Inequality

Question 1

Central thesis of Harriet Evans (1997)

Answer 1

1. Even though topics such as female sexual pleasure are more prominent, representation is still structured by a heterosexual discourse emphasising the conjugal responsibilities of women. Women are naturally subservient to men, monogamous heterosexuality, pre- and extra-marital sex are all condemned.
2. Party regulates sexuality eg. incarceration and medical treatment of homosexuals, and forced abortions of peasant women.
3. Although gender practice in employment and education has changed radically, gender equality still mediated by embedded assumptions about the limitations of women’s bodies, emotions and minds.

Question 2

Evans: What are the two assumptions about gender discussion she rebuts?

Answer 2

Rebuts two assumptions: that the Party imposed a puritanical silence about sex in the 1950s, and that the reforms post-Mao have ushered in an new era of sexual liberation. During Mao, the importation of western ‘scientific; sexology legitimised a ‘modern’ ideology of essential biological difference between men and women, and severely restricted the possible liberation that women might have found in the androgynous ideal and silence on sexuality of the 1960s and 1970s. Post-Mao, much of the same ideology persisted. Advice to adolescents targeted girls as responsible for sexual restraint in a newly lax age, with girls guarding against dangers like pregnancy and disease.

Question 3

Famous Mao quote

Answer 3

‘Women hold up half the sky’

Question 4

Central thesis of Hong Fincher (Leftover Women)

Answer 4

Argues that women in China have experienced a dramatic rollback of rights and gains relative to men and analyses concept of ‘leftover women’ (shengnu). Women lack rights in modern China including 1) social equality, 2) property rights, and 3) legal protection from domestic abuse.

Question 5

Fincher (Leftover Women): What are the examples for the three problems she raises?

Answer 5

1) Social equality - state-sponsored media campaign for ‘leftover women’ over 27, designed to get educated women into early marriages to safeguard social stability. The official Women’s Federation website says that ugly women hope to further education to increase their competitiveness, not realising they are becoming old, like yellowed pearls. This is due to state belief that many single men threaten social order, so single, educated women threaten the moral fabric by being free agents and not taming restless men. Employment rates for urban women have fallen in the past two decades, from almost 80% to 60%; some women drop out to make themselves less intimidating to suitors.

2) Property rights - although more than 70% of women help finance the purchase of a marital home, only 30% of such deeds include the wife’s name. Legal developments further undermine women’s property rights - reversal of 1950 policy in 2011 - only the person whose name is on the deed is entitled to the house. Parents routinely help sons buy their own apartments, but many choose to financially assist a male nephew rather than their own daughter (duty of the spouse instead).

3) Domestic abuse: Women are actively discouraged from reporting abuse: wives who go public are accused of ‘exposing family ugliness’ (jiachou buke waiyang), and marital rape is not considered a crime

Question 6

Central thesis of Hong Fincher (Betraying Big Brother: Feminist Awakening)

Answer 6

Details how the Feminist Five, a small feminist group was perceived as a large threat and shut down by the CCP. In March 2015, a day before International Women’s Day, the Feminist Five were detained by China’s aggressive state security apparatus and held for 37 days, being treated roughly. They had planned to hand out stickers decrying sexual harassment in public spaces. Even though there was mass international outcry, the state’s repressive tactics worked - they remained under surveillance even after being released, with threats to themselves and their families. Three moved abroad.

Question 7

Fincher: What have feminists been fighting for in China?

Answer 7

In recent years, Chinese feminist have:
1) advocated for national law on domestic violence;
2) criticized sexual harassment, sexual assault, and misogyny in the media and culture;
3) challenged gender discrimination in college admissions, job recruitment, and workplace practices; and
4) appealed for more public restrooms for women.

