Midterm Flashcards

1
Q

KING: What are the four steps in a nonviolent campaign?

A
  1. Collection of the facts to determine whether injustices are alive.
  2. Negotiation.
  3. Self-purification.
  4. Direct action.
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2
Q

KING: What is the purpose of a direct action program?

A

Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has consistently refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks to dramatize the issue so that it can no longer be ignored. The purpose of direct action is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation (the call for negotiation).

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3
Q

KING: What is the difference between an unjust law and a just law?

A

What is the difference between an unjust law and a just law?

A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law, or the law of God. Any law that uplifts human personality is just.

An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. An unjust law is a code inflected upon a majority which that minority had no part in enacting or creating because it did not have the unhampered right to vote.

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4
Q

KING: Why are segregation statutes unjust?

A

All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. To use the words of Martin Buber, segregation substitutes an “I-it” relationship for the “I-thou” relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. So segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, but it is morally wrong and sinful. King urges people to disobey segregation ordinances because they are morally wrong.

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5
Q

KING: What obligations fall on someone who breaks an unjust law?

A

You must break laws nonviolently and then accept your punishment.

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6
Q

WALDMAN: On p. 108, Waldman describes and responds to two of King’s justifications for civil disobedience. What are King’s justifications and how does Waldman respond to each?

A

King wanted to comment on the “oft-heard charge that we who urge non-cooperation with evil in the form of civil disobedience are equally lawless…the devotees of nonviolent action…feel a moral responsibility to obey just laws. But they recognize that there are also unjust laws.”

Waldman says that King then performs intellectual acrobatics by jumping from the premise—that he and his “devotees”…“recognize that there are also unjust laws”—to the asserted right to violate such laws “that conscience tells him [are] unjust,” that is, in the sole judgment of the violator. He defines “an unjust law” as “…One in which people are required to obey a code that they had no part in making because they were denied the right to vote” and also as being “…One in which the minority is compelled to observe a code that is not binding on the majority.”

According to this logic, every person under 21 or the millions of non-citizens, all denied the right to vote, have no obligation to obey the law. Now, as to the minority logic. There are thousands of laws throughout the land which apply only to minorities, and are “not binding on” the majorities.

We all know of laws that apply only to bankers, farmers, trade unions, manufacturers, sailors, or electricians, or other trades or groups, but do not apply to the great bulk of the rest of the nation, to the “majority.” May all such laws be ignored by the affected minority because they do not bind the majority?

These glib generalizations in King’s advocacy of civil disobedience are as bad as they are illogical. When literally applied by many of his followers, who do not have the sophistication and training of King, such shibboleths lead to an intellectual, religious, and moral justification for doing illegal acts of which violence and lawlessness are but the extreme expressions.

King was asked whether he thought “there is a right to disobey an unjust law” in those places “where the Negroes actually have the right to vote.” This is King’s answer”

“There may be a community where Negroes have the right to vote, but there are sill unjust laws in that community. There may be unjust laws in a community where people in large numbers are voting, and I think wherever unjust laws exist people on the basis of conscience have a right to disobey those laws.”

If this philosophy were accepted and carried out by the 20 million American Negroes, it would be enough to disorganize our entire society and produce an intolerable chaos and a denial of individual liberty to every other American.

But, note carefully, King does not limit him philosophy to Negroes. He says “whatever unjust laws exists people on the basis of conscience have a right to disobey those laws.” To this I say that we are all fully aware that human beings, being what they are, “conscience” can be, and sometimes is, elastic, conforming to what people want, both overtly and subconsciously. But, as King must know, civil disobedience cannot end with Negroes alone. You cannot build a fence around this kind of program. Other people become involved.

The consequences of King’s program, if allowed to continue, would be disastrous to our nation. What if in the last 18 years the Labor Movement had proceeded with a program of civil disobedience as outlined by King, and had used its organizational power to stage marches, “non-violent marches” of course, sit-ins, “non-violent sit-ins” of course, and other activities—would not such actions tend to disorient our politically organized society?

Whatever the group, if they decide in the name of religion, morality or personal conscience that certain laws are unjust, then, according to King’s program, they would be justified in carrying out civil disobedience.

Again I ask: If this be so, where would our nation be? Where would our freedom be? Where would our civil rights be?

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7
Q

WALDMAN: What does Waldman think of those who violate the law openly? Why does Waldman think better of secret violators?

