lecture 1 - what is normal? Flashcards

(42 cards)

1
Q

What are individual differences?

A

What is typical? Categories and dimensions, difficulties in defining typicality

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2
Q

Defining (a) typicality
Defining normal behaviour - determining atypical behaviour(s)?
Normal behaviour is:

A

➢ Statistically frequent (common)
➢ Positive bias to society/personally
➢ Socially normal
➢ Does not lead to personal distress or harmful dysfunction
➢ Expected and appropriate

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3
Q

Abnormal behaviour is

A

atypical behaviour
➢ Statistically infrequent (rare)
➢ Negative bias to society/personally
➢ Socially deviant
➢ Leads to personal distress and
harmful dysfunction
➢ Unexpected and inappropriate in certain situations

No single definition works for all cases, but together they provide a framework for understanding
Definitions change with social norms, cultural differences, strata of society, new advances
Need to define what is ‘normal’ for particular society…

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4
Q

statistical infrequency

A

Abnormality: large differences from the norm
statistically rare occurrences
Everyone within the normal curve
Statistical infrequency – rare
Extremes thought to be abnormal

But …
Where does abnormal begin?
Scoring range
High scores
Cultural differences…

Generally interpreted at negative end of spectrum or negative emphasis on
personal health and wellbeing or towards society
Patients with a clinical diagnosis are rare in the population
High IQ not considered ‘abnormal’ ?, or low anxiety = ‘abnormal’

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5
Q

Socially deviant Behaviour -

A

those that behave in a socially deviant manner, can make others uncomfortable
Issues such as: personal space/ eye contact, physical touch, speech volume.

eg seen in a diagnosis of autism - they struggle to make eye contact or make eye contact in different ways.

a child may come up and touch you so need to be dynamic in terms of our thinking.

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6
Q

Unexpected/inappropriate behaviour -

A

Unexpected/inappropriate reaction to an event
e.g. Phobias,(evolutionary conserved behaviour) anxiety disorders or PTSD – expected or not?
taking normal pattern of behaviour to a subtly higher level

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7
Q

Personal distress/harmful dysfunction -

A

creates distress in person, or affects life adversely, or leads to failure to function normally
e.g. When does an obsession (liking clean hands, train-spotting) turn into OCD? obsessions - gauge when a hobby becomes an obsession. Or Is being afraid of snakes phobic or sensible?

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8
Q

Defining (a)typicality
Defining normal behaviour – determining atypical behaviour(s)

A

Normal behaviour is:
➢ Statistically frequent (common)
➢ Positive bias to society/personally
➢ Socially normal
➢ Does not lead to personal distress
or harmful dysfunction
➢ Expected and appropriate

Abnormal behaviour is:
➢ Statistically infrequent (rare)
➢ Negative bias to society/personally
➢ Socially deviant
➢ Leads to personal distress and
harmful dysfunction
➢ Unexpected and inappropriate

Normal psychological processes -> unhelpful outcome
No single definition works for all cases, but together they provide a framework for understanding
Definitions change with social norms, cultural differences, strata of society, new advances
Need to define what is ‘normal’ for particular society…. (quite tricky?

trying to define what we would expect to see as normal for a particular society

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9
Q

coloured marbles task

A

Jar A = 80:20 - 80% blue
Jar B = 80:20 - 20% red

people react differently in the task

experimenter says they have 2 jars. one 80% blue balls and 20% red. and one 80% red and 20% blue.

experimenter said I am going to randomly select a jar and start to pick out balls
he picks
- red
- blue
-blue
-red
-blue

about how many balls you need to make the judgement
jars are hypothetical

on average normally 8 to make a desicision

Coloured marbles task jumping to a conclusion
Individuals with delusions more likely to jump to a conclusion
Less selections to certainty
50% certain after 2 marbles

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10
Q

Jumping to conclusions and persecutory delusions
Helen Startup*, Daniel Freeman, Philippa A. Garety
European psychiatry 23 (2008) 457-459

A

should we be concerned about people that take over average time to make a desicion rather than jumping to a decision?

started to put the dimensional data into categories - its from categorical use of data we start to create such things as mental health conditions and sorts of personality types.

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11
Q

Categories and dimensions

A

Most psychological tests score with a range – dimensional
➢ Where to place the thresholds/limits?
➢ Most disorders classified by category (DSM5/ICD-11)
➢ Most disorders have overlapping symptoms
➢ Evidence for continuum of disorders?
➢ More dimensional approach/less categorisation?
(didn’t happen in DSM-5 as proposed)
➢ DSM and ICD mostly similar >70% similarity
19 disorders in ICD not in DSM
7 disorders in DSM that are not in ICD
➢ Two people get same diagnosis, completely different symptoms - very subjective
➢ Difference between diagnoses based in part of terms like “marked changed” or
“clinically significant distress” – says who?
➢ What about transdiagnostic factors – not accounted for It assumes discrete disorders
P. 758-769

the manuals assume discrete disorders with limited overlap. it doesnt account for co-morbidity - dual presentation of disorders

DSM 1 came out in 1970 before no real classification system for mental health conditions

where do we place our thresholds? we do it by experience by having collected lots of data by looking at patterns and using those patterns to develop categories and to refine them overtime

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12
Q

DSM

A

diagnostic statistical manual is the American psychiatric society’s mental health classification system

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13
Q

ICD

A

international classification of diseases. all diseases with a chapter on mental health conditions - used in practice in Europe and Britain

they are very similar

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14
Q

What is a mental health disorder?

