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Flashcards in Human Factors in Aviation Deck (26):

Pilot Competency is Based on



Training factors to ensure competency of individual pilot

Aircraft manual flight
Aircraft auto flight
Leadership and teamwork
Problem solving and decision making
Application of procedures
Workload management
Situational awareness


What is the accident rate of flying

1.2 per million flights,
zero per billion km flown


percent accidents caused by humans?

73% or 70%-80%


summarise accident trend in modern aviation

0 deaths per billion km
since 1959 rapid decline in accident rate, due to GPWS


use of statistics to develop strategy for future improvement

can identify trends
can then address possible changes in equipment, training procedures and organisation


3 components of TEM model

Hope to avoid all threats and errors
Detect errors and deal with them

Threat - External, unexpected, crew cannot predict

Error - Internal, crew's fault. Erron action or inaction

Undesired Aircraft State - crew-induced aircraft position or speed deviation, misapplication of flight controls, incorrect systems leading to reduction in margins of safety.

UAS must be crew-induced. ATC/weather things are threats.


3 types of threat - LEO


Though in some questions latent may be included inside organisational and environmental.

Can have latent, anticipated or unexpected organisational or environmental threats

Anticipated - eg weather
Unexpected - eg aircraft malfunction without warning
Latent - equipment design, mangement cutbacks, short turnaround schedules, optical illusions

Environmental - Can be planned or spontaneous
eg - ATC, airport, weather, terrain

Usually latent
eg - Aircraft, cabin, ground, documentation, scheduling


Explain and examples - Latent threat

Often hidden until it becomes apparent

eg - misplaced waypoint in flight software


Explain and examples - Environmental threat

Derived from the conditions that you are working in.

Generally steps can be taken to reduce these, but generally have to be dealt with in real time

eg temperature, weather, rain..

eg ATC issue such as language

eg issue with airport such as runway misaligned or bad surface, birds, bad signs

eg terrain, high ground/slope

eg similar call signs


Explain and examples - Organisational threat

To do with the company. Can normally be somehow mitigated

eg policy, communication,
eg operational pressure, delays
eg errors with charts
eg error from crew
eg maintenance error


Give ICAO definition of error

actions or inactions by the flight crew that lead to deviations from organisational or flight crew intentions or expectations

Errors must be observable.

Error can be any person, not just pilot

Primary interaction defines what kind of error.

Types of error: PAC

Procedural - Interacting with procedure
Aircraft Handling - When touching control system
Communication - Must be talking to people


examples of countermeasures for threats, errors and undesired aircraft states

Steady systematic approach to flight safety

Trap - stop it having consequences
Mitigate - stop consequences getting worse

Another list of error handling -

Error Prevention - rarely possible, needs new design
Error Reduction - minimise likelihood and magnitude
Error Detection - make apparent as fast and clearly as possible
Error Recovery - make easy to rapidly recover
Error Tolerance - minimising consequences


explain and examples of Procedural Error

not doing checklists accurately,
wrong callouts
omitted briefings
documentation - wrong fuel/pax etc


explain and examples - Undesired Aircraft State

flight crew-induced aircraft position or speed deviations, misapplication of flight controls, or incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margins of safety

eg altitude/attitude
eg wrong runway
eg bad ground handling
eg incorrect aircraft configuration


summarise relevance of shell model

Model to deal with human error

Software - rules and procedures, not just computery
Hardware - systems, displays,
Environment - Internal and external, noise, political. Situation in which L,H and S must operate
Liveware - Human, most important. Any person involved in flight. physical wellbeing, knowledge, attitides, culture, stress
Liveware (peripheral) - other humans, controllers, flight crews, engineers, maintenance personel, management and admin

This model looks at the interactions between these 5 things, with the Livewire centre of the grid


analyse interaction between the bits of SHELL

QUITE COMPLEX - will do in class


explain how interaction between individual crew members can affect flight safety



explain how interaction between flight crew and management can affect flight safety



distinguish between open and closed cultures

not covered, verify
Open - everyone knows risks, accidents, dangers. Allows mistakes to be reported without risk of sanctions. Allows others to benefit from the knowledge.

Closed - things covered up, perhaps to save face


Illustrate how safety culture is reflected by national culture

Russian people dubious of Nuclear power. Soviet government seeks to show that it is riskless by not reporting any issues. This means that no-one appreciated the dangers and no-one knew to be afraid. Conspiracy of silence, nothing learned from minor incidents,

Safety culture is a sub-set of national culture


Safety first in terms of a commercial entity

Always need to balance safety and profit


James Reason Swiss cheese model

Holes in layers of Swiss cheese are where there are gaps that prevent threats and errors creeping through.

Two types of accidents -Individual and Organisational

Individual has few defences
Organisational has many defences - harder to get through, so people actually less aware of risks.

If these holes and errors line up, then this will lead to an outcome.

Latent holes stationary
Active errors are holes that are moving around

A system is vulnerable if one error can affect a whole system


State important factors that form good safety culture

Each employee has the same attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that combine to form a good overall safety culture.

Starts with an Informed-Culture, ie if humans are aware of danger, they will take steps to stop it

Reports dont identify
Must be trust

Considering a typical civil aviation environment, the Safety Culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change. This is true according to a question.


Distinguish between Just Culture and Non-Punitive Culture

Just culture - Members know that things can be reported without fear of punishment.


Non-punitive is no-blame


Name components of James Reason safety culture