Assuming others think like us
Stereotypes
Seeing the future as an extension of the past
“They’ve always done it this way.”
Defending past analytic positions
Group think
```
35
pitfall clarity
the question.
assumption vs. fact.
fact and analytic assertions.
noting when a previous analytic position has changed.
36
“Linchpin” analysis
pitfall. Making key assumptions and knowledge clear.
37
Alternative hypotheses
pitfall. Creating, evaluating several explanations
38
Scenarios
pitfall. Looking at several possible outcomes or trends
39
Alternative/ “competitive” analysis
pitfall. “Contrarian” analysis by design
40
Linchpin analysis example
“Despite yesterday’s announcement that Maricopa is willing to listen to Pima’s concessions, we judge that war is still likely.”
“This is based on our key assumption that because of a variety of economic pressures, Maricopa is determined to attack Pima no matter what.”
41
Example -- Use of scenarios
World oil supplies could tighten further in coming months.
a) World oil demand rises at current high rate, no supply disruptions
b) World oil demand rises at current high rate, with major supply disruption
c) World oil demand stops rising
42
drafting
Stating bottom line (“key judgments”) at the beginning.
Keep paper concise.
clear factual argument.
43
Work pace – crisis support
Short deadlines during crises
Much care required against analytic mistakes
Special task forces often created
Within agencies and across agencies
Analysts might work temporarily outside their major areas of expertise
44
Work pace: short-term intelligence
Increased importance of daily and ad hoc intelligence products
Daily (“current”) intelligence can drive much of analyst’s day
Major importance for entire Intelligence Community of key daily briefings
Many other daily, weekly products
45
Work pace: deadlines
Timely delivery is key
“Perfection” vs. getting it there when customer needs it
Increased focus on short-fuse products
Can put pressure on all stages of the analytic process
46
Top intelligence recipients White House
```
President
Vice President
National Security Advisor
Deputy National Security Advisor
Chief of Staff
They make (or help make) final decisions -- they get whatever support they need
```
47
Key intelligence consumers Cabinet
```
State
Defense
Homeland Security
Treasury
Attorney General
Commerce
All receive significant, highly tailored intel support
```
48
Sub cabinet officials undersecretaries do what
May oversee several policy areas
| May wield major influence, receive tailored products
49
Sub cabinet officials assistant secretaries do what
Run the major policy components
| Key players in interagency process, recieve tailored products
50
DAS name
Dep. Asst Secretary. under undersecretary and assistant secretary. that order
51
what the DAS does
A key driver of policy development within own agency
Major player at lower levels of interagency process
A major intelligence customer
Often tailored support
52
Office Directors what they do where on totem pole
Manage basic policy work units
Critical players in drafting, shaping, and implementing policy decisions
Major interaction with intelligence at working level
Less tailored support
53
The interagency process.
Policy Development, Interagency policy Committees, Deputies Committee, Principals Committee,
54
Policy development
Origination of new initiatives or changes in existing policy
Can involve several levels within single agency or among several agencies
Most basic and frequent opportunity for intelligence support
Goal: regular interaction at working level
55
Interagency Policy Committees
IPCs are the workhorse of the interagency process
Usually chaired by top NSC official
Key negotiations, debates, drafting
Moves policies to Deputies level
Major channel for intelligence input
Regular participation, briefings--not voting members
56
Deputies Committee
Deputy-secretary level
Chaired by Dep. National Security Advisor
Reviews policy proposals from IPC or from deputies level
Dep. DNI is official intelligence representative
Can provide briefings, clarifications, take new tasking
57
Principals Committee
```
Cabinet secretaries
Chaired by National Security Advisor
Final deliberation
Send to President or reject
DNI is intel rep
Final opportunity for providing input to interagency group, receive new tasking
```
58
Types of intelligence input
Raw intelligence
Finished intelligence
Briefings
Intelligence reps
59
Raw Intelligence
Official reporting from various collectors
SIGINT, HUMINT, imagery, open source
Often part of regular briefings
Can be provided by IC agencies or by in-house intelligence units
E.g., Treasury, Energy, Commerce
60
Current intelligence --the PDB
Primary regular intel support to President and other key officials
Highly tailored
Inputs from throughout IC
Major source of tasking by top policy leaders
61
Ad hoc products
Large growth in such products in past decade
Respond to direct policymaker requests for information and analysis on specific issues
Can be tied to key meetings
“Actionable” intelligence
62
Wider-dissem products
```
Longer-term research, “basic intelligence”
Maintains intelligence expertise
Builds databases useful in crises
Reaches lower-level policy officials
Many who in turn brief their superiors
Usually initiated by IC
(Estimates -- subject of future class)
```
63
Briefings Substantial growth in use
Tailored support for key policymakers
| Reflects rise of interagency process
64
Briefings Can provide
Can provide rapid, very targeted input
Direct communication
Feedback, tasking, clarification
65
Intelligence representatives
Increased number of IC reps
Provide regular briefings to key officials
Convey tasking back to intelligence agencies
Enable more targeted support
Enhance IC understanding of policy concerns, information needs
66
Policymakers world
a political environment
Trying to initiate, manage specific policies, programs . . .