Question 8

Central thesis of Greenhalgh and Wang

Answer 8

Respond to Fincher’s book, arguing her view is exaggerated and oversimplistic in ‘bad state, good feminists’, and that the Feminist Five never intended to challenge the CCP’s rule and legitimacy. They believed their agenda is consistent with the CCP’s constitutional guarantee of ‘equal rights for men and women’. Argues that Fincher misunderstands the government’s role in this as well - instead of the state consciously deciding that gender subordination is on their agenda, they have enacted some systematic laws and changes within the system, eg. Anti-Domestic Violence Law (2016), though they do note the detrimental birth-planning policies in the 1980s and 90s.

Question 9

Greenhalgh and Wang: What were the strategies deployed by the Feminist Five?

Answer 9

1) They rejected protests used by Western feminists, using mild tactics of performance art.
2) They seldom directly critiqued government policies, and instead submitted proposals to China’s legislature, advocating new laws protecting women and referring to China’s ratification of international agreements.
3) They deliberately chose topics eg. domestic violence which were in line with national policy.

Question 10

Greenhalgh and Wang: What is the historical context for the rise of such ‘feminism’?

Answer 10

As the first generation born under China’s one-child policy (in the 1980s), they were the precious daughters of their families, and they reaped the rewards of huge investments made by the state and to create a cohort of well-educated young people.

Question 11

Greenhalgh and Wang: What is the current state of feminism in China?

Answer 11

1) Women’s Federation is focusing on family values, a far cry from egalitarian Mao-era slogans.
2) on the World Economic Forum gender gap index, China fell from 63 to 103.
3) Feminists have to deploy safer terms like ‘gender equality’ to advance the cause until the political environment changes

Question 12

Central thesis of Gail Hershatter (2004)

Answer 12

Recharacterises what life was like under Mao and under Deng.
1) Marriage - 1950 Marriage Law abolished feudal marriage and marriage by purchase, which raised the age of marriage. 1990s saw a rise in divorce, with almost two-thirds initiated by women on grounds of incompatibility.
2) Birth planning - 1970s - government had begun effort to lower birth rate via policy of ‘later, longer, fewer’, and there was a dramatic reduction in the birth rate even before the one-child campaign (Parish and Whyte). Late 1970s - one-child policy, women told if population was not controlled, disaster will reign. Contraception and sterilisation, some abortion though rates were lower than Eastern Europe.

Question 13

Hershatter: Why was the one-child policy successful in the cities?

Answer 13

1) state’s ability to provide effective incentives and penalties in the urban environment,
2) crowded housing conditions,
3) reliance on pensions in addition to children for old age support,
4) mobility strategies relying on education and work connections rather than extended family ties,
5) urban women keen to limit childbearing to reduce their own burdens.

Question 14

Hershatter: What happened to rural families under one-child policy?

Answer 14

For farming families, virilocality (settling down in the husband’s family) meant that they valued sons over daughters, and the weakening of the collective meant they had to almost exclusively rely on their son for old age support. Local state authorities had to meet quotas and used draconian measures - 1) fines, 2) late-term abortions, 3) sterilisation, 4) inserting and monitoring of IUDs. State-sanctioned discrimination of girls happened when regulations were relaxed, with a second child allowed if the first was a girl, while there was decreased pressure to have sons with the diversification of rural economies.

Question 15

Hershatter: What was the idea for women under Mao? (long)

Answer 15

1. Johnson - They had a reductionist theory of women’s liberation, focusing almost exclusively on bringing women into social production. Gender was always given lower priority than class conflict, patriarchal alliances or production goals
2. Wolf - ‘revolution postponed’ (Margery Wolf).
3. Croll - state policy under Mao was contradictory - ‘anything a man can do a woman can also do’, but women were suited for lighter and less-skilled tasks. Collectivisation in the countryside undermined sidelines (an important sphere of women’s economic activity) and also devalued domestic work.
4. Evans - the language of liberation (jiefang), to emphasise gender as primary was to endanger revolutionary unity based on class.
5. Young - the new woman was ‘socialist androgyne’, portrayed as political militants under men, with revolutionary rhetoric extolling the Iron Girls.

