Legislation & Legal Issues Flashcards

1
Q

Executive order 12898

A

Issued by Bill Clinton in 1994.

Directs federal agencies to:
- ID and address disproportionately high and adverse human health and env effects on minority and low-income populations.

  • Develop a strategy to implement environmental justice.
  • Promote nondiscrimination in federal programs that affect health and the env and provide minority and low-income communities access to public info and public participation.
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2
Q

Emergency Planning and Right to Know Act

A

1986, authorized by Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act to help communities plan for chemical emergencies.

It requires industry to report on the storage, use, and release of certain chemicals to federal, state, tribal, territorial, and/or local gov.

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3
Q

National Environmental Policy Act

A

Also known as NEPA. Signed into law by 1970 under the Nixon administration.

NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to making decisions. This includes permit apps, adopting fed land management actions, and constructing highways and other publicly-owned facilities.

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4
Q

Civil Rights Act - Title VI

A

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

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5
Q

Federal Highway Act of 1956

A

Also known as the National Defense Highway Act.

  • Created the interstate highway system.
  • Largest US public works program at the time.
  • Extended the road system by 41,000 miles.
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6
Q

Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) (when, what)

A

1924

Issued by the US Dept. of Commerce under Secretary Herbert Hoover

zoning regulations must be “in conformance with a comprehensive plan” but did not define the term

Drafted by Alfred Bettman

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7
Q

State City Planning Enabling Act (when, what)

A

1928, Bettman

Addressed planning commission, subdivision regulations, and regional planning commission

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8
Q

Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co.

A

1926, upholds zoning

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9
Q

Franklin Township vs. Tugwell

A

Greenbelt town development ruled unconstitutional because housing construction was considered a state power and the Resettlement Administration was ruled an illegal delegation of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration’s power.

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10
Q

1949 Housing Act

A

Wagner - Ellender - Taft Bill
- first comp housing legislation
- aimed to construct 800K housing units
- inaugurated urban renewal

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11
Q

Housing Act of 1954

A
  • Stressed slum prevention and urban renewal rather than slumclearance and urban redevelopments as in the 1949 act
    -Stimulated general planning for cities under 25K
  • 701 funding later extended to foster statewide, interstate, and substate regional planning
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12
Q

Berman v. Parker

A

1954, DC

US Supreme Court upholds DC Redevelopment Land Agency to condemn unsightly, though non-deteriorated, properties in accordance with area redevelopment plans.

“Blighted” private property can be taken for aesthetic and redevelopment purposes, not just for public use.

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13
Q

Clean Air Act

A

1970

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14
Q

Clean Water Act

A

1972

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15
Q

Coastal Zone Management Act

A

1972

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16
Q

Endangered Species Act

A

1973

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17
Q

Superfund Act

A

1980

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18
Q

Real Property Rights (bundled rights)

A

surface, subsurface, air, water, use and enjoyment

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19
Q

Public nuisance

A

a person’s unreasonable conduct interferes with the public’s right to health, safety, peace, morals, comfort, or convenience. Remedy is abatement or injunction.

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20
Q

Hadacheck v. Sebastian

A

Los Angeles, 1915
Pre-existing brickyard declared a public nuisance; 88% reduction in value; SCOTUS upholds. No right to maintain a nuisance and no compensation for abatement.

(Brickmaker) Holding that ordinance was a valid exercise of police power (despite ignoring the 3rd criteria of substantive due process)

Early zoning case

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21
Q

What are police powers?

A

general power to regulate that is possessed by the states to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The power to regulate land use and development rests on the police power of states — US Constitution Article 1, Section 8 (federal police power)

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22
Q

Munn v. Illinois

A

1876, regulation of business does not violate the 14th amendment. Railroad hauling rates

Illinois regulated gain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing license reqs and maximum rates for storage and transport of grain. The Chicago gain warehouse, Munn and Scott, was found guilty of violating the new law. Munn and Scott appealed on the grounds that the law was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process.

SCOTUS upheld constitutionality of state regulations extending private industries that affect public interests.