A

The open violation of law is an open invitation to others to join in such violation. Disobedience to law is bad enough when done secretly, but it is far worse when done openly, especially when accompanied by clothing such acts in the mantle of virtue and organizing well-advertised and financed plans to carry out such violations. The secret violator of law recognizes his act for what it is: an antisocial act; he may even be ashamed of what he is doing and seek to avoid disapprobation of his neighbors. But the open violator, the agitating violator, acts shamelessly, in defiance of his neighbor’s judgment and his fellow man’s disapproval.

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8
Q

WALDMAN: King says that civil disobedience applies in the North as well as the South. The reason is that the North is guilty of broad injustice in three areas: unemployment, housing and education. How does Waldman respond? That is, what is patently obvious to Waldman?

A

The reason why the North is to be included in the civil disobedience program, according to King, is that the North is guilty of broad injustice in 3 areas: unemployment, housing and education. Yet, it is patently obvious, that these three problems involve broad social and economic policies, on the justice or injustice of which thousands of laws, touching on these questions, honest men may in good conscience differ.

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9
Q

WALDMAN: King says that non-violent direct action is supposed to create the kind of crisis-packed situation that will lead to negotiation. Waldman responds that creating crisis-packed situations and tension is the very opposite of non-violence. Who is right?

A

King says, “Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with…”

Waldman: Thus, we have the philosophy and purpose of King’s program. It is to produce “crisis-packed” situations and “tensions.” Such a purpose is the very opposite of non-violence, for the atmosphere-of-crisis policy leads to violence by provoking violence. And the provocation of violence is violence. To describe such provocations as “non-violent” is to trifle with the plain meaning of words.

The perpetual crisis technique has been used by the Communist movement throughout the world. Both Communist governments and parties follow it. It was used by Hitler in Germany, both on his road to power and after power came to him, as a means of justifying his arbitrary, brutal and barbarous policy. It has been used by every Fascist country we learned to know and abhor in this century. It is disruptive of democratic society and institutions.

The policy of perpetual crisis, of provoking “tensions,” as he calls it, and of civil disobedience, are disastrous to the Negro people themselves, to civil liberties and to constitutional government. Such a policy flies in the teeth of the very purpose of our Constitution, which is clearly stated in the preamble to be, among other things, “to insure domestic tranquility.”

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10
Q

TAYLOR: According to Taylor, the willingness to accept the penalty is based on a principle important to civil disobedience. What is this principle?

A

The willingness to accept the penalty of law is based on the principle that the violation of pernicious laws is justified by the fact that these laws themselves violate a higher law.

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11
Q

TAYLOR: According to Taylor, almost all major forms of direct community action—sit-ins, freedom rides, demonstrations, picketing, and rent strikes—are not properly understood as civil disobedience. Explain Taylor’s reasoning for two forms of action listed above.

A

In the case of sit-ins, many of the people arrested have not pleaded guilty. They have acted under the pretense of their legal right. In the case of freedom rides, the violators were not the riders themselves, who were exercising their federal rights, but the bus companies and police who were denying them the rights.

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12
Q

TAYLOR: According to Taylor, the Triborough-Bridge demonstration was not an act of civil disobedience. Why not?

A

The Triborough-Bridge demonstration was not civil disobedience because they were breaking just laws and preventing those who had nothing to do with the atrocities in the South from moving around freely. They were breaking laws in the North, a place that had been trying to itself from unjust racial laws. Gandhi would allow for just laws to be broken in an unjust system, but the North had been trying to improve—not so in the South.

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13
Q

TAYLOR: Why does Taylor worry about “a philosophy which says that each man must decide for himself which laws he will obey”?

A

Taylor’s worry about “a philosophy which says that each man must decide for himself which laws to obey” is justice. There is a difference between breaking a law by appealing to higher law or logic then just arbitrarily saying that you do not want to obey it.

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14
Q

COHEN: How does Cohen define civil disobedience?

A

An act of civil disobedience is an act of illegal, public protest, nonviolent in character. That is to say: the civilly disobedient act must be a knowing violation of the law, else it will not be disobedient; the act must be performed openly, being one of general community concern of which the agent is not ashamed; and the act must be intended as an object to some law or administrative policy or public act.

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15
Q

COHEN: What is the difference between direct and indirect civil disobedience?

