MBE Questions Flashcards
Last year, Congress enacted legislation providing for funding opportunities to eligible secular and religiously affiliated colleges and universities. The funding will be available through individual counties as each county’s funding limitations allow. The legislation does not require that each county apply standard guidelines nor does it provide any suggested guidelines other than a statement that “all counties should track funding and compile guidelines in the event of a federal audit.”
A county awards a large grant to a religiously affiliated college that employs a substantial number of residents. The grant contract, signed by representatives from both the county and the college, states as follows: “All grant monies must be used in compliance with county regulations. Further, the college must track the allocation of grant monies throughout the grant term.”
Is the county’s award of the grant constitutional?
A) No, because the county provided grant monies to a religiously affiliated college.
B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes.
C) Yes, because the college is required to track funding.
D) Yes, because the college may be the subject of a federal audit.
B) No, because it does not require that the aid be used only for nonreligious purposes.
Governmental financial assistance to religious institutions is permitted IF
1) the aid is secular in nature/ used only for secular purposes, and
2) when the aid is distributed among secular and religious institutions, the distribution criteria must be religiously neutral.
A state enacted a law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors and imposed a fine for each violation. The legislative history demonstrated a concern that there was a correlation between playing such games and subsequent violent behavior. A maker of video games brought suit contending that this law violated its First Amendment right of free speech. Is this law unconstitutional?
A) Yes, because the costs of such a restriction on speech outweigh its benefits.
B) Yes, because the state law is a content-based restriction.
C) No, because video games do not qualify for First Amendment protection.
D) No, because states have the power to protect children from harm.
B) Yes, because the state law is a content-based restriction
The state law = content-based restriction
subject to strict scrutiny = regulations must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest
A public university adopted the following policy: In order to be recognized as a student organization with rights to school facilities and funds, an organization must permit any student to be a member regardless of the student’s status or beliefs. One student organization was a local chapter of a national organization that restricted membership in local chapters to members of a particular religious sect and denied membership to homosexual individuals. May the university apply its policy to the student religious group?
A) No, because the policy violates the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.
B) No, because the policy violates the First Amendment Freedom of Association Clause.
C) Yes, because a public university is free to allocate its funds among student groups in any rational manner it sees fit.
D) Yes, because a public university is a limited public forum and the policy is viewpoint neutral.
D) Yes, because a public university is a limited public forum and the policy is viewpoint neutral.
A state airport commission adopted a regulation prohibiting the solicitation of money inside airport terminals, but permitted the solicitation of money on the pathways outside the terminals where travelers were accessible. The commission adopted the regulation due to the disrupting effect solicitation had on travelers attempting to reach their gates, causing delays and congestion in the terminals. Fundraisers from an organization devoted to raising money to help cure cancer attempted to solicit donations in the airport terminal, and were detained for violating the regulation. The organization has challenged the constitutionality of the regulation. Is the regulation constitutional?
A) No, because a ban on all solicitation is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
B) No, because the regulation preventing solicitation in airport terminals is not content neutral.
C) Yes, because the ban on solicitation is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
D) Yes, because the regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication on the sidewalks outside the airport terminals.
C) Yes, because the ban on solicitation is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
government may regulate speech-related activities in nonpublic forums as long as the regulation is
(i) viewpoint-neutral and
(ii) reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
An airport terminal is considered a nonpublic forum.
Here, the ban on solicitation in the airport terminals is viewpoint-neutral because it prohibits all types of solicitation; it does not target solicitation based on the specific cause. The ban is also reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of avoiding a disruptive effect for travelers inside an airport terminal.
The President issued an executive order in an effort to encourage U.S. citizens to use the metric (Celsius) system of temperatures. Section 1 of the executive order requires the U.S. Weather Bureau, a federal executive agency, to state temperatures only in Celsius in all weather reports. Section 2 of the executive order requires all privately owned federally licensed radio and television stations giving weather reports to report temperatures only in Celsius. No federal statute is applicable.
Is the President’s executive order constitutional?
(A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not.
(B) Section 2 is constitutional, but Section 1 is not.
(C) Sections 1 and 2 are constitutional.