Question 16

Hershatter: What was the idea for ‘women’ under Deng?

Answer 16

Addressing material factors meant permitting inequalities to allow the jump-start of economic development. Household responsibility agricultural system meant women’s jobs in heavy industry were less important. Girls attended school much less. Even though absolute number of women employed in state enterprises increased 1) they were discriminated against and 2) were in collective rather than state-owned enterprises, in low-paying sectors which were an extension of gendered domestic division of labour: catering, textiles, health.

Question 17

Tamara Jacka: three dichotomies for women and results

Answer 17

Three dichotomies shaped the gendered division of labour in rural reform China: 1) outside-inside, 2) heavy-light, and 3) skilled-unskilled. 1980s saw emphasis on gender difference, sexual appeal to men and motherhood, because Mao’s idea of gender equality created backlash and women wanting to emphasise their differences.

Question 18

Central thesis of Li Xiaojiang

Answer 18

Western feminist discourse is not useful - ‘the personal is political’ cannot open up feminist modes of analysis in situations where personal life has been relentlessly politicised for decades

Question 19

Central thesis of Nicola Spakowski

Answer 19

Argues for ‘socialist feminism’, which emphasises political economy and attributes women’s status to their place in the economic structures of Chinese society. Argues the rejection of analysis purely on gender is an act of ‘epistemic disobedience’ to Western feminism. There is a need to historicise and look into China’s socialist past and current ‘postsocialist’ situation to understand the role of gender.

Question 20

Jacka: What does marriage mean?

Answer 20

Particularly for women, marriage has always marked a radical disjuncture: 1) a departure from her natal home, 2) a loss of autonomy, 3) a loss of support from kin and friends, 4) the assumption of heavy new responsibilities and tasks, 5) under the authority of scarcely-known in-laws

Question 21

Central thesis of Yunxiang Yan (2010)

Answer 21

Explores the Chinese path to individualisation, arguing it consisted of two parts: collectivist Mao policies which alienated individuals from their families and communities, then Deng reforms which reduced reliance on the state and supported decollectivisation.

Question 22

Yan: What were the mechanisms which fixed individuals within a hierarchy under Mao?

Answer 22

1) Rigid class labels - revolutionary cadres, workers, poor peasants etc.
2) Household registration system hukou divided the Chinese population into rural and urban residents - banned rural-urban migration and had specific benefits for those in urban areas → party redistributed rationed supplies of subsistence, regulated domestic travel.
3) Centralized system of employment, known as the rural collectives and urban work units, with no free market distribution. Walder (1986) - ‘organized dependency’, where the state provided practically all the important resources and opportunities in one’s life course and cradle-to-tomb benefits.
4) Political dossier system for state to monitor every individual with detailed records of their employees’ personal histories and activities. This fixed the individual into an almost immutable position. At the surface level, Maoist China seemed to be completely collective with the individual’s autonomy removed. But the Chinese individual was also disembedded from traditional networks of family, kinship, Confucian and patriarchal values, and reinvented themselves as a citizen of the nation-state and be Chairman Mao’s good soldiers instead of a member of a family. Emphasis on small self xiaowo vs big self dawo

Question 23

Yan: What were the mechanisms for individualisation under Deng?

Answer 23

1) privatisation of labour, such as de-collectivisation; 2) private businessmen as getihu and individual units; 3) ending the party-state monopoly over resource allocations and life changes, 4) wave of dismemberment frm the socialist public ownership and planned economy. Three major reform projects since late 1990s - 1) privatisation of housing, 2) marketisation of education, 3) marketisation of medical care to force individuals to shoulder more responsibility.

Question 24

Yan: What were the effects of increased individualisation under Deng?

