Japan Flashcards
(12 cards)
background
military success:
- 1st Sino Japanese War (1894-1895)
- Korea (1984-1985), was controlled by a weak CH
- Russo Japanese War (1904-1905) → first non-European country to win against European country
- WW1 (1914-1918) (KO part of JP empire), invited to be member of LoN council w/ IT, GB and FR
importance of feudalism riziculture and SHINTOISM → ancestral religion, believing that ancestors can influence your life → not open to modernisation
Meiji → godlike
late to industrialise → all the more impressive when won against Russia
extreme nationalism → taught in school + hereditary
Treaty of Shimonoseki, after 1st Sino-JP → CH gave Korea indep. CH gave Landing peninsula and Taiwan to JP
Tripartite intervention 1895 → intervention on the behalf of RU GY and FR (had colonies in Asia) → humiliation for JP → showed JP European powers thought they could run Asia
JP wanted a sphere of influence in Asia
1902: Anglo JP alliance → help each other in the case of war → prestige for JP + GB wanted.a weak CH and was afraid of RU expansion
→ JP confident
Washington naval conference JP 3 : USA 5 : GB 5
→ harsh but beneficial bc saving money and had training partners
Zaibatsu → monopolies
Manchurian crisis
problems facing JP in 1920s:
- shortage of raw materials
- overpopulation
- limited farmland
- GD → JP textile industry (silk) collapsed
Sep 1931:
JP wanted Manchuria bc needed Lebensraum, MA was rich in resources, and it created a border w/ communism
18 dec 1931:
Kwantung (JP) army exploded part of JP railway and blamed CH → pretence to invade
1932:
Only Jehol remained unoccupied, KMT (CH nationalist, Jiang Jieshi) → JP ignored LoN’s orders to withdraw
Mar: MA became Manchuko → index state strongly influenced by JP
Oct: Lytton report condemning JP
LoN did not impose economic sanction or take military action → only moral
1933:
Feb: JP left the LoN bc saw condemnation as hypocritical
May: Tanggu Truce: gave JP control of Jehol and demilitarised Beijing
2nd Sino-JP war
1936: creation of the second united front bt/ KMT and CCP
JP wanted the “greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere”
1937:
July: Marco Polo bridge incident → unclear who shoot first → pretence for war (near Beijing, S capital)
Aug-Nov: bombardment of industrial capital (Shanghai) → only CH parts to not attract attention from foreign powers
for full control JP knew they needed control of Nanjin (capital of CH)
→ dec: Rape of Nanjing: mass murder of civilians, competition for JP soldiers, overpopulated, didn’t value CH life, saw CH as inferior → 300,000 civilians killed
LoN too busy w/ H in GY to condemn JP
GY and IT
Nov 1936:
anti commintern pact w/ GY
JP, IT, GY → tripartite pact (1940)
JP saw Nazi Soviet Pact as a betrayal
Pearl Harbour
JP sunk US ship → accepted apology
July 1941: US imposed an oil embargo →limitation. to JP’s ability to fight in the second Sino JP war → negotiations were in place → non successful
→ attack on Pearl Harbour, a retaliation
→ both unwilling to compromise
→ defeat would be seen as a humiliation → Samuraii mentality → would rather fight to the death
→ appeased past of the JP hierarchy, the house of peers (diet)
→ boost to moral of the JP people → lack of success of the Sino JP war → US supported enemy CH
→ US was a threat to the JP desire for a sphere of Asia co-prosperity and influence (Hull note)
→ belief of racial superiority → social Darwinism → national pride
→ hypocrisy from the US → has colonies in Asia, such as the Philipeans
→ US response to lack of retaliation to Manchuria
→ Open doors policy → US supported nationalist in CH
→ Hull note could be viewed as US provocation to enter the war
time was crucial due to the weather, typhoon and monsoon season would make it hard to fly
proposed non agression pact from US to JP → would entail JP giving up IndoCH and CH
Hull note → 1941 →attempt at non agression pact → as a response to JP occupation of CH and French Indochina
successes of the 2nd Sino-JP war
took over much of CH soc including destroying schools and opposition centres
much of the S was still under CH control
toll on JP economy
second united front meant that by 1938, JP had lost control over military in CH
→ stalemate + JP defeats
→ 1940 → JP puppet gov in CH
July 1941 → US, GB and Dutch oil embargo that rendered military success virtually impossible
significance of the second united front in the sino-jp war
2nd united front → theoretically CH would be difficult to defeat
creation of 2nd united front → Mao risked being alienated by the USSR
→ brought an end to the civil war bt/ Jiang and Mao
→ fight against commun enemy
