Khrushchev Flashcards
(42 cards)
Collective leadership 1953-55
-Five man collective leadership of Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov and Khrushchev, who took over the Party on Stalin’s death, pledged themselves to collective leadership, but there was a fierce power struggle going on behind the scenes. They decided quickly to cut the size of the Presidium down to ten.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Malenkov
- Obvious successor when Stalin dies, ranked second on the eve of Stalin’s death, succeeded Stalin as Prime Minister and Party Secretary. He remained Party Secretary for only a week. It is unclear whether this was his decision, but if a collective leadership was to be viable no one should stand out.
-However, Malenkov may well have believed that being Prime Minister was a more important role than that of Party Secretary. Lenin had been Prime Minister as had Stalin from 1941.
-Member of Politburo from 1941, so couldn’t be blamed for Great terror/ purge but did lead purge of Leningrad with Beria.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Beria
-Had initially replaced Yezhov as head of NKVD after Great Terror 1938, which became the MVD after war, yielding more power.
-He is hated and seen as evil due to power, terror and sex
-Purged Leningrad party and Mingrelian
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Molotov
-Stalin Loyalist - had been in the politburo since 1926, Molotov and Kuganovich only ones in Politburo before and after the Great Terror
-1952 19th Party Congress - Stalin talks about presidium, in a speech attacks Molotov as a problem. Seemed to have fallen out of favour with Stalin and had little chance of emerging as leader.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev
-Originally a peasant, very poor, had trained as a metal worker in Brezhnev generation, so was a beneficiary of communist regime.
-When Stalin dies Khrushchev was the only member of the collective leadership who did not have a top government job, Moscow Party Secretary, although was powerful, so not seen as a main contender, but he was also the only person who was in the Secretariat and the Presidium. The Party was now his power base and he was determined to exploit it fully, as Stalin had done in the 1920s.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Beria early actions
Beria rushed from Stalin’s deathbed to ransack Stalin’s office and empty the safe in which he kept evidence of colleagues personal foibles (which Beria himself planned to use) and damning reports on the state’s excessive violence. Beria, ambitious, head of the secret police and personally odious, was feared and disliked by the other leaders. He was quick to grasp the initiative and appeared initially to overwhelm his competitors, adding to their fears. He put forward a reform programme. An amnesty brought the release of about 1 million prisoners, mainly criminals on shorter sentences, and he talked of dismantling the gulags. Beria knew better than anyone how uneconomic they were and how innocent most of the inmates were. He reversed the policies of Russification, in particular in west Ukraine and the Baltic states. He appeared ready to accept a unified, neutral non-communist Germany and imposed reforms on the East German leadership. But when there was a rising in East Berlin, Beria was blamed. This helped Khrushchev to gain support for his removal.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev response to Beria
-Beria was hard to move against since he had control of the secret police and he had bugged the Kremlin and the telephones and homes of his rivals. Surprise and the support of the army were essential. Khrushchev took the lead at the Presidium meeting on 26 June; several members were carrying arms in case things got out of hand. Marshall Zhukov and an armed squad were in the next room. Khrushchev, Malenkov and others accused Beria of many crimes and at a given signal Zhukov rushed in and arrested him. Two weeks later his disgrace was endorsed by the Central Committee who, with Khrushchev as the dominant figure, blamed him for the worst excesses of Stalinism. Beria was denounced in Pravda, in the old Stalinist style, as an enemy of the people and an enemy agent. Implausibly he was accused of having been a British agent for 30 years. He was kept in custody for six months and after a secret trial, was executed along with six of his colleagues.
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Malenkov reform
-Malenkov, as Prime Minister, was the leading reformist. His rivalry with Khrushchev produced the first open policy debates in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. The economy was a crucial battleground and Malenkov embarked upon a New Course in which the output of consumer goods was to expand even faster than that of heavy industry. He also announced that agricultural taxes would be halved, the prices paid for produce were to be raised and the size of private plots was to be increased - all measures popular with peasants.