Answer 24

1) Rights awareness and rights movements, with villagers using legal weapons to launch ‘rightful resistance’. 2) increased sexual freedom vs selection of spouse under Mao as a political action which better served socialism. 3) autonomy in switching jobs vs doing private jobs under Mao could land you in jail

Question 25

Yan: What was the process of individualism in China post-1949?

Answer 25

Two stages. 1) 1949-77 saw partial individualisation, when state-sponsored social engineering disembedded individuals from family, kinship and local community, and re-embedded individuals as socialist subjects in the state-controlled redistributive system of work, life and wellbeing. 2) 1978 - market-oriented economic reforms to reverse ‘collectivist way of individualisation’, forcing individuals to be more reliant and disembedded from paternalistic redistribution under Mao. Saw the individual desires legitimised and intensifying individual competition due to triumph of the market economy and global consumerism

Question 26

Yan: How is Chinese individualism different from Western Europe individualism?

Answer 26

Individualisation in Western Europe started in an affluent society where individual rights were protected and material needs were no longer the primary goal of social progress. VS China which started in an economy of shortage, poverty and totalitarianism, where rights were suppressed for national survival and satisfying material needs. Communist version of modernity was individual freedom being sacrified for the nation-state

Question 27

Central thesis of Liu and Rofel (short))

Answer 27

A collection of essays which argue that transnationalism and an understanding of how the US shapes queer spaces in China and Taiwan is important.

Question 28

Liu and Rofel: Why is the US important in queer politics or more generally in Asia?

Answer 28

1) globalisation of English as language of new elite and upward mobility,
2) integration of China into a system of capitalist production dominated by the United States has turned them into an indispensable friend/foe,
3) the phenomenon of ‘America’s Asia’ refers to American foreign policy with Asia-Pacific as its jurisdiction

Question 29

Liu and Rofel: How has the US attempted to influence Chinese/Taiwanese politics?

Answer 29

1) entry of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits,
2) American ‘Operation Summer Pulse ‘04’ in the Pacific to counter Chinese military drills during the 2004 Taiwanese presidential race,
3) branch of Taiwan independence movement formulated as a project to join the US as its 51st state

Question 30

Liu and Rofel: How has China attempted to undermine US hegemonic influence?

Answer 30

1) buying up US debt,
2) going around contours of current US interests by focusing on Africa and Latin America,
3) starting an Asian Union that tries to mirror the EU

Question 31

Central thesis of Cui and Shi

Answer 31

Cui and Shi show that there is an emergent queer culture in China that contrasts the bleak persecution of homosexuals by the state that dominates Western media

Question 32

Central thesis of Ho and Wang

Answer 32

Ho and Wang - in Taiwan, there exists an alliance between state power and conservative civil society NGOs forged to suppress dissident sexualities and sexual expressions. This is because global governance punishes deviant sexual expressions

Question 33

Central thesis of Lisa Rofel

Answer 33

Analyses the situation surrounding homosexuality in China and the negotiations of identities faced by gay men.
1) There is no law currently prohibiting homosexuality, and under socialism, this and other forms of immoral activities were swept under the label of ‘hooliganism’. Homosexuality is now a crime against social nature, and the ‘sex criminal’ includes rape, exhibitionism etc but not homosexuality.
2) However, officials still invoke ‘public morality’ to close bars and arrest people. Fear of repercussions also makes individuals cautious.
3) Analyses the family dynamic - ‘face’, or mianzi means that gay men shy away from telling their parents.
4) The question of what ‘quality’, or suzhi is ascribed to gay men if they are confused with male prostitution.
5) Appropriation of the term ‘tongzhi’ (conrade)

Question 34

Central thesis of Susan McCarthy (2017)

Answer 34

Analyses religious charities in China and argues it presents a dilemma to the state - it helps the party-state alleviate the social welfare burden and minimises the sources of poular discontent, but also goes against the aim of stopping the spread of religion. Charity enables religion to spill over its designated boundaries and enter public square, though is tolerated because it focuses on this life instead of the next, and so still adheres to the regime’s secularising ambitions. China’s ‘fragmented authoritarian’ means there is quite variable ways in dealing with them, including tolerance, demontrating ‘authoritarian resilience (Andrew Nathan 2003)

Question 35

McCarthy: Examples of faith-based charities.

