what is Descartes account of (the transfer of) motion?
Descartes suggests that when two bodies, A & B, collide, there is a transfer in motion. If one body collides with a weaker body, then it loses that quantity of motion of which is equal to the amount the weaker body has gained. (A precursor to newtons laws?)
What is the negative claim that cavendish argues against this?
Cavendish argues against the transfer model of causal interaction. This is because, if motion can transfer,then it would be possible for a mode to transfer/separate from one substance and join another. (Mode=the way in which a substance exists). Mode cannot transfer, as they are inseparable from the substances by which they characterize thus motion cannot transfer.
Overall, she believes bodies are distinct substances and motion cannot travel between bodies.
Evaluate cavendish’s negative claim that motion des not transfer.
- Goes against Newtonian physics e.g the conservation of energy
- Her positive claim that oldies move themselves does not hold either
Why is Descartes account of motion weak overall?
Not all bodies need collision to move, e.g the dropping of a pen. This does not rely on collision, indicating there is something more to motion than a simple transfer.
Descartes defines motion as corporeal, that is it exists in the physical because he sees motion as something that only applies to bodies in the physical world.
However, Descartes whole metaphysics is built on substance dualism:
- res extensa (extended stuff, matter , bodies)
- res cogitans (thinking stuff, mind, soul)
Only extended things can undergo motion, because for Descartes, extension is the defining feature for all matter,
BUT,
He doesn’t actually believe motion is a fundamental property of matter like extension is
If matter is just extension, and motion is just a change in position, what is actually moving?
Cavendish on the loss of mass
If Descartes’s metaphysics is right, that motion is corporal and can be transferred from one body to another, then it should be the case that objects lose mass upon collision with another.
Hume on causation
We observe: contact, impact, collision.
But these observations are a force of habit, we just assume cause and affect, it isn’t an inherent law of nature (bollocks)
Descartes possible response to cavendish’s negative claim:
- Response to mode: motion is in a separate ontological category to other modes. It cannot be grouped in with other modes (e.g shape) as it is a FEATURE that can’t be separated.
Overall Descartes wants motion to be part of the physical, rather than mental domain
Margaret Cavendish’s positive claim: bodies are self-moving
Cavenfish clearly subscribes to the principle of sufficient reason: she does not consider humes response that nothing causes motion.
Instead, every material thing is responsible for its OWN motion.
Why?nature freely moves. Humans have free will so we freely move. Because there is continuity between humans and nature.
So every part of matter presses an intrinsic power of self-motion. This means that al entities in nature, from the smallest particle to the largest structures, have the Nate ability to move themselves with external influence. “Natures parts move themselves, and are not moved by any agent.
Instead of interaction, what we percieve is actually each bodies self-motion responding to others. E.g when a ball is thrown, it moves not because the hand imparts motion on it, but rather because the balls inherent self-motion response to the OCCASION provided by the hand. (How does ‘occasioning’ something differ from causation?)
Distinction between occasioning and causing just collapses back into the Cartesian causal view of motion (counter factual view of motion)
Blurred Distinction: Critics suggest that if an external body’s action provides the necessary occasion for another body’s self-motion, this relationship closely resembles traditional causation. In both scenarios, one body’s action results in a change in another, making the distinction between “occasioning” and “causing” less apparent.
• Dependence on External Triggers: While Cavendish posits that bodies have inherent self-motion, the activation of this motion often depends on external occasions. This reliance implies that external bodies play a causal role in triggering motion, aligning with conventional causal views.
In essence, the objection posits that Cavendish’s concept of “occasioning” may inadvertently mirror traditional causation, as external bodies still appear to initiate changes in others.
How does Cavendish criticize the idea that an immaterial thing acts on a material thing?
Cavendish is a staunch materialist, asserting that everything in nature is material. She argues that if immaterial entities existed, they would be so radically different from material substances that any interaction between the two would be impossible. This leads her to reject the notion of immaterial substances, such as Cartesian souls, influencing material bodies. She contends that attributing motion or causation to immaterial entities is both unnecessary and unintelligible within a coherent natural philosophy. 