However, the harvest in 1953 was poor and Malenkov got the blame. In foreign affairs Malenkov believed that now that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons war would be disastrous for both communists and capitalists; therefore, peace could be achieved
Collective leadership 1953-55 - Khrushchev response to Malenkov
-Khrushchev counter-attacked. He resented Malenkov taking the initiative on agriculture, which he regarded as his area of expertise. Early in 1954 he launched his Virgin Lands campaign in Kazakhstan and Siberia, promising a quick end to the grain shortage. Khrushchev got the Party behind his campaign and its early success gave him momentum. He saw better than Malenkov the importance of the role of Party organisation. He became known as First Secretary in September. He asserted the clear supremacy of the Party bureaucracy over that of the secret police - the new Committee for State Security (KGB) - and the Council of Ministers.
-Khrushchev had strengthened his own position and weakened that of Malenkov. The military, who wanted to match US defence spending, said Malenkov was unbalancing the economy. The economy was indeed overstrained and Malenkov was not in a strong enough position politically to adjudicate between conflicting claimants on resources. Khrushchev had made allies with heavy industry, planners and the military men, and on this issue he could count on the support in the Presidium of the Stalinist hardliners Molotov and Kaganovich. As a result, Malenkov was forced to resign as Prime Minister in February 1955. Bulganin, who was not a threat, took over with Khrushchev’s support
Khrushchev tactical moves against Malenkov
Malenkov indsutry policy - Raise living standards. His New Course focused on consumer goods at the expense of the military - industrial complex and heavy industry. Khrushchev sided with heavy industry and planners who said Malenkov was unbalancing the economy. After Malenkov defeat favoured raising living standards.
Malenkov Agriculture- Halved taxes on agriculture.
Increased prices paid to collective farms. Increased size of private plots allowed.
More mechanisation and use of chemical fertilisers. Khrushchev attacks Malenkov proposals- as a retreat from the collective principle. Virgin lands campaign began in Kazakhstan and Siberia in 1954, an ideologically pure alternative.
Cold war- Malenkov argued that now the
USSR had the H-bomb a state of deterrence existed between East and West. Resources could be diverted from defence to consumer goods.
Soviet service chiefs
rejected Malenkov’s policies. Khrushchev backed their view to gain their support against Malenkov. Once Malenkov was defeated. Khrushchev adopted this policy.
Why did the ‘secret speech’ happen
-Following Stalin’s death there had been a process of silent de-Stalinisation.
-Reforms had been discussed and prisoners had been released but no public announcement or explanation had been made for this change of policy, such as Beria’s release of 1 million prisoners from Gulags
-Khrushchev wanted to speak openly about Stalin’s crimes
-In Dec 1955 Khrushchev set up a Commission to investigate Stalin’s activities particularly regarding Party officials
-The resulting 70 page report revealed that of almost 2 million arrested 1935-1940 almost 700,000 had been shot and that all alleged plots and conspiracies had been fabricated.
-Khrushchev insisted they reveal the truth but Molotov and Kaganovich strongly disagreed. They had both been members of the Politburo at the time (Molotov since 1926 and Kaganovich since 1930) and would no doubt be held somewhat accountable for Stalin’s crimes.
-De-Stalinisation would allow Khrushchev to undermine them by associating them with the excesses of the terror against the party
-It is also possible Khrushchev wanted to liberate the party from fear of repression so that they party would be more efficient or that he was driven by a moral belief that the truth and condemnation of the truth would save the party from a complete loss of self-belief. He perhaps wanted to restore faith in the Party. Arguably trying to restore faith in Communism which had become unpopular due to repression and lack of free speech/democracy, move away from this and the Stalin image.
Contents of the ‘Secret Speech’
-Distanced Stalin From Lenin - read out Lenin’s testament emphasising the part criticising Stalin and letters about Stalin’s rudeness to Krupskaya to demonstrate Lenin’s doubts about him.
