Searle Flashcards

Question

“I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still __. For that reason Schank’s program understands ___.” “We can see that the computer and its program ___ understanding since the computer and the program are functioning, and there is ____.”

Answer 1

1. understand nothing 2. nothing of stories 3. do not provide sufficient conditions for 4. no understanding

Answer 2

not a sufficient test for intelligence

Answer 3

in principle yes, as long as whatever machine we could make could duplicate whatever causal powers that are necessary to produce consciousness

Answer 4

yes (humans are technically digital computers

Answer 5

syntactically

Answer 6

no, this is where computationalism goes wrong because they think thats all we are is digital computers however humans go beyond that

Answer 7

1. programs are formal (syntactical) 2. minds have content (semantic content) 3. syntax is not identical nor sufficient by itself for semantics Therefore: programs are not sufficient nor identical to minds (strong AI false)

Answer 8

Cognitive Science Assumption – Cognitive science assumes that the mind works like a computer, processing information in a similar way that a computer runs a program. Searle’s Critique – Searle argues that when humans process information (e.g., math, reflection, deliberation), they do so with meaning (semantics). In contrast, computers don’t actually "process" information in this sense. The Key Difference – Computers only manipulate formal symbols (syntax) without any understanding or meaning (semantics). They follow rules but don’t actually "know" or "understand" anything.

Answer 9

1. intrinsic 2. Derived

Answer 10

mental states have meaningful content and intrinsic to being that mental state (thirst)

Answer 11

only in virtue of it being given by something outside of the system (5 dollar bill has the status and content only in virtue of assigning it that value)

Answer 12

something is intentional when it is about something else (aboutness)

Answer 13

Computation Misconception – A calculator doesn’t truly "process information"; it just manipulates symbols. Searle’s Argument – "2" and "4" have meaning to us, but to a computer, they are just symbols with no understanding. Meaning Comes from Us – Computers don’t grasp semantics; humans assign meaning to the symbols they process.

Answer 14

1. exactly nothing 2. it is zero

Answer 15

behaviorism, despite being flawed, still influences cognitive science. We are tempted to attribute mental states to computers because they have inputs and outputs like humans. However, the Chinese Room Argument shows that behaving like a human is not enough to prove understanding or real mental states

Answer 16

Despite rejecting traditional dualism, computationalists treat the mind like a program, separate from the physical brain. Strong AI argues that if this view is true, the mind must be conceptually and empirically independent of the brain, making it a form of dualism.

Answer 17

While the individual in the Chinese Room doesn’t understand Chinese, the entire system—including inputs, outputs, and processes—does. Critics argue that Searle wrongly focuses on the individual rather than the whole system, which is functionally indistinguishable from a native Chinese speaker.

Answer 18

Absurdity of Parts Understanding – If the individual doesn’t understand, how do the parts together suddenly create understanding? That seems implausible. Internalization Thought Experiment – Even if the individual memorized the entire system (rules, inputs, outputs), he still wouldn’t understand Chinese, proving that the system as a whole doesn’t truly understand either.

Answer 19

Robot Reply – Instead of just running a program in isolation, embed it in a robot with a human-like body. This robot can interact with the world, respond to questions, and behave appropriately (e.g., if it "feels" hunger, it goes to a restaurant). The idea is that grounding the program in real-world interactions gives it genuine understanding.

Answer 20

Response to the Robot Reply: Cognition is More Than Symbol Manipulation – Simply adding a robotic body doesn’t solve the core issue. Understanding requires more than just formal symbol processing. Interaction Doesn’t Create Understanding – Even with perception and real-world responses, the system is still just following rules without true comprehension. Thought Experiment – If a human were placed inside the robot, receiving and processing Chinese symbols while the robot’s body reacts appropriately, the human still wouldn’t understand Chinese—proving that the system as a whole doesn’t truly understand either.

Answer 21

Instead of just manipulating symbols, design a program that simulates the exact neural processes of a native Chinese speaker. The machine would take in Chinese stories and questions, process them by mimicking the formal neural patterns of understanding, and then produce appropriate Chinese answers. The idea is that by closely simulating the brain, the machine would achieve real understanding.

