Nagel Flashcards
(39 cards)
why is Nagel easy to misunderstand
he is mostly critical of theories of mind
he gives rough descriptions
easy to assume he hold to a particular view but he is careful not to endorse a theory of mind
how does Nagel define consciousness
an organism has consciousness if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism
if there is nothing that it is like to be X then it X is not conscious
He treats the phenomenological by how things are presented to the mind subjectively speaking.
what does Nagel say about reductive accounts
like searle. he thinks they fail.
We have so many different reductive accounts that have the same problem the story will always be incomplete without the qualia
what does Nagel think about physicalism
alot of philosophers of mind desire to get to a physical account.
but if we are physicalists, phenomenological perceptual experiences must be given a physical account
But we have no idea how to explain perceptual experiences–and we are no closer to explaining it physically
every subjective phenomenon is essentially (by definition) connected to a….?
point of view
why are we no closer to explaining phenomenological stuff on a physical level?
SUBJECTVIVITY
because every subjective phenomenon is essentially (by definition) connected to a point of view
objective descriptions seem to abandon subjectivity
how are we able to explain the subjective from an objective point of view ?
provide an example for the complications that explains the issue that arises when trying to objectively explain something subjective
Bats:
1.we are biologically similar
- they have experiences and consciousness
- Perceive the world by sonar
- very different experiences than we have
- even if i have all of these physical facts i cant KNOW what it is like to be a bat. At most i can imagine what it is like FOR ME to be a bat, but i can not fully know.
If Nagel is right about the body and mind then…
the mind body problem is far worse off than
the problem is deeply troubled
why is the mind/ body problem deeply troubled according to Nagel
If facts of experience are only accessible from one point of view
It is a genuine mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of the organism
WHY;
Physical operations are objective
It is not a matter of doing more work in neuro science (it is not a matter of completleing the “full story”)
If explained in purely physical terms it misses the fundamentally subjective content.
What its like to be an organism is only accessible from the point of view from the organism itself. I cant capture all there is to capture.
Applies to Any conscious organism
what is something we talk about both subjectivly and objectively
lightning can be spoken about in both Objective and subjective ways
there is the Pov; how we perceive lightning and there is the objetive scientific explanation of whats “really going on”
what is something that introtheoretic reduction/ science does well
remove personal experience and give a neutral objective description.
remove the unneeded to get to what is really going on,
unneeded here is the subjective experience
explain the quote from Nagel “ the physicalists want to do with the mind what is done lightning” and why is that problematic
The problem is that the mental is the phenomena we are trying to explain, it IS the appearance that is the object of study not what is behind the experience. Can we really capture all of the perceptual things objectively? like with lighting ?
FIll in the blank and explain : there is not an _________ ________ to experience
there is not an objective character to experience
There is nothing objective beyond the subjective nature of experience
and If that is true then there is not a way for a physiologist to observe mental states
why does reduction fail
We move from descriptions that depend on impressions we have to more general properties
We ainclude properties that are unrecognizable/ inaccessible to human species
The less it relies on human view point the more objective it it
The process of reduction is an attempt to move from subjectivity toward objectivity
But objectivity does not = accuracy in the account
The process of reduction is a move to _______________
The process of reduction is a move to ____the more objective___
the “more accurate things”
Science/Philosophy are in the business of giving a ___ _____________________
Science/Philosophy are in the business of giving a description of reality and not mere appearance
Trying to avoid specific view points (we have historical success in doing this)
But__________does not appear to fit this pattern
The idea of moving ________________makes no sense whatsoever
“If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to _____________—that is, less attachment to _____________—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it.” -Nagel
But__experience________does not appear to fit this pattern
The idea of moving ___from appearance to reality_______makes no sense whatsoever
“If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to ___greater objectivity___—that is, less attachment to ______a specific view point_______—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it.” -Nagel
what does nagel say about subjectivity and objectivity
they are not simply different ways of talking about/explaining something,
They are actually COMPETING ways that are sometimes incompatible with one another
why cant we move from appearance to reality in Phil of mind according to Nagel
because the appearance IS the reality.
Study of mind is the study of experience WHAT IS experience
explain reductive failures in phil of mind
In cases like sickness we carve off the experience from the reality “what is really going on”
You can not do this with conciseness, once you carve off the experience you carve off the very thing that you are trying to explain.
all these theories that try to reduce consciousness fail because of this
does nagel claim that physicalism is false
NO
It might still be true that mental states are physical states even if we don’t know how or which physical states
provide an example for how
You might have evidence for something and but not know exactly what it proves
the butterfly example
Suppose a man who does not understand metamorphasis
Puts caterpillar in safe
opens the case he sees a butterly -
May not udneestnad what just happened but can have reasonable evidence that the butterfly used
to be the catipliiar
Perhaps that is the situation we are currently in with the mind and physicality
Or maybe were not but it is tough to say
maybe we dont yet have ________________ to explain why mental states are physical
adequate conceptual tools
explain some issues with the physical descriptions of the mind
Maybe mental states are physical but they are irreducible
Maybe we dont yet have adequate conceptual tools to explain how they are physical
maybe they are physical but we dont have the tools to explain HOW they could even BE physical.