Answer 35

1. GAMCEP (Muslim-based charity) addresses economic/educational problems for poor ethnic minorities in Gansu, a poor province. It has secular policy goals pursued alongside Muslim objectives, stressing the party line on Islamic extremism. The CCP turns blind eye and so it is essentially government-organised NGO.
2. Gospel Rehab helps addicts overcome drug addiction through Christian prayer-based treatment and evangelism. They are technically not allowed to proselytise, but this is tacitly allowed by local officials, with staff, facilities and biblical treatment absorbed into government-backed associations, especially with the relative inefficacy of state methods

Question 36

McCarthy: What is the background on religion in China?

Answer 36

1) Party-state seeks to contain religion and limit its influence so it remains governable.
2) Recent growth in traditional / new religions.
3) Strict local crackdowns on religion still common eg. In 2013 Zhejiang province, 1200 crosses and dozens of churches destroyed.
4) Xi has recently called for the ‘sinicization’ of Christianity, and reminded CCP officials of Marxist atheism.

Question 37

Central thesis of Fenggang Yang (2006)

Answer 37

Argues that increased religious regulation will not lead to a reduction of religion per se, but to a triple religious market. This includes a red market (officially permitted religions), a black market (officially banned religions), and a gray market (religions with an ambiguous legal/illegal status). Grey means non-institutionalised religiosity, with informal religious practices and spiritual alternatives, such as Mao worship or qigong. Argues that regulation by the state is - in exchange for political protection or privileges, the sanctioned religion must accept political restrictions, with the state watching closely for deviance by the sanctioned religion. Stronger regulations blacken previously gray markets, 1) enlarging the black market and 2) emptying the gray market. This reduces the total number of religious adherents because not all want to practice in the underground, but the emptied gray market opens up space for new and innovative suppliers. An ambiguous gray market is volatile, making religious regulation an arduous task and impossible to enforce.

Question 38

Central thesis of Ian Johnson

Answer 38

Documents the variety of religious life in China
1. The state has different tolerance for different religious groups, such as tolerating Buddhism and Taoism, while wary of Christianity and outright banning certain evil cults.
2. The CCP exhibits parallels with religious rituals and wishes to set themselves up as a religion.

Question 39

Johnson: What has Xi said about religion?

Answer 39

In 2016, Xi declared CCP authority over questions of faith, arguing that believers must interpret doctrines in line with social harmony and conducive to modern China’s progress, with members of the CCP remaining unyielding atheists

Question 40

Johnson: What was the historical context of religion in China?

Answer 40

1) Religion is not mutually exclusive, with believers veering between Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism according to social and ritual need.
2) Religion blurred into political power, where control of temples gave local bigwigs community clout.
3) The emperor was the ‘Son of Heaven’ with a semi-divine nature and elaborate rituals.
4) Under Mao, revolutionaries were discontented with China torn apart by foreign enemies, blaming religious tradition especially Confucianism for holding China back from being modern and rational. Christians were automatically suspect as adherents of a ‘Western’ faith (ironically replaced by Mao worship).

Question 41

Johnson: How does the CCP now demonstrate parallels with religion?

Answer 41

1) Conferences held in the Great Hall of the People saturated with ritual symbols. Johnson notes Hu’s anointment of successor was ‘like a Taoist priest’, with propaganda conferring immortality on the CCP.
2) Xi is involved with Buddhism with multiple state-sanctioned attempts to rebuild the Linji Temple, and the CCP tries to harness traditional Chinese religions as agents of social harmony. Hypothesises that the religious are trying to fill the spiritual vacuum created by Mao’s suppression of religion then the unbridled materialism of Deng

Question 42

Johnson: What is the current context of religiosity (socially not CCP)?

