Is Psychology a Science? Flashcards
roger bacon
- pioneer of scientific method in medieval christianity
- observation, hypothesis, experimentation, independent verification
- diff forms of acquiring knowledge: authority, reason, experience
- support/refute theoretical claims to attain doubt free knowledge
- observations/instruments to aid dev of other sciences
- investigate the secrets of nature
religiously mediated - wanted to further understanding of god & creations
william of occam
- occam’s razor
- given 2 theories to explain same phenomena, simpler one more likely to be true
- useless to do with more what can be done with less
analogdy to representativeness heuristic & conjunction fallacy (Kahneman & Tverksy) - linda
newton
- polymath
- experimentation –> empirical data collection
- used induction as a means of scientific validation: generalisting from particular to general
hume
- problems with induction
- demonstrative arguments produce wrongkind of conclusion: deductive reasoning, analytic, a priori, relations of ideas
- probable arguments are circular: inductive reasoning, synthetic, a posteriori, matters of fact
positivism
- ‘standard’ view of science
- something in the world that exists independently of us (realism)
- from observations we can make generalisations to derive theories (induction)
- theories can predict beh of natural world & hypotheses can be tested (deduction)
- universal, objective truths
- knowledge is accumulative - build on previous research
charles sanders peirce
- pragmatist
- science advances through induction, deduction, and abduction
- abduction - form of explanatory reasoning where conclusions dont logically follow from premises
- abduction is usesd as a hypothesis generating procedure in face on anomalous results
postpositivism
- popper
- quine & theory laden-ness
- kuhn
- lakatos
- merton
popper
postpositivism
- solution to problem of induction
- if not amount of observation can establish a universal, then 1 contrary 1 is sufficient to disconfirm
- we dont discover ‘true’ regularities but make statements that are conditionally true
- falsification
quine & theory laden-ness
post positivism
- what data do we know to collect? - based on theory
- –> issue of theoretical construction: observations & measurments are imbued with a theory (theory laden/dependent)
- raises the issue that disconfirming data may be a problem of observations, not theoretical claim
can reject a good theory because you dont have the ev to support it at the time
kuhn
post positivism
- emphasised science consisted of a network of statements rather than single ones (contrast popper)
- network = paradigm
- paradigms as underlying scientific theories
- ‘normal science’ is the dev & accumulation of knowledge within a paradigm
- if anomalies accumulate in a theory & cannot be explained, paradigm entires a crisis stage
- at this critical point - paradigm shifts, scientific revolution
kuhn vs popper
post positivism
- popper - test core hypotheses in exp, kuhn - exp within scientific worldview
- popper - scientists beleive core theories were conditional, kuhn - believe theories
- popper - try to disprove theories, kuhn - hold theories modify & abandon when anomalous ev
lakatos
post positivism
- falsification account within research programmes
- divided knowledge into basic assumptions & secondary hypotheses
- +ve & -ve heuristics
- -ve: prevents direction of falsification toward core tenets of theory
- +ve: direct attention to a chain of known anomalies
- auxiliary theories form ‘protective belt’ around hard core
- sequences of theories make up science
- theoretically & empirically progressive programmes of denerating
hard core = basic assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses = secondary hypotheses
post-positivism
about
- knowledge is reconstructive - new info used to reinterpret & add
- knowledge not fixed in time
- diff research programmes can have competing claims to knowledge
kuhnian values of science
- theories should order phenomena so that with theory’s absence would be isolated & confused
- theories should be internally consistent with other accepted theories
- consequences deducible from a theory should agree with current ev & extenf beyond particular observations, laws/sub-theories it was designed to explain
- theory should be fruitful of new research findings
mertonian values of science
- universalism
- communalism/communism
- disinterestedness
- organised scepticism
universalism
mertonian values of science
ideas should be evaluated using impersonal criteria, that are universally accepted within the scientific community - idea, not the person
- scientists view well known practitioners as more reliable (Mitzroff, 1974)
- scientist often depict theory choices as individual and not by some accepted of values (Mulkay & Gilbert, 1974)
- scientists do not always agree on what experiments mean (M&G, 1974)
communalism/communism
mertonian values of science
knowledge should be regarded as communal, common heritage and shared freely within the scientific community
disinterestedness
mertonian values of science
scientists should not seek personal gain, especially not through questionable means or supporting vested interests
- scientists promote their own ideas to their own advantage (Mitzroff, 1974)
- advocates of particular theories often claim that their theories were supported the ev, but others’ conclusions were impaired by psychological or cultural distortions or other difficulties (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1972)
organised scepticism
mertonian values of science
scientists should not credulous or jump to conclusions; ought to weigh ev in a considered manner
scientific method
psych as a science
- observations & measurmements of beh
- makes generalisations into theories
- enables predictions & hypotheses about our minds & beh
approaches to science
psych
- most research follows confirmatory approach - predictions based on theories & tested
- stats tests popperian - falisify H0
- kuhnian - behaviourist & cog revolutions link to idea of kuhnian paradigm
- O’Donohue: kuhn’s views on psych all over the place
existence of natural vs social objects
- objects of natural inquiry (physical objects) are external to us & exist independently of our knowledge of them
- objects of social inquiry are the actions of human beings, and ppl ascribe meaning to their actions, which are integral to how and why they act
Objects of inquiry are preinterpreted as they are brough into being on basis of those meanings
beh of natural vs social objects
- beh of natural objects is continuous - they follow regularities and are predictable
- beh of social objects is discontinuous - actors ‘could have done otherwise’
double hermeneutic problem
natural objects cannot change their beh in response to scientific knowledge
