Mind Brain Type Identity Theory Flashcards
Brief description of MBTIT
The claim that mental states are ontologically reducible to (identical to) physical states. Statements about mental states are not equivalent in meaning to any physical properties (not an analytical reduction).
A particular type of mental state X is identical to a particular type of physical state Y
What sort of statement is MBTIT??
“Mental states are brain states” is a contingent, synthetic, a posteriori statement.
It would be the same as saying Water = H20
Morning and Evening Star Analogy
There is a star that I see in the morning and one that I see at night. I call one the morning star and the other the evening star. When I refer to them, I mean different things, but they can be ontologically reduced to the same thing- the star I see in the morning is the SAME as the one I see in the evening.
Key philosopher for MBTIT
.Smart: Mental states are identical to brain states.
.Everything should be explicable in terms of physics
.“Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes”
.Uses Ockhams razor- if there is mo overwhelming arguments in favour of dualism, we should reject the idea of distinct non-physical substances.
.Science indicates physical properties of brain are a good indicator for what mental properties are!
Another strength of MBTIT
.Neuroscience- Pain is identical to neurons firing in the brain, beliefs are identical to certain neural connections existing
.Been able to show that increased blood flow to specific parts of Brian is correlated with specific mental events such as doing arithmetic.
Distinguished from the claim that mental state are correlated with brain states?
For example, having a heart is correlated with having kidneys-every animal that has a heart also has kidneys and vv.
But heart and kidneys are not the same thing!
So pointing out that everything has a particular brain state also has a particular mental state- doesn’t show that they are the same thing.
They could be two distinct things that occur together.
Correlation is not identity.
Objection 1 to MBTIT: Multiple realisability of mental states
Multiple realisability of mental states- put forward by Putnam
. Mental properties are not identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be related to different physical properties
. Each type of MS is MR through more than 1 distinct type of PS
. If this is the case- it cannot be identical to any specific type of PS
./\ no type of MS is identical to any type of PS
. According to MBTIT, each type of MS is identical to a specific PS
. /\ MBTIT is false
Mental states can be manifested/ realisable in many different brain states.
P1. It is conceivable, and therefore possible for a being with different physical constitution from us to have the same thoughts/sensations
P2. It is inconceivable, and therefore impossible for something both to have and not have a certain property
C1. /\ mental properties cant be the same as physical properties
Different species analogy for Multiple realisability objection
. The brain states that relate to pain are different in different species, yet pain is the same mental state.
. There are creatures who when they are in pain have different physical properties from use when we are in pain
. /\ “being in pain” canot be the same thing as having a particular physical property.
. If there are aliens- extremely unlikely they would have the same physical states as us
Response from MBTIT to multiple realisable objection
. We should talk specifically about “human pain”, not just “pain”
. It is a different mental property from for e.g. dog pain.
. We should talk of “human thoughts” rather than “alien thoughts”
Different response:
Reply to MBTITs claim that we should talk about “human pain”
Does not seem plausible- pain is pain because of how it feels
A dog and a human being in pain share something in common- we identify as mental property “being in pain”
If an alien believes that the grass is green and so do i, we have the same type of thought, whatever our physiology.
Not to say that there is no relation between mental and physical properties- just to argue the relation is not an identity.
E.g. can accept that mental states are correlated with brain states in humans, while also allowing that in different species, same type of mental state is correlated with a different type of physical state.
ISSUE 2: Irreducibility of Subjectivity
. The way that anger feels cant be reduced to a load of chemicals/particles
. To claim that thoughts + feelings can be reduced to electrical events taking place amongst particles is absurd
. The most valuable thing we have are mental states like relationships, memories and desires- unable to be explained in terms of particles- they are nothing like electrical events taking place amongst particles
. Backed up by Leibniz’ law of identity of indiscernables- the fact that mental states have property of being subjective (experienced from 1st person perspective), whilst physical events have the property of being objective (experienced from 2nd person perspective) is enough to prove that mental states are not identical to the physical.
Response from MBTIT to irreducibility of subjectivity
Just because mental states appear differently to chemicals, it does not mean they are not the same thing
For instance the chemicals that make up grass look completely different under a microscope and yet it can still be reduced to chemicals and particles.
Fact that grass appears radically unlike it does under a microscope does not show that it isn’t grass.
Reply to MBTIT response that even though mental states may not appear the same, they can still be reduced to particles.
Does not cause damage to original argument because mental states are different to physical states in a different way.
MS cannot be captured physically at all.
The MBTIT response is mistaking the cause of a mental state for a mental state; the qualities fo what causes them.
Mental states are radically unlike neurophysiological states and /\ they cannot be the same thing.
Cause of a burn is not the same as a burn
Subjective experience of pain i.e. what it feels like is an essential part of our concept of it.