(D) Sections 1 and 2 are unconstitutional.
(A) Section 1 is constitutional, but Section 2 is not.
The President, as the chief executive officer of the U.S. government, has authority to direct the actions of federal executive agencies, so long as the President’s directives are not inconsistent with an act of Congress. (The facts state that there is no applicable statute here.) Section 2 of the executive order is unconstitutional. At least as a general rule, the President does not have authority to direct the actions of persons outside the executive branch unless the President’s direction is authorized by an act of Congress. There are no circumstances presented in the facts (such as a sudden attack on the United States) that might justify an exception to this general rule.
The childhood home of a former U.S. president is part of a national park located in a city. The National Park Service entered into a contract with an independent antique collector to acquire items owned by residents of the city during the former president’s lifetime. According to the contract, the collector purchases items and then sells them to the Park Service at a price equal to the collector’s cost plus a 10% commission. Purchases by antique collectors are ordinarily subject to the sales tax of the state in which the city is located. The collector has filed suit in state court to enjoin collection of the tax on these purchases for the Park Service, claiming that the sales tax is unconstitutional as applied to them.
Should the state court issue the injunction?
(A) No, because as the purchaser of the antiques, the collector, rather than the federal government, is liable for the tax.
(B) No, because the suit is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
(C) Yes, because the federal government is contractually obligated to pay the amount of the sales tax when the government covers the collector’s cost of the antiques.
(D) Yes, because under the supremacy clause, the federal program to acquire the antiques preempts the state sales tax on he purchase of these items.
(A) No, because as the purchaser of the antiques, the collector, rather than the federal government, is liable for the tax.
The responsibility for the state sales tax on the collector’s purchases of antiques is on the collector, who is independent of the National Park Service. The fact that the collector passes the cost of the tax on to a federal agency when the collector sells an item to the agency does not change the responsibility for the tax on the collector’s purchase
Note: There is no indication in the facts that the sales tax on the collector’s purchases conflicts with any federal law governing the Park Service’s program. Moreover, the responsibility for the state sales tax on the collector’s purchases of antiques is on the collector, who is independent of the National Park Service.
Congress enacted a federal statute providing that any state may “require labeling to show the state or other geographic origin of citrus fruit that is imported into the receiving state.” Pursuant to the federal statute, a state that produced large quantities of citrus fruit enacted a law requiring all citrus fruit imported into the state to be stamped with a two-letter postal abbreviation signifying the state of the fruit’s origin. The law did not impose any such requirement for citrus fruit grown within the state. When it adopted the law, the state legislature declared that its purpose was to reduce the risks of infection of local citrus crops by itinerant diseases that have been found to attack citrus fruit. A national association of citrus growers has sued to have the state law declared unconstitutional. The association claims that the law is prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Which of the following is the best argument in favor of the state’s effort to have this lawsuit dismissed?
(A) Any burden on interstate commerce imposed by the state law is outweighed by a legitimate state interest.
(B) Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation.
(C) The state law does not discriminate against out-of-state citrus growers or producers.
(D) The state law furthers a legitimate state interest, the burden it imposes on interstate commerce is only incidental, and the state’s interest cannot be satisfied by other means that are less burdensome to interstate commerce.
(B) Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation.
Congress may use its commerce power (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution) to permit states to discriminate against interstate commerce. The federal statute here explicitly authorizes states to enact state-of-origin labeling requirements on imported citrus fruit.
The President created an office to encourage the improvement of local communities through faith-based organizations. The office was funded from monies appropriated by Congress for the general discretionary use of the President. The office provided support only to religious organizations. A taxpayer brought suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of this office. The federal government has moved to dismiss this suit.
Should the court allow the taxpayer’s suit to proceed?
A) Yes, because the funding of the office violates the First Amendment establishment of religion clause.
B) Yes, because the source of the funds for the office is a congressional appropriation.
C) No, because the plaintiff as a taxpayer lacks standing.
D) No, because the First Amendment establishment of religion clause does not apply to the executive branch.
C) No, because the plaintiff as a taxpayer lacks standing.
