Politics of Redistribution & Inequality Flashcards
Evidence for relationship between partisanship and welfare state generosity?
Huber and Stephens (2001)
(i) Welfare generosity strongly positively associated w/cumulative left control
Evidence that income negatively associated with support for redistribution?
Finseraas (2009)
What is the Robin Hood paradox?
Perotti (1996)
Cross-sectional negative association between income inequality and redistribution (more equal countries redistribute more, not less)
Evidence for interaction between welfare state generosity and voter turnout?
Franzese (2002)
Empirical evidence that overall support for generous welfare states explained by correlation between labour market risk and low income levels?
Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012)
Partisanship determined to large extent by coalition dynamics associated with electoral systems
Iversen and Soskice (2006)
Evidence that PR electoral systems associated with different level and composition of public spending
Funk and Gathmann (2013)
SWISS CANTONAL ELECTORAL REFORM
- Data:
(i) novel’ evidence of electoral reform in Swiss cantonal parliaments
(ii) Over last century or so, Swiss cantons at different times moved from plurality to PR electoral systems
(iii) Common history reduces problems of unquantifiable historical + institutional differences inherent in cross-sectional studies - Results:
(i) PR benefits left parties, leading to increased social spending on welfare and education
(ii) PR results in lower ‘targeted’ spending (e.g. roads)
Pre-existing strength of left-wing may have influenced initial choice of electoral system
Boix (1999)
Novel evidence that electoral success of left primary a consequence (not cause) of electoral reform?
Funk and Gatmann (2013)
- Evidence from Swiss Cantonal parliaments
- Over last century or so, Swiss cantons at different times moved from plurality to PR electoral systems
- Common history reduces problems of unquantifiable historical + institutional differences inherent in cross-sectional studies
- Right/centre-right controlled …..% of parliamentary representation in almost all ….. countries in last …. years and yet ….
- Which study?
- Right/centre-right controlled >50% of parliamentary representation in almost all PR countries in last 100 years and yet there have been almost no attempts to adopt majoritarian systems
- Iversen, Soskice and Cusack (2007)
Empirical evidence that increased redistribution positively associated with income inequality
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)
Within-country association between growth of inequality and increases in redistribution 1975-2000
Within-country association between growth of inequality and increases in redistribution 1975-2000
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)
3 possible explanations for pattern that countries w/majoritarian electoral systems elect more right-wing governments? Which find empirical support?
Manow and Doring (2017):
- Empirical support for A and B:
A. Voting behaviour (Iversen/Soskice argument)
B. Electoral geography (regional distribution of votes biases vote-seat translation against left in majoritarian systems, due to wide margins by which left wins urban districts)
C. Party fragmentation (if right more fragmented than left in PR countries, less chance of winning)
Evidence about changes preferences for redistribution in OECD in 80s/90s?
Kenworthy and McCall (2007)
- Empirical evidence from 8 OECD countries in 80s/90s
- Little/no change in preferences for redistribution
Funk and Gathmann (2013)
SWISS CANTONAL ELECTORAL REFORM
- Data:
(i) novel’ evidence of electoral reform in Swiss cantonal parliaments
(ii) Over last century or so, Swiss cantons at different times moved from plurality to PR electoral systems
(iii) Common history reduces problems of unquantifiable historical + institutional differences inherent in cross-sectional studies - Results:
(i) Electoral success of left primary a consequence (not cause) of electoral reform
(ii) Pre-existing left strength didn’t predict electoral reform
(iii) PR benefits left parties, leading to increased spending on welfare and education
(iv) PR leads to lower ‘targeted’ spending (e.g. roads)
(v) No clear evidence that PR changes total overall level of government spending
Huber and Stephens (2001)
PARTISANSHIP AND WELFARE GENEROSITY
Welfare generosity strongly positively associated w/cumulative left control
Finseraas (2009)
INCOME AND REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES
Income negatively associated with support for redistribution
Franzese (2002)
TURNOUT AND WELFARE GENEROSITY
Positive interaction between welfare state generosity and voter turnout
Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012)