A

The distinction of the two centers on the relation between the disobedient act and the object of protest. An act of direct civil disobedience is one in which the law broken is the law protested (for example: tearing up one’s draft card in protest against the law which specifically forbids one to do so); an act of indirect disobedience is one in which the law broken is other than the object of protest (for example: deliberately blocking traffic in front of a construction site). Clearly, the problems encountered in justifying cases of civil disobedience will vary greatly depending upon (among other things) whether that disobedience were direct or indirect.

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16
Q

COHEN: What are the two general strategies for justifying civil disobedience?

A

Two patterns of justification are commonly employed, and may be roughly described as follows: on the one hand, it may be claimed that disobedience is justified by some higher law or principle imposing an obligation so compelling as to override the obligation to obey any civil or positive law. The higher law may or may not be claimed to have divine origin, but it will normally be held to have universal force, and to have a source outside of, and superior to, the system of positive law. On the other hand, it may be claimed that, without resort to divine or supernatural authority, deliberate disobedience may sometimes be justified on some utilitarian grounds. Very different utilitarian calculi may be proposed; “utilitarianism” here must be interpreted very generously. These two patterns are often mutually consistent, and in a given case both might be applicable; but it is likely that each disobedient, depending upon his more fundamental philosophical beliefs, will rely ultimately upon one or the other pattern.

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17
Q

COHEN: What is the first argument against civil disobedience? How does Cohen respond to this argument?

A

1st Argument → The resort to a higher law, in the effort to justify civil disobedience, fails because it leads to social chaos. Effective law and social order are undermined by such appeals, and what destroys effective law and order cannot justify civil disobedience.

There are several things wrong with this argument:

  1. It does not seem to be the case, in fact, that the appeal to some higher law leads to chaos. The Western political tradition is greatly indebted to philosophers who advocated just such an appeal, and to their followers who relied upon such appeals to support their battles for a juster society. In theory and in practice the appeal to higher law, although sometimes badly abused, has most often been the instrument of persons with noble, socially desirable objectives, and its use has generally brought not chaos, but a better political order.
  2. It is not even true that the reliance upon a higher law has any natural tendency to result in social chaos, for the higher law is usually held to require obedience to the legally constituted authorities save under the most extraordinary circumstances. it is only when the offense of the legally constituted authorities against that higher law is perfectly clear, perfectly wrongful, and morally intolerable that such law is likely to be used as a defense of deliberate disobedience to the positive law.
  3. The fact that the appeal to a higher law may be misused, whether by mistake or by design, and thereby disrupt the social order, does not prove such an appeal always inappropriate or insufficient. The possibility of mistaken use, and even of occasional deliberate misuse, of the “higher law” appeal does not show that such law does not bind a man, or all men, to disobey some positive laws under some circumstances. Higher laws may offer only shaky support for political conduct, but proof of their universal insufficiency is hard to come by.
  4. Even were the premise of the argument granted (that resort to higher laws does destroy, or tend to destroy, an effective system of laws) the conclusion (that such a resort cannot justify civil disobedience) does not follow. For there may well be cases in which the injustice of the positive laws is so great, and the acts they command so wrongful, that one has, even in the face of that fearful consequence, an absolute duty to disobey.
From my class notes:
Resort to higher law; undermines law/order and leads to chaos, and what leads to chaos cannot be justified.  So you should never engage in civil disobedience because of higher law and the utilitarian common good.

Cohen agrees but only sometimes. It is often a noble act and only when authority goes badly wrong is civil disobedience justified. Maybe the law is so unjust that chaos is protestable.

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18
Q

COHEN: What is the fourth argument against civil disobedience? How does Cohen respond?

A

4th Argument → Persons who engage in civil disobedience deliberately flout the law; they are contemptuous of the law, making light of it in a way that cannot be justified in a law-governed community.