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23
Q

Dillon’s Rule

A

Municipal governments have no powers except those expressly delegated by the State (in a charter) or necessarily implied. (v. home rule states)

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24
Q

Home Rule

A

Municipal governments have all powers unless expressly restricted by the state (public purpose). (v. Dillion’s Rule states)

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25
Q

1st amendment (related to planning law)

A

Freedom of religion, speech, and right to assemble, petition government for redress

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

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26
Q

5th amendment (related to planning law)

A

Limits federal powers. Due process, just compensation.

…nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

(state constitutions limit state police powers and powers of eminent domain)

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27
Q

10th amendment (related to planning law)

A

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

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28
Q

14th amendment (related to planning law)

A

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the US; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

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29
Q

What is a taking?

A

Government physically invades or condemns private property.

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30
Q

Eminent Domain

A

the power to take private property for public use, a power possessed by federal and state governments, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking.

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31
Q

What is a regulatory taking?

A

State or local “police power” interferes with or limits owner’s “highest and best” economic use and enjoyment for the purpose of protecting the public interest.

This is an inherent power of government that is limited by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.

While there is no express constitutional requirement to pay compensation for the exercise of power power, the Supreme Court has concluded that under some circumstances, a regulation can affect land so significantly that is the functional equivalent of a taking of property for which compensation must be paid.

32
Q

What is an inverse condemnation

A

A government action forces owners to sue (i.e. owner’s position is “inverse” compared to eminent domain.

33
Q

What is an exaction?

A

An exaction is a concept in US real property law where a condition for development is imposed on a parcel of land that requires the developer to mitigate anticipated negative impacts of the development.

The rationale for imposing the exaction is to offset the costs, defined broadly in economic terms, of the development to the municipality. Exactions are similar to impact fees, which are direct payments to local governments instead of conditions on development.

34
Q

Pennsylvania Coal Co vs. Mahon

A

1922 - coal mining and support rights. Establishes the concept of a regulatory taking.

In 1878, Penn Coal Co sells surface rights to Mahon, but reserves the right to remove subsurface coal. 1921 state statute prohibits mining of coal if it causes subsidence of a residence; reduction in value of property from the regulation. Mahon sues to cancel the covenant based on the new law.

Mahon loses, Penn Coal Co’s property rights were “taken” by the state, not Mahon’s.

35
Q

Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV

A

1982 - even “minor” physical invasions are “per se” takings. 100% physical takings of certain property rights.

NYC law requires landlords to install cable TV wiring on buildings and absorb the costs.

SCOTUS: physical invasion, no matter how small, is a taking and requires compensation.

On REMAND: damages were set at $1 because cable access increased the property value

36
Q

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

A

1992, 100% regulatory taking of all property rights

Owner denied building permits for two oceanfront lots after a hurricane. Lots were seaward of the setback line.

SCOTUS: per/se categorical taking; compensation is required when the regulations deny all economic use of the property, unless nuisance law already prohibits the use.

On REMAND: settlement reached, the state buys the lots and sells them for development.

37
Q

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York

A

1978 - takings, TDR, and innovative regulation. balance 3 factors: (1) character of gov action, (2) econ impact of the regulation on owners, and (3) owner’s investment-backed expectations.

NYC Landmarks Preservation law adopted and applied to protect Grand Central Station; reaction to demolition of Penn Station. City does not prohibit use of all of the rights on the property and creates a transfer of development rights (TDR) system for air rights above the station, owner can transfer to other sites in Manhattan.

SCOTUS: a taking requires all reasonable use of the property and must evaluate the entire property, not just a portion of it or one of the rights associated with ownership.

38
Q

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County

A

1987, Temporary takings require compensation.

FACTS: Church camp destroyed by flood; LA County adopts an interim moratorium ordinance prohibiting reconstruction of buildings in a flood plain for a defined period; Church claims “inverse condemnation” and
demands monetary damages; state courts say no monetary damages due and can only invalidate the ordinance; Church appeals

SCOTUS: Monetary damages are allowed for a
temporary taking, not just invalidation of the
ordinance. Does not decide if this was in fact a
“taking” or how to calculate damages, if any are due; state courts will decide.

On REMAND: Church loses - public necessity of keeping handicapped children out of harm’s way was found to outweigh church’s alleged economic loss.