-Depicted Stalin as an enemy of the Party - focused on Stalin’s attack on loyal Party members, notably the delegates to the 1934 Party Congress, projecting an aura of heroism about them and revealing shocking figures, for example, 98 out of the 134 members of the Central Committee had been arrested and shot. This undermined Kaganovich (joins 1930) and Molotov (1926).
-Accused Stalin of mismanaging the War- Held him responsible for the disasters of 1941 and denounced the mass deportations of the punished peoples during the war as contrary not only to Marxism-Leninism but also to common sense.
-Claimed Stalin abused his power - attacked Stalin for what now became a cardinal sin - the ‘cult of the personality - and the way in which Stalin was given unquestioning adulation. He cited how Stalin was guilty of sickening self-glorification while maintaining a front of modesty in his amendments to his 1948 Short Biography. Also criticised role of NKVD in the purges, especially the use of torture to extract confessions for which Stalin was personally responsible, giving instructions to beat, beat and, once again, beat’. And showed that grave abuse of power continued after the war with the purge of Leningrad party and the Doctors Plot (also when Malenkov in party)
What wasnt mentioned in secret speech
-No criticism of the correctness of Marxism-Leninism, the viability of the Soviet system of rule or its superiority to every other form of government. Khrushchev went out of his way to stress that Stalin’s grave abuse of power’ was an aberration.
-There was no criticism of Stalin before 1934 and it accepted that rapid industrialisation and enforced collectivisation were necessary.
-It ignores the sufferings of non-Party members before the war. There was nothing on the repression of the kulaks, ethnic eleansing of the border regions before the war or the notorious NKVD Order 00447 ordering mass executions of former kulaks and criminals.
This final omission was likely due to Khrushchevs involvement in this terror. He over-fulfilled his quota for Moscow and Moscow, arresting 41,500 (35,000 quota) and shooting 8,500 (5000 quota). Only 10 out of 146 Party Secretaries in the Moscow region survived.
When he was moved to the Ukraine in January 1938, Khrushchey was just as active. All members but one of the Ukrainian Party Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat were arrested. Khrushchev could not, or would not, prevent even his closest and most trusted associates from being arrested and shot, and made violent speeches in favour of the purges.
The obvious defence for Khrushchev in retrospect would have been that to oppose Stalin would have been to invite his own death. But Khrushchev was unwilling to invoke this defence. Taubman argues that Khrushchev remained to the very end ‘in denial’ about his own complicity. Guilty of deception and self-deception’, Khrushchev preferred to plead ignorance of what was happening.
The 22nd Party Congress, 1961
Even though Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ was widely discussed, it was not until 1961 that he managed to criticise Stalin the person; prompting a full wave of anti-Stalinism following the Twenty-Second Party Congress. By then, almost 9 million prisoners had been released from the Gulags and special work-camps from across the Soviet Union (the release had accelerated following ‘secret speech’. In 3 years preceding speech 7000 rehabilitated, in ten months after, 617,000 rehabilitated (complete reinstatement of job, apartment, pension, was very rate and less than half of party members granted), and it simply would not do to ignore the ordinary civilians who had suffered under the terror. Thus, it was here that Khrushchev finally acknowledged that the people of Russia, not just the party, had suffered under Stalin. New information about the purges was given and following congress:
* Stalin’s mummified body was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum and reburied in a simpler grave by the Kremlin wall.
* Places named after Stalin were renamed, for example, Stalingrad became Volgograd and Stalino became Donetsk.
* Monuments of Stalin were destroyed
* Khrushchev proposed that a memorial to Stalin’s victims be built in Moscow.
Donald Filtzer (1993) suggests that the renewed attack upon Stalin may have been used by Khrushchev to detract attention away from his own policies which by this time had become very unpopular.
Anti-Party Group
- In his secret speech, Khrushchev attacked Malenkov, Molotov and Kagonovich. Subsequently they form the anti-party group as want Khrushchev to step down as party secretary.
-After 20th party congress, anti-party congress formed. Justification is that they say his foreign and domestic policies are causing problems.
