Intentionality & Mental Representation

Question 1

What are the arguments for Intentionality?

Answer 1

1. Background
2. Causal Theories of Mental Representation
3. Issues
4. Function
5. Issues

Question 2

What did Brentano claim about intentional states?

Answer 2

That all mental states have intentionality.

Question 3

What is intentionality?

Answer 3

The directedness or the aboutness of mental states.

Question 4

What was the way that Analytic Philosophy thought of intentionality?

Answer 4

A propositional attitudes.

Question 5

What are propositional attitudes?

Answer 5

The relation between a subject and a proposition.

Such as belief, desire, fear, etc.

Question 6

What does the Representational Theory of Mind claim?

Answer 6

That when we have intentional thoughts, we are related to some mental representation.

These mental representations have propositional content.

Question 7

What is the issue of non-existent objects?

Answer 7

We can have intentional thoughts about non-existent things.
- Being related to something entails it exists.

Question 8

How does Representational Theory of Mind get around the issue of non-existent objects?

Answer 8

We are not relating to the non-existent object but a mental representation with propositional content.

Question 9

What are the questions needed to be answered by Representational Theory of Mind?

Answer 9

What is the nature of this representation?

What is it for a mental representation to have some specific content?

Question 10

What is the Causal Theories of Mental Representation’s claim?

Answer 10

That what makes the specific content of a mental representation is being caused by the world.

I have the mental representation of ‘cow’ because it is caused by actual cows.

Question 11

What is the benefit of the causal theory of MR?

Answer 11

It reduces intentionality to causal relations.

This is in physicalist terms.

Question 12

What can we compare the causal connection between MR and the outside world to?

Answer 12

Smoke means fire because fire causes smoke.

Question 13

What is an issue with causal theory of MR?

Answer 13

How do we account for error?

Question 14

What is the problem of error for causal theory of MR?

Answer 14

If the content is what causes it then content that is caused by various things simply is that set of things.

If MR of ‘cows’ can be caused by cows and LSD, then my MR simply is either cows or LSD.

Question 15

Why is not being able to account for error an issue for the causal theory of MR?

Answer 15

Because we want to be able to say that we can misrepresent the world.
- This is not possible with CToMR because the content is by definition what causes it.

Question 16

How can function be a solution to the CToMR?

Answer 16

We can detatch meaning from cause by instead claiming that what a thought represents is its function.

We can misrepresent the world if the MR is not caused by the thing necessary to fulfil its function.

Question 17

What example can we use to demonstrate how function solves the issue of error?

Answer 17

A fuel gauge represents the fuel in the tank, even if the tank is full of water, because it is its function.

A thought Type C represents ‘cows’ even if caused by LSD because its function is to represent cows.

Question 18

What is the issue for function as a solution for CToMR?

Answer 18

The function of a system (or element of a system is indeterminate.

Question 19

What example can we use to demontrate how function is indeterminate?

Answer 19

Some bacteria that live in ponds need to avoid oxygen-rich water and use magnetosomes to pull towards north (away from oxygen-rich water).

• What is the function of magnetosomes in this case? North or the presence of oxygen-rich?
• Some things have multiple functions.
• There seems to be no good way to decipher what the function is (and thus representation).

Question 20

What are teleosemantic theories?

Answer 20

They claim that function is determined by biology.

Question 21

In what way is indeterminacy an issue for teleosemantic theories?

Answer 21

• They are based on evolutionary history.

Question 22

What example does Davidson use to demonstrate how being based on evolutionary history is an issue for teleosemantic theories?

Answer 22

Davidson’s Swampman:

• Lightning causes a perfect molecule for molecule replica review to a murder from a swamp.
• It is intuitive that this swampman would have the same intentional states as you .
• This is the physicist claim.
• But the teleosemantic theory would not be able to accommodate this intuition.

This is because it has no evolutionary history and this cannot determine the function of its mental representations.

Question 23

What are the arguments for Internalism and Externalism?

Answer 23

1. Semantic externalism
2. Externalism about mental content
3. Introspection objection.
4. The causal problem.

Question 24

What are the two assumptions made concerning linguistic meaning?

Answer 24

• the linguistic meaning of a term determines its extension (same meaning = same extension).
• knowing the linguistic meaning of a term is simply being in a certain psychological state.

Question 25

What does Putnam try and show about these two assumptions?

Answer 25

He tries to show that these two assumptions are incompatible and reject the second assumption.

Question 26

What is semantic externalism?

Answer 26

The linguistic meaning of sometimes is not solely determined by the internal psychological states of the speaker.

Question 27

How does the twin earth example extend to linguistic meaning?