Answer 42

1) A 2005 survey showed almost a third of the population believed in some form of religion. Interesting to note that people respond much more positively when one speaks of faith, xinyang, than religion, zongjiao.
2) Protestants are the fastest-growing sect in China today, especially among educated Chinese. The Buddhists and Daoists are more palatable to the CCP because they are indigenous and do not have as strong foreign ties or Western sponsors as the Christians.
3) Rapidly popularised qigong movement Falungong outlawed by CCP as ‘evil cults’ (xiejiao).
4) CCP sees itself as the arbiter of morality and conscience but more powerful than in the past, able to control a modern bureaucratic state. The party wishes to renew their claims to guide China’s spiritual life, but wish to become a religion in and of itself.
5) Johnson believes religion is the only real example of civil society left in China

Question 43

Johnson: example of potentially subversive religious group

Answer 43

Chengdu Protestants. Eg. Early Rain, a Protestant church operating in a ‘gray area’; it operates openly, but cannot buy property so they have to rent space in an office building. They also do a lot of charitable work, such as running a homeless shelter, giving aid to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake victims, and aids the families of dissidents who are numerous in Chengdu. The Chengdu Protestants are hence the most potentially subversive of all Chinese religious groups

Question 44

Central thesis of Karrie Koesel (2013)

Answer 44

Analyses the similarities between the organisational innovation of one underground Protestant house church in China, the China Gospel Fellowship (CGF) and the rise of early communist parties. Churches and a religious ‘vanguard’ reuse the ‘organisational weapon’ developed by the Bolsheviks to protect them from a hostile political environment. Also notes that Protestant Christianity has risen by a significant amount

Question 45

Koesel: What are the strategies used by both groups?

Answer 45

1) the different levels are insulated with limited knowledge of those above and below, so raidings do not interrupt as much.
2) the organisation is staffed by loyal ‘cadres’ who are plugged into an efficient system of command and operate from behind the scenes.
3) Low-ranking members are tightly-knit through regular meetings, ideology and cell groups.
Eg. James Tong has shown that Falun Gong mirrored the regime’s administrative hierarchies, which threatened those in power and also facilitated crackdown because the regime was familiar with the organisational template.

Question 46

Central thesis of Robin Munro

Answer 46

1. Documents a very dramatic revival of religion, especially folk religion, in many rural parts of China post-Mao. Draws a distinction with other sectarian religions.
2. Such folk religion is the counterpart of China’s fast-growing democratic/dissident movement in the urban context.
3. Ordinary superstition can become counter-revolutionary once it forms a certain degree of ideological complexity and organisational sophistication.

Question 47

Munro: Why is there such a religious (folk religion) revival?

Answer 47

1) ideological vacuum from the crisis of Marxism,
2) rapid decline of party authority and control in the villages, and
3) uncertainty and social dislocations brought by recent economic reforms

Question 48

Munro: What is the distinction between secret sects or folk religions, and sectarian or actually religious organisations?

Answer 48

1) The secret societies were organized primarily for political purposes, and used religion and ritual as a means to political ends, while the sectarians did the opposite to pursue religious ends.
2) sectarian movements were not secret, with their existence being common knowledge and them proselytising openly

Question 49

Central thesis of Noakes and Ford

Answer 49

Argue the CCP is ineffective in stopping Falun Gong and challenge the view of the Party as adaptable and highly capable of reform from within. Also argues CCP is controlled by path dependency, which explains why they have to continue persecution/suppression. The fight now may be too expensive (because they keep growing) but it is also too costly for the state to move away, because they have framed the struggle as a matter of life or death. This suppression of Falun Gong shows that human rights and the rule of law have not advanced as far in the post-Tiananmen era as we might imagine.

Question 50

Noakes and Ford: What is the timeline of the CCP crackdown on Falun Gong?

