GV4N2 Author Main Arguments

Question 1

Stephan and Chenoweth

Answer 1

Protest-focused: Basically trying to analyze what and why nonviolent civil resistance movements are used and to what degree are they successful
Trying to provide another take on how opppootsiotn movements mobilize, underscoring how violence may not necessairly be more productive/effective than non-violence (7)
So theirl goal: explain the “strategic effectivness of violent and nonviolent cmapings” using data on violent and nonviolent movements from 1990-2006 (8)
Using a qual (historical cases) and quant (statstical analysis) approach (8)
Find that large-scale nonviolent cmapigns are successful 53% of the time compared with 26% efficacy rate of violent ones (8)
The reason for this is that committing to nonviolence enhances the movement’s credibility and dom and int rep. This also increases pressure on the state (9)
And also the regime loses credibility if they use violence against a non-violent group and doing so could garner sympathy towards the dissident group (9)

Question 2

Sullivan

Answer 2

Create a theory of how repression and resistance develop (1163)
Take a quant and qual approach, looking at data from the Guatamalen National Police and anlayzing newspapers (1163)
Argue that state anticipate challengers by figuring out how they mobilize and tactics they use and target the most radical challengers (1163)
Basically, arguing that authorities analyze how dissidnets organize and mobilize to try and nip potential challenges to the regime in the bud before it develops into a serious or popular threat to the regime’s survival (1164)
But clafiry that governments only look at highly influential and radical leaders that are the most persuasive and capable of mobilizing large numbers (1164)
Find that biases in newspaper data lead researchers astray in suggesting that state only repress in response to challenge instead of pre-emptively repressing them (1165)
Provides a model of repressive action to differentiate repression from one that targets mobilization to one that focuses on repressing overt challenges (1165)
Challenges the “thereta response theory” in which governm,etn use coercion in response to dissidence (1165)

Question 3

Pearlman

Question 4

Fearon and Laitin

Answer 4

First to produce quantitative study of civil wars and to identify what characteristics o f countries are more likely to experience a civil war. Focus on macro-level of country (rather than meso (orginzation and groups) or mirco levels (individuals). Use country years as their unit of analysis. Onset is binary (so doesn’t account for low levels of fighting) . Assume unit homogeneity
Assess inequality and ethnic diversity and find no relatio ship between individual level inequality (gini coefficient) and rise of civil war onset. Also find no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset. Evaluate low GDP per capita (strongest finding). Low GDP per capita captures opportunity (focus on low state capacity) and greed (poverty and opp cost) explanations. Some other studies say that state capacity is more important. Find a U shaped relationship with democracy scores, so basically that mixed/hybrid demcoracies are more at risk of civil war that full democracies or full autoacracies. Analyze rough terrain and see that mountains increased risk, according to their study and reason that mountains enable insurgencies to separate and organize away from the city center, and t provide natural cover and obstacles from state troops. Also find that among natural resources, oil exports increase onset of civil war.

Question 5

Cederman et al

Answer 5

Points out that scholars tend to write off grievances as a civil war cause because in some quantiative studies, often don’t see a “statistically significant” relationship between grievances (like ethnic diversity and unequal individual wealth distribution) and civil war outbreak (1)
Create a new data set – Ethnic Power Relations dataset or EPR-ETH to be able to measure grievances in a new way that includes horizontal inequalities (3-4)
Argue that by highlighitn grievances as a cause of civil wars can also pave ways for finding solutions to peace that actually work and address the causes of the war (7)

Question 6

Lewis

Answer 6

Scope conditions: Weak states w limited capacity to monitor their peripheries. Study focus on Uganda since 1986
Fieldwork: 14 months in Uganda – relied on interviews with former rebels, government officials, journalists + data from amnesty program + newspaper sources
Argument: insurgency in weak states often state “small poor and secre” with just a handful of fighters and weapons and often without proor networks. Usually easily defeated in its early stages - many orgs fail before becoming viable ooponesnts
2-stage model
Stage 1: why reb grps form in the first place
Ehtnciity does not matter for stage 1
Stage 2: Why some succeeded while other fail
Ethnic homoegnentiy matters for stage 2 (when they become viable) because homogenous ethnic networks faciitlate the spead of rmours abt rebel capabilities
Problem: When they initially form, insurgent groups have very limited capabilities so people would not support them since tehy are not credible actors
Rebels use remours and low level violence to dispaly credibility. Discusses how most political science research by 2016 concluded that ethnicity does not play a role in civil war onset – citing Fearon and Laitin in particular (1426-7)
Used a mixed quanttiiative and qualitative approach:
Interviewed former rebels, govenment official, and civilians who livied during the conflict, conducing focus groups (1428-9)
And also creating a dataset of all the rebel groups in Uganda that formed in 1986 which represents the turning point before the conflict started (1433