39
Q

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

A

2000, a temporary moratorium is not a regulatory taking

FACTS: Tahoe RPA declares 2 moratoria on residential permits – lasting a total of 32 months- to draft & adopt new policies to protect Lake Tahoe. Owners denied building permits during moratorium & new rules disqualify for permits unless can satisfy complex TDR system; Owners demand money damages for the 32 months they could not develop. SCOTUS asked to declare a temporary moratorium = a “per se” taking.

SCOTUS: A temporary moratorium is not a per se taking. Review each case on its facts; apply Penn Central multi-factor criteria = “parcel-as-a-whole”

Property will recover value when the prohibition is lifted.

40
Q

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

A

2001 - Can prior knowledge preclude taking?

FACTS: Owners have state permit for construction in coastal wetland; State agency changes permit requirements; Palazzolo acquires property after rule change; denied permit to build under old rules; sues for inverse condemnation/taking; state courts rule no standing to sue because acquired after rule change

SCOTUS: Owner does not waive right to challenge a regulation as an uncompensated
taking by purchasing property after the enactment of the regulation being challenged; no “statute of limitations on the exercise of Constitutional rights”; would create two
categories of ownership too difficult to administer.

On REMAND: case dismissed, no loss of all value per Penn Central

41
Q

Kelo v. City of New London

A

2005, exercise of police powers for economic development

FACTS: CRA justifies condemnation of entire
neighborhood solely on economic development and job creation grounds; no proof of “blight or slum” conditions; City adopts an “integrated development plan”

SCOTUS (5 to 4): Proposed action is sufficient “public purpose” under 5th Amendment and upheld the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes.;” Berman v. Parker upheld; defers to the legislative
process (Euclid)

42
Q

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

A

1987, exactions and the essential nexus

FACTS: Nollan wants to demolish an oceanfront bungalow and erect a larger house; State agency imposes a permit condition requiring Nollan to “contribute” an
easement for lateral public access along the beach, but justifies demand based on the view of the beach from the road.

SCOTUS: Exactions must demonstrate an “essential nexus” to a legitimate state interest. The justification for the regulation & the condition must coincide. Here, exaction (beach access) and its stated purpose (view) were not logically consistent. The easement did not let anyone else see the beach from the road. Burden is on agency to justify the link; staff reports must establish the “essential nexus”

43
Q

Dolan v. City of Tigard

A

1997, exactions, rough proportionality

FACTS: Oregon drug store owner wants to expand; city imposes permit condition requiring easements for a bike path and a storm drainage area; 20% unbuildable. City adopted a greenway plan that includes Dolan’s property; sounds like an “essential
nexus”

SCOTUS: “Essential nexus” (Nolan) is not
enough; must also be “rough proportionality”
between the exaction and its impacts on the
property. The essential nexus was proved, but
there is no evidence on record to demonstrate that the degree of impact on the property was “proportional;” term not defined.

44
Q

What is rough proportionality? And what land use case established the concept?

A

1997, Dolan v. City of Tigard

An exaction is legitimate only if the public benefit from the exaction is roughly proportional to the burden imposed on the public by allowing the proposed land use—that is, that the exaction is not excessive to compensate for the externality the proposed land use would impose. This “rough proportionality” must be shown by an individualized determination, with the burden on the government to show its evidence.

45
Q

What is the essential nexus? And which land use case established the concept?

A

1987, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

an exaction is legitimate if it shares an “essential nexus” if justification for the regulation & the condition coincide and are logically consistent.

In Nollan, the court required compensation for a public easement over the dry sand area of the beach as a condition for development, because they found that the easement was not closely related enough to fighting the psychological barrier to beach access that the development would present.

46
Q

Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District

A

2013, takings, exactions: unconstitutional conditions, extends dual nexus test to monetary exactions and application denials.

FACTS: Koontz applies for permit to develop 4 acres with 11 acre conservation easement (CE); WMD proposes 2 options: either 4 ac + offsite mitigation 7 miles away (c.$150,000) + 11 ac CE; or 1 acre + 14 ac CE; Koontz rejects both options; no permit issued, so no actual “taking”; Koontz argues that Nollan/Dolan should apply; an “attempted extortion” is a “taking”; loses in FL Supreme Court.