A taxpayer has standing when the taxpayer’s suit
(1) challenges legislation enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power and
(2) alleges a violation of a specific constitutional limitation on that power
Here, the taxpayer has challenged the President’s expenditure of general discretionary funds—not the legislation enacted under Congress’s taxing and spending power that allocated those funds to the President
Note: The question is not asking about substantive law, but if the taxpayer has standing!
In response to growing concerns about the overcrowding of landfills with scrap metal nationwide, Congress passed a statute requiring all unwanted vehicles to be disposed of at federally licensed auto-recycling facilities. These facilities were able to recycle more components of vehicles than most other recycling facilities. However, due to the high operating costs of these facilities, the cost of disposing of the vehicles was much higher than the cost of disposing of them at general-purpose recycling facilities. A state wants to dispose of its fleet of decommissioned trucks at a state-operated recycling facility. However, this facility is not federally licensed.
Is the state permitted to dispose of its decommissioned trucks at the state-operated facility?
A) No, because the federal statute was passed pursuant to Congress’s power to legislate for the general welfare.
B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
C) Yes, because the market-participant exception applies.
D) Yes, because states are given broad discretion in areas governed by the state’s police power.
B) No, because the federal statute regulates interstate commerce.
The commerce clause gives Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce—including in-state activities that substantially impact interstate commerce, singly or in the aggregate.
Here, the aggregate is an important issue
Note: The taxing and spending clause permits Congress to tax and spend (not legislate) for the general welfare
Note: The DCC does not authorize states to violate a federal statute (as seen here).
The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings against a federal district court judge. The President, a lifelong friend of the judge, considered the grounds for impeachment that were being discussed to be politically motivated and without substantial merit. Prior to any hearing on the matter by the House committee, the President pardoned the judge.
What effect does this pardon have on the impeachment proceedings against the judge?
A) The proceedings must stop, because the President’s power to pardon is plenary.
B) The proceedings must stop, because the President acted in good faith in granting the pardon.
C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President’s power to pardon does not extend to impeachment.
D) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President may not pardon a person until that person has been convicted.
C) The pardon has no effect on the proceedings, because a President’s power to pardon does not extend to impeachment.
The President has the plenary power to grant reprieves and pardons to persons who commit federal offenses—except in cases of impeachment.
A small, struggling, formerly industrial city in one state was only 30 miles from the border of a neighboring state and only 40 miles from a booming city in the neighboring state. In an effort to entice more citizens of the neighboring state to come to the small city to shop, dine, and otherwise spend money, the small city passed an ordinance relieving out-of-state citizens from paying the small city’s sales tax. A group of small-city citizens properly brought a suit against the city, challenging the ordinance.
Of the following constitutional provisions, which would be the basis on which the citizens could most effectively challenge the ordinance?
A) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
B) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2.
D) The privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1) Equal protection: Discriminatory treatment of similarly situated people
Here, the small city’s ordinance is discriminatory because out-of-state citizens are relieved from paying the small city’s sales tax while in-state citizens are not.
2) Due process:
+ Substantive – deprivation of life, liberty, or property without adequate justification
+ Procedural – deprivation of life, liberty, or property without adequate process
3) Privileges or immunities: Interference with rights of national citizenship – RARELY THE RIGHT ANSWER!
Note: The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the federal government give individuals notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard when depriving them of life, liberty, or property. Here, the citizens are challenging a city ordinance, so this clause does not apply.
Faced with poorly performing public schools in a city, the state instituted a state-funded voucher program for parents with school-age children who lived in the city. The state gave parents a voucher for each school-age child that could be used either toward tuition for the child to attend a private school in the child’s school district, whether parochial or not, or be presented to the child’s public school, which would receive the same amount in additional funding. The choice of whether to attend a private or public school was solely left to the parents and their child. Over 95 percent of the vouchers were used by parents toward tuition payments to parochial schools. The program contained no restrictions as to how the schools could use the funds.
Is this program constitutional?
A) No, because the primary effect of the program is to provide state aid to parochial schools.
B) No, because the program contains no provisions to prevent the use of state aid to fund religious instruction at the parochial schools.
C) Yes, because governmental financial assistance that benefits both religious and secular educational institutions is constitutional.
D) Yes, because the purpose of the program is secular and funding is only directed to religious institutions through individual choice.
