Mind Body Dualism Flashcards
(15 cards)
Which of his texts discuss mind-body dualism?
Meditations Chapter 6
Descates argument for the existence of material things: FROM IMAGINATION
P1: Imagination is not essential to the minds nature, as the mind can exist without it.
P2: Imagination involves a special mental effort distinct from pure understanding.
P3: This effort suggests that imagination is connected to something external, namely the body.
C: The faculty of imagination implies the existence of a body intimately connected to the mind.
Overall, Descartes posits that this faculty (imagination) seems to suggest the existence of material things because imagination involves mental images that seem to require a condition for something external to be experienced — e.g., imagining a chiliagon (1,000 sides) vs. imagining a triangle. An image of a triangle requires less mental effort than a chiliagon; thus, imagination is body-dependent.
However, Descartes acknowledges that the imagination (based on images) is not conclusive evidence for material things. Images can be internally generated or due to innate faculties and do not prove material existence conclusively. (Argues more conclusively later)
Imagination vs pure intellect
Imagination involves a special mental effort distinct from pure understanding.
Imagination = requires ‘image’ of thing (e.g. triangle), has to be presented to mind
Pure intellect/understanding = apprehends essence (e.g. triangle = 3 sides), no ‘image’ needed
This is why compound imagination is harder (e.g. chiliagon). Pure understanding is clearer and independent of the body.
Descartes second argument: from sensory experience
Sense experience must be caused by something external because the experiences are involuntary. Therefore, sense experiences must correspond to real, material things.
P1: I have involuntary sensory experiences (seeing, tasting).
P2: These experiences are not produced by my will and are vivid and distinct.
P3: They must be caused by something external to the mind.
P4: God is not a deceiver and, if these experiences were caused by deception, it would allow me to be misled even when using reason.
C: Material things exist and are the cause (or near cause) of most sensory experience.
Imagination vs intellect
Imagination = requires ‘image’ of thing (e.g. triangle), has to be presented to mind
Pure intellect/understanding = apprehends essence (e.g. triangle = 3 sides), no ‘image’ needed
This is why compound imagination is harder (e.g. chiliagon). Pure understanding is clearer and independent of the body.
Descartes second argument for material things: sensory experience
Descartes’ Second Argument: From Sensory Experience
Sense experience must be caused by something external because the experiences are involuntary. Therefore, sense experiences must correspond to real, material things.
P1: I have involuntary sensory experiences (seeing, tasting).
P2: These experiences are not produced by my will and are vivid and distinct.
P3: They must be caused by something external to the mind.
P4: God is not a deceiver and, if these experiences were caused by deception, it would allow me to be misled even when using reason.
C: Material things exist and are the cause (or near cause) of most sensory experience.
Sense experience mist be caused by something external because hey are involuntary and vivid, and since god is NOT a deceiver, rather, an expistemological verifier, these experiences must correspond to real, material things
First argument for the mind-body distinction. CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTIONS
First Argument from Mind–Body Distinction: My Mind
P1: I clearly and distinctly understand myself to be a thinking, unextended thing.
P2: I clearly and distinctly understand my body to be extended and unthinking.
P3: Anything I can understand clearly and distinctly must be as I understand it.
C: Therefore, mind and body are distinct.
Argument 2: Argument from Indivisibility
P1: The mind is indivisible; the body is divisible. P2: The body has shape, size, and can be divided into parts. P3: The mind is indivisible, unified. C: Therefore, mind and body must be fundamentally different kinds of substance.
Indiscernability of identical psychic/leibniz law: two things are the same iff they share every property in common
Princess Elizabeth of Bohemias objection:
Reduction ad absurdum argument:
Objection 1: Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
Raises a key dilemma:
1. If voluntary action is possible, then the mind/soul must be capable of setting the body in motion.
2. Something can only set the body in motion if it pushes the body.
3. Pushing a body requires physical contact and extension.
4. But the mind lacks extension (as argued by Descartes) and is incapable of physical contact.
C: Therefore, the soul is incapable of moving the body, and hence, that would make voluntary action impossible — which would be absurd!
She points out that bodily states (illness, “vapours”) clearly affect our thoughts (like fatigue affecting thought clarity) and such effects would be more straightforwardly explained by considering the mind to be material and extended. Overall, pure separation is dubious.
Hobbes Ontological and semantic objection to mind-body dualism
Hobbes objected to Descartes’ mind–body dualism on both ontological and semantic grounds. Ontologically, he denied the existence of immaterial substances, insisting that all phenomena — including thought — must be explained in terms of physical bodies and their motions. For Hobbes, the mind is not a separate substance but rather a set of functions or motions within the material brain. Semantically, he argued that speaking of a “thinking thing” that is not extended or physical is incoherent; our language about substances, existence, and properties only makes sense when applied to material objects. Thus, Hobbes saw Descartes’ notion of an immaterial, thinking mind as not only metaphysically untenable but also conceptually meaningless — a misuse of language that disguises confusion as insight.
Descartes defense to Hobbes
Descartess holds ere conceivability IS sufficient to yell truths. Hobbss may e attacking a straw man: ‘if i can imagine it, then it is possible’. But this isnt what Descartes is sayng, his argumentment is subtler: only clear ad dustinct perceptionions, backed by gods non-decieving nature, ground metalhysical conclusions. Hobbes is too dismissive of the spistemological role of god as the non-deceptivee guarantor of clear and distinctnct perceptions
The Cartesian circle
Clear and distinctnct perceptions (CDPs are trustworthy because god exists and is not a deciever
Gods existence is proven through CDPs
THE ARGUMENT IS CIRCULAR
How does descartes account for mind-body interaction:
Primitive notions — fundamental categories of understanding — cannot be reduced to one another:
1. Thought (pertaining to the mind)
2. Extension (pertaining to the body)
3. Union (pertaining to the whole person)
* The union between the mind and body is a primitive notion known only through experience — e.g. feeling hunger or pain.
* We know the union directly through experience, not through reason alone. Just as we intuitively grasp heaviness without fully understanding its mechanism, we experience the mind-body union directly through sensations and passions.
why does Descarteses ‘union’ not work to explain mind body interaction?
The response is rather vague and circular, by calling it a ‘primitive notion’, descartes avoids giving it a clear or mechanistic or metaphysical account as to HOW 2 fundamentally seperate substances interact. instead, he just asserts that they DO interact because we feel it- which does not resolve the origional problem
Neuroscientific Evidence Against the Mind’s Indivisibility
Neuroscientific Evidence Against the Mind’s Indivisibility
1. Cognitive functions (memory, perception, emotion) can be selectively impaired by brain damage (e.g., amnesia from hippocampal damage, personality changes from frontal lobe injuries).
2. Even without brain damage, we experience conflicts (e.g reason vs desire) suggesting the mind has divided functiona parts, even if not spatially divisible