Question 7

Shesterinina

Answer 7

4 pathways to civil war that armed groups can take
Small, clandestine groups (Lewis model)
Pre-existing organizations and networks (Stanliland model)
Social movements, sometimes with defections from military
Splits with the regime (like military coup that escalates or regime collapse)
These pathways vary in their ties to and interactions with civilians, the state, other non-state actors, and with international actors
These origins have path-dependent effects on onset, wartime dynamics, and post-war effects of conflict. Factors endogenous to the conflict are important too
Argument: Need a processual approach to studying civil war

Question 8

Weinstein

Question 9

Revkin

Question 10

Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler

Question 11

Kydd and Walter

Question 12

Horowitz

Question 13

Doyle and Sambanis

Question 14

Fortna and Howard

Answer 14

conducted an analysis of past UN peace missions using SOO and matching similar UN missions to each other
Findings:
Peacekeeping makes civil war less likely to resume after a ceasefire
Peace also tends to be longer lasting when peacekeepers are deployed and eventually leave, than when there are no peacekeepers at all
All kinds of missions have a positive impact on lasting peace BUT
Multidimensional missions seem to have the best impact as well as any missions that combine military and civilians cooperation
Gilligan and Sergenti also ask whether UN interventions cause

Question 15

Gilligan and Sergenti

Answer 15

Ask whether UN interventions cause peace also using matching to test between non-PK missions and PK missions
Identify the duration of the war and ethnic factionalization as confounders
Match civil wars in their data based on similar covariates to assess whether the only difference between the pairs is the presence of PK
Findings:
PK has a significant impact on peace maintenance
PK missions happen best (and produce longer lasting peace) once a ceasefire is implemented
But PK doesn’t work when there is still fighting going on, so has no effect on shortening civil wars

Question 16

Wallensteen

Question 17

Tarrow and della Porta

Answer 17

Discuss the role that globalization has had in shaping protests and discuss the idea of “complex internationalism” (227)
Explaining why protests against the US invasion of Iraq was a salient political moment that redefined understanding of protest and how it mobilized people: “We think not: for its immediate target was not one of the great international financial institutions, or even American or global neoliberalism. Nor was it primarily composed of activists with a global vocation, though many of these also took up the antiwar cause. Most were what we will call “rooted cosmopolitans”: ordinary citizens, more commonly involved in domestic politics or movements, who reached beyond their own home bases to join with millions of others around the world” (228)
Argue that intentional movements reflect globalization and the fact the sphere of political authority has partially internationalized. They argue that international protest provides young activists with new political opportunities through internationalization. And also have created ‘rooted cosmopolitans” (228)
Theory of complex internationalism from pg 230-242

Question 18

Bray

Answer 18

Considers how prest movement reflects “cosmopolitan practices and possibilities” and argues that global protests create “cosmopolitan publicity” where people engage in “transnationally connected social criticism” and political conflict created with the purpose of dismantling or impacting the authority of the state and status quo (685)

Question 19

Ayoub and Stoeckl

Answer 19

Come up with the double helix theory of how protest and counter-protest TANs interact, looking specifically at conservative TANs and LGBTQ+ TANs. Also notes how the conservative tans readapt tactics that the LGBTQ TANs use for recruitment and also to advocate their cause. Underscore how “rival TANs have reciprocal relationship” and are intertwined in each other’s moves and actions like a double helix (289)

Question 20

Kinds of nonstate vactivity agains the state

Answer 20

Organized crimes (cartels, mass protest/brellion, military coup, political assasination, civil war, terrorism

Question 21

Dissent

Answer 21

Non-state actors “collectively threatening to impose costs on the ruling entity to incentivize the government to change a status quo policy, treatment, power allocation, or resource distribution”

Question 22

Repression

Answer 22

The “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organizations, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practises or institutions”

Question 23

Dissent-repression nexus

Answer 23

Reciprocal interactions between state repression and dissident which means that actors make decision in anticipation of other decisions. Can understand by either making dissent or repression the independent variable

Question 24

What is the consensus on Dissent and Repression?

