Handout 14

Question 1

Representationalism says that how things seem to a subject is ___________

Answer 1

just how the subject’s
experience represents the world as being

Question 2

The Scope question of Representationalism is

Answer 2

which elements of the world does sensory experience represent?

Question 3

The Scope Question of Representationalism is similar to Siegel’s question:

Answer 3

Do any sensory experiences represent any properties other than color, shape, illumination, motion, their co-instantiation in objects and successions thereof?’

Question 4

What is the most famous answer to the Scope Question of Representationalism?

Answer 4

Hume’s denial that we perceive causal relations.

Question 5

How does Kant respond to the Scope Question of Representationalism?

Answer 5

Kant denies that we perceive
things as they are in themselves

Question 6

How does Berkeley respond to the Scope Question of Representationalism?

Answer 6

no sensible quality is perceived by
more than one sense

Question 7

The Scope Question presupposes _________ representationalism

Answer 7

Weak (or impure)

Question 8

What is the Scope Question for naive realism?

Answer 8

which aspects of the external world
can our sensory experience can present?

Question 9

What is the scope question for sense datum theory?

Answer 9

which sensible features can sense data possess?

Question 10

What is a conservative way to address the Scope Question?

Answer 10

restrict the represented elements to ‘orthodox’ or ‘low level’ qualities like sizes, shapes, and colours.

Question 11

How do naive realists go beyond the conservative position in addressing the Scope Question?

Answer 11

By admitting ordinary objects as elements that sensory experience presents.

Question 12

How would we go about arguing that sensory experience represents ‘high level’ or ‘unorthodox’
properties?

Answer 12

Phenomenal Contrast Method (siegel)

Question 13

Siegel mostly restricts her attention to ________

Answer 13

visual experience

Question 14

Rich Content View (i.e. Thesis K)

Answer 14

in some visual experiences, some high-level properties (e.g.
causal relations, kind properties) are represented.

Question 15

How does Siegel make her case for the Rich Content View?

Answer 15

by arguing on a case-by-case basis for the inclusions
of various sorts of high-level property amongst what visual experience represents.

Question 16

The Rich Content View is a view about which kinds of properties?

Answer 16

properties whose representation helps determine
the phenomenal character of visual experience.

Question 17

How could someone deny the Rich Content View while still insisting that experience represents various high-level properties?

Answer 17

so long as they could
argue that the representation was irrelevant to visual experience’s phenomenal character.

Question 18

Someone might deny that Rich Content View while still allowing that visual experience permits
________ the high-level properties of objects

Answer 18

us to learn about

Question 19

Even _________________ will allow that perception can inform subjects about more than just those aspects of the world whose representation fixes phenomenal character.

Answer 19

pure representationalists

Question 20

Does the Rich Content View entail that any creature with experience like ours (even infants) can represent high-level properties?

Answer 20

No

Question 21

Siegel argues that our non-perceptual capacities can make a difference to __________

Answer 21

the sorts of sensory experiences we can undergo.

Question 21

Siegel often formulates the Rich Content View not directly in terms of representation, but in terms of ___________

Answer 21

content

Question 22

To a first approximation, an experience’s ‘content’ is ________________

Answer 22

how it represents
things as standing in the world

Question 23

Siegel takes contents to have (or be identical to) ____________

Answer 23

accuracy conditions

Question 24

naïve realists and sense datum theorists deny that sensory experience is fundamentally
a matter of __________________

Answer 24

representing the world as being a certain way.

Question 25

Siegel’s general strategy for defending the Rich Content View is what she dubs the

Answer 25

Phenomenal Contrast Method

Question 26

How does the Phenomenal Contrast Method argue for the Rich Contrast View?

Answer 26

the method begins with an intuition about a pair of
experiences—namely that the two differ in phenomenal character—and then argues that an appropriate instance of the Rich Content View provides the best explanation for the
phenomenological contrast between the two experiences.

Question 27

What are the 2 questions that you get whenever Siegel applies the Phenomenal Contrast Method?

Answer 27

1. Is the initial intuition compelling?
2. Is the Rich Content View really the best explanation of the intuition?

Question 28

How does Siegel’s Phenomenal Contrast Method begin?

Answer 28

0. The overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in phenomenal character from the overall phenomenology of which E2 is a part.

Question 29

What is Siegel’s first alternative expanation for ‘0’ that she rules out?

