PLAIR Cases Flashcards
(104 cards)
R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003]
INQUIRIES
• A family sought to challenge the decision of the Home Secretary not to hold an inquiry in public on the death of their relative who was murdered while in legal custody. They were successful. the Court relied on Article 2 ECHR on the right to life to find that there was an obligation to investigate the death of the petitioner’s relative as it was ‘in the public interest for a public inquiry to be held into the death of a person who at the time of the death was being held in legal custody’.
• This case should be viewed as fact specific
• Not all governmental refusals to hold an inquiry can be successfully challenged through JR
Keyu and others v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2015]
INQUIRIES
• The petitioners’ claim under Article 2 ECHR was unsuccessful but they also relied on common law grounds to challenge the respondents’ failure to hold an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 s1.
• Petitioners argued that the decision was irrational and disproportionate
• “The respondents clearly considered the request for an inquiry seriously and rejected it for reasons which are individually defensible and relevant, and which cumulatively render it impossible to characterise their conclusion as unreasonable, let alone irrational”. [129] per Lord Neuberger
• Lady Hale dissenting: The decision was unreasonable. The Respondents did not consider the public interest in properly inquiring into an event of this magnitude, the private interests of the relatives and survivors in knowing the truth and the importance of setting the record straight. In this case, the value of establishing the truth was overwhelming.
R (Anderson) v SS for Home Department (2003)
HRA 1998
• HRA 1998 s. 2: A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any Judgment, decision, declaration of the European Court of Human Rights
• What does “take into account” mean?
• Court will not, without good reason, depart from principles laid down in judgement in grant chamber
Kay v Lambeth LBC (2006)
HRA 1998
• Question arose as to whether lower domestic courts have to follow prior HoL decisions where they conflict with ECHR
• Held that lower courts are still bound by High Court decisions
• Duty to take ECHR law into account, but not necessarily to follow it
• -> not relieved of duty to follow prior house of lords rulings, even where they conflict with the Strasbourg Court
R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator (2004)
HRA 1998
• Duty of courts is to keep pace of Strasbourg courts
• No more, no less (per Lord Bingham): Mirror principlE
R (Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2004)
HRA 1998
• “We must interpret the Convention Rights in a way which keeps pace with rather than leaps ahead of the Strasbourg jurisprudence” (per Lady Hale)
R v A (2001)
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• Strong interpretative obligation
• Applies even if there’s no ambiguity in the language
• Even if parliament’s intention is clear, and it goes against HR, courts will try and find it compatible with HR
• s. 3 places a duty on court to strive to find a possible interpretation compatible with convention rights
Re S (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) (2002)
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• s. 3 (1) not available where the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or is by implication necessarily contradicted by the statute
• Judge’s task is to interpret, not to legislate
Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004]
HRA 1998: READING DOWN REQUIREMENT
• The Rent Act 1977 allowed the surviving spouse of a protected tenant of a dwelling house to succeed to the statutory tenancy on the tenant’s death, if living there. A person living with the original tenant as “his or her wife or husband” was treated as a spouse for these purposes. The petitioner in this case complained that this breached his Article 8 ECHR rights since he was prevented from succeeding to the statutory tenancy of his late partner, with whom he had lived in a stable homosexual relationship for almost 20 years.
• Found law was discriminatory and a violation of ECHR
• Relied on s. 3 to “read down” the provisions so as to allow the same sex partner of the deceased tenant to succeed to the statutory tenancy
• s. 3 might require court to depart from the legislative intention of provision in issue
• If purpose of HRA is to give effect to longstanding ECHR rights, and court is being asked to do what s. 3 says it must do, why is court being asked to do that?
