Lecture 7 Flashcards

1
Q

Behavioural Finance

A

A relatively new school of thought, behavioural finance, argues that the sprawling literature on trading strategies has missed a larger and more important point by overlooking the first implication of efficient markets.

Whereas conventional theories presume that investors are rational, behavioural finance starts with the assumption that they are not.

Behavioural finance: investors suffer from behavioural biases that can have an impact on market prices.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

The behavioural critique

Irrationalities that seem to characterise individuals making complicated decisions, are…

A

The premise of behavioural finance is that conventional financial theory ignores
how real people make decisions.

Investors are not always rational when making complicated decisions:

  • Information processing
  • Inconsistent/suboptimal decision making.

There are limits to arbitrage such that prices may deviate from the true asset values. When there are regulation based limitations, such as transaction costs , short selling being forbidden, occasions when it snot possible for arbitrage to eliminate mispricing. Then might show that there is alpha to be made, profit to be made. But this profit is still less than the transaction costs.

Remains exploited, cant make money of it. The limits for persistent mispricing is rational as it doesn’t require inefficiency or irrationality from the investors.

  1. Investors do not always process
    information correctly and therefore infer incorrect probability distributions about future rates of return.
  2. Even given a probability distribution of returns, they often make inconsistent or

If such irrationalities did affect prices, then sharp-eyed arbitrageurs taking advantage of profit opportunities might be expected to push prices back to their proper values.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Both the CAPM and the EMH assumes that investors are rational. (buy low, sell high)

A

Behavioural doesn’t contradict EMH but it complements it.

CAPM:
All investors hold the well diversified market portfolio. If the return on an asset i s not commensurate with systematic risk, arbitrageurs will exploit the mispricing and restore equilibrium.
- single explanation for the returns of risky assets, their systematic risk.

EMH:
Price reflects all information available to investors. As new information arrives, investors use the information to drive prices to their right level.
- EMH, just says that in equilibrium things will be priced correctly as rational behaviour will eliminate any mispricing.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

-

A

-

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

-

A

-

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Information Processing

A

Errors in information processing can lead investors to misestimate the true probabilities of possible events or associated rates of return.

Biases

  1. Forecasting Errors
  2. Overconfidence
  3. Conservatism
  4. Sample Size Neglect and Representativeness
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q
  1. Forecasting Errors
A

indicate that people give too much weight to recent experience compared to prior beliefs when making forecasts (sometimes dubbed a memory bias ) and tend to make forecasts that are too extreme given the uncertainty inherent in their information.

Instead of taking the weight of every observation the same, it turns out this bias leads to forming an exceptions for the recent observations have higher weights.

when forecasts of a firm’s future earnings are high, perhaps due to favorable recent performance, they tend to be too high relative to the objective prospects of the firm. This results in a high initial P/E (due to the excessive optimism built into the stock price) and poor subsequent performance when investors recognise their error.

Thus, high P/E firms tend to be poor investments.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q
  1. Overconfidence
A

People tend to overestimate the precision of their beliefs or forecasts, and they tend to overestimate their abilities.

Our ability to summaries information is superior to others.

They find that men (in particular, single men) trade far more actively than women, consistent with the generally greater overconfidence among men well documented in the psychology literature.

For example, overconfident CEOs are more likely to overpay for target firms when making corporate acquisitions. Just as overconfidence can degrade portfolio investments, it also can lead such firms to make poor investments in real assets.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q
  1. Conservatism (Rise to Momentum)
A

A conservatism bias means that investors are too slow (too conservative) in updating their beliefs in response to new evidence

  • might initially under-react to news
  • prices will fully reflect new information
    only gradually and not immediately.

Such a bias would give rise to momentum in stock market returns.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q
  1. Sample Size Neglect and Representativeness
A

The notion of representativeness bias holds that people commonly do not take into account the size of a sample, acting as if a small sample is just as representative of a population as a large one.