A

❑ Psychiatric viewpoint: gives Diagnostic Criteria for each “disorder”
❑ Descriptive text that mentions issues related to e.g. risk, “culture-related
diagnostic issues”, sex and gender consideration, links to risks etc.
❑ A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour
that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or
developmental processes underlying mental functioning.
❑ Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in social,
occupational, or other important activities.
❑ An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or
loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder.
❑ Socially deviant behaviour (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts
that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental
disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the
individual, as described above

DSM remains controversial
- comes from psychiatry not psychology - so psychs potentially unhappy using it
- based mainly on American data
- interpretations by culture, sex and gender need to be taken into account - why mainly used in America
- patterns of behaviour are unexpected and somethings are not culturally approved

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15
Q

Rosenhan (1973) ‘on being sane in insane places’

A

12 pseudo-patients
looked at subjectivity of diagnosing
Faked symptoms
All admitted to hospital - experts conned into believing someone
Acted normal on ward – hmmm…..
Not detected by staff – but found out by patients
Treated poorly – not listened too
not unusual for one of the real patients to
say to one of the pseudo-patients, “You’re
not crazy; you’re checking up on the
hospital!” or “You’re a journalist.”
because pseudo-patients were seen in the context of a mental ward – and
because they had been labelled schizophrenic – anything they did was seen as a
symptom of their “illness.”

a controversial study

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16
Q

social anxiety test

A

the Wisconsin castle test

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17
Q

summary

A

Defining normal behaviour – determining abnormal behaviours?
➢ Statistical infrequency
➢ Negative bias
➢ Social deviance
➢ Personal distress/harmful dysfunction
➢ Unexpected/inappropriate behaviour
No single definition works for all cases, but together they provide a framework
Definitions change with social norms, new advances
But, need to define what is ‘normal’ for particular society:
cultural differences, strata of society
Use of categories to aid diagnosis of disorders, but issues of thresholds (dimensions)
How difficult is it to spot abnormality??

18
Q

Classification and diagnosis of mental disorders-

A
  • Abnormal psychology is the area of psychology which studies and treats mental illness.
    • A mental disorder has been defined as ‘a syndrome characterised by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological or developmental processes underlying mental functioning’ (American Psychiatric Association, DSM, 2013, p. 20).
    • Its cause may be genetic, environmental, cognitive or neurobiological, and it produces serious distress to the individual and a disruption to the individual’s social and occupational life.
    • The purpose of a diagnosis of mental disorder is to help prognosis, plan a treatment and predict and evaluate treatment outcomes, although a diagnosis may not necessarily lead to the suggestion of treatment.
    • In 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched its Special Initiative for Mental Health which aimed to achieve access to affordable mental health help and treatment for 12 priority countries.
    • The names of some mental illnesses you may already be familiar with; depression and anxiety, for example.
    • Others will not be so familiar, such as paraphilia and conversion disorder. Although the symptoms described for each disorder may apply to healthy individuals who exhibit a ‘bad mood’ or who are under stress, these disorders represent a severe impairment in functioning. Clinical depression is not the same as the ‘low’ we sometimes feel in life, and generalised anxiety disorder does not represent the stress we feel before an exam or speaking in public.
    • ‘Mental disorder’ is a clinical impairment characterised by abnormal thought, feeling or behaviour. Some mental disorders, especially the less severe ones, appear to be caused by environmental factors or by a person’s perception of these factors, such as stress or unhealthy family interactions.
    • In contrast, many of the more severe mental disorders appear to be caused by hereditary and other biological factors that disrupt normal thought processes or produce inappropriate emotional reactions.
    • The descriptions of mental disorders in this chapter necessarily make distinctions that are not always easy to make in real life; the essential features of the more important mental disorders are simplified here for the sake of clarity.
    • In addition, many of the cases that clinicians encounter are less clear-cut than the ones included here and are thus not so easily classified.
    • To understand, diagnose and treat psychological disorders, some sort of classification system is needed.
    • The need for a comprehensive classification system of psychological disorders was first recognised by Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926), who provided his version in a textbook of psychiatry published in 1883.
      The classification most widely used today still retains a number of Kraepelin’s original categories.
19
Q

Causes of mental disorders

A

What causes mental disorders? In general, they are caused by an interaction between hereditary, cognitive and environmental factors. In some cases, the genetic component is strong, and the person is likely to develop a mental disorder even in a very supportive environment. In other cases, the cognitive and environmental components are strong. A complete understanding of mental disorders requires that scientists investigate genetic, cognitive and environmental factors. Once genetic factors are identified, the scientist faces the task of determining the physiological effects of the relevant genes and the consequences of these effects on a person’s susceptibility to a mental disorder. Understanding the cognitive factors involved in mental disorders requires identification of the origins of distorted perceptions and maladaptive thought patterns. And environmental factors encompass more than simply a person’s family history or present social interactions; they also include the effects of prenatal health and nutrition, childhood diseases and exposure to drugs and environmental toxins.
Different psychologists and other mental health professionals approach the study of mental disorders from different perspectives, each of which places more or less emphasis on these factors. The perspectives differ primarily in their explanation of the aetiology, or origin, of mental disorders.

20
Q

Medical perspective -

A

The medical perspective has its origins in the work of the ancient Greek physician Hippocrates. Hippocrates formulated the idea that excesses in the four humours (black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm) led to emotional problems. Other physicians, Greek and Roman, extended Hippocrates’ ideas and developed the concept of mental illness: illnesses of the mind. Eventually, specialised institutions or asylums were established where people with mental disorders were confined. Early asylums were ill-run and the patients’ problems were poorly understood and often mistreated. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, massive reforms in the institutional care of people with mental disorders took place. The quality of the facilities and the amount of compassion for patients improved, and physicians, including neurosurgeons and psychiatrists, who were specifically trained in the medical treatment of mental disorders, were hired to care for these patients.
Today, the medical perspective is the dominant perspective in the treatment of mental disorders. Individuals with mental disorders are no longer confined to mental institutions. Instead, they are treated on an out-patient basis with drugs that are effective in abating the symptoms of mental disorders. Usually, only those people with very severe mental problems are institutionalised. The medical model, as the medical perspective is properly called, is based on the idea that mental disorders are caused by specific abnormalities of the brain and nervous system and that, in principle, they should be approached the same way as physical illnesses. As we shall see, several mental disorders, including schizophrenia, depression and bipolar disorder, are known to have specific biological causes and can be treated to some extent with drugs. We shall also see that genetics play a pivotal role in some of these disorders.
However, not all mental disorders can be traced so directly to physical causes. For that reason, other perspectives, which focus on the cognitive and environmental factors involved in mental disorders, have emerged.