solidified resistance and opposition to JP
KMT (Jiang was the gov) so was needed
USSR would supply the united front by militarily supporting CH
lack of resistance to JP occ meant that some retaliation was needed
→ Mao consolidated his position as head of CCP → turning point for CCP
→ attempt to reconcile internal conflict
→ in terms of military it slowed JP advances → not very significantly bc JP invaded CH in July 1937 → KMT and CCP retreated to Chongquing → forced JP to waste resources to get to them → inner CH
→ US intervention and USSR support
ineffective response of the LoN was the main cause of JP expansion into CH
Lytton report → nearly a year after JP invaded MA (4 sep) → encouraged JP bc LoN was slow
LoN did not understand the importance of MA as an economic region (rich in natural resources)
LoN could not stop the Kwangtung (JP) entry into CH
→ order from LoN to remove troops was vetoed by JP in the league council
The Lytton report did not recognize JP actions as self defense but was unable to prevent further JP expansion into china
other factors:
JP militarism
GD, collapse of JP silk industry
political instability in JP due to the civil war & Jiang Jieshi’s deliberate policy of non- resistance to the JP
US was not willing to support bc feared for it’s own Asian colonies (Philipeans)
JP aggression furthered CH political instability
JP agression meant that Jiang Jieshi could not make a centralised state
led to a period of unity → 2nd united front → ended in 1941 so short lived
JP agression politically and economically weakened the nationalists → CCP could expand north
JP agression meant that CCP and KMT had a commun enemy
Jiang Jieshi later used the US supplies to fight the communists rather then JP “internal pacification before external resistance”
political instability in CH had other causes → KMT’s failed promise of land reforms
JP foreign policy up until 1937 was achieved peacefully
- source I: asserts that the great powers had aggressive policies that were a threat to JP, indicates that JPs relationship with other powers should develop thru “friendly relations”
- source J: JP relations with other peoples in the area would be based on coexistence and co-prosperity. Any interest in SE Asia must be based on a non-aggressive policy based on a peaceful approach. It also shows that the ministers in Tokyo were not interested in territorial expansion through force but by exerting pressure on governments in Asia
- source K: an industrial base would be needed in case of war and that aggressive offensive operations of a short duration were necessary and would necessitate the elimination of China militarily. Military action would also be necessary against the USSR
- source L: JP had aggressive intentions towards china and were threatening to annex it, as they had already done with Manchukuo, suggest that JP would not be afraid to use military force
- knowledge: By 1931, after the invasion of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army simply ignored efforts by the Imperial government in Tokyo to check its aggression. Militarists assassinated Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932, for trying to bring the Kwantung Army under control. By 1933 Jehol had been annexed and Manchukuo created under the puppet leader Pu Yi. By the mid-1930s, army extremists had become impatient with Japan’s existing political and economic policies that led to the attempted coup on 26 February 1936. Although the coup failed, militarists were committed to extending Japanese territory by force. The signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936 was seen as protecting Manchukuo against the Soviet Union and guaranteeing the safety of Japanese territory allowing for a more aggressive policy towards China. In July 1937, tensions between Chinese troops and Japanese troops led to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident after which Japanese armies invaded China’s northern provinces and quickly captured Beijing. The Japanese captured Shanghai in November 1937 and then attacked Nanjing in December 1937 with the resulting massacre of the civilian population.
mutual fear led to increasing tensions bt JP and US
- source I: The fact that Japanese diplomats were considering a partial withdrawal from China could indicate their fear of the US. Japan’s plans for a pre-emptive strike against the US and its allies may be interpreted by some candidates as evidence that the Japanese did not fear provoking war against the US. Roosevelt’s decision to impose an oil embargo on Japan may be interpreted as a response to US fear of Japanese hegemony in Asia.