-But main issue is that hes spoken out against Stalin and Desalinisation, feel enough Stalin supporters in party to support.
-They agreed that destalinisation had de-stabilised the party, such as Hungarian uprising following secret speech, gave hope.
-Mau Zedong, communist leader in China looses respect for communist party in Russia due to Khurshchevs reformist approach, increasing freedom
-But main reason for anti-party is personal dislike to Khrushchev
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Reasons for formation
The unrest in Poland and the Hungarian uprising were used by the hardliners to argue that Khrushchev’s secret speech’ had undermined the credibility. unity and strength of the international communist movement. Khrushchev was too liberal for them. But it was not just the hardliners who had been alienated The Presidium majority were angered by his abolition of the central economic ministries, which weakened their power. They were prepared to challenge Khrushchev whose style of leadership had become increasingly assertive. His unpredictable and ill considered initiatives across foreign and domestic policy were cited as the reason for the need to remove him.
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Central Committee
In June 1957, Khrushchev was outvoted seven to four, but he appealed to the Central Committee who had elected him First Secretary, arguing only the Central Committee could remove him from his post. He also had the support of the head of the army, Zhukov, and the head of the KGB, and they made sure that members of the Central Commiuce were assembled quickly, flying in members from all over the USSR. Khrushchev had promoted many of them and he prevailed. He referred to his opponents as the Anti-Party group.
A Central Committee resolution expelling them denounced them for opposing Party policy on a whole range of issues over the previous three or four years, and Molotov was castigated for his long years as Stalins Foreign Minister.
They were condemned for factionalism. All this, and the carefully recorded unanimous verdict of the Central Committee, had echoes of the Stalin years Their fate did not. Kaganovich feared for his life and he telephoned Khrushchev This gave Khrishchey the chance to make clear the difference between his regime and Stalin.
Kagonovich and his colleagues were sent a very long way from Moscow and given humiliating jobs. Kaganovich was sent to manage a cement factory in the Erals. Molotov was made ambassador to Mongolia and Malenkov was sent to cok after a hydroelectric plant in Kazakhstan. The fact that Khrushchev had been in a minority in the Presidium was not made public and he did not take over as Prime Minister from Bulganin, who had been one of the Anti-Party group, until 1958
How did Khrushchev deal with the Anti-Party group - Changes to the Presidium
The Presidium was enlarged again to 15 members, bringing in Zhukov, Brezhnev and Kozlov, who had robustly defended their leader during the plenum. In this way, Khrushchev had shifted the balance of power so that those holding party posts now dominated the inner circle. The way in which Khrushchev dealt with his rivals reveals how much things had changed in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death, for under him they would almost certainly have been shot, and they knew it. Kaganovich is reported to have called the leader fearing for his life, but Khrushchev berated him for measuring others by his own vile intentions. None of
Khrushchev’s opponents were expelled from the party, but were simply moved out of Moscow. Bulganin was allowed to stay on as Prime Minister until the following year (1958) , when Khrushchev replaced him. Zhukov too, despite his display of loyalty and being vital support to Khrushchev in removal of Beria and defeat of the Anti-party group had proved too independent and assertive. As Minister of Defence, introducing military reform in 1957 without consulting the party to try and develop a purely professional army, he was seen as a threat to party control and was removed from Presidium and Central Committee (1957). Khrushchev’s rivals were demoted in a most humiliating way: Malenkov became the Minister for Electricity and Molotov was posted to Mongolia (moves far away) . After this, it was clear that all the glamorous posts the party could offer would be Khrushchev’s; however, his refusal to use coercion against his rivals meant that he needed legitimacy to maintain his status.
Khrushchev was determined to make the Party supreme and to strengthen his own position. The years 1957-60 were his best he had more freedom of action than ever before but he also became more authoritarian and arrogant.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - Reorganisation
Khrushchev’s reorganisations had clear political motives, though it was hoped they would avoid waste by streamlining production and bring decision-making nearer the point of production to make planning more realistic and progressive.