21
Q

Cognitive behavioural perspective

A

In contrast to the medical perspective, the cognitive behavioural perspective holds that mental disorders are learned maladaptive behaviour patterns that can best be understood by focusing on environmental factors and a person’s perception of those factors. In this view, a mental disorder is not something that arises spontaneously within a person. Instead, it is caused by the person’s interaction with their environment. For example, a person’s excessive use of alcohol or other drugs may be negatively reinforced by the relief from tension or anxiety that often accompanies intoxication.
According to the cognitive behavioural perspective, it is not merely the environment that matters: what also counts is a person’s ongoing subjective interpretation of the events taking place in their environment. Therapists operating from the cognitive behavioural perspective therefore encourage their clients to replace or substitute maladaptive thoughts and behaviours with more adaptive ones

22
Q

Humanistic and sociocultural perspective

A

Proponents of the humanistic perspective (see Chapter 14) argue that proper personality development occurs when people experience unconditional positive regard. According to this view, mental disorders arise when people perceive that they must earn the positive regard of others. Cultural variables influence the nature and extent to which people interpret their own behaviours as normal or abnormal. What is considered perfectly normal in one culture may be considered abnormal in another. Moreover, mental disorders exist that appear to occur only in certain cultures – a phenomenon called culture-bound syndrome.

23
Q

Psychodynamic perspective

A

According to the psychodynamic perspective, based on Freud’s early work (see Chapter 14), mental disorders originate in intrapsychic conflict produced by the three warring factions of the mind: the id, ego and superego. For some people, the conflict becomes so severe that the mind’s defence mechanisms are ineffective, resulting in mental disorders that may involve, among other symptoms, extreme anxiety, obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviour, depression, distorted perceptions and patterns of thinking, and paralysis or blindness for which there is no physical cause. The id, ego and superego are hypothetical constructs, not physical structures of the brain (see Chapter 14). But Freud and his followers often spoke as if these structures and their functions were real. Even today, psychodynamic theorists and practitioners approach mental disorders by emphasising the role of intrapsychic conflict in creating psychological distress and maladaptive behaviour.

24
Q

Classification of disorders

A

Mental disorders can be classified in many ways, but the two systems most commonly used in the world are those found in the latest revision of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (of Mental Disorders) V (DSM-5), published in 2013, and the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases 11 (ICD-11) published in 2019. DSM was originally devised by American psychiatrists to classify mental disorders specifically, whereas the ICD was devised as an international classification system for all diseases. The section below describes some of the main differences and similarities between them.
According to the APA, the DSM-V represents a ‘classification of mental disorders with associated criteria designed to facilitate more reliable diagnosis of those disorders’ (p. xii). The original version of the manual was published in 1952 (although the first attempt by an earlier incarnation of the APA at classifying disorders occurred in 1844) and there have been five versions and two revisions since then. The number of mental disorders classified in the first version of DSM was 108; in DSM-II (1968), 182; in DSM-III (1980), 265; in DSM-III-R (1987), 292; in DSM-IV, 297 (1994). The first edition comprised 130 pages; the latest edition is 999 pages long (Khoury et al., 2014). The expansion of behaviour and mental conditions described as mental disorders with each subsequent edition has been a spur to vocal criticism by many psychologists and psychiatrists who argue that DSM pathologises normal behaviour. We will return to this debate a little later
DSM-V took 12 years to complete, starting properly in 2003 when 13 international planning conferences were set up with 400 participants from 39 countries. ‘Work groups’ were charged with proposing revisions, and new scientific findings from the past two decades were included as part of the process. Its aim was to be a manual which could be used by practitioners, which was guided by research evidence, which provided a continuation of DSM-IV and would leave no possible inclusion unconsidered, although it admits that it does ‘not constitute comprehensive definition of underlying disorders which encompasses cognitive, environmental, behavioural, and physiological processes that are far more complex than can be described in these brief summaries’, (p. 11) nor does it describe the ‘full range of mental disorders that individuals experience . . . daily . . . throughout the world (p. 19)’, which does undermine the manual’s usefulness as a diagnostic tool somewhat.
Field trials were set up in 11 large medical and academic settings, as well as clinical practices, to determine whether the new diagnoses and criteria had validity. For example, patients would complete a list of their symptoms which would be scored by a central server; results were sent to clinicians who would carry out interviews and scored the patient’s symptoms according to DSM criteria on a computer. The clinician would submit them to a server, and the agreement between two independent clinicians on the diagnosis would be assessed

