Is Kantian ethics too abstract to be applicable to practical moral decision making? Flashcards
(8 cards)
Introduction
Kantian ethics, developed during the Enlightenment by Immanuel Kant, is grounded in reason and aims to provide a universal moral law through the categorical imperative.
For Kant, morality must be based on duty, not emotion or consequence. This has led to widespread admiration for its consistency and clarity—but also criticism that it is too abstract, rigid, and impractical in real-life moral situations.
This essay will explore whether Kantian ethics fails in its purpose as a normative theory due to its abstraction, focusing on the problems of clashing duties, its rejection of emotion, and its dismissal of consequences.
While Kant offers defences against each criticism, this essay will argue that these are ultimately unsuccessful, suggesting that Kantian ethics, though intellectually rigorous, is too abstract to guide practical moral decision making.
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1: Clashing Duties and Practical Inapplicability
Point:
One of the most significant practical challenges to Kantian ethics is its inability to resolve moral dilemmas involving clashing duties, making it unworkable in real-life decision making.
Paragraph 1: Clashing Duties and Practical Inapplicability
A01
Kant asserts that we must follow only those duties derived from the categorical imperative, which must be universalizable and respect humanity as ends.
However, Sartre and others note that conflicting duties often meet both criteria yet cannot be fulfilled simultaneously.
For example, a soldier may face the duty to fight for their country or stay home to care for a sick parent. Both are universalizable and respect persons as ends—yet the soldier cannot do both.
Paragraph 1: Clashing Duties and Practical Inapplicability
A02
Evaluation:
This situation undermines Kant’s theory, as his ethical system offers no clear way to resolve such moral conflicts. If two duties conflict and we cannot perform both, then neither can be considered obligatory, violating Kant’s own principle that “ought implies can.” This shows Kantian ethics cannot always guide action, thereby failing in its normative aim.
Counter:
Kant might respond that such examples involve imperfect duties, which allow for flexibility in how they’re fulfilled. The soldier might stay and help the country in other ways or find someone else to care for the parent.
Counter-Evaluation:
This defence fails in cases where no alternative fulfillment is available—if no one else can care for the parent and the country doesn’t need bomb-makers, for example. In such real scenarios, duties do genuinely clash, showing that Kant’s response is inadequate. The problem isn’t just a theoretical inconsistency—it’s a practical failure to offer moral guidance in complex situations, revealing the theory’s abstraction from moral reality.
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2: Exclusion of Emotion and Consequences from Moral Value
Point:
Another major criticism of Kantian ethics is its exclusion of emotions and consequences from moral motivation, which detaches it from the actual human experience of morality and renders it abstract and unnatural.
Paragraph 2: Exclusion of Emotion and Consequences from Moral Value
A01
Kant insists only actions done from duty have moral worth—emotions like love or compassion are morally irrelevant. Michael Stocker illustrates this with the example of a friend visiting you in hospital only out of duty; such an act, though morally “good” by Kantian standards, would feel emotionally hollow.
Bernard Williams adds that this approach involves “one thought too many,” ignoring the spontaneous virtues that actually enrich moral life.
Paragraph 2: Exclusion of Emotion and Consequences from Moral Value
A02
Evaluation:
Kant’s strict focus on reason alienates key dimensions of human moral behaviour. Emotions are integral to moral development and motivation. Aristotle, for example, argued that emotions can be rationally cultivated into virtues like compassion and friendship. Excluding them undermines human moral flourishing and again shows how Kantian ethics abstracts away from moral psychology and everyday ethics.
Evidence (Consequences):
Kant’s refusal to consider consequences also weakens his theory’s practical value. In Constant’s “murderer at the door” scenario, Kant maintains that one must tell the truth—even if it leads to murder. This rigid absolutism contradicts common moral intuitions and real-life ethical reasoning.
Counter:
Kant argues we cannot control consequences and thus shouldn’t be held morally accountable for them. We are only responsible for our intentions, not results.
Counter-Evaluation:
However, this stance is flawed. While we may not fully control outcomes, we often have reasonable expectations, as Peter Singer notes. If lying is the only plausible way to save a life, then failing to do so seems morally negligent. Consequentialism does not demand omniscience—only that we act based on likely outcomes. Kant’s abstraction here ignores the moral importance of context and consequence, again proving his ethics impractical in morally urgent situations.
Conclusion
Kantian ethics aspires to universal moral certainty by rooting ethics in reason and duty, rejecting emotion and consequence as unreliable guides. While this brings admirable clarity and consistency, it also makes the theory abstract, rigid, and detached from real-life moral complexity. Its inability to resolve clashing duties, and its rejection of emotional and consequential moral reasoning, mean that it often fails to guide action in the very situations that demand moral clarity.
Therefore, despite its intellectual elegance, Kantian ethics is too abstract to be fully applicable to practical moral decision making. A more holistic approach—one that includes emotion, virtue, and consequence—may offer a more workable moral framework.