This is the most frequently heard criticism of civil disobedients; and it is among the weakest. Although the manner of civil disobedients is sometimes defiant, their conduct is more often a manifestation of respect for law than of contempt for it. Recognizing that a given law applies to him, the civil disobedient breaks it knowingly, in the effort to correct what he believes is a serious injustice, and thereby to improve the system of laws. He understands (or should understand) that such deliberate violation of law will be met with legal punishment. He may expect that the punishment meted out to him will be (rightly or not) more severe than the inflicted upon less principled offenders against the same law. The civil disobedient generally undertakes his act with the intention of public self-sacrifice; he breaks the law and is punished. His suffering public punishment, his humiliation and probable maltreatment, is an essential part of his protest; it is his manner of declaring, in what he believes to be the clearest and most effective way he can, his deep concern and distress over a community wrong infinitely worse (as he believes) than that he commits. In accepting punishment he also demonstrates his respect for the system of laws, a system he seeks to improve, not subvert or destroy. Many recent civil disobedients in this country have been very clear about this, pleading guilty (or “no contest”) when charged, and insisting upon their own punishment as the public culmination of their protest. Such conduct cannot deserve the criticism that it demonstrates contempt for law, or makes light of the law. Some disobedients, it is true, have sought acquittal for their alleged crime, either on the ground that the object of their protest was a criminal act by their government which it was their legal duty to protest, or on the ground that their act was a form of speech protected by the 1st Amendment of the Constitution. Such claims, which are not common, are mistaken, and are inconsistent with civilly disobedient protest as usually conceived. In general, criticism of civil disobedients for “making light of the law” badly misapprehends the nature of their act, and ignores their publicly stated intentions.

19
Q

COHEN: What is the ninth argument against civil disobedience? How does Cohen respond?

A

9th Argument → Although civil disobedience might sometimes prove justifiable under arbitrary and dictatorial rule, it can never be justifiable under governments within which there are lawful channels for the registering of protest, and lawful means for the correction of the wrong protested.

This is a bad argument, although it is often heard. Its plausibility arises from the conviction that where there are two ways of achieving the same objective, one lawful and the other not, the unlawful procedure (other things being equal) would not be justifiable. This principle is reasonable enough, but it does not really support the argument at hand. Even if there are lawful channels for the registering of protest, it does not follow that such protest will accomplish the same objectives, that it will (or could) be as effective as the self-sacrificial protest of the civil disobedient. Showing that lawful protest is possible, therefore, cannot by itself prove that disobedient protest is unjustifiable; what would have to be shown is that (assuming the object of a protest a wrong in need of remedy) some form of legal protest is equally (or almost equally) effective in achieving the protester’s social goals. Clearly, however, there are at least some cases in which lawful protest is not as effective as disobedient protest.

The civil disobedient is often moved to his protest just because, with these channels present and acknowledged, the remedies do not come, and do not even appear likely. Civil disobedience is a tactic resorted to when the normal processes of politics fail to meet the most pressing needs of some segment of the community, needs that could and should be met. It is a form of protest designed to do what normal political activities have not done, and do not appear likely to succeed in doing. It is true that real costs, both personal and social, are imposed by this disobedience. But that these coasts, because they include deliberate infractions of the law, must outweigh the gains in long-term social justice is precisely what the civil disobedient, after careful reflection, denies. His assessment of the pros and cons may be mistaken in any given case; but to assume that the mere presence of the possibility of lawful remedy necessarily refutes the case of the civil disobedient is to bed the central question.

From class notes:
Civil disobedience may be ok under dictorial rule, but it is never justified when lawful channels of protest and lawful means of changing law exist.

Cohen responds that unlawful acts might accomplish things lawful acts cannot. Unlawful might be more effective than lawful. Even with lawful channels, change sometimes doesn’t come – sometimes it takes a long time.

20
Q

FULLER: What happened to the Speluncean explorers?

A

They were exploring a cave when a landslide occurred and blocked them inside the cave. They were unable to get out on their own. Eventually help came for them, but it took so long that they ran out of food. They decided that they would have to kill one of them so that the rest could survive. This was initially Whetmore’s idea. They were going to roll dice to determine which person would be killed. Whetmore then decided that he no longer wanted to participate and refused to roll the dice. The others rolled the dice for him and asked whether he agreed that the dice were rolled fairly. He agreed that they were. He was the one that was chosen to die so the others killed him. They were then put on trial for murder.

They were trapped for 32 days. On day 20 they established communication with rescuers. On day 23, Whetmore was killed. Day 30 would have been the earliest day they could have been rescued. When communication was first made, they attempted to ask various people (police, doctors, etc.) if killing another would be wrong but no one that could have provided them with the answers wanted to answer them, so they made their own decisions based on their needs while being trapped.

21
Q

FULLER: How does each judge rule?

A

Truepenny → He affirmed the conviction.