Answer 50

The CCP started campaign in 1999, with mass crackdown including
1) detention in prisons and torture, such as force-feeding, sleep deprivation,
2) labour camps and re-education facilities (laojiao),
3) anti-Falun Gong literature sweeps,
4) surveillance and censorship techniques including daily TV invectives proclaiming them a threat to the socialist cause, and
5) systematic exclusion from education and employment opportunities.
In 2013, they launched a ‘rule of law knowledge’ campaign, where citizens could win 5000 yuan by completing an online quiz about Falun Gong’s crimes. Because local authorities have ‘transformation quotas’, they try to use any method necessary

Question 51

Noakes and Ford: How does Falun Gong challenge the CCP?

Answer 51

1) Continue to attract new practitioners, and it is common for individuals to return after leaving or being put in custody;
2) 2004 - directly challenged the legitimacy and mandate of the CCP, including publishing the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party.
3) Even though in 2002, they had no more protests in Tiananmen Square and the CCP declared victory, they revived later.
4) There is ‘persecution fatigue’, with the CCP losing the hearts and minds battle

Question 52

Central thesis of Jerome Doyon

Answer 52

Analyses the Nanjing Islamic Association, showing that the party-state and religious communities involve complex negotiations that have allowed a depoliticised form of Islam to develop in coastal China. Islam is different because the religious and the ethnic are inextricably linked from the perspective of the state and Islamic associations. This can sometimes assist access to state subsidies, but can also legitimise the intervention of the state into the affairs of the Muslim community. In Nanjing, less than 2% of the population are officially registered Muslims, but they are especially urbanised and integrated into the running of the city. The NIA creates a win-win situation, as it defends the vision of local Islam that its leaders share with a part of the administration. It guarantees its status as a privileged intermediary between the Party-State and Muslims by helping the development of a depoliticised local Islam, providing the community with a platform for discussion with the authorities, while also ensuring a certain level of social stability from the State’s point of view.

Question 53

Central thesis of Dru Gladney

Answer 53

Looks at ethnicity in China from a subaltern perspective, deconstructing essentialised notions of a monolithic Han majority. Argues the Chinese have defined themselves against marginalised groups in their own community. Challenges the idea of assumed homogeneity of China as a nation-state made up of a unified and undifferentiated Han majority and a few ethnic groups in its border areas. Also challenges the use of the term ‘semi-colonial’, noting instead that it should be notion of “internal colonialism”, to do justice to the experiences of the largely voiceless subaltern groups who have been subjected to various forms of Chinese domination. Argues that in art (most examples are taken from fine arts and film-making) the objectified portrayal of minority groups as both exotic and erotic is essential for the construction of the “unmarked”, modern, civilised Han majority. For example, it can serve as a way of addressing controversial issues which are considered taboo in Han society but only when conveniently dislocated into an ethnic setting.

Question 54

Gladney: How are different Muslims treated differently?

Answer 54

Traces the example of the Hui Muslim disaspora in Turkey. Notes the evolution from huijiao (Hui religion, i.e. Islam) to huimin (Hui ethnicity) becomes a metanarrative of the trajectory from religiously (Islamic) infused identity to a ‘modern’ secular ‘minority’ category. Some Muslim groups are more of an asset than a liability; Hui Muslims are closer to the centre than other groups because they are 1) sinicised, 2) seen as religiously moderate, and 3) live in proximity to non-Muslim Chinese neighbours, whereas Central Asian Muslims eg. Xinjiang’s Uyghurs are more distant from China’s centre and more culturally alien and prone to religious extremism. Eg. In 2017, Xinjiang authorities rounding up Uyghur men and women for mass internment; concerns regarding Islamist extremism and separatism with indoctrination sessions; seen as cultural genocide

Question 55

Mullaney quote or equation!

Answer 55

Mullaney argues, one that seeks to balance a single super-majority with a small yet territorial significant minority population in an inherently unstable formula of 55 + 1 = 1.