Answer 29

1. If the overall experience of which E1 is a part differs in phenomenal character from the overall experience of which E2 is a part, then there is a difference in phenomenal character between the sensory experiences E1 and E2. [i.e. the difference concerns sensory phenomenology]

Question 30

What is Siegel’s second alternative expanation for ‘0’ that she rules out?

Answer 30

2. If there is a difference in phenomenal character between the sensory experiences E1 and E2,
   then E1 and E2 represent different properties (i.e. they differ in content). [i.e. the difference in sensory phenomenology is a difference in what the experiences represent]

Question 31

What is Siegel’s third alternative expanation for ‘0’ that she rules out?

Answer 31

3. If there is a difference in what E1 and E2 represent, it is a difference with respect to the high level or unorthodox properties E1 and E2 represent.

Question 32

What is Siegel’s burden in defending the Phenomenal Contrast Method?

Answer 32

to find compelling examples to motivate (0) for given sorts of high-level property, and then defend the corresponding versions of (1)-(3).

Question 33

What is the gist of Siegel’s main case in her 2006 paper (pine tree case)

Answer 33

Upon being tasked with cutting down pine trees in a diverse grove, initial unfamiliarity prompts guidance in identifying them. Over time, heightened discernment emerges, allowing immediate recognition and visual salience of the pine trees, marking a distinct shift in phenomenological experience.

Question 34

What is Siegel’s playing catch example for the claim that visual experience can represent causal relations

Answer 34

While playing catch indoors, if the ball falls short and lands in a potted plant just before the lights go out, it might give rise to a target experience where, despite not believing in a causal connection, it seems to you that the ball’s landing caused the lights to go out. In contrast, the contrasting experience involves seeing the ball land and the lights go out, without feeling a causal link between the two events, as they occur in rapid succession in the visual experience.

Question 35

What is Siegel’s case to motivate the claim that visual experience
can represent the following modal properties of an object (tiny doll)

Answer 35

After interacting with a tiny doll, you notice an odd phenomenon—an apparent connection between the doll’s movements and your head, leading you to hypothesize an unnoticed attachment to your eyeglasses. As the strange visual experiences persist, with the doll seemingly responsive to eye movements and even persisting with closed eyes or attempts to block it from view, the conditional belief (B) about the doll’s independence becomes increasingly untenable, resembling the persistence of visual experiences akin to “seeing stars” despite external occlusion or distractions. In response to these bizarre occurrences, one might reasonably abandon or cease representing the conditional belief (B) as its antecedent appears practically impossible.

Question 36

Cognitive phenomenology

Answer 36

consists in the phenomenal character associated with standing in a given cognitive state (e.g. believing that p) or engaging in a given cognitive activity

Question 37

Background phenomenology

Answer 37

consists in the phenomenal character due to standing background states (e.g. moods) as opposed to specific cognitive or perceptual states/activities.

Question 38

What does it take for Siegel to reject (1)?

Answer 38

requires explaining the initial contrast between the total experiences (i.e. those
that include E1 and E2) without appeal to sensory phenomenology.

Question 39

What are two potential appeals to nonsensory phenomenology

Answer 39

i. Cognitive phenomenology
ii. Background phenomenology

Question 40

What does it take for Siegel to reject (2)?

Answer 40

requires explaining the (by now established) difference in sensory phenomenal
character without appealing to a difference in represented properties.

Question 41

What is an example of a difference in sensory phenomenal
character without appealing to a difference in represented properties

Answer 41

non-representational feeling of
familiarity.

Question 42

What is Siegels rejection of non-representational feeling of familiarity

Answer 42

‘familiarity is not the sort of thing that could be felt without any representation of something as familiar’

Question 43

What does it take for Siegel to reject (3)?

Answer 43

requires isolating a difference in represented properties between E1 and E2 that
suffices to explain the phenomenal contrast between them, but which does not amount to either experience representing a natural kind property.

Question 44

Why does the Rich Content View matter? (4)

Answer 44

1. expands the types of beliefs which sensory experience can justify.
2. Could be first step in response to Hume’s scepticism
3. The visual system’s cognitive processing can influence
   what our sensory experiences represent.
4. Creates a problem for sense-datum theorists

Question 45

How does Siegel’s Rich Contrast View present a problem for Sense-Datum theorists?

Answer 45

given the Phenomenal Principle, they must
allow that sense data can instantiate high level properties.