Foster → He voted to overturn the conviction.

Tatting → He withdrew from the decision.

Keen → He affirmed the conviction.

Handy → He voted to overturn the conviction.

22
Q

FULLER: What is (are) the main reason(s) each judge offers for deciding as he does?

A

Truepenny → The laws and statutes should be interpreted by their plain meanings. Extra-legal means available for dealing with “rigor” of the law – executive clemency.

Foster → To him, positive law presupposes the possibility of coexistence and every possible law has to be interpreted reasonably (in terms of its evident purpose: evident; coexistence; what society needs today; legislators’ purpose). He believes the law should be interpreted by the letter of the law but in context of its purpose. The law is our (the People’s) tool. Its purpose is to solve our problems. The law should do what we want it to do. Laws are preconditions of society. Foster wants to agree with Keen about not interpreting the law and that judges only apply the law, but he says that the law must be intelligently applied.

Tatting → There are many purposes for the law: (1) deterrence; (2) orderly retribution; (3) rehabilitation; etc.

Keen → There are 4 ways people are let off: (1) Judge decides there was no crime. (2) Prosecutor decides not to indict. (3) Acquittal by jury. (4) Pardon by CE (What does CE mean?) (Extra: (5) Police did not arrest.) ← These are all fuzzy and allow for judgment. As judges, interpreting the law is not our problem. We apply the law; a legislature makes the law. Our only question is whether the law has been broken.

Handy → The law is our (the People’s) tool. Its purpose is to solve our problems. The law should do what we want it to do. Laws are preconditions of society. He believes the law should be interpreted by the letter of the law but in context of its purpose. He believes that their acts were outside the normal boundaries of society and that societal norms were not applicable to them.

23
Q

FULLER: Which judge offers the best defense of his view, in your opinion? Why?

A

Foster, because he believes that the law should be applied by the letter of the law, but that it must be applied intelligently based on the context of the law’s purpose.

24
Q

LEVI: What is the pretense that has long been under attack (and the Levi seeks to dismiss)? What is the alternative?

A

The pretense under attack is that law is a system of known rules applied by a judge. Levi says that it is the participation of the community in interpreting law that makes it valid.

25
Q

LEVI: What is the three-step process Levi calls “reasoning by example”? What is the difference between this method and the method described in the pretense?

A
  1. Similarities are seen between cases.
  2. The rule of law is inherent in the first case, is announced.
  3. The rule of law is made applicable in the second case. This is different because it uses what has already been done as precedence for decisions.
26
Q

LEVI: According to Levi, “the kind of legal reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules change as the rules are applied.” What do you think he means?

A

It seems that law is dynamic and changing. Cases are rarely the same and the similarity and differences between them will be seen and dealt with when the judge decides.

27
Q

LEVI: Levi says that reasoning by example gives society a role to play in the development of law. How? What do you think Levi means?

A

The backlash or acceptance of a judgment will affect how a case similar will be ruled…

28
Q

LLEWELLYN: According to Llewellyn, there is no single right and accurate way of reading a case. He says the same of a series or body of cases. What are the three reactions he describes to a series or body of cases?

A
  1. It is correct to see that “That rule is too well settled in this jurisdiction to be disturbed”; and so to apply it to a wholly novel circumstance. But
  2. It is no less correct to see that “The rule has never been extended to a case like the present”; and so to refuse to apply it: “We here limit the rule.” Again,
  3. It is no less correct to look over the prior “applications” of “the rule” and rework them into a wholly new formulation of “the true rule” or “true principle” which knocks out some of the prior cases as simply “misapplications” and then builds up the others.
29
Q

LLEWELLYN: What is the major defect of our system of precedent as it has come down to us?

A

The major defect in that system is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it—to wit, the idea that the cases themselves and in themselves, plus the correct rules on how to handle cases, provide one single correct answer to a disputed issue of law. In fact the available correct answers are two, three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available correct answers will the court select—and why? For since there is always more than one available correct answer, the court always has to select.

30
Q

LLEWELLYN: What are the two tempers Llewellyn says we see again and again when we consider courts through time? Why is the temper of a court important to understanding its use of precedent?