Answer 24

Dissent always evokes state repression in some form, the scope and intensity of repression are conditioned by the regime type, short and long term effects of repression often vary considerably, state repression is less effective against non-violent movements that are highly organized, non-violent dissent tends to elicit less intense government repression than violent dissent, cooperation of security forces is critical to a resistance campaign’s ultimate success

Question 25

Protest

Answer 25

Protest is a mode of contentious politics non-state actors may choose to utilize, amongst others.

Question 26

Ideology

Answer 26

But mainly a mix of ideas that “explain”, “justify”, “eliminate contesting interpretations of political concepts," can induce “mass mobilization, manipulation, and control,” are “mobilized belief systems,” are “logically arbitrary, but often with great cultural significance,“aims to preserve, amend, uproot, or rebuild a given social order.”

Question 27

Liberal

Answer 27

intellectual tradition grand strategy And/or as IR theoretical approach and foreign policy doctrine

Question 28

Illiberalism

Answer 28

permanently situated in relation to liberalism but not synonymous with undemocratic or authoritarian ones Represents backlash against today’s liberalism (political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and civilization often in the name of democratic principles Form of “post-liberalism” Proposes majoritarian, nation-centric, sovereigntist solutions favoring traditional hierarchies and cultural homogeneity Its proponents utilizes the existing structure of the liberal state to gain and consolidate power permanently situated in relation to liberalism but not synonymous with undemocratic or authoritarian ones Represents backlash against today’s liberalism (political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and civilization often in the name of democratic principles Form of “post-liberalism” Proposes majoritarian, nation-centric, sovereigntist solutions favoring traditional hierarchies and cultural homogeneity Its proponents utilizes the existing structure of the liberal state to gain and consolidate power

Question 29

(il)liberal intentionalism

Answer 29

Generally hold a western “cosmopolitan vision of ‘a single humanity endowed with rights for all identities, races, and genders, and the subsumption of conflict under multilateral institutions and trade.’” (De Orellana and Michelsen Illiberalism and the New Right does not negate the international Distinct in how they draw from the history nationalism and liberal internationalism So they can still be pro multilateral institutions/trade by just don’t want the “unjust limitations imposed by liberal intentionalist norms”

Question 30

Transnational Protest

Answer 30

Instances where non-state actors and across states with a shared agenda collectively impose costs on multiple states and/or organizations to change a status quo policy, treatment, power allocation, or resources distribution Key actors: Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANS)

Question 31

Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANS)

Answer 31

Actors working intentionally on an issue who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchange of information and services Potentially TAN actors: Ingentional and domestic NGOs Research and advocacy orgs Local social movement organizers Foundations Media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals Parts of regional and intentional IOS Parts of executive/parliamentary branches of governments Emerge when channels between domestic groups and governments are hampered or severed, when activities believe the network will enhance their campaigns, when international conferences create arenda for building networks Have been important in debates regarding human rights, women’s rights, the environment, infant health, and indigenous people Haver emerged since the 1970s Unprecedented in number size, professionality, density and complexity of int-dom linkages Shift in globalization and institutional interdependence has made them more common Development of international institutions allow for networks to form Increased visibility of nonstate actors, awareness of each other and power to influence decisions

Question 32

Complex Internationalism

Answer 32

“the expansion of international institutions, international regimes, and the transfer of the resources of local and national actors to the international stage, producing threats, opportunities and indirectly, grassroots social movements”

Question 33

Double Helix Entanglements

Answer 33

Ayoube and Stoecki examine how moral conservative and LGBT advocacy networks respond and anticipate each other actions How? Globalization shapes protest dynamics and social movements How social movements with diff ideologies interact and respond to each other on the global scale How conservative movements have adopted the tools o liberal movements in advocating for their claims

Question 34

Cosmopolitian Publicity

Answer 34

Where publics around the world form a "xxx public” and challenge the idea of the nation-state as representative of their public(s) interests. Recent protests have created spaces for this by "suspending the orderly process and ordinary rules of engagement policies by governments,” ’ which can ‘at least partially suspend the normal modes of power and control over national and global publicity (Bray). Determines who gets to appear in public, who gets to speak and represent others, what discourses and issues are politically visible. Such changes, in relation to disillusionment with liberalism, institutions, and the conducts of one own’s state, have arguable effects on international-oriented protest coming to the foray.