SCOTUS: Dual nexus test applies even if no permit is issued. Dual nexus applies to exactions requiring money. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine: govt may not require an individual to give up a constitutional right (e.g. compensation) in order to obtain a gov benefit.

47
Q

What is the basic concept in the 5th and 14th amendment that relate to planning law?

A

Government shall not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

48
Q

What are the two types of due process land use cases?

A

(1) procedural - court examines how a law is administered, applied, or enforced. The official action may not be “arbitrary or capricious” or “confiscatory”. Must provide reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal

(2) substantive - court will examine the content of the law. “economic/contractual” or “zoning” issues, “personal liberty” issues

No need to prove loss of value in a due process claim; the remedy is to void the law, not money damages.

49
Q

City of East Lake v. Forest City Enterprises

A

1976 - Can exercise of rights by the public violate due process?

FACTS: Cleveland area developer proposed to rezone 8 ac. parcel from Industrial MF to build high rise; City charter requires zoning changes to be subject to 55% popular referendum; voters overturn City Council approval; developer claims referendum requirement is an arbitrary & capricious delegation of legislative authority and violates due process clause; State law classifies zoning as “legislative” act and allows referenda

SCOTUS: Referendum does not violate 5th/14th Amendment due process; not
an invalid “delegation” of legislative power because State Constitution specifically reserves right of referendum to the People and Ohio law classifies zoning as a “legislative” act

50
Q

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation

A

1977- Negative impact on a protected class is not enough to justify overturning the law/admin decision; must prove the intent to discriminate.

FACTS: Church wants to build multi family low income housing in largely white Chicago suburb zoned single family; village refuses to rezone.

SCOTUS: Negative racial impact without proof of discriminatory intent does not violate 14th
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, but Fair Housing Act may apply.

50
Q

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

A

1985 -

FACTS: Texas town denies special permit for a “hospital for the feeble minded” (i.e., group home); lower courts find “retardation” to be a “quasi-suspect category” requiring “heightened scrutiny” under 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause

SCOTUS: Rejects “heightened scrutiny;” concept of “retardation” is too hard to define, unlike race, religion, national origin, etc. (“Suspect Categories”); ordinance overturned on “rational basis” grounds

50
Q

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

A

1974

FACTS: Long Island town adjacent to SUNY/Stony Brook defines “family” to exclude student housing; not more than 2 unrelated persons living together

SCOTUS defers to legislative process, regulation is “fairly debatable” (Euclid v. Ambler).

50
Q

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House

A

1994 - Federal statutes can protect federal rights, fair housing act civil rights act of 1968, Title VIII as amended.

FACTS: Seattle-area city zoning code requires SF occupancy to constitute a “family”, defined as related by blood/adoption/marriage or no more than 5 unrelated persons; Oxford runs group home for 12 adult recovering alcoholics in SF zone; cited for code violation; Oxford claims Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination based on handicap; trial court rules FHA exempts “reasonable restrictions” on occupancy (e.g., Housing Codes)

SCOTUS: Ordinance is subject to FHA; not a maximum occupancy/public safety requirement; intent here is to preserve the “family” character of a neighborhood

51
Q

Southern Burlington NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (1975)

A

FACTS: 1960s “urban renewal” in Camden, NJ leads to “white flight;” rural Mt. Laurel Township zones for PUDs; Township has historic African American community; township uses “police power” to “discourage” blacks to stay; AME Church petitions for townhouses as “replacement” housing; township denies rezoning

RESULT: NJ Supreme Court interprets State Constitution to require all municipalities to provide their “fair share” of regional need for affordable housing, SCOTUS declines Town appeal; 1975-1983, most municipalities refuse to comply.

52
Q

Southern Burlington NAACP v. Town of Mt. Laurel (1983)

A

FACTS: Mt. Laurel adopts limited response to Mt. Laurel I; appealed

RESULT: NJ Supreme Court repeats, expands, and redefines its requirements for statewide compliance with “fair share” by municipalities; legislature intervenes and adopts “fair share” standards.

52
Q

Young v. American Mini Theaters (1976)

A

1st amendment, free speech and sexual expression

FACTS: Detroit adopts zoning to disperse adult entertainment; thru spacing requirements; to prevent “skid row”; movies are not “obscene” and are protected theater owner seeks injunction.