A

The current temper of the court is reflected in the same material, and represents the court’s tradition as modified by its personnel. For it is plain that the two earlier period-styles represent also two eternal types of human being. There is the man who loves creativeness who can without loss of sleep combine risk-taking with responsibility, who sees and feels institutions as things built and to be built to serve functions, and who sees the functions as vital and law as a tool to be eternally reoriented to justice and to general welfare. There is the other man who loves order, who finds risk uncomfortable and has seen so much irresponsible or unwise innovation that responsibility to him means caution, who sees and feels institutions as the tested, slow-built ways which for all their faults are man’s sole safeguard against relapse into barbarism, and who regards reorientation of the law in our polity as essentially committed to the legislature. Commonly a man of such temper has also a craftsman’s pride in clean craftsman’s work, and commonly he does not view with too much sympathy any ill-done legislative job of attempted reorientation. Judges, like other men, range up and down the scale between the extremes of either type of temper, and in this aspect (as in the aspect of intellectual power and acumen or of personal force or persuasiveness) the constellation of the personnel on a particular bench at a particular time plays its important part in urging the court toward a more literal or a more creative selection among the available accepted and correct “ways” of handling precedent.

From class notes:

(1) legal formulism – law is static
(2) legal pragmatism – law is dynamic

(1) Judges decide cases on the basis of distinctively legal rules and legal reasons (legally relevant facts).
(2) Legal rules and reasons determine a unique outcome in (nearly) every case.

RE 1: Judges decide cases for many reasons (including non-legal ones) – often moral
RE 2: Legal rules and reasons almost never identify a unique outcome. In most cases, many outcomes are consistent with legal rules/reasons.

31
Q

LLEWELLYN: According to Llewellyn, what should be the real guide in construing case-law?

A

We ought to be familiar with the fact that the right doctrine and going practice of our highest courts leave them a very real leeway within which (a) to narrow or avoid what seem today to have been unfortunate prior phrasings or even rulings; or (b), on the other hand, to pick up, develop, expand what seem today to have been fortunate prior rulings or even phrasings.

It is silly to think of use of this leeway as involving “twisting” of precedent. The very phrase presupposes the thing which is not and which has never been. The phrase presupposes that there was in the precedent under consideration some one and single meaning. The whole experience of our case-law shows that that assumption is false. It is, instead, the business of the courts to use the precedents constantly to make the law always a little better, to correct old mistakes, to recorrect mistaken or ill-advised attempts at correction—but always within limits severely set not only by the precedents, but equally by the traditions of right conduct in judicial office.

All of this is paralleled, in regard to statutes, because of (1) the power of the legislature both to choose policy and to select measures; and (2) the necessity that the legislature shall, in so doing, use language—language fixed in particular words; and (3) the continuing duty of the courts to make sense, under and within the law.

A court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a whole. It must take the music of any statute as written by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as written by the legislature. But there are many ways to play that music, to play that play, and a court’s duty is to play it well, and in harmony with the other music of the legal system.

There are “correct,” unchallengeable rules of “how to read” which lead in happily variant directions.

This must be so until courts recognize that the real guide is Sense-for-All-of-Us. It must be so, so long as we and the courts pretend that there has been only one single correct answer possible. Until we give up that foolish pretense there must be a set of mutually contradictory correct rules on How to Construe Statutes: either set available as duty and sense may require.

Until then, the problem will recur in the handling of case-law: Which of the technically correct answers (a) should be given: (b) will be given—and Why?

32
Q

LLEWELLYN: What is the point of the “thrust/parry” section at the end of the paper? How is this section related to the American legal realists’ claim that law is indeterminate?

A

idk

33
Q

SCHAUER: According to Schauer, Lochner is “formalistic” because “the analogy between pelicans (as birds) and unrestricted contracting (as liberty) fails.” What does he mean? What do pelicans have to do with Justice Peckham’s reasoning?

A

Lockner implies that the word liberty is definite and has an exact definition. Schauer illustrates this by making an example of a person saying that a pelican is not a bird, but clearly it is, that person that made that claim simply does not know the meaning of the word bird. He uses this example to compare to Lochner’s use of the word liberty to the concept of contracting for labor by saying Lochner treats the word liberty like the word bird and that it does have a meaning that is definite. Schauer claims that this fails because you could know all about the word liberty but still say that “unconstrained labor contracting” is not considered liberty.

34
Q

SCHAUER: Schauer uses Hunter v. Norman to illustrate a denial of a certain type. What role does Ryshpan play? What choice does this create for a judge? What is denied in this sort of “formalism”?