Question 35

Rooted Cosmopolitans

Answer 35

“People and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transactional network of contacts and conflict” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005, pg. 237) Unusual character of current wave of globalization is not heighted economic integration but “the growth of a stratum of people who, in their lives and their cognitions, are able to combine the resources and opportunities of their own societies with activism beyond borders’” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005, pg. 238)

Question 36

Grievances

Answer 36

Can explain onset in some places but not others Broad concepts: political violence (civil war, rebellions, coups, and riots), Earliest author was Gurr who saw grievance causes as “sociological response to the colonial view of rebellion as ‘irrational’ and actors who engaged in them were 'fanatics,'" Theory: Collective violence varies with relative deprivation of a collective, Anger about what people get v expectations about they ought to get, modernization and visible inequality makes people expect more than they get, Mechanism: psychological frustration-aggression, Evidence: Mixed, but not well-supported, Trivial Conditions (Goertz 2006), Are grievances just trivial? Trivial condition = a necessary condition for the outcome but has no explanatory values because it is present in all/most cases with and without the outcome

Question 37

Greed

Answer 37

Authors: Collier: “Rebel movements themselves justify their actions in terms of a catalogue of grievances: repression, exploitation, exclusion. Politically motivated academics have piled in with their own hobbyhorses, which usually cast rebels as heroes. I have come to distrust this discourse of grievance as self-serving” (Collier 2007: The Conflict Trap), Greed of Rebel Leaders: predatory rebel leaders start civil wars to seize control of natural resources, oil reserves, and create opportunities for illegal production (like opium), Greed of Rank and File: opportunity cost of fighting, low economic, development/job/wages makes fighting attractive and recruiting cheaper. This is where winning hearts and mind strategy comes in – developmental aid can lift incomes and increase support for the government. In reality war doesn’t always pay. Low and risk-insensitive rebel compensation in Iraq as an example. No evidence of a positive effect of regional unemployment on rebellion Poor individuals support rebels less in Pakistan. Mixed experimental support for vocational training and cash transfers. Pure opportunity cost arguments lack a political theory of civil war

Question 38

Opportunity

Answer 38

Authors: Fearon and Laitin discuss the opp for insurgency which they define as “Insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas” (2003: 79), Factors that make civil war likely: Low state capacity (GDP per capita) Information capacity, knowledge of insurgency, Administrative capacity, ability to effectively govern, Military capacity, ability to effectively fight and repress Rough Terrain - mountains, jungles, swamps, Large territories, Large populations Non-contiguous territories

Question 39

Correlates of Civil War (Fearon and Laitin)

Answer 39

First to produce quantitative study of civil wars and produces many quant studies to identify what characteristics o f countries are more likely to experience a civil war. Focus on macro-level of country (rather than meso (organization and groups) or micro levels (individuals). Use country years as their unit of analysis. Onset is binary (so doesn’t account for low levels of fighting). Assume unit homogeneity. Assess these among many : Inequality and ethnic diversity, find no relationship between individual level inequality (gini coefficient) and rise of civil war onset. No relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset. Low GDP per capita (strongest finding). Captures opportunity (focus on low state capacity) and greed (poverty and opp cost) explanations. Some other studies say that state capacity is more important U shaped relationship with democracy scores. So basically that mixed/hybrid democracies are more at risk of civil war that full democracies or full autocracies. But other studies show that civil war and political violence are confounders for democracy score. Rough terrain: mountains increased risk but other studies found no significant effect of mountains. Potential reason for why mountains increase risk of civil war is that they enable insurgencies to separate and organize away from the city center and they also provide natural cover and obstacles from state troops. Natural resources: Oil exports is significant. Other natural resources like minerals, diamonds, and drugs can prolong wars. But oil can work through several mechanisms: Rebel greed: Resource control as “prize”, grievances: Resources may cause inequalities, economic instability, and local externalities fueling dissatisfaction and conflict, feasibility: Resources as “permissive” cause, providing financial basis for rebellion Weak statehood: Lack of bureaucratic capacity and/or accountability mechanisms, Weak social cohesion due to little internal trade. But correlates of war have many limitations. Proxy variables at macro level may not capture grievances experienced at meso and micro levels. Variables are slow moving. Not good predictors of where civil war will occur – civil wars are actually rare even in poor, large, mountainous, oil rich countries

Question 40

Rebel Governance

Answer 40

Organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for public purpose (Kasfir 2015). Types of rebel governance: government, economic treaty, currency, education, attempt to join an IO, health, border patrol, welfare/aid, constitution, housing, elections, infrastructure, diplomatic mission abroad, public transportation, identification documents, justice, political party, law, media outlet, policing/security, negotiate resource rights, consittutency politics, taxation, armed forces

Question 41

Internal War

Answer 41

“Denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or policies” Can also be known as “revolution,” “civil war,” “revolt,” “uprising,” "guerilla warfare,” “mutiny,” jacquerie,” “coup d’etat,” “terrorism,” “insurrection”

Question 42

Correlates of War

Answer 42

Identifying civil wars through data, military action internal to the metropole, the active participation of the national government, effective resistance by both sides, at least 1000 annual battle deaths

Question 43

Civil War

Answer 43

“Civil war can be defined as armed combat within a sovereign state between an incumbent government and a nonstate challenger that claims full or partial sovereignty over the territory of the state. In other words, civil war always concerns an incompatibility in terms of political control.”