Answer 27

Suppose Oscar and Twoscar have identical psychological states. - the word 'water' has different extension on Earth and on twin earth. - thus, the meaning of the term varies. - therefore, the meaning cannot be determined by mental states.

Question 28

What does Burge believe about mental content?

Answer 28

He extends externalism from linguistic meaning to mental content.

Question 29

What example does Burge use to demonstrate mental content not being caused by psychological features?

Answer 29

The arthritis example: - a patient has a set of propositional attitudes about arthritis (such as he thinks that he has had arthritis for years; that it is better to have arthritis and cancer of the liver). - in addition to all these unsurprising propositional attitudes he has a false propositional attitude that he has developed arthritis in his thigh. - the doctor tells him that arthritis is only inflammation of joints – not thighs.

Question 30

How does the arthritis example demonstrate that mental content is not determined by psychological states?

Answer 30

Consider the counterexample: an identical person in a different society but has the same propositional attitudes. - but in this society, 'arthritis' applies also to thighs. - his propositional attitude is correct. Despite being physically and mentally identical, the counterfactual individual's thought is correct and the original individuals thought is incorrect. - therefore, mental content depends on more than mental states. It depends also on social context.

Question 31

What is the introspection objection against semantic externalism?

Answer 31

We seem to assume that we have privileged self knowledge. - we are able to know, without empirical investigation, what our thoughts are. If we believe that we have PK and SE, then we are compatiblist and most reason as follows: 1. If I have the concept of water, then water exists. 2. I have the concept of water. 3. Therefore, water exists.

Question 32

Why is the introspection objection an issue for semantic externalism?

Answer 32

It is a reductio ad absurdum. - we cannot know a priori that water exists. We either have to give up on externalism or PSK.

Question 33

In what way is naturalistically explaining how intentional states can have causal powers a problem for semantic externalism?

Answer 33

A) intentional states calls behaviour and virtue of their content. B) causal Powers are intrinsic features of an entity. c) content is an extrinsic feature of intentional states.

Question 34

What is a possible response to the causal problem against semantic externalism for mental contact?

Answer 34

Why do causal powers need to be intrinsic features?

Question 35

How does Fodor demonstrate that causal powers must be intrinsic features?

Answer 35

He shows that relational properties are irrelevant causal powers. - this is done with the H particle example. - thus, the relational properties of intentional states (to society) is also causally irrelevant. - therefore, causal powers cannot be extrinsic.

Question 36

What are the arguments for the question: Are our thoughts language like?

Answer 36

1. Background 2. Thinking with Maps 3. Issues

Question 37

What assumption have we made about belief states?

Answer 37

That belief states are propositional (have propositional contents). From this we have tried to compare perceptual states to belief states in this respect.

Question 38

What does Fodor claim about the systematicity of thought?

Answer 38

He has claimed that only propositional contents can have the systemicity necessary to explain the systemicity of thought.

Question 40

In what way does Camp agree with the Fodorian claim?

Answer 40

That does seem to be systematicity in thoughts. - someone who can think that John loves a girl can always think Henry loves a girl. It seems as though this systematicity is reflected in the structure of the thought. - inferences made from beliefs seem to not be possible without some structure.

Question 42

What does Camp claim is necessary to fulfil the first three premises of the reconstructed Fodorian argument?

Answer 42

Weak language of thought: Thought requires a system of representational vehicles with some recurrent constituents that can be recombined according to some set of rules to produce representations of systematically related entire contents.

Question 43

What does Camp argue fulfil weak language of thought, other than language?

Answer 43

Maps

Question 44

What is a possible response to Camp's claim that maps can be the representational vehicle of thought?

Answer 44

Are maps not simply sentences with funny notation?

Question 45

What is Camp's response to map simply being sentences with funny notation?

Answer 45

They have different combination principles. - thinking in maps is substantially different. Rely on isomorphism. - this is the redescribing of something in a very different way. Maps fall in between pictures and sentences. - they seem to abstract away from details. - this is because it is only red describing one dimension (the spatial dimension). Maps are holistic while sentences are atomic. - this makes maps more efficient with simple thoughts.

Question 46

What is the struggle with having maps as the representational vehicle of thought?

Answer 46

It struggles with complex thought. - maps become increasingly cumbersome the more complex thought becomes.

Question 47

What is your conclusion to: Are our thoughts language-like?

Answer 47

Camp seems to successfully argue that we need not have language as the representational vehicle of thought. However, maps struggle with complex thought due to the inability to describe things along multiple dimensions. Even so, maps do not require us to understand some language (like English) which seems to better describe how infants would structure their thoughts. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be reasonable to conclude that thoughts are structured by the way of maps at our infancy stage but we develop a language of thought once we develop our linguistic language. - this enables us to have more complex thoughts as we grow older.