• Cases dealt w/ in domestic courts instead of in Strasbourg
• By reading statute in such a way, brings it in line w/ convention rights
o Obligation is to read and give effect to legislation in a way which is compatible with convention rights so far as is possible
• Court is to try as hard as possible to find a compatible meaning, which may mean going beyond express words parliament has used
• Avoiding the need for a declaration of incompatibility per s.4
o Lord Millett (dissenting): “In my view, s3 does not entitle the court to supply words which are inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislative scheme; nor to repeal, delete or contradict the language of the offending statute”
o Lord Rodger: If the interpretive obligation is exercised in a manner which does not contradict the principle and scope of the legislation, then the court is not crossing the border from interpretation to amendment
o Lord Nicholls: “It is an unusual and far-reaching obligation that may require the Court to depart from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear”
o Lady Hale: have to consider ordinary meaning of leg; acknowledge that things change over time (ie social norms are different now than they were when leg. was enacted, should read leg. in view of this)
Smith v Scott 2007
HRA 1998: DECLARATION OF INCOMPATIBILITY S. 4
• The appellant argued that the law which does not allow prisoners to vote violated the Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR. The CoS could not rely on HRA s3 as it would depart too significantly from a fundamental feature of the legislation, so the legislation was found to be incompatible with the ECHR.
• Court said there are a bunch of ways to draw the line with regards to prisoner voting rights, but that’s NOT an interpretative exercise
o Would be legislating on it’s own account
• Not for court ot say who should vote and who shouldn’t
• That’s for parliament
• So made declaration of incompatibility
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote v. Wallbank [2004]
HRA 1998 S. 6 PUBLIC AUTHORITY
• Core Public Authority: A body whose nature is governmental in a broad sense of that expression. Hence, under the Human Rights Act a body of this nature is required to act compatibly with Convention rights in everything it does”.
• Hybrid Public Authority: A body “exercising both public functions and non-public functions […] A hybrid public authority is not a public authority in respect of an act of a private nature. (Per Lord Nicholls)
Whaley v Watson (2000)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Scottish parliament has been created by UK parliament, thus must act within scope of powers like any other public bodies
• If it doesn’t court can intervene and require it to do so
• “[The Scottish Parliament is a] body which – however important its role – has been created by statute and derives its powers from statute. As such, it is a body which, like any other statutory body, must work within the scope of those powers. If it does not do so, then in an appropriate case the court may be asked to intervene and will require to do so, in a manner permitted by the legislation. In principle, therefore, the Parliament like any other body set up by law is subject to the law and to the courts which exist to uphold that law.” [per Lord Rodger].
AXA Case (2011)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Common law grounds of JR don’t apply to Scottish parliament (can only bring action under s. 29 SA 1998)
• SO is not just any public body, so if you want to challenge an act of Scottish parliament it must be under s. 29
• But: would be open to the courts to strike down an Act of the Scottish parliament if such an act was contrary to fundamental rights of the rule of law
• “It cannot however be assumed that the grounds upon which the lawfulness of an Act of the Scottish Parliament may be reviewed include all, or any, of the grounds upon which the Court of Session may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in other contexts” (Per Lord Reed)
Cameron v Procurator Fiscal (2012)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Statute imposed additional bail conditions, court found that these breached art. 5
o Struck down
Salvesen v Riddell (2012)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Issue was complicated land law
• Statute at stake held to be a violation of article 1, protocol 1
• Used s. 102 -> suspended effect of statute for 12 months to give them a chance to fix it
Christian Institute & Ors v Lord Advocate (Scotland) (2016)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• SC struck down “named person” scheme under art. 8
Somerville v Scottish Ministers (2008)
HR & DEVOLUTION
• Time limits -> one year time bar in HRA (s. 7 (5) (a))
• But not in SA 1998 for “devolution issues”
• HoL: one year time limit does not apply to the proceedings as drafted because the petitioner’s case was that the acts of the Scottish ministers were outside the limits of their devolved competence
• Scottish government didn’t like this…
• Passed Convention Rights Proceedings Amendment (Scotland) Act 2009
o One year time limit to bring action on devolution issue challenges
Guzzardi v Italy
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• Applicant arrested on suspicion of being involved with the mafia
• Put in prison, awaiting trial
• Law in Italy at that time said people could be held in prison for up to two years while awaiting trial, after that time they must be set free
• After 2 years, police took him out of prison, put him on a remote island near Sicily where they forced him to be a resident
o Didn’t have enough to take him to trial, but also weren’t allowed to keep him in prison, so…
• Italy tried to argue that he wasn’t deprived because he was “free” and not in prison
