Modern Approaches to the Mind-Body Problem Flashcards

1
Q

descartes’ substance dualism

A
  • mind & brain made up of 2 things
  • interact via pineal gland

epiphenomenalists: bodily states can cause bodily & mental states. mental states cannot

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2
Q

leibniz’s parallelism

A
  • mental & physical states cause each other, but are separate processes
  • mind & body dont interact directly
  • instead live parallel lives
  • caused by god

no mind-body problem

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3
Q

mind-body problem

A
  • if diff subjects: dont interact or separate substances or wave problem away
  • or they are 1 substance (monism)
  • substance: mental (idealists), physical (materialists), compromise between both aspects (neutral monists)
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4
Q

mind-body spectrum

A
  • dualism
  • monism
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5
Q

dualisms

A
  • substance dualism - descartes
  • property dualism
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6
Q

property dualism

A
  • only one kind of thing but matter has mental 7 physical components
  • emergent materialism (Chalmers)
  • epiphenomenalism (Huxley)
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7
Q

monism

A
  • only one kind of thing in the universe - matter
  • computational functionalism (putnam)
  • eliminative materialism (churchland)
  • type identity theory (place)
  • behaviourism (ryle)
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8
Q

philosophical behaviourism

ryle

A
  • mental states are statements about the ‘beh’ of mind
  • treating them as separate statements is a ‘category mistake’
  • capable of not acting on impulses unless states are really dispositions

eliminate the need for ‘mind’ by reducing it to ‘beh’

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9
Q

philosophical behaviourism critiques

A
  • required to deny mental states and experiences
  • ignorance about one’s own self
  • ‘super spartans’: not allowed to show pain, mean they cant feel pain?
  • states ref beh but beh also ref states

neuroscience shows concepts like ‘pain’ and ‘trust’ map onto certain brain areas - both beh and a state

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10
Q

phenomenology

A

the study of phenomenas from phenomenous perspective

shown by physicality, mind embodied in the things that we do

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11
Q

existentialism

A

everything is meaningless & pointless

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12
Q

structuralism

A

everything located within mind

mind centre

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13
Q

epiphenomenalism

huxley

A
  • brain causes mental states
  • mental states have no affect on physical states
  • humans & animals are automata, reflexively responding to stimuli

mental properties are real, but have no causal role

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14
Q

emotion & epiphenomenalism

A
  • caused by neurochemical interactions in brain
  • no causal efficacy
  • James-Lang theory of emotion relevant
  • BUT: how do ppl act ‘emotionally’, purpose?
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15
Q

arguments for epiphenomenalism

A
  • neuropsych: many reactions dont require conscious functioning
  • neurophysiology: conscious awareness follows the brain states that ‘cause’ it
  • behaviourism: predicted on stimulus/response without ref to mind

conscious awareness of making a movement might come some time after the movement

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16
Q

arguments against epiphenomenalism

A
  • evolutionary: if mind serves no function, why evolve?
  • interact: how do they interact?
  • empirical: mind had a ‘concsious veto’ over beh?
  • logic: if mind cant affect brain, how do we know about it?
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17
Q

panpsychism

nagel

A
  • everything has mental properties
  • mind is a non-physical property of all matter
  • mental properties are found in all forms of matter

all matter has non-physical properties which can produce mental states

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18
Q

emotion & panpsychism

A
  • consciousness is a fundamental property of universe
  • emotions are fundamental property of consciousness
  • all things have emotion, to some extent
  • thought not separate from experience
19
Q

arguments for panpsychism

A

nagel: 4 premises
1. mind is real
2. everything is matter
3. mind cannot be reduced to physical states
4. mind doesnt emerge from physical states

20
Q

arguments against panpsychism

A
  • not falsifiable
  • cannot be tested empirically
  • meaningless: not even a theory yet
  • panpsychists claim no ev against it - russel’s teapot

russel’s teapot: the philosophic burden of proof lies upon a person making empirically unfalsifiable claims, rather than shifting the burden of disproof to others