25
Differences between DSM-V and ICD-11
DSM has been the system most widely used in research whereas, outside the US, ICD was the preferred classification system used by psychiatrists in clinical practice (Clark et al, 2017; First et al, 2018). There has been close collaboration between both organisations, the World Health Organisation and the American Psychiatric Association, in the development of their respective systems since 1978, with the aim of ‘harmonising’ both. For the latest iteration of ICD, both groups formed an ICD-DSM Harmonisation Group, whose main focus was on reaching agreement in the grouping of disorders so that any differences were deliberate rather than accidental or avoidable. Some deliberate differences remain. The groupings, or meta-structure, were summarised by First et al (2021) and you can see a comparison between ICD-11 and DSM-V in Table 17.2a and b. The newest version of the ICD (ICD-11) was adopted in April 2019 and while it is separate to the DSM, both share similarities, some differences in emphasis, and some very obvious differences in what each includes at the disorder and definition of disorder level. A comprehensive review of the similarities and differences in diagnostic criteria by First et al (2021), for example, found that although agreement between ICD-11 and DSM-5 was greater than between ICD-10 and DSM-IV, ICD-11 contained 19 disorders that did not appear in DSM and DSM contained seven disorders not included in ICD. Of the 103 diagnostic entries in both systems, 19.4 per cent (20) were judged to feature major differences, 10 per cent featured minor differences, 40.8 per cent (42) featured minor differences in definition and 30 per cent (31) were virtually identical. Eleven disorders in ICD-11 are ‘new’, that is, they did not appear in previous editions. Compare this with DSM-V which proposed very few new categories largely because of the criticism it received after the publication of DSM-IV and its proliferation of new disorders. ICD-11 also allows the same disorder to appear under more than one diagnosis, but it is listed as primary where it is the major disorder. Two disorders added to DSM-V which do not appear in ICD-11 include Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (previously known as pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, now dropped) and Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder: neither were considered to have a strong enough evidence base to be included in ICD as a separate diagnosis. The criteria for autism spectrum disorder are similar but DSM provides three prescriptive lists of symptoms for social communication problems whereas ICD indicates that the individual may manifest one of seven behaviours (which are characteristic of DSM’s three principal symptoms). Similarities are also seen for Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, but DSM lists a specific set of nine symptoms, six of which must be manifested in adults, whereas ICD lists two groups of symptoms and individuals must manifest at least one symptom from each group
26
One of the major disorders which shows differences between the two systems is schizophrenia
For example, the minimum required duration of symptoms in ICD is one month and in DSM it is at least six months, the rationale (in the ICD’s case) being that earlier intervention leads to a better outcome. DSM includes schizophreniform disorder (which is of at least one month’s duration) but this does not appear in ICD. Both require a minimum number of symptoms to be present for at least month, but ICD adds ‘experiences of influence, passivity or control’, that is, having thoughts controlled by others, having their thoughts removed, and having thoughts inserted. DSM describes these as delusions, but ICD reserves the word delusions for the beliefs that may arise from these experiences. ICD lists alogia (lack of speech), asociality and ahedonia as negative symptoms but does not, as DSM does, list a deterioration in work and relationships as a symptom. The systems also differ in how they measure the severity of different types of symptoms. In ICD, there are six symptom domains, one of which is positive symptoms; DSM includes three symptom domains captured by this one domain. ICD has a four- point scale (not present, mild, moderate, severe); DSM has five (not present, equivocal, mild, moderate, severe).
27
There is almost complete agreement on the definitions of a major depressive episode:
the individual must experience at least five symptoms every day for two weeks and one is depressed mood or lack of pleasure/interest (First et al, 2021). ICD lists 10 symptoms; DSM lists nine; ICD includes ‘hopelessness about the future’ as it considers this to be highly predictive of the disorder. There is a difference in how the systems consider depression following bereavement. This is a normal process in response to the death of a loved person, but persistent and continued depression might signify a more serious, protracted disorder. DSM provides guidance on what might constitute depressive symptoms not related to bereavement, but ICD does not consider depressive symptoms experienced during grief to be the same as other depressive symptoms. ICD also has a separate diagnostic category, Dysthymic Disorder, characterised by depressive symptoms experienced for most days but does not constitute a major depressive episode. The two systems agree that in anxiety, the feeling must persist for more days than not, but DSM requires a minimum duration of six months and ICD ‘at least several months’. ICD, unlike DSM, also includes ‘free-floating anxiety’ as a symptom, anxiety that cannot be attributed to any known cause, a symptom that has been included partly because patients are unable to identify the cognitions that lead to their experiencing anxiety.
28
ICD also includes hyperchondriasis as a disorder
a preoccupation with the fear of developing illness – whereas DSM subsumes this under ‘Somatic Symptom Disorder or Illness Anxiety Disorder’. Somatic Symptom Disorder replaced somatisation disorder and has three categories of symptoms, A, B and C. A level criterion requires a distressing somatic symptom, B level involves serious thoughts about the symptoms and excessive energy spent on worrying about these symptoms, and C level requires the symptoms to have been experienced for over 6 months. The disorder has good reliability and the response to its inclusion in DSM has been positive (Lowe et al, 2021).
29
For post-traumatic stress, ICD includes two categories to DSM’s one.
DSM includes one category for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); ICD includes PTSD and Complex PTSD, the latter describing a pervasive stress response that can affect relationships and how negatively the person views themselves. Both ICD and DSM list a core set of symptoms including intrusive thoughts, avoiding stimuli associated with the traumatic experience and changes in arousal. DSM includes a negative change in mood and thinking as a core symptom, but this is subsumed in the CPTSD category in ICD. Events causing trauma are broadly defined in ICD (‘ extremely threatening or horrific nature’) but more specifically so in DSM (‘exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence’). First et al suggest that this reflects DSM’s concern that the PTSD category might be abused by those wishing to exploit the disorder. Research suggests that the use of ICD criteria lead to lower prevalence rates than the use of DSM and that the systems may not identify the same individuals (Shelvin et al, 2018).
30
Acute Stress Disorder does not appear in ICD but Gambling Disorder does
(Billieux et al, 2021). DSM did consider including internet gaming disorder, as a result of the growth in gaming and online gaming. Billieux et al raise a criticism that was levelled at DSM-IV that there is a danger the diagnosis might lead to a pathologising of gaming. However, a Delphi study in which experts were asked to judge the validity of the criteria used in the diagnosis of gambling disorder, concluded that the guidelines could successfully identify problem gambling without pathologising gambling in general (Castro-Calvo et al, 2021). There are some subtle differences in the diagnostic criteria for eating disorders. Both require frequent and persistent episodes of binge eating as core symptoms of bulimia nervosa or binge-eating disorder but they define binge eating differently: DSM requires that the amount of food eaten in an episode is larger than what most people eat; ICD requires that the individual eat more than usual (First et al, 2021). Signifiant differences exist in the consideration of substance use disorders with ICD listing specific substances including NMDA (found under hallucinogen class in DSM), cocaine (included under stimulant class in DSM) and cannabinoids (under cannabis class in DSM). Some disorders are included on the basis of the pattern of use including one episode of harmful use, persistent episodes of harmful use and dependence (having no control over use). DSM has one category: Substance Use Disorder. One final difference, although not the only one, concerns the system’s diagnoses of paraphilias. ICD now distinguishes between disorders than involve non-consenting others (there are five categories) and behaviour which involves solitary behaviour or behaviour with a consenting other, to prevent the pathologising of sexual behaviour that differs from the norm. ICD includes a specific category for the latter if the behaviour includes risk of harm or distress