- source J: The Japanese military interpreted US and British defence of their military installations as a threat to Japanese security. It also feared the strengthening of US and British military preparations if war was postponed. Japan feared the depletion of its own resources
Source K: The source suggests that the US did not fear Japan as Roosevelt claimed he would not be intimidated by Japan. This is supported by the reference to US citizens increasingly supporting strong action against Japan. Also, the signing of the Tripartite Pact did not deter the US. Japanese officers feared that the embargo could turn the Japanese navy into a “paper navy”. This implies it could cease to be seen as a threat by the US and its allies. - source L: It depicts the Japanese, ready to use military force because they were worried about the oil reserves.
- knowledge: argue that the US became increasingly fearful of Japan with the invasion of Manchuria (1931) and the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. Although at the time US response was limited to moral denunciation, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 increased fears for US national security. Additionally, the Japanese naval expansion and the sinking of the American gunboat USS Panay (1937) contributed to the escalation of tensions. Japan’s intention to implement the “Southern advance” and to mobilize bombers to attack Burma, Malaya and possibly the Philippines raised alarm in the US. Also, Japan feared the increasing involvement of the US in the Sino-Japanese War, such as financial and military aid to the Guomindang (GMD) was prolonging the war and pushing the Japanese economy to the limit. Additional material on economic factors, such as the negative impact on Japan’s economy of the US protective tariffs or Roosevelt’s decision in 1939 not to renew the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. These contributed to a negative perception of the US and to the rise of Japanese nationalism. also argue that it was not only mutual fear that increased tensions between the US and Japan and refer to the fear of Soviet influence in China. The US began to move away from its isolationist policy more openly after 1938 and by late 1941 some perceived the war against Japan as inevitable.refer to the failure of diplomatic negotiations (such as the US rejection of a partial Japanese withdrawal from China; the Hull note), the rise of Japanese militarism, Japanese alliances with Germany and Italy and the influence on Japan of Nazi victories in Europe.
impact of JP economic and political policies on foreign relations
- source I: Indicates that Japan is determined to expand into China to obtain raw materials to become more self-sufficient in commodities such as iron ore and coal. Chinese cotton will replace the imported cotton from India and the United States. These policies will lead to war with China as these raw materials are vital to the development of Japan’s empire.
- source J: Indicates that it was the political and economic policies pursued by the military that led to war and impacted on foreign relations.
- source K: The military’s policy to expand into China required raw materials such as oil from the United States and rubber from British Malaya and these were not in Japan’s sphere of influence. The war drained the Japanese economy and led to a change in strategy as the navy proposed expanding southwards into Dutch Indonesia for its oil and Malaya for its rubber. Economic factors were key in explaining Japanese expansion.
- source L: As the Japanese military expanded further into China after 1931, with increasing costs, Japan was obliged to buy increasing amounts of raw materials from the US, which meant that they had to remain to maintain reasonable relations with the US.
- knowledge: argue that Japan’s political and economic policies, which supported military expansionism, damaged foreign relations, international reaction to the 1931 invasion of Manchuria and the involvement of the Lytton Commission, with the subsequent withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. 1936 saw the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Further detail of the 1937 Sino-Japanese War could also be discussed. Mention could be made of the Non-Aggression Pact (1940), the Japanese joining of the Tripartite Pact (1941) and the oil embargo imposed on Japan by the USA and other countries.