Infer a pattern too quickly based on a small sample and extrapolate apparent trends
too far into the future. Such a pattern would be consistent with overreaction and correction anomalies.

short-lived run of good earnings reports or high stock returns would lead such investors to revise their assessments of likely future performance, and thus generate buying pressure that exaggerates the price run-up. This is when we are hasty to uncover to uncover patterns, even when data are purely random. (Very common)

Eventually, the gap between price and intrinsic value becomes glaring and the market corrects its initial error.

Stocks with the best recent performance suffer reversals precisely in the few days surrounding earnings announcements, suggesting that the correction occurs just as investors learn that their initial beliefs were too extreme.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Behavioural Biases

A

Even if information processing were perfect, individuals would tend to make less-than-fully-rational decisions using that information.

These behavioural biases largely affect how investors frame questions of risk versus return, and therefore make risk–return trade-offs.

  1. Framing
  2. Mental Accounting
  3. Regret Avoidance
  4. Loss aversion
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q
  1. Framing
A

Decisions seem to be affected by how choices are framed.

Example: Individual may reject a bet when it is posed in terms of the risk surrounding possible gains but may accept that same bet when described in terms of the risk surrounding potential losses

Example: Example: “If you quit smoking, you will not develop lung cancer” vs “if you continue to smoke, you will die of lung cancer”.

Example: ‘Annuity puzzle’ annuity is a great way to address the risk of outliving ones income, yet annuity contracts are extremely rare. You take your pension savings and give to investment company and they will pay you an annuity and they will pay you monthly until you live.- longer or short. People are not keen on giving up on savings, as they don’t like the prospect of dying. Find that participants find an annuity more attractive when framed as consumption rather than investment.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q
  1. Mental Accounting
A

Mental accounting is a specific form of framing in which people segregate certain decisions

Example: an investor may take a lot of risk with one investment account but establish a very conservative position with another account that is dedicated to her child’s education. Rationally, it might be better to view both accounts as part of the investor’s overall portfolio with the risk–return profiles of each integrated into a unified framework.

Example: Mental accounting effects also can help explain momentum in stock prices. The house money effect refers to gamblers’ greater willingness to accept new bets if they currently are ahead.

Example: after a stock market run-up, individuals may view investments as largely
funded out of a “capital gains account,” become more tolerant of risk, discount future cash flows at a lower rate, and thus further push up prices.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q
  1. Regret Avoidance
A

Investors regret poor returns more if they formed unconventional portfolios.

Example:
Buying a blue chip portfolio that turns down is not as painful as experiencing the same losses on an unknown start up firm. Investors may attribute losses on the blue chip stocks to bad luck, whereas those on the unknown start up firm to bad decision making.

The level of acknowledgement may vary between investors.

Higher book-to-market firms tend to have depressed stock prices. These firms are “out of favor” and more likely to be in a financially precarious position. Similarly, smaller, less well known firms are also less conventional investments.

Mental accounting can add to this effect. If investors focus on the gains or losses of individual stocks, rather than on broad portfolios, they can become more risk averse concerning stocks with recent poor performance, discount their cash flows at a higher rate, and thereby create a value-stock risk premium.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q
  1. Loss aversion
A

Investors exhibit risk seeking behaviour when faced with certain losses. We would take more risk to avoid losses. The shape of the utility function works with this theory.

Not framing, just frame of loss

Example:
Treatment 1: You are given £10 and faced with the following options:
1. A sure gain of £5. Expected Value = 5
2. Coin toss: no gain versus a gain of £10.
Expected value = 0.5 (10) + 0 (10) = 5

Treatment 2: You are given £20 and faced with the following options:
1. A safe loss of £5. Expected Value = -5
2. Coin toss: no loss versus a loss of £10.
Expected Value = -10

The majority of people who are subjected to treatment 1 (2) goes for the safe (risky) option, which implies risk aversion ( seeking)

Thus, people seem to act in a risk averse (seeking) way when faced with certain gains (losses). They are happy to take risks to avoid losses.

Prospect theory offers an explanation for this type of behaviour.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Affect

A

Conventional models of portfolio choice focus on asset risk and return. But behavioural finance focuses as well on affect, which is a feeling of “good” or “bad” that consumers may attach to a potential purchase or investors to a stock.