SCOTUS: Law upheld. “Speech” is not absolute; this involves “low-value speech” and city’s policy goals can be considered; OK to use zoning controls for sexually explicit theaters and bookstores.

53
Q

City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters (1986)

A

1st amendment, free speech and sexual expression

FACTS: Seattle suburb prohibits “adult” theaters within 1,000 feet of residential, church, park or school; theater owner sues

SCOTUS: Upheld; separation or concentration requirements for adult uses are okay if a substantial government interest exists & restriction is “content neutral/time, place & manner” and provide “reasonable alternative avenues of communication;” no total ban; “intermediate scrutiny” applied

54
Q

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981)

A

1st amendment, free speech and sexual expression

FACTS: The City banned almost all off-premise outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city’s appearance and prevent
dangerous distractions to motorists. Only “onsite” billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. A trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses, but this was reversed by the California Supreme Court.

SCOTUS: The ban’s exception allowing “onsite” commercial advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. The Court held that affording “a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech” reversed the long standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech, i.e. that this reached “too far into the realm of protected speech.”

55
Q

Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

A

1st amendment, free speech: signs and commercial speech

FACTS: Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News’ services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

RESULTS: The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.

56
Q

Larkin v. Grendel’s Den (1982)

A

“Establishment” Clause Case

FACTS: Mass. statute gives schools and churches power to veto issuance of alcohol permits to establishments within 500 feet; Boston restaurant operator sues after church 10 feet away prevents him from obtaining a liquor license.

SCOTUS: Law violates Establishment Clause by giving Police Power directly to a church

57
Q

The Jehovah’s Witness Cases (1930s/1940s)

A

“Free exercise” clause case

No permits can be required to distribute religious pamphlets; No compulsory flag salutes or Pledge of Allegiance

58
Q

3-part test established by Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

A

“Free exercise” clause case

(1) secular purpose
(2) neither advance nor inhibit
(3) no excessive government entanglement

59
Q

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993)

A

“Free exercise” clause case

FACTS: City ordinance bans ritual animal slaughter; practice is central to Santeria; makes exceptions for Jewish kosher slaughter

SCOTUS: Ordinance targets a particular religion and is not “a neutral law of general applicability”.

Certain practices can be prohibited if they don’t hinder the religion itself (e.g. Mormon polygamy)

60
Q

Oregon Employment Division v. Smith (1990)

A

1st amendment - religion, statutory protection

FACTS: Native Americans employed by drug rehab smoke peyote as part of a ceremony; fired; denied unemployment benefits because of their “misconduct”

SCOTUS: Upholds firing – neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate Free Exercise Clause

BIG POLITICAL STINK ENSUES -Congress struggles to define limits of official action,
1997-1999; Courts reject

61
Q

RLUIPA

A

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act - 2000

Designed to prevent “invidious discrimination” against the free exercise of religion by citizens vested with land use discretion or authority (or prison authorities).

Land use regulations may not impose a “substantial burden” on religious assemblies”:
(1) must use “least restrictive means” and have a “compelling gov interest” for restrictions, (2) not treat religious assembly “unequally” or “unreasonably limit assemblies, institutions, or structures”

To date, the courts have generally found that the gov did not substantially burden religious land-use applicants in 3 broad categories, 1.) general zoning and land-use restrictions that apply to everyone. 2.) churches are excluded from some districts, ex. central business district, and 3.) general review processes that apply to everyone, ex. requiring a religious homeless shelter to comply with the town’s building code, problematic: establishing a conditional use approval process for certain religious institutions.