Question 56

Central thesis of James Leibold (nationalism)

Answer 56

Argues that Han nationalism can be dangerous and destabilising, and ignore the many ethnic minorities who exist. The Internet allows ethnic nationalists to resist historicised multiculturalism and fashion spontaneous, bottom-up forms of nationalism which can shore up state legitimacy. Many netizens have called for a revival of Han culture, identity and power, questioning the CCP’s multi-ethnic mosaic. The Internet empowers but ultimately blunts the threat of Han nationalism, and renders it largely impotent when faced with the hegemony of state territorialisation. Currently, 92% of individuals in China are Han Chinese, with the remaining 8% part of 55 different ethnic minority groups.

Question 57

Central thesis of James Leibold (surveillance)

Answer 57

looks at surveillance in China’s Xinjiang region, with the region’s Uyghur Muslim minority the chief target of augmented Party-state controls. This takes the traditional form of: 1) traditional form of physical monitoring and 2) forced kinship, and technology-driven forms of 3) GPS tracking, 4) voice and facial recognition technologies, and 5) machine-learning algorithms. The CCP then uses surveillance to delineate ‘correct’ thought and behaviour among citizens, then persuade (coerce) self-alignment with Party and Han-defined norms.

Question 58

Leibold: What are the results of surveillance?

Answer 58

1) fewer spaces for autonomous, bottom-up social mobilisation by the Uyghurs and other minorities,
2) abolition of non-Han cultural, linguistic and religious practices, and
3) erosion of social trust in Xinjiang society

Question 59

Central thesis of Thomas Heberer (2017)

Answer 59

Argues ethnic minorities in China are mostly given autonomy or excluded, instead of being assimilated. Notes that China has a diverse array of minorities, such as the Hui in China speak the same language and are ethnic minorities, while the Cantonese and the Hakka speak the same language without considering themselves a separate nationality. This complexity means China needs a more differentiated approach in dealing with their minority problem.

Question 60

Heberer: What happened during the end of the fifties and the Cultural Revolution?

Answer 60

There were strong at­tempts through massive pressure to assimilate ethnic minorities. They were divested of all special rights, their languages and modes of writing were forbidden, and their manners and customs suppressed, so they had to renounce most of their national identities. In Tibet, almost all the convents and religious edifices were destroyed

Question 61

Heberer: What were the effects of China’s policies towards ethnic minorities in the 50s?

Answer 61

1) Economic and cultural backward­ness,
2) alienation between the Han Chinese and the minorities, and, especially for the smaller groups,
3) a growing loss of national and cultur­al identities

Question 62

Heberer: What is the Tibet question?

Answer 62

In the mid-1950s the Chinese sought to enforce their domain in Tibet, creating unrest and open revolts in 1959. The Dalai Lama led a large number of Tibetans into exile in India. In the succeeding years, especially during the Cultural Revolution, all forms of Tibetan independence and political structures were shattered, and the monasteries were closed and destroyed. The plan was to pacify Tibet by abolishing its culture and persecuting dissidents. Not until the early 1980s, when the Chinese state (hitherto having little or no information as to the actual affairs in Tibet) delved into the Tibet situation, were the Tibetans promised more independence in political, economic, and cultural respects. The success of this has been limited, however, since local officials are reluctant to institute reforms; thus Tibet lags behind other regions.

Question 63

Heberer: What is China’s territorial principle wrt to Tibet and more generally?

Answer 63

The ideological basis for the reincorporation of Tibet in 1950 was based on both the view that all the peoples and ethnic groups who had lived on Chinese territory up to 1911 were part of the Chinese nation, and on the fact that China’s weakness at the time was unable to prevent the “ defection” of some territories. In 1950 the Communists attempted to revalidate this principle of law with the reincorporation of Tibet, and to show the era of the “ ailing man in the East,” as China had long been called, was past. The international community has accepted that China has the ‘legitimacy’ and therefore Tibet is a part of China