DETERMINANTS OF WELFARE STATE SUPPORT
1a. Overall support for generous welfare states explained by correlation between labour market risk and low income levels
1b. Strong empirical support cross-nationally using unemployment benefits and across policy domains within the USA
- Strong empirical support for both income and unemployment risk as motivations for individual-level welfare state support
Boix (1999)
POTENTIAL ENDOGENEITY OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
Pre-existing strength of left-wing may have influenced initial choice of electoral system
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)
INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES
- Within-country positive association between growth of inequality and increases in redistribution 1975-2000 (due to 2 ‘automatic’ mechanisms)
A. Increased unemployment:
(i) Example (Finland) - % of working-age households receiving unemployment benefit more than tripled from 80s to 90s
B. Concentrated gains at top + progressive tax systems
- Low turnout = compelling reason why US welfare state much less responsive to rising market inequality compare to other countries
Manow and Doring (2017)
WHY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS PRODUCE LEFT/RIGHT BIAS
- Empirical support for A and B:
A. Voting behaviour (Iversen/Soskice argument)
B. Electoral geography (regional distribution of votes biases vote-seat translation against left in majoritarian systems, due to wide margins by which left wins urban districts)
C. Party fragmentation (if right more fragmented than left in PR countries, less chance of winning)
Kenworthy and McCall (2007)
REDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES
Empirical evidence from 8 OECD countries in 80s/90s
- Common trend of significant increases in income inequality
- Little/no change in preferences for redistribution
- Perceptions of income inequality not significantly changed
Evidence of increasing income inequality in OECD
- OECD avg. Gini coefficient increased ~10% from mid 80s to late 2000s (from ~0.29 to ~0.32)
- Inequality increased in 17/22 countries, including in egalitarian Nordic countries
- OECD avg. Gini coefficient increased ….. from the mid 80s to late 2000s (from ….. to …..)
- Inequality increased in ….. out of ….. countries, including …..
- OECD avg. Gini coefficient increased ~10% from mid 80s to late 2000s (from ~0.29 to ~0.32)
- Inequality increased in 17 out of 22 countries, including in egalitarian Nordic countries
Meltzer and Richard (1981)
- Decisive median voter prefers more redistribution as inequality increases
- If income of median voter less than average, they have more to gain from redistribution
Mechanisms by which redistribution has increased due to increased inequality in recent decades, despite little/no change in preferences for redistribution
Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005)
1a. Increased unemployment:
(i) Shifts to post-industrial economic structures caused increased income inequality and unemployment
(ii) Increased unemployment led to sharp increase in claims of unemployment + related benefits
(iii) Such claims mostly made by low-income earners, resulting in ‘automatic’ increase in redistribution from rich to poor
1b. Concentrated gains at top:
(i) Increased income inequality largely due to concentrated gains at top
(ii) Progressive nature of OECD tax systems means this has led to automatic increase in redistribution
Evidence that income inequality largely driven by concentrated gains at top
Hacker and Pierson (2010)
In USA, from 70s to ~2000, % of income going to:
(i) Top 1% doubled
(ii) Top 0.1% quadrupled
Hacker and Pierson (2010)
In ….., from 70s to ~2000, the % of income going to:
(i) Top …..% ….. (from …..% to …..%)
(ii) Top …..% …… (from …..% to …..%)
Hacker and Pierson (2010)
In USA, from 70s to ~2000, % of income going to:
(i) Top 1% doubled
(ii) Top 0.1% quadrupled
Gimpelson and Treisman (2017)
INEQUALITY MISPERCEPTIONS
- Demand for redistribution varies not w/actual inequality, but perceptions of it (which are often wrong)
- Individuals tend to place themselves in centre of income distribution
- Given misperceptions about inequality and place in income distribution, unclear voters even know whether they would benefit from redistribution or not
Demand for redistribution varies not w/actual inequality, but perceptions of it (which are often wrong)
Gimpelson and Treisman (2017)
Individuals tend to place themselves in centre of income distribution
Gimpelson and Treisman (2017)
Given misperceptions about inequality and place in income distribution, unclear voters even know whether they would benefit from redistribution or not
Gimpelson and Treisman (2017)