. . . whether or not the foreign environment conducive
67
Intelligence world
trying to help understand foreign environment
How that environment might affect policy goals
The picture intelligence paints may--or may not--be welcome news
68
How P and I look at things
Policymakers: positive, can-do
Don’t like to be told something “won’t work”
Intelligence: tries to look objectively, critically at the foreign situation
Look for both obstacles and opportunities
69
P and I making decisions
Policymakers: tend to be decisive
Make many decisions every day
Often prefer clear alternatives
Intelligence: more open-ended
Variables, possible outcomes
Analysis may not clearly support a particular course of action
70
P and I focus on hard data
Policymakers: prefer concrete information
For making--and justifying--decisions
Intelligence: may not always have the specific data desired
Or may not be as specific and concrete as could be
71
P and I how they look at an issue
Policymakers: many issues at a time
Lack of time -- focus on bottom line
Intelligence: diving deeply into an issue
Potential for disconnects on how much detail needed
72
Political environment for P and I
Policymakers: may face strong political momentum behind given policy
Intelligence: objectivity vs. being out of step “with the program”
73
Tradecraft pitfalls, Not being clear about:
```
Intelligence question
“Why are you telling me this?”
What is known vs. not known
Level of confidence in sources
What is fact, what is judgment
```
74
Tradecraft,
| Failure to:
Carefully draw implications from data
Look at alternative interpretations, scenarios
Indicate level of confidence in a particular assessment
Or being careless in stating it
75
Style addressing things
Not getting to the bottom line quickly
Dwelling on details rather than big picture
Dwelling on the negative
76
Style distance to policy/maker
Keeping away from policymaker . . .
. . . or trying to get “too close”
Not listening to policymaker objections regarding tradecraft
77
situational awareness,Not knowing policy context:
What policymakers trying to do
What real issues and debates are
Background vs. “actionable intelligence”
78
Situational awareness of the policymaker more specifically
Not understanding policymaker’s level of knowledge
Failing to adjust to the policymaker’s level of knowledge
E.g., not providing enough new facts if the policymaker is an expert
79
Policymaker pitfalls
Selective reading/listening
Using raw intelligence to make own intelligence assessments
Viewing intelligence as having nothing to add to own expertise
80
Policymaker pitfalls when looking at their own policy more
Distorting intelligence to support own position
Viewing intelligence as “the enemy” if assessments don’t support own position
Trying to get intelligence to change its assessment
81
Politicization
The purposeful slanting of intelligence to support a specific policy or a specific outcome in a policy debate
Corrupts the basic intelligence-customer equation
Crossing the “red line”
Does not include policymaker efforts to change intel conclusions (ignore Lowenthal on this point)
82
Who might politicize
Policymakers can urge intelligence to reconsider judgments
For political reasons, not tradecraft issues
This is not politicization
It may or may not be good, but it happens
83
Intel officers and Politicization
For reasons of political pressure (or personal belief), not tradecraft
84
How politicization happens
Analysts might slant their analysis
E.g., can emphasize certain data or conclusions over others
Managers might revise, reject or “sit on” analysis that they disagree with
Could also fail to defend assessments
85
What covert action is
An effort to influence foreign country or group
But US intervention kept hidden or plausibly deniable
In effect, an extension of US policy by non-attributable means
86
CA used in situations where:
Other policy tools alone deemed not effective or feasible
. . . but non-action is also unacceptable
. . . and potential benefits are seen to outweigh risks
87
Why covert ?
