Legal Skills Friday #5 Flashcards
(7 cards)
Gian-Cursio v. State
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, 1965 180 So.2d 396
FACTS
Mozian was treated by defendants, Dr. Gian-Cursio and Dr. Epstein at the offices of Dr. Epstein who was a licensed chiropractor in Florida. Dr. Epstein was an influential chiropractor in Florida. Plaintiff was hospitalized for tuberculosis treatment approximately six months later. Following plaintiff’s death, the defendants where charged with manslaughter. At trial, the jury found that the defendants’ treatment increased rather than slowed the tuberculosis. The defendants appealed and they lost.
RULE
Criminal negligence exists where the physician or surgeon, or person assuming to act as such, exhibits gross lack of competency, gross inattention, or criminal indifference to the patient’s safety.
State v. Petersen
Oregon Court of Appeals 522 P.2d 912 (1974)
FACTS
Defendant Petersen and Mike Barlow were driving in Petersen’s pickup truck when they saw Daniel Warren and Richard Wille at a gas station. Wille told defendant he wanted to race his Chevrolet Nova against his truck. In a residential area of town, the two vehicles drag raced and reached speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. At some point prior to coming to an intersection, defendant brought his truck to a complete stop. Wille passed defendant without slowing, entered the intersection, and collided with a truck. Wille and Warren were killed by the truck after the truck ran a stop sign. Following the accident, defendant left without rendering assistance or identifying himself. Jury convicted defendant of manslaughter and two other convictions.
RULE
A manslaughter charge is where the defendant “recklessly” caused decedent passenger’s death by consciously disregarding “substantial and unjustifiable” risk to human life that defendant’s drag racing created.
Conroy v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992 843 S.W.2d 67
FACTS
A few hours after drinking at a bar for several hours, defendant Conroy and three friends returned to his house around 3:00 a.m. Defendant held the gun at waist level as he entered the third room. Elissa Anne Roberts was killed when a shot struck her in the head. Defendant has been charged with murder. Defendant testified at trial that he had not intended to shoot anyone, specifically Elissa, and that the gun went off by accident. Defendant, who had prior military and weapons training, stated that he knew the gun was loaded, cocked, and that his finger was on the trigger when he entered the third room. A weapons expert testified that the gun would not go off accidentally, but only if the trigger was pressed. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision to deny him an instruction on negligent homicide, and he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense.
RULE
To be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the actor must be aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk surrounding his conduct or the results thereof, but consciously disregard that risk. The specific intent to kill is not an element of the offense of involuntary manslaughter.
State v. Howard
Supreme Court of Utah, 1979 597 P.2d 878
FACTS
Defendant Howard was involved in a heated argument with a group of people at a friend’s house, and he knew ahead of time that he would get into the fight, so he brought a shotgun. Defendant shot Johnson again as Johnson stumbled toward another gun in the room. Crager and Johnson both died. Two counts of first degree murder were filed against defendant. On the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter, the trial court instructed the jury. Defendant also requested a jury instruction on negligent homicide. The trial court declined his request and the jury convicted him of second degree murder and manslaughter. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on negligent homicide.
RULE
The difference between the minimum required mens rea of recklessness for manslaughter and criminal negligence for negligent homicide is simply whether the defendant was aware, but consciously disregarded a substantial risk the result would happen, or was unaware but ought to have been aware of a substantial risk the result would happen. This distinction is purely one of subjective intent in the mind of the actor; and, a question of fact to be decided by the jury if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the lesser included offense.
Commonwealth v. Olshefski
Pennsylvania District and County Court, 1948
64 Pa. D. & C. 343
FACTS
Defendant Olshefski told his driver, John Fisher, take one of Olshefksi’s trucks to the Gilberton Coal Company and have it loaded with coal. In Pennsylvania, the truck’s gross weight limit was 15,750 pounds. A weigh slip was given to Fisher indicating that the truck’s gross weight was 15,200 pounds after defendant’s truck had been loaded with the coal. To sell the coal in Danville, a city ordinance required that the seller have a Danville weigh slip. Before reaching the scales, however, he was directed by a police officer to a different set of scales. After his truck was weighed, defendant was handed a weigh slip indicating a gross weight of 16,015 pounds, 265 pounds over the limit. The police officer cited defendant with a violation of the state’s Vehicle Code and the matter was presented for disposition in court.
RULE
Pa. Vehicle Code of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, does not require a truck to be weighed by a licensed weighmaster, but specifically a peace officer is authorized to weigh and unload the truck’s gross limit. It further provides, that no arrests shall be made where the maximum gross weights provided in this act are not exceeded by more than five percent.
Staples v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States, 1994
511 U.S. 600, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608
FACTS
Defendant Staples owned a semi-automatic rifle that originally had a metal piece preventing it from firing automatically. As a result, the rifle met the statutory definition of a firearm under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Defendant did not register the weapon as required by the act. Plaintiff The United States charged Staples under the above-mentioned act, that makes possession of an unregistered firearm punishable by up to ten years in prison. Defendant asserted he did not know the rifle could automatically be fired. The trial judge refused to give defendant’s a jury instruction, which stated that the government was required to prove that defendant was aware that the gun would fire automatically. Rather, the judge instructed the jury that to sustain a conviction that defendant only needed to know that he had a dangerous device and that defendant should have know the consequences of the gun if it fired automatically. Defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari against defendant.
RULE
Under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.S. §§ 5801-5872, all firearms must be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury. 26 U.S.C.S. § 5841. 26 U.S.C.S. § 5861(d) makes it a crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, for any person to possess a firearm that is not properly registered.
Commonwealth v. Koczwara
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1959
397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825
FACTS
Defendant Koczwara worked in a tavern in Pennsylvania, where he had a liquor license. Defendant was convicted on three counts of violating the Pennsylvania Liquor Code. The convictions was related to the presence of minors in his tavern on two occasions and the sale of beer to minors on one occasion. No facts are supporting evidence show that defendant was present at the tavern when the minors were there. Further, there were no supporting facts or evidence that defendant personally sold the beer to underage drinkers or that he had any knowledge that the sale had actually happened. Defendant’s bartender had sold the beers to the minor not defendant. However, the trial court found defendant liable and sentenced him to three months in jail and a $500 fine. Supreme Court affirmed.
RULE
Section 491 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code states that it is unlawful for any person, by himself, or by an employee or agent, to expose or keep for sale, or directly or indirectly to sell or offer to sell any liquor within the Commonwealth, except in accordance with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code and the regulations of the board.