The Stalinist command economy concentrated great power in the central governmental ministries and this was where his main Presidium opponents had their power bases. Khrushchev’s devolution of powers to the republics strengthened Party rather than ministry control and increased his power and influence.
* Between 1954 and 1955 about 11,000 enterprises were transferred from central to republican control.
* In 1956 factories run by twelve central governmental ministries were placed under the jurisdiction of republican governments.
Khrushchev also extended his policy of decentralisation into industry by abolishing Moscow-based ministries and replacing them with sovnarkhozy (not to be confused with sovkhozes). A sovnarkhoze was largely independent of central control and was free to regulate industrial activity within an area. Each sovnarkhoze covered an area of one of the administrative divisions of the country. The local sovnarkhoze were, in part, politically controlled since they were intended to allow local Party leaders to have a greater say in the running of Soviet industry (increased interference resented by local managers) . In May 1957, 105 regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy) were established to take the place of the central economic ministries. This was one of the factors which stirred up Khrushchev’s Presidium opponents into challenging him.
It also meant that regional councils controlled factories according to their location, not by the type of industry they made goods for, which was disastrous. This policy served to add another layer of bureaucracy as enterprises now had to deal with dozens of sovnarkhozy to coordinate the production of items, creating what Filtzer (1993) calls ‘bureaucratic anarchy. To overcome these problems, a reorganisation of Gosplan occurred 1957, creating State Committees and Central Councils, all of which worked in parallel to the sovnarkhozy, only deepening the chaos. Alec Nove (1977) has pointed out that these reforms tried to solve a problem whilst leaving the basic bureaucratic planning structure in place. Therefore were always likely to fail. In 1962,a national sovnarkhoze was set up to replace the long established Gosplan and become responsible to the management of the Soviet economy.
Khrushchev overcame his opponents but the regional economic councils were abolished soon after Khrushchev was ousted.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - Seven Year Plans
Khrushchev introduced a Seven-Year Plan covering the years 1959-65. He wanted a rapid expansion of the chemical industry to provide more mineral fertilisers for agriculture. There was a large investment in oil and natural gas, and a focus on investment in areas east of the Urals. By 1961 Khrushchev, who was always in a hurry and now buoyed up by Soviet space exploits (see below) announced some upward amendments. Overall industrial progress was impressive and there was a major increase in consumer goods. However, the soaring expenses of the space and missile programme, and increased military expenditure placed a heavy strain on scarce skills and specialist equipment. Growth rates suffered, and in 1963 and 1964 fell to the lowest in peacetime since planning began.
Despite overall growth in industry under Khrushchev, in 1964 the SU remained an economy of imbalances, some areas were successful, others weren’t. Inflation was hidden from records, as was poor labour discipline and the USSR continued to lag behind almost every other developed country in terms of consumer goods. Although the seven year plan focused on light industry and consumer goods, it was once again heavy industry that saw the biggest expansion. Apart from military and space technology, technical innovation was very slow as new equipment caused the disruption of production lines and anything that reduced output, even temporarily, reduced workers pay.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform industry - The space programme
The Soviet Union under Khrushchev took the lead in space research and exploration. In August 1957 the first successful test of an inter-continental ballistic missile was carried out, and two months later that rocket was used to launch the first satellite - the Sputnik - into space to great excitement. There was even more when in 1961 Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. It was a huge boost to Soviet prestige and coupled with Khrushchev’s boasting about its military rocketry, led the outside world to overestimate Soviet progress. There was in fact no ‘missile gap’ with the United States in favour of the Soviet Union.
While there was a clampdown after 1962 on publishing the revelatory works associated with the thaw’, samizdat still grew. The significant numbers of students receiving higher education posed a dilemma for the Soviet state. It needed highly qualified people with inquiring minds in all branches of science and technology, but, in time, such minds might also challenge the whole system.
However, in 1964 the Soviet Union entered upon twenty years of stagnation.