31
How valid and reliable is the DSM? 1
The DSM is not short of critics. Frances and Widiger (2012) argued that ‘our classification of mental disorders is no more than a collection of fallible and limited constructs that seek, but never find, an elusive truth’. However, they go on: ‘Nevertheless, this is our best current way of defining and communicating about mental disorders,’ The principal criticism of the new DSM (and some of the old ones) is that it has been overly keen to introduce new mental disorders on the basis of, in some cases, very little evidence; no data on prevalence, validity, reliability, treatment response and so on has been included (see Maj, 2014; Lasalvia, 2015; Stein and Nesse, 2015 for some lively arguments). Until DSM-III, homosexuality was included as a mental illness. Frances and Nardo (2013) provide two examples of disorders which may not merit inclusion. ‘Binge-eating disorder’, for example, is described as a mental disorder where a person binge eats once a week for three months. Whether this behaviour, which some might consider not exactly abnormal, constitutes a serious mental condition is arguable. DSM has also pathologised what some have described as normal behaviour: children’s temper tantrums (which are now described as ‘disruptive mood dysregulation disorder’). Grief is another behaviour which has been pathologised. Houts (2001), one of DSM’s fiercest critics, refers to sleep disorders as an example of this invention and over-inclusiveness. Until DSM-III-R, sleep disorders were not considered mental disorders. ‘It is as though sleep problems became mental disorders overnight sometime in 1987’, he notes. Other behaviours which Houts argues were inappropriately classed as mental disorder at the time include frotteurism (touching or rubbing up against another in a sexual way without consent), kleptomania (compulsive theft), dyscalculia (a disorder of mathematical thinking), pathological gambling and voyeurism. Critics, even those involved in chairing previous DSM revisions, such as Allen Frances, have offered excoriating assessments of this new set of diagnoses (you can find his objections here: www.huffingtonpost.com).
32
How valid and reliable is the DSM? 2
Another issue with classification is the potential of overdiagnosis or attaching a diagnosis of mental illness to a behaviour which would otherwise not have been so-described, even by those describing symptoms. Moffitt et al (2010) found that over a 15-year period, diagnosis of anxiety disorder had increased by 50 per cent, depression by 41 per cent, alcohol dependence by 38 per cent and cannabis dependence by 18 per cent. A study of 1,420 individuals assessed nine times between the ages of 9 and 21 found that 61 per cent of them met well-defined criteria for mental illness (Copeland et al, 2011). Other conditions which have seen a rise in diagnosis in the past 15 years include autism (20-fold increase), ADHD (tripled) and adult bipolar disorder (doubled). Antidepressant medication is the third most popularly prescribed medication in the US, especially in the 18–44-year-old group (Pratt et al, 2011); this either reflects a genuine response to a genuine condition or an over-prescription. The US does report the highest prevalence of mental illness and the greatest severity of illness than any other major country: bipolar disorder is 4.4 per cent in the US, twice as high as that reported in other countries (Deacon, 2013). Reflecting the fact that the DSM-V is strongly influenced by psychiatrists, the manual tends to be more consistent with the medical perspective on mental disorders. This means that diagnosis and treatment based on the DSM-V emphasise biological factors, and equate mental illness with physical illness which may, in turn, mean that potential cognitive and environmental determinants may be overlooked. The current revision is partly driven by the US’s National Institute of Mental Health which views mental disorders as diseases and whose new framework for undertaking mental health research is focused on discovering the neurobiological mechanisms which underlie mental illness (Kirmayer and Crafa, 2014) and on creating a diagnostic system based on neural, biological measures.
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How valid and reliable is the DSM? 3
Although DSM argues that its diagnostic criteria and classifications are based on neurobiological research, there are few consistent neurobiological correlates of the disorders contained within it. Some have noted that a biological test does not appear as a criterion for diagnosis in any DSM disorder (Deacon, 2013). Even the measures used to derive these correlates might present us with confounds. A person with autism, for example, responds to the experience of undergoing an fMRI scan (one of the principal measures of brain activation) differently to a person with schizophrenia (Weinberger and Goldberg, 2014). Other authors have pointed out that DSM’s own methods did not provide some support for the existence of certain types of mental disorder. For example, the DSM field trials used a statistic called kappa to ensure that agreement between two clinicians on the diagnosis of a disorder was sound and consistent. If an illness appears in 10 per cent of patients in a clinic, and two clinicians agree that the same diagnosis can be confirmed in 85 per cent, the kappa value of this is 85 (Freedman et al, 2013). The kappa value for schizophrenia in DSM-IV, for example, was 85 per cent, that is, high. It is also high for bipolar disorder, a condition called schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (67 per cent), major neurocognitive disorders and hoarding disorders. Major depression, which has not changed substantially since DSM-IV, presents more of a problem because its symptoms can vary from mild to severe and from those who seek treatment to those who are disabled by the illness. But depression also co-occurs with anxiety; in the jargon, it is ‘co-morbid with’. Personality disorder is another illness which performed badly in terms of kappa results; while agreement on the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder was good, antisocial personality disorder and obsessive-compulsive personality had questionable reliability; narcissistic personality and schizotypal personality disorders appeared so infrequently that they could not be evaluated.
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DSM reliability
* The DSM has a problem with reliability, which means what it did in the context of psychological testing consistency across applications. * If the DSM was perfectly reliable, users would be able to diagnose each case in the same way. But evaluating psychological disorders is not so easy. * Using the DSM is more like navigating through an unfamiliar city using only a crude map and using this map you may not find your destination. * Mental disorders do not have distinct borders that allow a mental health professional to diagnose a disorder in a person with 100 per cent accuracy all of the time. * Some critics argue that DSM encourages the making of false-positive judgements, claiming a disorder exists when there only exists a moderate, normal disruption in behaviour. Eg one in four cases of bereavement might be diagnosed as major depressive disorder when these people are undergoing a natural, event-specific change in mood - wakefield and first 2012 * Evidence suggests that actuarial statistical analysis of symptoms is better than clinical analysis (Egisdottir et al 2006) * Specific indicators such as sex, age, test scores, and medical history are superior to expert ‘experience’ and knowledge of previous cases. * The actuarial method was used to assess how long a person would live (using statistics such as age, sex, height, weight etc) and to set levels of insurance. * Not every individual will follow the pattern predicted by these statistics but as a general guide they are a useful statistical predictor of groups of people's behaviour as a whole. * The actuarial method is 13% more accurate than the clinical method - found by egisdottir et al's (2006) meta-analysis. * Reasons for the success include its reliability - a decision is based on the same criteria and not based on the subjective impression of the clinician who may be influenced by irrelevant variables or not pay attention to relevant ones. * Most clinicians, however, adopt the clinical method, despite the advantages of the actuarial method. * People are always more persuaded by the importance of narrative than the importance of statistics. Another criticism of DSM is that by giving a diagnosis of mental illness, the individual carries a formal signal of stigma. People respond negatively to those with mental illness, and the evidence for this and what we might do to change this behaviour is considered next.