• ECHR didn’t agree with Italy’s argument”
• “In order to determine whether someone has been ‘deprived of his liberty’, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effect and manner of implementation of the measure in question”
R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2006)/ Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• UK domestic case on this issue
• Became Gillan v Quinton…
• Gillan was PhD student on his way to protest arms fair; Quinton was a journalist who was also going to this arms fair but was there to cover the protests for work
• Both stopped by police, searched
• PhD student had some papers confiscated
• Police ignored journalist’s press credentials, wouldn’t let her take photos of being stopped and searched
• Police had carried out the stop and searches under s. 44 Terrorism Act (2000)
• Gave them the power to stop and search individuals without reasonable suspicion
• G and Q challenged under art 5
• HoL did not accept this challenge
o “I would accept that when a person is stopped and searched, the procedure has the features on which the appellants rely. ON the other hand, the procedure will ordinarily be relatively brief. The person stopped will not be arrested, handcuffed, confined or removed to any different place. I do not think, in the absence of special circumstances, such a person should be regarded as being detained in the sense of confined or kept in custody, but more properly of being detained in the sense of kept from proceeding or kept waiting. There is no deprivation of liberty” (Lord Bingham)
• Applicants took case to ECHR -> case became Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010)
• “The court observes that although the length of time during which each applicant was stopped and searched did not in either case exceed 30 minutes, during this period the applicants were entirely deprived of any freedom of movement. They were obliged to remain where they were and submit to the search and if they had refused they would have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 s. 1”
o Eventually, ECHR found UK in violation of Art. 8
Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1990)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 5
• Case from which the Reasonable Grounds test was derived
• Test:
• 1. If the suspicion is honestly held (subjective test), it is for the accused to prove that the suspicion was unreasonable
o Police officer themselves must have an honest belief that the individual has done something warranting a stop and search or arrest
• 2. This suspicion must be based on objectively reasonable grounds (objective test)
o Looking at specific circumstances of the case, a fair minded observer would also have reached the same conclusion as the police officer (that individual and done something worth of stop and search or arrest)
• Both parts of test ^^ must be met
o If both are met, reasonable grounds valid even if the belief was mistaken
- Applicants were former members of the IRA
- Had been convicted in the past for crimes relating to the IRA, but had served their time and were out free
- Every time police were concerned about IRA activity, they would keep arresting the applicants
- Police would say they had a reasonable suspicion because they had been convicted in the past for IRA activity
- Held: failed to meet requirements of objective observer
- “Reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as “reasonable” will, however, depend upon all the circumstances”
- Terrorism concerns cannot lead to suspension of “reasonableness” requirement
Salduz v Turkey (2009)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Young man (minor) arrested on charges that he had participated in an unlawful protest
• Arrested and taken to station, interrogated, without being given access to a solicitor
• ECHR found this violated his rights under art. 6, because he hadn’t been provided access to a lawyer
• “In order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently ‘practicable and effective’, Article 6 ECHR requires that, as a rule access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right”
Cadder v HM Advocate (2010)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Scotland
• Young man (minor) detained on suspicion of having attacked a father and son
• Arrested
• At time, in Scotland, under s. 14 Criminal Procedure (S) Act 1995 a person detained had no right to consult a solicitor, only to have the fact of their detention intimated to a solicitor
o No access to a solicitor before your interrogation
• High Court: declined to follow Salduz
• Said Salduz applied specifically to the situation in Turkey, interrogation procedures in Scotland are different and are overall rights compliant
o TF decided against petition of applicant
• UKSC: it is a breach of art. 6 for the prosecution to rely on evidence obtained during an interview where the suspect had not been afforded an opportunity to consult a solicitor
• HC should have followed Salduz
Chalmers v HM Advocate (1954)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Purpose of questioning not to extract a confession
• Interrogations should have the sole purpose of fact finding
o Clarifying the facts of what happened
• Can’t place individual under such an amount of stress that they feel compelled to confess
• Questioning which amounts to cross-examination will probably be excluded
Cudona v HM Advocate (1996)
POLICE POWERS: ART. 6
• Young girl arrested on suspicion of murder
• Questioned for uninterrupted period of 3 and a half hours
• Broke down and confessed
• Interrogation found to be in violation of art. 6, therefore her confession could not be used
• Suspect statements must be spontaneous and voluntary
• Cross-examination or interrogation problematic
• Leading or repetitive questioning likely to lead to exclusion of evidence