Stalins Legacy - Agriculture
-Remained weaker than industry
-Low productivity- lower than it was under Nicholas II
-Livestock numbers were low - By 1953 fewer cattle than in 1916 and numbers falling
-Low rural incomes and poverty - food shortages issue, Low prices paid for grain led to low income. In 1946 an average days labour earnt less than a ruble (not even enough for 1/3rd loaf of bread)
-Invest in agriculture only to support the industry
-In desperate need of reform
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Virgin Lands Campaign
-Huge operation designed to plough up a vast tract of virgin and fallow land in Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia for grain cultivation. Khurshcehv presented as ideologically pure alternative to Malenkov’s idea of enlarging private plots. He believed could achieve US levels of grain production. Also knew that industrial bosses would never allow the redistribution of resources to favour agriculture, so he sought short-term measures and took huge risks to increase yield levels. Developed as part of seven year plan.
-Leaders of Kazakh communist party had warned of infertile soil and poor climate, although really worried about Russians and Ukrainians working on their land.
-More than 300,000 Komsomol volunteers were mobilised to settle and cultivate this huge area - by 1956, 35.9 million acres, an area equal to the total cultivated area of Canada. They would be joined by even larger contingents of students, soldiers, and truck and combine-drivers who were transported to the virgin lands on a seasonal basis. Conditions were primitive and the climate harsh. Like the Five-Year Plans it was run like a military campaign with an emphasis on speed. There was much publicity and very little listening to advice. Huge propaganda campaign.
-Harvest in 1956 was announced as great victory, largest in soviet history up to that point, over half of the 125 million tons of grain produced came from new regions. -Results never quite reached that level again and by early 1960s, reliance on single crop cultivation had taken its toll on the fertililty of soil and failure to adopt anti-erosion measures led to millions of tons of topsoil simply blowing away, in 1960 this happened to 13,000sq miles of land. By 1963 Grain harvest was disastrous and the Virgin lands produced their smallest crop for years. Specialised chemical fertilisers were needed to cultivate land however chemical industry not able to keep up with demand which was weak due to competition for resources with defence and heavy industry (still second to industry).
-Problems also included: in the first two years over 10 million square hectares of land were taken out of use because the land was indeed unsuitable for growing crops (as the Kazakh leaders had warned). Also, Amenities had not been thoroughly planned before sending the young, inexperienced party members out to these tough lands. Hastily constructed army barracks housed hundreds, not creating the ideal family life many had hoped for; some didn’t even have a canteen, forcing them to travel almost two hours to the nearest barracks to get breakfast. The lack of schools, housing, facilities and assistance in farming the infertile lands meant that many left within the first two years of the scheme to go back to the cities to gain jobs there.
To what extent did Khrushchev transform agriculture - Maize production
-Khrushchev heavily believes in. With the Virgin Lands campaign underway, maize could now be grown in traditional grain-producing areas. It would provide cattle-feed and revive meat and dairy farming which was languishing. He wanted it grown everywhere, claiming, that ‘corn is unequalled by any other crop’.
-K wanted to grow it as US did, ignoring the good reasons why Russian farmers hadn’t before, namely climate and soil. While it is a valuable crop in the Ukraine, it barely ripens elsewhere. Whilst 85 million acres were planted, only about one-sixth was harvested ripe.
-This caused a fall in hay production, which also had the knock-on effect of reducing meat production. Khrushchev’s mistakes were costly.
-His solution was to create new ploughs; he suggested that more ploughing would surely help the crop grow in Soviet soil. The new machines were hastily made and did not tackle weed infestation (as the old ones had), so farmers were forced to leave 20% of their fields fallow. This led to mass soil erosion in the virgin lands, creating vast swathes of dusty, infertile fields. Just as Stalin had, Khrushchev sought advice from the charlatan agronomist Lysenko (see Sections on ‘Political authority and government to 1953’; ‘High Stalinism’; ‘Agriculture’), who suggested early sowing would help cultivation in the virgin lands; however, drought plagued the Soviet Union in 1963 leading to the loss of millions of hectares of fields due to soil erosion.