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Stigma and mental health
* Labelling can lead to a perception of a person that is based solely on the label and the characteristics associated with it and their behaviour will probably be perceived selectively and interpreted in terms of the diagnosis. * In an experiment by Langer and Abelson (1974), illustrated how labelling can affect clinical judgements. psychoanalysts were shown a videotape of a young man who was being interviewed. Half of the psychoanalysts were told that the man was a job applicant and the other half were told that he was a patient. Both groups of clinicians watched the same man exhibiting the same behaviour, those who were told that he was a patient rated him as being more disturbed, that is, less well adjusted. * It is easy to lapse into the mistaken belief that, somehow or other, labelling disorders explains why people are like they are. * Diagnosing a psychological disorder only describes the symptoms, it does not explain the origins of the disorder. * Ben-Zeev et al (2010) describes three types of stigma: public stigma whereby large groups of people hold stereotypical perceptions of a group and respond towards it negatively, self-stigma in which an individual loses their sense of self-esteem because they perceive that others view them negatively, and label avoidance where people avoid seeking out mental health services because they do not want to be labelled. * Labels can be quite dangerous triggers of negative stereotypes. * Knowing someone has a mental illness can lead to an increase in expressed prejudice towards them, (Crisp et al, 2000) as mental illness is often seen as unchangeable and fixed. * DSM has been criticized for attributing the cause of mental illness to the individual rather than to situations. * Mental health literacy has improved among the public, but attitudes towards people with depression and schizophrenia have not improved. People still prefer to maintain some distance between themselves and those with mental illness.
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Need for classification
· Proper classification has advantages for a patient. · One advantage is that with few exceptions the recognition of a specific diagnostic category precedes the development of successful treatment for that disorder, · Treatments for diseases such as diabetes, syphilis, tetanus and malaria were found only after the disorders could be reliably diagnosed. · A patient may have a multitude of symptoms, but before the cause of the disorder and hence its treatment can be discovered, the primary symptoms must be identified. · Different kinds of mental disorder have different causes and they respond to different types of psychological treatment and drugs. If future research is to reveal more about causes and treatments of these disorders, we must be able to classify specific mental disorders reliably and accurately. · Another important reason for properly classifying mental disorders is prognosis. Some disorders have good prognoses; the patients are likely to improve soon and are unlikely to have a recurrence of their problems. · Other disorders have progressive courses; patients are less likely to recover from these disorders. · In the first case, patients can obtain reassurance about their futures; in the second case, patients' families can obtain assistance in making realistic plans.
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indicators of abnormality
Subjective distress: If people suffer or experience psychological pain we are inclined to consider this as indicative of abnormality. Maladaptiveness: Maladaptive behavior is often an indicator of abnormality. Statistical deviancy: The word abnormal literally means “away from the normal.” But simply consider- ing statistically rare behavior to be abnormal does not provide us with a solution to our problem of defining abnormality. Genius is statistically rare, as is perfect pitch. However, we do not consider people with such uncommon talents to be abnormal in any way. Also, just because something is statistically common doesn’t make it normal. Violation of the standards of society: All cultures have rules. Some of these are formalized as laws. Others form the norms and moralstandardsthat we are taught to follow. Although many social rules are arbitrary to some extent, when people fail to follow the conven- tional social and moral rules of their cultural group, we may consider their behavior abnormal. Social discomfort: Not all rules are explicit.And not all rules bother us when they are violated. Nonetheless, when someone violates an implicit or unwritten social rule, those around him or her may experience a sense of discomfort or unease. Imagine Irrationalityand unpredictability:Aswe have already noted, we expect people to behave in certain ways. Al- though a little unconventionality may add some spice to life, there is a point at which we are likely to con- sider a given unorthodox behavior abnormal. If a per- son sitting next to you suddenly began to scream and yell obscenities at nothing, you would probably regard that behavior as abnormal. It would be unpredictable, and it would make no sense to you. Dangerousness: It seems quite reasonable to think that someone who is a danger to him- or herself or to another person must be psychologically abnormal.
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the DSM-5 and definition of mental disorder
In the United States, the accepted standard for defining various types of mental disorders is the American Psychi- atric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men- tal Disorders. This manual, commonly referred to as the DSM, is revised and updated from time to time. The cur- rent version, called DSM-5, was published in 2013. It is 947 pages long and contains a total of 541 diagnostic categories (Blashfield et al., 2014). This recent revision of the DSM has been the topic of much debate and controversy. In the Thinking Critically about DSM-5 box we explain more about the DSM and discuss why a revision was necessary. Although the DSM is widely used, it is not the only psy- chiatric classification system. The World Health Organiza- tion (WHO) produces a document with the rather macabre title of the International Classification ofDiseases.The 11th revi- sion of this (called ICD-11) has just been published. Chapter V of this document covers mental and behavioral disorders (WHO, 2018). Although the ICD-11 has much in common with DSM-5, it also has many differences, with similar disor- ders having different names, for example. The ICD-11 is used in many countries outside the United States. ICD code numbers (which are provided next to the various diagnoses in the DSM) are also used in hospital settings in the United States because the U.S. is a member country of the WHO. Within DSM-5, a mental disorder is defined as a syn- drome that is present in an individual and that involves clin- icallysignificantdisturbancein behavior,emotion regulation, or cognitive functioning. These disturbances are thought to reflect a dysfunction in biological, psychological, or develop- mental processes that are necessary for mental functioning. DSM-5 also recognizes that mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in key areas of functioning such as social, occupational, or other activi- ties. Predictable or culturally approved responses to com- mon stressors or losses (such as death of a loved one) are excluded. It is also important that this dysfunctional pattern of behavior not stem from social deviance or conflicts that the person has with society as a whole. The DSM-5 definition of mental illness was based on input from various DSM-5 work groups as well as other sources (Broome & Bortolotti, 2010; First & Wakefield, 2010; Stein et al., 2010). Although this definition will still not sat- isfy everyone, it brings us even closer to a good working description.