D) Yes, because the purpose of the program is secular and funding is only directed to religious institutions through individual choice.
The government can provide indirect funding to religious institutions if the funding program comports with historical practices and understandings of the establishment clause—i.e., when funding flows to religious schools through individual, not government, choice.
A religious leader ran a temple in honor of his sect’s gods. For weeks, the religious leader solicited numerous offerings from the community, including some cash donations, and explained to donors that the offerings would be “put toward the temple’s efforts to combat global warming.” After he collected these offerings, the religious leader burned all of them, including the cash, in a ritual offering to one of the gods to request divine assistance to counter the effects of global warming. The state charged the religious leader under a state statute that makes it a crime to make fraudulent claims in order to solicit monetary donations. The charge was based on the assertion that “the defendant should have known that the god does not exist and burning cash donations as a pious offering would have no effect on global warming.” The state has never brought a similar charge against leaders of other religions who collected donations.
Which of the following is the religious leader’s strongest constitutional defense to the charge?
A) The charge denies the religious leader’s free exercise of religion because the charge depends on the reasonableness of his sincerely held beliefs.
B) The charge denies the religious leader’s rights under the obligation of contracts clause because it criminalized the collection of voluntary monetary donations.
C) The charge violates the equal protection clause because no leaders of other religions have been charged under this statute.
D) The ministerial exception protects the religious leader from criminal liability under this statute based on the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.
A) The charge denies the religious leader’s free exercise of religion because the charge depends on the reasonableness of his sincerely held beliefs.
A state highway administration, acting pursuant to statutory authorization by the state legislature, has promulgated rules for large electronic billboards located along roads maintained by the state. These rules stem from concern about the potential for driver distraction and the ensuing adverse consequences for highway safety. Among the rules is one that bans the graphic display of violence. The producer of a movie wants to promote the movie through a short clip from the movie on billboards subject to this rule. The clip contains a graphic display of violence. The producer has filed an action in the appropriate federal court challenging the state highway administration’s rule as a violation of the First Amendment as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
By which of the following standards should the state highway administration’s rule be judged?
A) As a rule that deals with a matter traditionally subject to regulation, it must be upheld unless it is arbitrary or irrational.
B) As a regulation of commercial speech, there must be a reasonable fit between the government’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.
C) As a time, place, or manner restriction, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.
D) As a content regulation, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
D) As a content regulation, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid and will be upheld only if they survive strict scrutiny—i.e., if the government proves that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Here, the state highway administration’s rule prohibits the graphic display of violence on large electronic billboards, so it should be judged as a content regulation
Concerned with the proliferation of signs about upcoming events and the failure to remove those signs after the event, a city enacted an ordinance specifying that “all signs concerning upcoming events may not be placed more than 14 days before the event and must be removed within 7 days after the event; no more than 10 signs per event are allowed on city property.”
A social organization wants to display signs about its monthly dinner, which is held to attract new members, in greater number and for a longer period than permitted by the ordinance. The organization has filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Of the following, by which standard will this ordinance be judged?
A) It must be narrowly tailored to further a significant government interest and leave open alternative channels of communication.
B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
C) It must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
D) It must not have a negative impact on the organization’s freedom of assembly.
B) It must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid and will only be upheld if they survive strict scrutiny— restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Here, the ordinance restricts the time period during which signs about upcoming events may be placed. It also restricts the number of those signs that may be placed on city property. Since the ordinance imposes these restrictions on one subject (upcoming events) but no others (e.g., candidacy for public office), it is a content-based restriction that is subject to strict scrutiny review.
Note: since the ordinance here is a content-based restriction, strict scrutiny applies.
A professional basketball player who was a citizen of one state sued an artist who was a citizen of another state. The artist had created multiple oil paintings of the player’s image from which limited-edition prints were created and sold without the player’s permission or consent. The player sought damages in excess of $80,000 for violation of his state statutory right to publicity.
The state trial court ruled in the player’s favor, but the state appellate court overturned this decision on the basis that the free speech clause of the state constitution created a privilege that protected the artist from this action. In making its decision, the appellate court relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. The appellate court decision denied the player recovery on his state-based cause of action. The state’s highest court declined to hear the appeal. The player then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Can the Supreme Court grant this petition?