A

The Ryshpan case acts as an escape route for the judge. He can use it instead of following the letter of the statute. He (the judge) can claim that he had no choice but to go along with the ruling in the Ryshpan case (treat like cases alike). But this is simply choosing not to choose.

35
Q

SCHAUER: Schauer asks, “could the judge instead ‘create’ Ryshpan by concluding that Hunter should win because he was misled by the clerk’s office?” How does he answer this question? What is the point of this example? How does this relate to formalism?

A

For Schauer the judge could “create” Ryshpan and it would deb consistent with the legal system (no one would find it absurd). If the judge did this he would appeal to some general legal principles such as “parties are estopped from relying on laws whose contents they have misstated to the disadvantage of another.” With this the judge creates Ryshpan whether by referencing general principles or not he still makes a choice. This relates back to formalism because the judge even with the Ryshpan case as something he cannot appeal to he still would use something like general legal principles to “make” the decision for him, and then deny having ever made such a decision himself.

36
Q

SCHAUER: Schauer does not have a lot of nice things to say about rules. However, he admits there is something we can say in favor of rules. What?

A

Presumptive formalism - Apply the literal reading unless there is a good reason not to. If we were to apply this to our legal system we would have some comfort that the system would be predictable, stable and constrain the decision makers associated with the decision. But this system would also invite: escape routes, “presumptive force attached to formalist readings,” and “would risk collapse into one in which the presumptions were for all practical purposes either absolute or nonexistent.” Schauer eventually just concludes that formal systems should not be condemned but that formalism should be seen as only a tool in some cases.

37
Q

SUNSTEIN: What is an “incompletely theorized agreement”? What, roughly, does Sunstein mean by this? (He mentions several kinds. What is the basic idea?)

A

Incompletely theorized agreements are accepted by people who may not agree on what it entails on individual cases. Murder is wrong but disagree on abortion. Agree on liberty but disagree on minimum wage.

38
Q

SUNSTEIN: According to Sunstein, one virtue of an incompletely theorized agreement is that it is a “constructive use of silence.” Consider what Sunstein says about “Multimember institutions” and “Multimember institutions and individual judges” and answer these questions. (Don’t try to offer a complete account of Sunstein here. A couple of examples will be sufficient for each question below.)

A

In the constructive use of silence only what is necessary is put forward to defend a decision. This saves losers from losing more than just the case by not attacking their deep-founded philosophical principles. Judges are not to take a stand on social or principles or highly philosophical matters. it is constructive by allowing a decision to be understood through a developing understanding of justice. The relevance of the correctness or incorrectness of that particular judge’s philosophy is not in question. It is constructive because people can arrive at the same conclusions through different paths. It also allows for decisions to be made in a smaller amount of time. It also allows for certain fixed points in the canon of legal decisions.

39
Q

SUNSTEIN: Sunstein is not impressed with Dworkin’s “Hercules.” What are some of the issues that trouble Sunstein?

A

Lawyers avoid broad and abstract questions that Dworkin’s Hercules seeks to appeal to. Some questions are simply too large for people to handle and prevent people that disagree on certain principles to come to an agreement.

40
Q

SUNSTEIN: What does Sunstein mean by “conceptual ascent”? Does he think it is a good thing?

A

Conceptual ascent is where a more or less isolated and small low-level principle is finally made part of a more generalized theory. He feels positive about it.

41
Q

CRENSHAW: What two interests unify critical race theory?

A

Two common interests that unify critical race theory are:

  1. Understand how white supremacy is created and maintained in America, particularly how it influences rule of law.
  2. Change the bond between law and racial power.
42
Q

CRENSHAW: What do critical race theorists say about the objectivity or neutrality of mainstream legal scholarship on race?

A

When it comes to scholarship on race, it can be neither objective nor neutral. Scholarship is inevitably political. It cannot be separated from social issues.

43
Q

CRENSHAW: What distinguishes critical race theory from conventional liberal and conservative legal scholarship on race and inequality?

A

It is separated from conventional liberal and conservative legal scholarship by being deeply dissatisfied with it. The conventional was built around an implicit social contract. Convention seems to legitimize unintentional racism.

44
Q

CRENSHAW: At a couple of points, Crenshaw suggests that the mainstream account of race, racism and power is constricted. What is this constricted idea?

A

idk