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classification and diagnosis
If defining abnormality is so contentious and so difficult, why do we try to do it? One simple reason is that most sci- ences rely on classification (e.g., the periodic table in chem- istry and the classification of living organisms into kingdoms, phyla, classes, and so on in biology). At the most fundamental level, classification systems provide us with a nomenclature (a naming system). This gives clinicians and researchers both a common language and shorthand terms for complex clinical conditions. Without having a common set of terms to describe specific clinical conditions, clinicians would have to talk at length about each patient individu- ally to provide an overview of the patient’s problems. But if there is a shared understanding of what the term “schizo- phrenia” means, for example, communication across pro- fessional boundaries is simplified and facilitated. Another advantage of classification systems is that they enable us to structure information in a more helpful manner. Classification systems shape the way information is organized. For example, most classification systems typi- cally place diagnoses that are thought to be related in some way close together. In DSM-5, the section on anxiety disor- ders includes disorders (such as panic disorder, specific phobia, and agoraphobia) that share the common features of fear and anxiety. Organizing information within a classification system also allows us to study the differentdisorders that weclassify andthereforetolearn new things. Inotherwords, classification facilitates research, which gives usmore information andfacili- tates greater understanding, not only about what causes various disorders but also how they might best be treated. For example, thinking back to the cases you read about, Jessica has alcohol and smoking disorders, and Bryan has anorexia, depression, and a mood disorder. Knowing what disorder each of them has is clearly very helpful, because Bryan’s treatment would be very different from Jessica’s. A final effect of classification system usage is somewhat more mundane. As others have pointed out, the classifica- tion of mental disorders has social and political implications (see Keeley et al., 2015; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). Simply put, defining the domain of what is considered to be pathological establishes the range of problems that the mental health pro- fession can address.Asa consequence, ona purelypragmatic level, it furthermore delineates which types of psychological difficulties warrant insurance reimbursement and the extent of such reimbursement.
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what are the disadvantages of classification
Of course, a number of potential disadvantages are associ- ated with the use of a discrete classification system. Classifi- cation,byitsverynature,providesinformationin ashorthand form. However, using any form of shorthandinevitably leads to a loss of information. If we knowthe specific history, person- ality traits, idiosyncrasies, and familial relations of a person with a particular type of disorder (e.g., from reading a case summary),we naturally have much more information thanif we were simply told the individual’s diagnosis (e.g., schizo- phrenia). In other words, as we simplify through classifica- tion, we inevitably lose an array of personal details about the actual person who has the disorder. Moreover, although things are improving, there can still be some stigma (disgrace) associated with having a psychi- atric diagnosis. Stigma, of course, is hardly the fault of the diagnostic system itself. But even today, people are gener- ally far more comfortable disclosing that they have a physi- cal illness such as diabetes than they are admitting to any mental disorder. This is in part due to the fear (real or imag- ined) that speaking candidly about having a psychological disorder will result in unwanted social or occupational con- sequences or frank discrimination. Be honest. Have you ever described someone as “nuts,” “crazy,” or “a psycho”? Now think of the hurt that people with mental disorders experience whenthey hear such words. In one study, 96 per- cent of patients with schizophrenia reported that stigma was a routine part of their lives (Jenkins & Carpenter-Song, 2008). Inspite of the large amount of information that is now available about mental health issues, the level of knowledge about mental illness (sometimes referred to as mental health literacy) is often very poor (Thornicroft et al., 2007). Stigma is a deterrent to seeking treatment for mental health problems. This is especially true for younger people, for men, and for ethnic minorities (Clement et al., 2015). Stigma is also a disproportionately greater deterrent to treatment seeking for two other groups: military personnel and (ironically) mental health professionals. Would you have predicted this? Why do you think this is the case? Related to stigma is the problem of stereotyping. Ste- reotypes are automatic beliefs concerning other people that we unavoidably learn as a result of growing up in a par- ticular culture (e.g., people who wear glasses are more intelligent; New Yorkers are rude). Because we may have heard about certain behaviors that can accompany mental disorders, we may automatically and incorrectly infer that these behaviors will also be present in any person we meet who has a psychiatric diagnosis. Negative stereotypes about psychiatric patients are also perpetuated in movies. If you have ever seen a horror movie you know that a com- mon dominant theme involves the homicidal maniac. And an analysis of 55 horror films made between 2000 and 2012 has shown that it is people with psychosis who are most often portrayed as murderers (Goodwin, 2014). Stereotyp- ing is also reflected in the comment “People like you don’t go back to work” in the case example of James McNulty. Finally, stigma can be perpetuated by the problem of labeling. A person’s self-concept may be directly affected by being given a diagnosis of schizophrenia, depression, or some other form of mental illness. How might you react if you were told something like this? Furthermore, once a group of symptoms is given a name and identified by means of a diagnosis, this diagnostic label can be hard to shake even if the person later makes a full recovery. It is important to keep in mind, however, that diagnos- tic classification systems do not classify people. Rather, they classify the disorders that people have.And stigma may be less a consequence of the diagnostic label than a result of the disturbed behavior that got the person the diagnosis in the first place. In some situations, a diagnosis may even reduce stigma because it provides at least a partial explanation for a person’s otherwise inexplicable behavior (Ruscio, 2004). Nonetheless, when we note that someone has an illness, we should take care not to define him or her by that illness. Respectful and appropriate language should instead be used. At one time, it was quite common for mental health professionals to describe a given patient as “a schizo- phrenic” or “a manic-depressive.” Now, however, it is widely acknowledged that it is more accurate (not to men- tion more considerate) to use what is called person-first language and say “a person with schizophrenia,” or “a person with bipolar disorder.” Simply put, the person is not the diagnosis.
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How Can We Reduce Prejudicial Attitudes Toward People Who Are Mentally Ill?