Example 
- socially responsible policies
- attractive working conditions
- producing popular products may generate
higher affect in public perception.

They found that stocks ranked high in Fortune’s survey of most admired companies tended to have lower average risk-adjusted returns than the least admired firms. This suggests that their prices have been bid up relative to their underlying profitability and thus, their expected future returns are lower

17
Q

Prospect Theory

A

Prospect theory modifies the analytic description of rational risk-averse investors found in standard financial theory

Figure 12.1 
A. Conventional Utility Function 
- Higher wealth provides higher utility
- but at a diminishing rate (the curve flattens as the individual becomes wealthier. As the same amount of wealth doesn't bring additional utility at same rate. Gain & loss are perceived at different rates 
- investors will reject risky prospects
that don’t offer a risk premium. 

B. Utility Function under Prospect Theory

  • a competing description of preferences characterised by “loss aversion.”
  • Utility doesn’t depends only on level of wealth, as in panel A, but on changes in wealth from current levels.
  • Less than 0, the curve is convex rather than concave.

Many conventional utility functions imply that investors may become less risk averse as wealth increases, the function in panel B always re-centers on current wealth, thereby ruling out such decreases in risk aversion and possibly helping to explain high average historical equity risk premiums.

Investors are risk-seeking rather than risk averse when it comes to losses.

18
Q

Limit to arbitrage

  1. Fundamental risk:
  2. Implementation costs
  3. Model risk
A

Behavioural biases would not matter for stock pricing if rational arbitrageurs could fully exploit the mistakes of behavioural investors.

Trades of profit-seeking investors would correct any misalignment of prices.

But, behavioural advocates argue that in practice, several factors limit the ability to profit from mispricing.

They do not have to be behavioural, only the nature of the rules of the market can explain persistent mispricing simply because it cannot be arbitrated away due to transition costs or other regulations.

19
Q

Limits to Arbitrage and the Law of One Price

Example 1: “Siamese twin” companies
Example 2: Equity carve outs
Example 3: Close end funds

A

Law of One Price
positing that effectively identical assets should have identical prices

We would assume that the Law of One price is satisfied under rational markets. Yet there are several instances where the law seems to have been violated. These instances are good case studies of the limits to arbitrage.

Assets that have identical cash flows should trade at the same price. This law should be satisfied in rational markets.There are several instances where the law seems to have been violated. This violation is probably due to the limits to arbitrage.

20
Q
  1. Fundamental risk:
A

More losses may incur before prices converge to the intrinsic values.

If the market keeps the mispricing long enough, you cant keep the position open as you get margin calls and you need to be able to find cash to keep the position open.

Markets can stay irrationals than you can stay solvent.

21
Q

Example 1: “Siamese twin” companies

A

Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport
merged their operations into one firm. The two original companies, which continued to trade separately, agreed to split all profits from the joint company on a 60/40 basis.

Shareholders of Royal Dutch receive 60% of the cash flow, and those of Shell receive 40%.

Thus one would expect Royal Dutch should sell fro exactly 60/40 = 1.5 times the price of Shell. –> but this wasn’t the case. However, there has been considerable departure from this parity.

They are the same company, this creating a arbitrage opportunity. If Royal Dutch sells for more than 1.5 times Shell. This means that Shell is relatively underpriced and short sell over-priced Royal.

Worked if you had followed it in February
1993 when Royal sold for about 10% more than its parity value,

This opportunity posed fundamental risk

22
Q
  1. Implementation costs
A
  • Pension or mutual fund managers cannot freely short sell.
  • Short selling a security entails costs; short-sellers may have to return the borrowed security on little notice, rendering the horizon of the short sale uncertain
  • Short selling is also costly.
  • Moreover, short sellers may be forced to
    close their positions prematurely.

This can limit the ability of arbitrage activity to force prices to fair value.

23
Q

Example 2: Equity carve outs

A

Several equity carve-outs also have violated the Law of One Price.