Usually outside normal bounds of nation-state interaction
Less aggressive than open military action; more intrusive than diplomacy
Open acknowledgement potentially seen as a hostile act
88
Plausible deniability
Reasonably defensible denial of association with an action if discovered
Permits both sides to save face and avoid open confrontation
A major reason why intelligence organizations are used
89
Substantial growth in Cold War
Nuclear standoff made open wars less acceptable
90
First permanent, peacetime CA program
Initiated by Truman
| Major boost from Eisenhower, Kennedy
91
A long-standing presence CA
```
CA in use since Washington
Tripoli and Jefferson
Florida and Madison
Civil War
Heavy use in World War II
```
92
Types of Covert action
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Propaganda
Psychological warfare
Political activity
Political action
Economic action
Coups
Paramilitary
```
93
Propaganda def.
Efforts to sway opinion of public or specific groups:
94
Propaganda use
Use of foreign media
Basic use of the truth
Eastern Europe during Cold War (RFE)
Used in political action
“Black” propaganda
False news reports
Spreading rumors
95
Political action
```
Support to particular political direction or group
Congress for Cultural Freedom
Support to specific political parties
Postwar support to Italian CD’s
Countering Allende in Chile
Countering specific political groups
```
96
Economic action
Attempts to disrupt or weaken economic capacity
Goal is usually to weaken or influence government
Can supplement more overt forms of influence
97
Coups
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Encouraging and/or orchestrating overthrow of foreign government
Several early successes
Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954)
Not a common approach in recent years
Effort against Allende, 1970
```
98
Paramilitary activity
Military-related support:
Training, equipment for another country’s police, military
Example of “special activities”
Training, equipping of local forces to attack a government or group
Usually not direct US role in combat
Bay of Pigs
99
who is at the center of the process of CA
But White House always at center
| Increased standardization since 1974
100
Who formally initiates
| CA
Covert action proposal formally originates with policy officials (NSC
101
Who plans
Proposal turned into an actual plan
| Usually by CIA
102
How CA plans approved
Plan approved via interagency process
President ultimately must approve
Congress then has oversight role
103
The “Finding”Who signs it
Requires Presidential approval of covert action, in writing
104
The “Finding”What it is
```
Justification -- how CA supports US policy
Policy and covert action objectives
Plan of action
Risk assessment
Resources required
```
105
Congressional oversight
President must notify Congress of new covert action within 48 hours
A memorandum of notification (“MON”) must be sent regarding CA changes
Congress conducts regular CA reviews
Goals, management
Can alter or halt funding
106
Policy issues
CAs objective?
Realistic goal?
CA best approach?
Support broader US policy?
107
The “silver bullet” problem
Is it being asked by itself to save a troubled policy or to resolve a crisis? CA
108
Some operational questions of CA
How much of the situation is actually understood?
Need for good tactical intelligence data
Need for good analysis
What is likely degree of control over events that a covert action will have?
Potential side-effects: near and long-term
109
Operational issues:
Knowing situation, controllability, deniability
| Need for analysis to inform CA decisions
110
Potential pitfalls of CA
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Failure to ask key planning questions
Inadequate understanding of target
Differences in expectations between policymaker and intelligence
Poor linkage with broader policy
Policymakers “fishing” for silver bullet
Unintended consequences
```
111
Disconnects with Congress
| CA
Failures in communication
| pitfall
112
Accountability CA
US laws
| pitfall
113
Legitimacy CA
Ethical issues
Broader US interests
pitfall
114
Guatemala
Anti-Arbenz propaganda Paramilitary
| Goal: prompt military to remove Arbenz
115
CUBA
oust Castro via exile invasion
Paramilitary invasion of Cuba
Referred to as JMATE
116
Chile
Major propaganda campaign against Allende and leftist parties
Goal: evoke popular fear that an Allende victory would bring a Castro-like regime to power
Nixon
117
Afghanistan
A decade-long paramilitary operation against Soviet forces
Helps get Soviets to leave Afghanistan
A success for Reagan “roll back
Goal: “harassment” of Soviet forces
Make Soviet intervention costly -- but avoid provoking broader Soviet retaliation