Negative reactions to people with mental illness are com- mon and may be a fairly widespread phenomenon throughout the world. Using focus groups, Arthur and colleagues (2010) asked community residents in Jamaica about the concept of stigma. Some participants came from rural communities, others from more urban areas. Regardless of their gender, level of education, or where they lived, most participants described highly prejudicial attitudes toward those with mental illnesses. One mid- dle-class male participant said, “We treat them as in a sense second class citizens, we stay far away from them, ostracize them, we just treat them bad” (see Arthur et al., 2010, p. 263). Fear of people who are mentally ill was also commonly expressed. A rural-dwelling middle-class man described a specific situation in the following way: “There is a mad lady on the road named […]. Even the police are afraid of her because she throws stones at them. She is very, very terrible” (p. 261). Moreover, even when more kindly attitudes were expressed, fear was still a common response. One person put it simply: “You are fearful even though you may be sympathetic” (p. 262). In short, the results of this study suggest that stereotyping, labeling, and stigma toward people with mental illness are not restricted to industrialized countries. Although we might wish that it were otherwise, prejudicial atti- tudes are common. This highlights the need for anti- stigma campaigns. For a long time, it was thought that educating people that mental illnesses were “real” brain disorders might be the solution. Sadly, however, this does not seem to be the case. Although there have been impressive increases in the proportion of people who now understand that mental disorders have neurobiological causes, this increased awareness has not resulted in decreases in stigma. In one study, Pescosolido and colleagues (2010) asked people in the community to read a vignette (brief description) about a person who showed symptoms of mental illness. Some people read a vignette about a per- son who had schizophrenia. Others read a vignette about someone with clinical depression or alcohol dependence. Importantly, no diagnostic labels were used to describe these people. The vignettes simply provided descriptive information. Nonetheless, the majority of the people who were surveyed in this study expressed an unwill- ingness to work with the person described in the vignette. They also did not want to have to socialize with them and did not want them to marry into their family. More- over, the level of rejection that was shown was just as high as it was in a similar survey that was done 10 years earlier. Over that same 10-year period, however, many more people embraced a neurobiological understanding about the causes of mental illness. So what this study tells us is that just because people understand that men- tal illness is caused by problems in the brain doesn’t mean that they are any less prejudiced toward those with mental illness. This is a disappointing conclusion for everyone who hoped that more scientific research into the biology of mental illness would lead to the elimina- tion of stigma. Stigma does seem to be reduced by having more con- tact with people in the stigmatized group (Corrigan et al., 2014; Couture & Penn, 2003). However, there may be bar- riers to this. Simply imagining interacting with a person who has a mental disorder can lead to distress and also to unpleasant physical reactions. In an interesting study, Graves and colleagues (2005) asked college students enrolled in a psychology course to imagine interacting with a person whose image was shown to them on a slide. As the slide was being presented, subjects were given some scripted biographical information that described the person. In some scripts, the target person was described as having been diagnosed with schizophrenia, although it was also mentioned that he or she was “doing much better now.” In other trials, the biographical description made no mention of any mental illness when the person on the slide was being described. Students who took part in the study reported more distress and had more muscle tension in their brows when they imag- ined interacting with a person with schizophrenia than when they imagined interacting with a person who did not have schizophrenia. Heart rate changes also sug- gested they were experiencing the imagined interactions with the patients as being more unpleasant than the inter- actions with the nonpatients. Finally, research partici- pants who had more psychophysiological reactivity to the slides of the patients reported higher levels of stigma toward these patients. These findings suggest that people may tend to avoid those with mental illness because the psychophysiological arousal these encounters create is experienced as unpleasant.
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culture and abnormality
Just as we must consider changing societal values and expectations in defining abnormality, so too must we consider differences across cultures. In fact, this is explic- itly acknowledged in the DSM-5 definition of disorder. Within a given culture, many shared beliefs and behav- iors exist that are widely accepted and that may consti- tute one or more customary practices. For instance, many people in Christian countries believe that the number 13 is unlucky. The origins of this may be linked to the Last Supper, at which 13 people were present. Many of us try to be especially cautious on Friday the 13th. Some hotels and apartment buildings avoid having a 13th floor alto- gether. Similarly, there is frequently no bed numbered 13 in hospital wards. The Japanese, in contrast, are not worried about the number 13. Rather, they attempt to avoid the number 4. This is because in Japanese the sound of the word for “four” is similar to the sound of the word for “death” (see Tseng, 2001, pp. 105–106). There is also considerable variation in the way differ- ent cultures describe psychological distress. For example, there is no word for “depressed” in the languages of cer- tain Native Americans, Alaska Natives, and Southeast Asian cultures (Manson, 1995). Of course, this does not mean that members from such cultural groups do not experience clinically significant depression. As the accom- panying case illustrates, however, the way some disorders present themselves may depend on culturally sanctioned ways of articulating distress. As is apparent in the case of JGH, culture can shape the clinical presentation of disorders like depression, which are present across cultures around the world (see Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003). In China, for instance, individuals with depression frequently focus on physical concerns (fatigue, dizziness, headaches) rather than verbalizing their feelings of melancholy or hopelessness (Kleinman, 1986; Parker et al., 2001). This focus on physical pain rather than emotional pain is also noteworthy in Mr. GH’s case. Despite progressively increasing cultural awareness, we still know relatively little concerning cultural interpre- tation and expression of abnormal psychology (Arrindell, 2003). The vast majority of the psychiatric literature origi- nates from Euro-American countries—that is, Western Europe, North America, andAustralia/New Zealand (Patel & Kim, 2007; Patel & Sumathipala, 2001). To exacerbate this underrepresentation,research published in languages other than English tends to be disregarded (Draguns, 2001). As noted, prejudice toward people with mental illness seems to be found worldwide. However, some types of psychopathology appear to be highly culture specific: They are found only in certain areas of the world and seem to be highly linked to culturally bound concerns. A case in point is taijin kyofusho. This syndrome, which is an anxiety disor- der, is quite prevalent in Japan. It involves a marked fear that one’s body, body parts, or body functions may offend, embarrass, or otherwise make others feel uncomfortable. Often, people with this disorder are afraid of blushing or upsetting others by their gaze, facial expression, or body odor (Levine & Gaw, 1995). Another culturally rooted expression of distress, found in people of Latino descent, especially those from the Caribbean, is ataque de nervios or an “attack of nerves” (Lizardi et al., 2009; Lopez & Guarnaccia, 2005). This is a clinical syndrome that does not seem to correspond to any specific diagnosis within the DSM. The symptoms of an ataque de nervios, which is often triggered by a stressful event such as divorce or bereavement, include crying, trembling, and uncontrollable screaming. There is also a sense of being out of control. Sometimes the person may become physically or verbally aggressive. Alternately, the person may faint or experience a seizure-like fit. Once the ataque is over, the person may promptly resume his or her normal manner, with little or no memory of the incident. As previously mentioned, abnormal behavior is behavior that deviates from the norms of the society in which the person lives. Experiences such as hearing the voice of a dead relative might be regarded as normative in one culture (e.g., in many Native American tribes) yet abnormal in another cultural milieu. Nonetheless, certain unconventional actions and behaviors are almost univer- sally considered to be the product of mental disorder. Many years ago,the anthropologist JaneMurphy (1976) studied abnormal behavior in the Yoruba of Africa and the Yupik-speaking Eskimos living on an island in the Bering Sea. Both societies had words that were used to denote abnormality or “craziness.” In addition, the clusters of behaviors that were considered to reflect abnormality in these cultures were behaviors that most of us would also regard as abnormal. These included hearing voices, laugh- ing at nothing, defecating in public, drinking urine, and believing things that no one elsebelieves. Why do you think these behaviors are universally considered to be abnormal?