Question 44

Horizontal Inequalities

Answer 44

Argument that ethnic civil wars driven by grievances and that non-ethnic civil wars driven by lack of economic opportunity Ethnic group: ‘Group of humans that “entertain a subjective belief in common descent” based on, e.g., a shared language, religion, phenotype, history, or settlement area. (Weber 1978: 385-398,’ In multiethnic states: Political power and redistribution centered around ethnic lines which can produce inequality and grievances Ethnic groups often live in spatially concentrated manner and are culturally distinct which facilitates mobilization and opportunities for rebellion Ethnic identities are less maleable than other identity markker s which hardens bargaining problem Indidivdibale symobolic goods tied to ethnicity and culture (territoriy and nation-state) Commitment probs due to ethnic demographics (changes and voting patterns that might prevent agrreement) Concepts: Ethnic civil wars – not all civil wars Focus on meso-level ethnic groups Hortional inequalityes between ethnic groups, not vertical inequalliies btwn indiivduals Theory: Horizontal inequality → grievances → civil war Group identification, integroup comparison, evalulation of injustice, framing and blaming (HI → grianveaces) Mobilization, claims and repression (grievances → civil war) Findings Political exclusion: Politically excluded ethnic groups are more lilety to fight civil wras than included groups Downgrading: recent exclusion increases risk of onset by ethnic group Size: large ecldued groups are more likleyt to fight civil wars than small excluded groups Economic exclusion: poorer ethnic groups more liklety to fight civil wars

Question 45

Bargaining Failure

Answer 45

A theory that because war is costly and risky for everyone, people rationally bargain to teach a compromise before settling on fighting. BUT this theory has limitations: Infromation asymmetry Incentives to misrepresent or having different beliefs in the others’ capabilities of fighting can lead actors to miscalculate. Commitment problems Inability of actors to credibily commit to a set of future actions, decrating range of possible bargains Indivdisbilities. Certain policy outcomes and territories are not amenable to compromise

Question 46

Armed mobilization

Answer 46

“Mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action.”

Question 47

International Factors

Answer 47

Spill-over effects When civil war crosses borders (rebel groups emerge across borderlines, invasion) Refugee flows. Increased military spending and decreased develooment in states neighboring a state with a civil war can also increse risk of civil war. Diasporas -- become a source of financial and material support in civil wars – more so after the end of CW. External Support -- can prolong conflicts, prospects of International support may influence onset, not just future conflict finances. Technology of rebellion, conventional warfare. Using heavy armor, artillery, well-defined front lines, battles, trench warfare, town sieges Irregular warfare, insurgency, guerilla tactics. Symmetric non-conventional, “Primitive war”s – both state and rebels have low capacity but no asymmetry"

Question 48

Collective action problem

Answer 48

An individual would be better off if they cooperated to a produce a public good but they dont procude the public good ebcause individual internst is not to pariticiapte in producing it (Olsen)

Question 49

Public good

Answer 49

non-excludable (you can’t prevent others from benefitting), nonrivalrous (the good doens’t diminsh government that would treat citizens better)

Question 50

Free-rider problem

Answer 50

everyone will benefit from new government whether they took risk of joining insurgency or not, so rational for individual not to fight

Question 51

Armed mobilization among Small groups with homogeneity

Answer 51

Easier to overcome problems, costs of coordination is lower, norms of reciprocity, peer pressure

Question 52

Amred mobilization among large groups with heterogeneity

Answer 52

Selective incentives (salaries, looting, only guerrillas benefit form land reform IF rebels win) Coercion (forced recruitment forced quartering)

Question 53

How armed orgs are built (Lewis)