21
Q

emergent materialism

chalmers

AKA non-reductive

A
  • causal relationships between body & mind
  • all mental states caused by physical statements
  • mind dependent on, but not reducible to, body

mental properties are real, and have causal roles

22
Q

emotions and emergent materialism

A
  • ‘caused’ by physiological & neurochemical reactions within brain
  • causal efficacy
  • emotion a property of complex brain interactions
  • levels of explanation: neurochemical interactions –> metaphysical experiences
23
Q

arguments for emergent materialism

A
  • physical properties can be described on multiple levels: nano, micro, macro
  • higher-order properties emerge from the lower-order ones
24
Q

arguments against emergent materialism

A
  • where do mental states arise?
  • what are mental states for?
  • if mental states cause physical, mental=physical
  • overdetermination
25
Q

type-identity theory

Place

A
  • mind & brain same - mental & physical states same
  • mental states group into types & correlate with brain states
  • key distinction between meaning & reference
  • mental states: something diff from brain states e.g. weight of brain vs weight of consciousness

mental and physical states are the same as each other; every mental state is caused by a particular physical state

26
Q

emotions and type-identity theory

A
  • direct 1-2-1 relationship between emotional states and brain states
  • every emotion has an associated pattern of brain activity
  • emotions are physical process
  • bundle theory: combine diff chemical processes in diff quantities to make full gamut of emotional experience
27
Q

arguments for type-identity theory

A
  • devs in neuroscience show physical & mental states being the same
  • many substances affect both physical & mental
  • brain damage affects both equally
  • resolves mind-body problem

damage to prefrontal cortex of the brain can remove a person’s feelings of shame

28
Q

arguments against type-identity theory

A
  • equating brain & mind implies diff brains should not produce diff states
  • brain plasticity
  • neuronal chauvinism: can only neurons support mental states?
  • do mental states generalise for ind –> group?

does not allow for multiple realisation

29
Q

functionalism

putnam

A
  • mental states dont have to be brain states
  • mental functional relationships between sensory inputs, other states, beh outputs
  • preserving functional relationships preserves mental states
  • derived from philosophical behaviourism
  • input/output

mental states consist of relationships between inputs, outputs, and other states; every mental state can be caused by different physical states

30
Q

emotions and functionalism

A
  • functional states within brain that serve a specific purpose
  • results of complex interactions between physical components of brain
  • multiple paths to achieving same emotional states
  • emotions have a +ve adaptive purpose
31
Q

arguments for functionalism

A
  • philosophical version of info theory & cog psych
  • philosophical response to computers & turing machine
  • accepts mental states exist, have causal roles & arise in multiple diff ways
  • neuroscience supports
  • cochlear implants
32
Q

arguments against functionalism

A
  • minds have minds? chinese brain problem (block), act as neuron, room a brain?
  • forgets about meaning
  • ignores intentionality
  • ‘right’ inputs & outputs dont necessarily guarantee a certain mental state response

inverted spectrum argument, zombies

33
Q

inverted spectrum argument

A

there might possibly be someone whose linguistic and non-linguistic behavior is just like ours, but whose color experiences are systematically inverted

34
Q

eliminative materialism

churchland

A
  • aims to remove ‘mentalist’ terms
  • developing science & understanding will surpass terms like ‘mind’ & ‘body’, rendering them obsolete

what we currently call mental states are explained by physical states, but these concepts will change

35
Q

emotions and eliminative materialism

A
  • folk-psych categories which are not actually meaningful/useful
  • everything caused by bio processes we dont understand yet
  • speak instead of neuroscientific concepts

e.g. brain activation, neurotransmitters

36
Q

arguments for eliminative materialism

A
  • phlogiston –> oxidation (physics)
  • elan vital/life force –> organic biochemistry
  • witches –> hysteria –> mental illness (psychiatry)
37
Q

arguments against eliminative materialism

A
  • counter-intuitive
  • logic - mental states of eliminative materialism doesnt exist, ev against itself
  • folk-psych theories easily refutable
  • cannot get rid of ‘mental’ talk, and still speak of same phenomenon just because we kept the hardware

the hard problem of consciousness cannot be explained away

38
Q

neuroscience in ancient greece

A
  • importance of brain
  • animal spirits
  • nerve
  • ventricles

wax tablet of mind

39
Q

neuroscience in middle ages

A
  • islam
  • medical conditions
  • neuropsych
  • neuroanatomy
40
Q

neuroscience in renaissance

A
  • detailed neuroanatomy
  • mind-brain dualism
  • blood circulation
41
Q

neuroscience in modernity

A
  • brain areas
  • neuroimaging
  • scanning
42
Q

computers influence on neuroscience

A
  • concepts of info processing
  • influenced functionalism, cog psych
43
Q

cerebellum

A

decision and movement