Answer 22

- strong AI should not care about how the brain works -mental processes are supposed to consist of computation process that can be captured over formal elements -functionalism is supposed to overcome the identity theory

Answer 23

Complex System, No Understanding – The man manipulates an intricate system of valves and pipes (analogous to a Chinese Room) where water flow represents neural connections, yet he still doesn't understand Chinese despite producing correct outputs. Missing Causal Properties – Even if the system functions like a brain, it lacks the causal mechanisms that create genuine understanding and intentional states

Answer 24

a combination of critics of Searle by adding in all of the critics together

Answer 25

Attributing Intelligence Too Easily – We are inclined to call something "intelligent" if it behaves intelligently, even if it lacks true understanding. Understanding the Mechanism Changes Perception – If we fully understood why the system behaves as it does, we might no longer be convinced it possesses real intelligence

Answer 26

The "Many Mansions" reply is an objection to John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, which argues against the possibility of strong AI (machines truly understanding language). The reply suggests that even if the specific system in Searle’s thought experiment lacks understanding, there could be other AI architectures—more sophisticated ones—that do achieve genuine understanding.

Answer 27

Searle's Response – Searle argues that no matter how complex the system becomes, if it still only follows formal rules (symbol manipulation), it will never achieve true intentionality or comprehension—just more sophisticated simulation.

Answer 28

Absurd Consequences of Strong AI – If the mind is just an information processor, then any system with inputs, outputs, and processing (like a stomach or thermostat) could be said to "think," which seems absurd. Searle's Critique – Defining the mind purely as symbol manipulation leads to over-attribution of mental states, making even thermostats capable of "beliefs," which Searle sees as a clearly flawed view of cognition.

Answer 29

1) while thermostats, telephones and adding machines dont 2) you have produced a counterexample to the theory and the theory is false...What we want to know is what distinguishes the ____________mind from thermostats and livers_____________…Strong AI wouldn’t have a hope of telling us that.”

Answer 30

Computation Alone Is Meaningless – Computers and calculators process symbols without understanding; meaning only comes from external observers, not from the system itself. Machines Can Think, But Not Just Any Machine – Not all information processors are minds; if everything can be described as a digital computer (even a rock), then the concept of computation becomes trivial and fails to explain real understanding.

Answer 31

Dualism’s Problems Persist – The fundamental issues with dualism haven’t been resolved, and its core challenges remain unchanged. Lack of Progress Suggests a Dead End – Since dualism hasn't advanced significantly over time, it appears to be an unproductive theory rather than a viable explanation of the mind.

Answer 32

Type Identity Theory – Every type of mental state corresponds exactly to a specific type of brain state (e.g., pain = C-fiber activation). Token Identity Theory – Each individual mental state corresponds to some brain state, but the same mental state (e.g., pain) might be realized differently in different brains. 🔹 Key Point – In both views, sensations aren’t caused by brain states; they are brain states.

Answer 33

Either the reduction includes those the feature of quail or it does not 1) If it does include quail than we have yet to be rid of the mind in our reduction 2) if we dont include in than the theory is false and its not materialism since we leave something out

Answer 34

the correctness of a dualistic point of view

Answer 35

1) still left with strange mental phenomena 2) left out some mental phenomena

Answer 36

philosophers should not be afraid to be impaled by the second horn

Answer 37

Limited Materialists are those who accept that the mind is grounded in physical processes but argue that not all mental phenomena can be fully explained in purely materialist terms. They acknowledge that: Material Basis – The mind depends on the brain and physical processes, but… Limits of Reduction – Some mental states (e.g., qualia, consciousness) might not be fully reducible to physical explanations. 🔹 Key Idea – Unlike strict materialists, they allow for gaps or limitations in how physical processes account for subjective experience.

Answer 38

is a set of assumptions and convictions that the common people use to explain everyday thoughts and actions

Answer 39

The Problem Might Be Qualia Itself – If every theory of mind fails to properly account for qualia, maybe the issue isn’t with the theories but with the concept of qualia itself. Qualia is Incoherent – Since no theory can logically incorporate qualia without contradictions or “danglers” (unexplained leftovers), it suggests qualia might not be a meaningful or valid concept.

