GENERAL 2 Flashcards

1
Q

What does the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics state?

A

Under perfect competition, complete markets, no externalities, and convex preferences, every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal—no one can be made better off without hurting someone else.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Why are the theorem’s assumptions critical—and often criticized?

A
  1. Complete markets: Every contingent good must be tradable—unrealistic for future states. 2. Perfect information: Agents know all prices and payoffs—contradicted by real-world asymmetries. 3. No externalities: Ignores pollution and public goods. 4. Convexity: Assumes diminishing returns and smooth preferences; fails with indivisibilities or increasing returns.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

What is market failure, and how does it arise?

A

A breakdown of Pareto optimality due to violated assumptions—typified by public goods (non-rivalry), externalities (e.g., pollution), monopolies, and information asymmetries.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What does the Second Fundamental Theorem imply for policy?

A

Any Pareto‐efficient outcome can be decentralised via lump-sum transfers followed by prices—so equity concerns can be separated from efficiency, in principle.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Define Pareto efficiency in welfare economics.

A

An allocation is Pareto efficient if no other allocation can improve at least one individual’s welfare without reducing another’s. It’s a minimal efficiency benchmark—silent on fairness or distribution.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

What are the ethical and practical limitations of Pareto efficiency?

A
  1. Equity blind: Cannot compare trade-offs when some lose and others gain. 2. Preference‐satisfaction focus: Ignores well-being aspects like health or capabilities (Sen). 3. Status quo bias: Only improvements over existing allocation count.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

What is government failure in public choice theory?

A

When interventions intended to correct market failures produce worse outcomes—due to rent-seeking, bureaucratic inefficiency, informational constraints, or political incentives.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Why might government failures outweigh market failures?

A

High transaction costs in the political process, concentrated lobbying gains versus diffuse public costs, and institutional rigidities can make regulation and redistribution far costlier than the original market distortion.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

What exactly are externalities?

A

Spillover effects—either positive (e.g., vaccination) or negative (e.g., pollution)—where private decisions impose unpriced costs or benefits on third parties.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

State and unpack the Coase Theorem.

A

If property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, parties will bargain to correct externalities and reach efficient outcomes regardless of initial rights assignment—but real‐world frictions limit its direct applicability.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

What are transaction costs, and why do they matter for externality resolution?

A

Costs of identifying affected parties, negotiating, and enforcing agreements—high costs can preclude Coasean bargaining and justify Pigovian taxes or regulation.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Compare Pigouvian versus Coasean solutions.

A
  • Pigou: Government levies taxes (negative externalities) or provides subsidies (positive) equal to the marginal external cost/benefit. - Coase: Assign property rights; let private negotiation internalize costs if bargaining is frictionless.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Why move “beyond markets and states” in institutional analysis?

A

Real social coordination often uses hybrids—commons regimes, firms, NGOs—so binary market-state models miss critical governance diversity and adaptive potential.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

What is polycentric governance (Ostrom)?

A

Multiple, overlapping decision centers (local councils, co-ops, national agencies) operating at different scales, enabling experimentation, mutual monitoring, and localized problem solving.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Explain co-production of public goods.

A

Joint production by state and citizens (e.g., community‐managed policing), leveraging local knowledge and shared incentives to improve efficiency and accountability.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

What is Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance?

A

A device where principals choose justice rules without knowing their own social position, ensuring impartiality and fairness—leads to equal liberties and the Difference Principle.

17
Q

What principles emerge from Rawls’s original position?

A

(1) Equal basic liberties for all; (2) social and economic inequalities arranged to benefit the least advantaged (Difference Principle).

18
Q

What is Nozick’s Entitlement Theory?

A

Justice in holdings arises from just acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification; any patterned distributive principle (e.g., end-state) violates individual rights.

19
Q

How does Dworkin’s Equality of Resources work?

A

Start everyone with equal resources; allow unequal outcomes only when reflecting choices, while compensating for “brute luck” disadvantages.

20
Q

Distinguish ideal from non-ideal theory.

A
  • Ideal: Construct full‐compliance models with perfect information—highly abstract, risk unrealistic policy. - Non-ideal: Incorporate incentive, informational, and compliance constraints to offer actionable recommendations.
21
Q

What motivational and epistemic constraints drive non-ideal theory?

A
  1. Motivational: Self‐interest, partial compliance, ideological diversity. 2. Epistemic: Bounded rationality, dispersed knowledge in complex systems (Hayek’s dispersed knowledge argument).
22
Q

What is symmetrical idealization?

A

Comparing regimes (capitalism vs. socialism) under identical ideal assumptions (full compliance, perfect information) to ensure fair institutional comparison.

23
Q

On what grounds does Cohen argue socialism superior under idealized conditions?

A

Collective ownership fosters egalitarian sharing, community cooperation, and eliminates market-driven inequalities—under assumptions of perfect motivation and coordination.

24
Q

How does Brennan defend capitalism as the superior ideal?

A

Incentive structures in markets promote innovation, efficiency, and individual freedom—under idealized self-interest assumptions.

25
How do Buchanan & Tullock model politics as **exchange**?
Constitutional rules emerge from bargaining under a “veil of uncertainty”—parties don’t know their future social positions, leading to broadly acceptable, rule-based decision frameworks. ## Footnote [Government Failures, Rent Seeking, and Public Choice - Econlib](https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/governmentfailures.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
26
What is the **veil of uncertainty** in constitutional choice?
A step back from Rawls’s original position: decision-makers know general preferences but not their outcomes, prompting them to design rules that protect against worst-case scenarios. ## Footnote [Government Failures, Rent Seeking, and Public Choice - Econlib](https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/governmentfailures.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
27
Why does Hayek call **social justice** a “mirage”?
He argues that no planner can aggregate the dispersed, tacit knowledge embedded in market prices; attempts to centrally allocate resources are doomed by epistemic limits. ## Footnote [The anatomy of government failure | Public Choice](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
28
How does **bounded rationality** underpin Hayek’s argument?
Agents have limited capacity to process information; the price mechanism harnesses dispersed knowledge more effectively than centralized planning. ## Footnote [The anatomy of government failure | Public Choice](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-015-0262-y?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
29
What is **bounded rationality**?
The concept that agents have limited capacity to process information.
30
How does bounded rationality underpin Hayek’s argument?
The price mechanism harnesses dispersed knowledge more effectively than centralized planning. ## Footnote This highlights the limitations of centralized decision-making in the context of economic information.
31
What parallels exist between Hayek and **standpoint epistemology**?
Both stress the importance of local, perspectival knowledge. ## Footnote Hayek focuses on market data points, while standpoint theories emphasize marginalized social perspectives.
32
Why shouldn’t the First Welfare Theorem be the **sole benchmark** for markets?
It omits distributional justice, dynamic innovation benefits, institutional diversity, and the discovery function of prices beyond static efficiency. ## Footnote These factors are crucial for understanding the full implications of market efficiency.
33
What elements are omitted by the First Welfare Theorem?
* Distributional justice * Dynamic innovation benefits * Institutional diversity (e.g., polycentric governance) * Discovery function of prices
34
True or False: The First Welfare Theorem accounts for dynamic innovation benefits.
False
35
What is the significance of **institutional diversity** in market evaluation?
It refers to the variety of governance structures that can affect market outcomes positively.
36
What does the term **discovery function of prices** refer to?
The ability of prices to convey information and facilitate the discovery of new opportunities in the market.
37
Fill in the blank: The **First Welfare Theorem** is primarily concerned with _______.
[static efficiency]
38
What is one key critique of government intervention as presented in the text?
Government interventions can lead to failures that are as significant as market failures.