Answer 53

Scope conditions: Weak states w limited capacity to monitor their peripheries. Study focus on Uganda since 1986. Fieldwork: 14 months in Uganda – relied on interviews with former rebels, government officials, journalists + data from amnesty program + newspaper sources. Argument: insurgency in weak states often state “small poor and secre” with just a handful of fighters and weapons and often without proor networks. Usually easily defeated in its early stages - many orgs fail before becoming viable opponents. 2-stage model Stage 1: why reb grps form in the first place. Ethnicity does not matter for stage 1. Stage 2: Why some succeeded while other fail Ethnic homoegnentiy matters for stage 2 (when they become viable) because homogenous ethnic networks faciitlate the spead of rmours abt rebel capabilities. Problem: When they initially form, insurgent groups have very limited capabilities so people would not support them since they are not credible actors. Rebels use rumors and low level violence to display credibility

Question 54

Territorial control

Answer 54

Control over the use of the means of violence in populated territory, potentially imperfect

Question 55

Rebel Organization

Answer 55

“consciously coordinated groups whose members engage in protracted violence with the intention of gaining undisputed political control over all or a portion of a pre-existing state’s territory” (Kasfir 2015)

Question 56

Definition of the state

Answer 56

“A state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1913) “The state as a person of international law should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with the other states” (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933) “The state is a social organization that acts as a supplier in the market for governances” (Acharya and Lee 2023)

Question 57

What states have that rebel governance might need

Answer 57

What states often have Orgnaization (rebels often have) Governance (rebels sometimes have) Monopoly of violence (rebels sometimes have) Territory (rebels sometimes have) Population (rebels sometimes have) Member of the international community of states (often no for rebels)

Question 58

Initial Endowments (Weinstein)

Answer 58

Material wealth: natural resources, external support Social endowments: local ties, ethnic identities, shared norms These affect the types of recruits of recruits leaders can attract. Recruits uncommitted opportunists with short-term material interests for enrichment. Recruits self-disciplined rebels with long-term or nonmaterial goals These affect the degree of discipline that rebel leaders are able to impose. Allowing indiscpline/abuses against civilians is necessary to maintain membership (military strategy still controlled from the top) Strict enforcement of discipline. Hence, governance varies based on initial material and social endowments: Opportunistic rebel organizations extract resources from civilians through coercion and do not create institutions that limit themselves Activist rebel organizations obtain resources from civilians by striking a bargain and creating governance institutions that limit abuses/place limits on extraction

Question 59

Competitive governance

Answer 59

Looking at competitive governance in Mosul in 2014 An estimated 75% of the population stayed (roughly 900,000 out of 1.2 million) “IS could not have captured and governed Mosul for as long as it did without the compliance and active support of some of the city’s population. Those who stayed (“stayers”) provided human and economic resources - whether voluntarily or involuntarily - that enabled IS to hold and govern territory.” What is important might not be active support but also that just staying provides an economic base for rebel groups. Research design 61 semi-strucuted interviews + survey of 1458 residents. DV: did respondents stay or leave Mosul (observable behavior). People who perceived governced to have improved under IS rule compared to governance by the Iraqi government were more likely to have stayed – but decision to say or leave were multifactorial

Question 60

Variance in Rebel Governance

Answer 60

There is signficiant variance in Whether rebels govern or use coercion to extract (Weinstein 2007) In the types of governance rebel groups do (Albert 2022) Whether governance is inclusive or provide selective incentives to supporters (Stwear 2018) Varianice might be explained by: Economic endowments (Weinstein 2007): Rebels with weak endowmenets govern to compensate for weakness (But: No clear correlation between rebel governance and rebel strength) Competitive governance between rebels and states This might be seen as a quest for legitimacy in the eyes of the local popular or the constituency rebels claim to represent …or just a way of avoiding exit since civilians who stay can contrinute whether they are willing or unwilling supporters (Revkin 2021) Ideology and an attempt to claim credibility as the new secessionist state might influence the decision to govern Stationary bandits Suggest an extractive logic where governance is a result of taxing production that is difficult to observe (like gold0 Time horizons matter

Question 61

Attrition

Answer 61

Try to persuade their enemy that they can impose considerable costs if they continue to pursue a certain policy

Question 62

Intimidation

Answer 62

Try to convince the population that they are strong enough to punish disobedient civilians and the government is too weak to stop them

Question 63

Provocation

Answer 63

get the enemy to respond to terrorism with violence and repression in order to get the population to support the terrorists

Question 64

Spoiling

Answer 64

Attack to perusade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are week and untrustworthy to undermine peace negotiations

Question 65

Outbidding

Answer 65

Use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have a greater resolce to fight than rival groups and should be more worthy of support