Answer 40

brain states and neural events

Answer 41

Eliminativists are philosophers who argue that certain common-sense mental concepts—like beliefs, desires, and qualia—should be eliminated because they are fundamentally flawed and will be replaced by neuroscience.

Answer 42

a physicalisist analyst of sensation reports dualistic of a dualistic conceptual scheme

Answer 43

so far, every theory of consciousness denies that consciousness is a part of the physical world

Answer 44

1)no adequate neurobiological account for consciousness. 2) History of phil of mind is filled with false claims about consciousness 3) Regarding mind/body problem, nothing has been solved

Answer 45

Behaviourism: consciousness doesn’t exist--all behaviour Computationalism: consciousness doesn’t exist--all just a program or several programs Epiphenomenalism: consciousness does exist but its not physical and has no impact on the physical world Readiness Potential: consciousness does exist, but has little importance--research shows that our actions are initiated before our conscious mind is aware of what we are doing Objective/Subjective: consciousness isn’t even a suitable study for science because it is subjective in nature and science is an objective area of study Materialism: if consciousness exists it must really be something else (there is no room for the mind in the material world)

Answer 46

1. consciousness is real 2.it is a biological phenomenon

Answer 47

1. spiritual dualism: a sense that the mind is an aspect of the soul (residual greek phil) 2. materialism: that forces itself into eliminativism "the time has come for psychology to discard ___all references to consciousness___…it is neither a definable nor useable concept, it is merely another word for ___the soul___of more ancient times…” (Watson, 1925)

Answer 48

the idea that some things that objectively exist are subjective in nature ( these can coexist) for example "i am in pain" is an objective fact, but "pain" is ontologically subjective. pain is always pain of a subject, so it is by nature of its objective existence, subjective.

Answer 49

Qualia: for every conscious state there is something that it is like to be in that state (NOT DEBATABLE ) Ontological Subjectivity: qualia are BY nature subjective—they are experienced by a subject Unity: our conscious states have unity---not mere perception and sensation but we have a single unified conscious field Intentionality: mental states are often about things in the physical world Intentional Causation: consciousness causes behaviour, the environment is presented to my consciousness

Answer 50

searles general account is that all of our conscious states are caused by neurological processes these conscious states exist only as a high level feature of the brain (they do not exist at the same level as neuro activity)

Answer 51

consciousness is a FEATURE of the brain in the same way that liquidity of water is a feature of the system of H2o molecules if you look at an h2o molecule, you do not see the "feature" of liquidity, you merely see h20 becuase the liquidity is a high level feature OF the h20 in the same way--Consciousness is a condition of the underlying structure (the brain)

Answer 52

non-reductive mental states can not be reduced to neuro Ontological (liquid and h2o) vs causal reduction (demons to grems) We cannot ontologically reduce mind- but we can casually reduce it.

Answer 53

That sounds so simple; but why haven’t we been able to give a causal account of how ___neurological activity__gives rise to this macro condition _____called conciousness_____________? Searle: “_______i dont know___________.” However what is true; our methods are way too limited in scope

Answer 54

the idea that the best explanation is the most reductive one

Answer 55

Behaviourism is an embarrassment of a theory, because it denies the obvious subjectivity of consciousness

Answer 56

1) Programs are defined purely syntactically, so they lack inherent meaning or understanding. 2) Computation is observer-relative, requiring a conscious agent to interpret or perform it—so it can't explain consciousness itself.

Answer 57

1)We directly experience our intentions causing actions, like raising an arm—this feels like a real causal relationship. 2)Brain chemistry is involved, so there is clearly a causal story to tell even if we haven’t figured it out yet

Answer 58

1)Readiness Potential doesn't prove unconscious decision-making—it appears even when no action is taken. 2)The experiments are often misinterpreted and don't show what many claim they do. 3)Dismissing consciousness to solve the mind-body problem is a misguided and unscientific approach.

Answer 59

there is no reason to think we cant study the mind because it is subjective

Answer 60

Materialism comes with conceptual baggage—terms and ideas carried over from one theory to another. These concepts divide mind and body into exclusive categories, making the mental and physical seem inherently incompatible.

Answer 61

1)prioritize cognitive neuroscience 2)get away from computationalism 3)Reject ANY view that denies the undeniable subjective consciousness state

Searle Flashcards

(90 cards)