62
Q

Civil Liberties for Urban Believers (Club) v. City of Chicago (2003)

A

FACTS: City Zoning Code limits zones in which churches can locate as of right & imposes complicated approval requirements for Special L/Use; group of churches have difficult time finding locations but all eventually do get
permits; sue City to recover costs under RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” clause & 1st & 14th Amendments

COURT: Churches lose on all counts: “There is no substantial burden placed on an individual’s free exercise of religion where a law or policy merely … make[s] the practice of … religious beliefs more expensive”; this is a “neutral law of general applicability“ with a “rational basis” (Euclid v. Ambler); ordinance places churches on equal footing with nonreligious assembly uses; courts will have final say on interpreting the U.S. Constitution

63
Q

Mugler v. Kansas (1887)

A

FACTS: 1877- Mugler buys a brewery in Salina;
1880- State Constitutional Amendment bans alcohol sales; 1885- statute declares liquor sales a “public nuisance;” value of Mugler’s brewery reduced from $10,000 to $2,500 & Mugler convicted & fined for nuisance; Mugler argues 14th Amendment “taking” & “due process” violations.

SCOTUS: Ordinance upheld; application of the state’s police power to prohibit use of property in order to “protect the health, the public morals, or the public safety” is not a taking and no compensation is required; abatement of a nuisance does not eliminate all property value; also no violation of due process.

64
Q

Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo (1972)

A

Concurrency

Adopted a zoning ordinance that made the “issuance of a development permit contingent on the presence of public utilities, drainage facilities, parks, road access, and firehouses. Although the community did intend to provide the required facilities in the future, new development could proceed promptly only if its location would not demand new facilities in advance of Ramapo’s schedule. It was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo (1972). Initiated a wave of no-growth or slow-growth management programs
nationwide.

65
Q

Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma (1975)

A

Concurrency

City of Petaluma, California set a simple annual quota on building permits at 500 per year beginning in 1971 (in 1970, Petaluma had issued over 2,000 building permits). In 1975, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Petaluma’s quota system in Construction Industry Association of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma

66
Q

Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore (1976)

A

Concurrency

1976, the California Supreme Court upheld a temporary moratorium on building permits in
Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore. Livermore had imposed the moratorium until certain performance criteria were met for the city as a whole.

67
Q

Welch v. Swasey (1909)

A

Zoning height regulations upheld

Prior to Euclid (1926); Permit denied for a plantiff proposing a 124’ building in a residential district that restricted building height to 100’. Commercial districts were allowed 125’ buildings. Plantiff contended that the statutes were not a valid exercise of police power because they were aesthetic in nature.

SCOTUS upheld the Massachusetts legislature allowing Boston city ordinance limiting building heights in certain districts… “greatest reluctance in interfering with the well-considered judgements of the courts of a state whose people are to be affected by the operation of the law.”

68
Q

The Stafford Act

A

1988 - Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

Federal legislation that provides funding for disaster relief, recovery, and hazard mitigation planning.

Framework for continued disaster relief. Legislated a minimum 75% federal cost share, 25% state and local cost share for the public assistance program.

69
Q

The intent of the SSZEA was to:

(A) Mandate state implementation
(B) Provide a model code for states to voluntarily adopt and implement
(C) Financially support state implementation and adoption
(D) Require standardization between the states

A

The correct answer is (B)

Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover’s had an interest in planning and zoning and the creation of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) was brought about due to his decision to have the federal government develop and promulgate model state laws.

Involved with developing the model was Edward Bassett (Father of American Zoning) who had developed the 1916 New York City first comprehensive zoning code.

70
Q

How appropriate would it be for the city planning board to hold an executive session for discussion with legal staff regarding pending litigation?

A) appropriate and unlikely to be overturned in court
B) inappropriate and action likely to be overturned in court
C) unclear and action unlikely to be overturned in court
D) insufficient information

A

The correct answer is A)

Discussions with legal staff regarding pending litigation is typically a valid reason for a public
agency to hold an executive session.

71
Q

How appropriate would it be for the city planning board to hold an executive session for an allegation by a landowner of improper advertising of a subdivision
public hearing?

A) appropriate and unlikely to be overturned in court
B) inappropriate and action likely to be overturned in court
C) unclear and action unlikely to be overturned in court
D) insufficient information

A

The correct answer is B)

This discussion focuses on the action of a public board (as opposed to a public official) and
must be held in a public session of the planning board.

72
Q

What cases established the legal principles of transfer-of-development rights?

A

Penn Central Transportation Co v. The City of New York (1978) - designation of Grand Central Station as a protected historic landmark, air rights

Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York (1976) rezoning of land to public park use accompanied by a grant of TDR useable within a designated receiving zone