A) No, because the player seeks to recover damages from the artist under a state statutory cause of action.
B) No, because the state’s highest court did not render a decision in this case since it declined to hear the appeal.
C) Yes, because diversity of citizenship exists between the player and the artist and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
D) Yes, because the state court decision relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.
D) Yes, because the state court decision relied on a recent decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court can choose to review final state-court decisions by certiorari unless the decision rests on adequate (state law fully resolves the matter) and independent (no federal precedent used) state grounds.
A man was charged with violating a state criminal statute in state court. While prosecution was pending, the man filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court, alleging that the state statute as applied to him violates the U.S. Constitution. The man sought an injunction against the state’s prosecution of him.
Should the federal district court hear the man’s claim?
A) No, because the man lacks standing since he has not been convicted and sentenced for a violation of the state statute.
B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding.
C) Yes, because a federal court may enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
D) Yes, because the man has alleged that the state statute violates the U.S. Constitution.
B) No, because the man seeks an injunction against a pending state criminal proceeding.
Younger abstention doctrine: applied in declaratory or injunctive relief is sought in federal court. Requires abstention when such relief would interfere with a pending state proceeding on any criminal matter or a particular civil matter* that:
1) involves an important state interest and
2) provides an adequate opportunity to litigate the federal issue(s).
A state legislature passed a law requiring employers to provide their employees with health insurance that covered certain prescription drugs. Violation of this statute was considered a crime that subjected the offender to fines, which were described in detail in the statute. The law was effective immediately.
An employer did not provide her employees with insurance that covered the required drugs and argued that such drugs were prohibited by the religion practiced by the employer. The employer filed a complaint in federal court asserting that the law was unconstitutional and asked for a preliminary injunction against the attorney general to prevent him from enforcing the statute while the case was being heard. The attorney general filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
How should the federal court rule on the attorney general’s motion to dismiss?
A) Deny the motion, because the employer has taxpayer standing due to the imposition of fines.
B) Deny the motion, because the employer’s injury is imminent.
C) Grant the motion based on prudential grounds.
D) Grant the motion based on the doctrine of abstention.
B) Deny the motion, because the employer’s injury is imminent.
A plaintiff has standing to sue in federal court if he/she allegedly
(1) suffered an injury-in-fact;
(2) was caused by the defendant’s challenged conduct; and
(3) is redressable by a favorable judicial decision.
Here, the state statute requires employers to provide employees with health insurance that covers certain prescription drugs. Employers who violate the statute are subject to monetary fines. As a result, the employer here will suffer imminent financial harm (injury-in-fact) when she is fined for violating the statute (causation). The court can prevent this injury by granting her request for a preliminary injunction (redressability).
In order to discourage the transfer of electrical products that could threaten national security and to raise revenue, Congress enacted a statute that imposed a tax on the export of electrical products containing military-grade technology to countries that were determined to be hostile to the United States.
Is the federal tax likely constitutional?
A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods.
B) No, because the tax unduly burdens foreign commerce.
C) Yes, because the commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce.
D) Yes, because the taxing and spending clause gives Congress the power to tax for any public purpose.
A) No, because Congress does not have the power to tax exported goods.
Congress has broad power to tax and spend for the general welfare. However, Congress can never impose taxes on exported goods or services or on services and activities closely related to the export process.
A violent storm resulted in severe property damage and extreme loss of life in States A, B, and C, which all became the subjects of emergency declarations by the President. The National Guard was present for three months in each state while recovery occurred. A year later, most of the damaged property had been reconstructed, and no current threat to life or property remained.
During a time of year when similar storms are common, the President instructed the National Guard to set up a presence within various points in all three states. Congress had previously enacted legislation allowing the President to deploy the National Guard in such a way. The President neither requested nor received authority from the governor of State C, the smallest state of the three, but he did receive authority from the governors of States A and B.
Was the President’s action constitutional?
A) No, because an emergency situation no longer existed at the time of the President’s order.
B) No, because the governor of State C did not authorize the presence of the National Guard.