Example: case of 3Com
In 1999 decided to spin off its Palm division. It first sold 5% of its stake in Palm in an IPO, announcing that it would distribute the remaining 95% of its Palm shares to 3Com shareholders 6 months later in a spinoff.
Each 3Com shareholder would receive 1.5 shares of Palm in the spinoff

Before this the process of 3Com should have been at-least 1.5times that of Palm. Then, Palm shares at the IPO actually sold for more than the 3Com shares. The stub value of 3Com could be computed as the price of 3Com minus 1.5 times the price of Palm. This showed that 3Com’s stub value was negative, despite the fact that it was a
profitable company with cash assets alone of about $10 per share.

Why not buy 3Com and sell Palm?
The limit to arbitrage in this case was the inability of investors to sell Palm short. Virtually all available shares in Palm were already borrowed and sold short, and the negative stub values persisted for more than 2 months.

24
Q
  1. Model risk
A

An apparent profit opportunity can be due to a poor valuation model.

Mispricing may make a position a good bet, but it is still a risky one, which limits the extent to which it will be pursued.

25
Q

Example 3: Close end funds

A

Open and closed end funds are managed investment companies.

Closed-end funds often sell for substantial
discounts or premiums from net asset value.

This is “nearly” a violation of the Law of One Price, because one would expect the value of the fund to equal the value of the shares it holds.

Open-end funds: investors can sell their shares back to the fund at net asset value NAV

Closed-end funds: investors have to sell their shares to other investors. This can only work at the secondary market to cash out.

Therefore, share prices of closed end funds can differ from their NAV s:
(Deviation=Price−NAV/ NAV)

The Price s should not deviate substantially from NAV s , but in reality they do.

26
Q

Technical analysis

A

Under the EMH, technical analysis should not work at all.

But we have seen some behavioural explanations why prices may not completely reflect fundamental values. In prolonged episodes in market where we feel there is persistent irrationality then technical analysis can be used in those periods to take advantage of mispricing.

These are some of the information used by technical analysts to gauge how the market is moving.

Trends and Corrections: There are various methods of “predicting” trends/movements in a market:

  1. Moving averages
  2. Relative strength
  3. Breadth

Trends are described as time series momentum. Looking at same assets and finding trends and rules to make money in the future.

27
Q
  1. Moving averages
A

A 52 week moving average tracks the average value over the most recent 52 weeks.

Each week, the moving average is recomputed by dropping the oldest observation and adding the latest. This would be the only differences of the re-compute of moving averages.

The moving average is calculated by adding a stock’s prices over a certain period and dividing the sum by the total no of periods.

  • Sell the security if its price was previously above the moving average, but is now moving below.
  • Buy the security if its price was previously below the moving average, but is now moving above.

They take this as the signal for future trend.
The moment it pushes through a moving average we have to sell. This trading strategy allows you to make money in short term. You need to get out of the position in the right time.

28
Q
  1. Relative strength
A

The ratio of the price of a security to a price index for the industry. Stock P : Index P

A rising ratio implies that the company is outperforming the rest of the industry.

Similarly, we can construct a ratio of the price index for an industry to the market price index.

29
Q
  1. Breadth
A

The breadth of a market is a measure of the extent to which movement in a market index is reflected widely in the movements of all the stocks in the market.

If most of the stocks are going up, Brett
1. Calculate the number of stocks that advanced in a particular day A
2. Calculate the number of stocks that declined in a particular day D
The difference is a way of measuring the breadth: A − D . This is difference between positive and negative returns in the market.

If A − D is large; The market is viewed as being stronger because the rally is widespread.

You can form the cumulative breath and see how the breadth was increased or decreased as the day changes.

30
Q

Sentiment indicators

A

There are various indicators of market
sentiment (general optimism among investors):

  1. Trin statistic
  2. Confidence index
  3. Put/Call ratio
31
Q

Momentum Effect

A

The tendency of poorly performing stocks and well-performing stocks in one period to continue that abnormal performance in following periods.