C) Yes, because the President sent the National Guard to all three states.
D) Yes, because the President’s actions were aligned with permissible Congressional authority.
D) Yes, because the President’s actions were aligned with permissible Congressional authority.
Congress has the power to authorize the President to deploy the National Guard into action without the approval of the state governor to execute federal laws, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions.
A federal statute established a life insurance exchange that allowed U.S. citizens and noncitizens to purchase affordable life insurance policies through it. U.S. citizens were immediately eligible to participate in the exchange, but resident noncitizens were not eligible to participate in it until they had resided in the U.S. for at least five years. A resident noncitizen who has resided in the U.S. for four years was denied eligibility pursuant to the statute and has filed suit in federal court challenging the statute on constitutional grounds. Specifically, the resident noncitizen claims that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Is the resident noncitizen likely to prevail?
A) No, because Congress has plenary authority over immigration and naturalization under Article I of the Constitution.
B) No, because the statute violates the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, because national origin is a suspect classification that triggers strict scrutiny.
D) Yes, because the statute is not substantially related to an important government interest.
A) No, because Congress has plenary authority over immigration and naturalization under Article I of the Constitution.
The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment requires federal laws based on U.S. citizenship to satisfy rational basis scrutiny. This level of scrutiny places the burden on the challenger to prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress has a legitimate interest in providing benefits only to citizens because U.S. citizens have closer ties to the U.S. than noncitizen
The District of Columbia government has the power to levy an income tax. In an effort to encourage nonresidents to conduct business in the District of Columbia, Congress enacted a federal statute that prohibits the District of Columbia from imposing an income tax on individuals who work there but reside elsewhere.
Is the statute likely to be found constitutional?
A) No, because it violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
B) No, because it violates the uniformity clause of Article I, Section 8.
C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8.
D) Yes, under the Sixteenth Amendment.
C) Yes, under the enclave clause in Article I, Section 8.
The Enclave clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) legislative power to govern the District of Columbia.
Note: The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to impose an income tax without apportioning it among the states on the basis of population. However, the amendment does not apply here since the statute prohibits the imposition of an income tax on nonresidents who work in the District of Columbia.
There has been a recent surge in the profitability of the agave nectar industry because more food and beverage manufacturers are utilizing agave in their food products instead of cane sugar. As a result, the cane sugar industry has been suffering economically. Agave plants are grown primarily in Mexico and South America. Congress recently enacted a statute placing a tariff on agave imported into the United States, causing the overall price of agave to increase.
An importer of agave into the United States has challenged the constitutionality of this statute because he lost significant business in the United States after having to raise the price of his imported agave products due to the import tariff.
Is the importer likely to succeed in his action?
A) No, because Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.
B) No, because the tariff does not place an undue burden on interstate commerce.
C) Yes, because the benefits of the tariff are clearly exceeded by the burden it places on interstate commerce.
D) Yes, because the tariff impedes the importer’s constitutional right to free trade.
A) No, because Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.
Commerce clause gives Congress plenary (i.e., absolute) authority to regulate foreign commerce, including power to impose tariffs (i.e., taxes) on imported goods like agave
A tenured professor who had been employed for 30 years at a state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, the professor was informed that she was being dismissed due to allegations of plagiarism in several of her published works. The professor was not given the opportunity to respond to the allegations against her prior to her dismissal. Shortly after her dismissal, the professor contested her termination in a post-termination evidentiary hearing, at which her termination was upheld. The professor then filed an action in federal court, arguing that her termination was unconstitutional as she was denied due process of law.
Was the professor’s termination constitutional?
A) No, because the professor was not granted a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination.
B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism.
C) Yes, because the professor could be terminated without cause, so no due process was required.
D) Yes, because the professor received notice of her dismissal and a post-termination hearing.
B) No, because the professor was not provided with a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations of plagiarism.
A public employee who can only be terminated for cause has a property interest in such employment—and termination is a serious deprivation of that interest—due process requires that the employee receive:
1) notice of his/her alleged misconduct
2) a pre-termination opportunity to respond to that allegation and
3) a post-termination evidentiary hearing to determine if the termination was warranted.