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Flashcards in Post-industrialism Deck (48)
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1

Evidence from UK of growth in jobs at top and bottom end of labour market?

Goos and Manning (2003)

UK - 1979-99, growth in % of jobs in following deciles of pay:
(i) Top decile = 25%
(iii) bottom decile = 40%

2

Evidence for globalisation vs deindustrialisation as determinant of increased income inequality

Huber and Stephens (2014)

1. Tested for effect of globalisation on income inequality via 3 measures of globalisation:
2. No globalisation measure anywhere near statistically significant
3. Key dynamic driving increased income inequality = labour market changes associated w/de-industrialisation

3

Individuals w/greater labour market risk likely to support increased social spending and welfare generosity

Iversen and Soskice (2009)

4

Goos and Manning (2003)

'LOVELY' AND 'LOUSY' JOBS

1. Due to deindustrialisation and technological change, new post-industrial service economies providing greater demand for highly skilled and low-skilled, but less so for ‘middling’ jobs
2. Data - UK

5

..... and ..... (.....)

In the UK, from ..... to ....., growth in the % of jobs in following deciles of pay:
(i) Top decile = .....%
(iii) bottom decile = .....%

Goos and Manning (2003)

UK - 1979-99, growth in % of jobs in following deciles of pay:
(i) Top decile = 25%
(iii) bottom decile = 40%

6

..... (2012)

Atypical employment (defined as .....) increased as % of total employment from .....% in 70s to .....% today

Emmenegger et al (2012)

Atypical employment (part-time or fixed-term employment) increased as % of total employment from ~10% in 70s to 25%-35% today

7

Emmenegger et al (2012)

GROWTH OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT

1. Atypical employment (part-time or fixed-term employment) increased as % of total employment from ~10% in 70s to 25%-35% today

8

Example of social democratic strategy in face of insider/outsider dilemma

Rueda and Lindvall (2013)

Sweden - Social Democrats attempted to recover outsiders' support, but this facilitated electoral success of centre-right

9

Rueda and Lindvall (2013)

INSIDER/OUTSIDER DILEMMA FOR CENTRE-LEFT

1. Centre-left face dilemma in policy proposals:
(i) Benefit insiders (e.g. increased employment protection), but risk losing outsiders (abstain or support populist parties)
(ii) Benefit outsiders (e.g. increased unemployment benefits), but risk losing insiders (to centre-right)

2. Example (Sweden) – attempts by left to recover outsiders’ support facilitated electoral success of centre-right

10

Goodin et al (1999)

VOLATILITY OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Panel data shows individual employment volatile over time, indicating movement between insider/outsider groups

11

Panel data shows individual employment volatile over time, indicating movement between insider/outsider groups

Goodin et al (1999)

12

Emmenegger (2009)

CRITICISES INSIDER/OUTSIDER DIVIDE

1. Criticises insider/outsider division for being too static

2a. For divide to be politicised, insider/outsider groups would need to be stable over time in terms of individual composition
2b. Cross-sectional evidence of stability doesn't mean groups composed of same people over time

3. International survey data shows that insiders/outsiders just as likely, on average, to support social democratic parties

13

Tomlinson and Walker (2012)

STABILITY OF OUTSIDER STATUS OVER TIME

1. Outsider status reasonably persistent over time
2. Labour market status today predict future status

14

1. Evidence that outsider status relatively stable over time

2. How can this be reconciled with previously contradictory evidence?

1. Tomlinson and Walker (2012)

2. Labour market dualisation intensified over time since earlier studies (Hausermann and Palier 2008)

15

Hausermann and Palier (2008)

INTENSIFICATION OF DUALISATION

Labour market dualisation intensified since 90s

16

Evidence that labour market dualisation intensified since 90s

Hausermann and Palier (2008)

17

Huber and Stephens (2014)

EVIDENCE AND CAUSES OF RISING INEQUALITY

1a. Tested for effect of globalisation on income inequality via 3 measures of globalisation:
1b. No globalisation measure anywhere near statistically significant
1c. Key dynamic driving increased income inequality = labour market changes associated w/de-industrialisation

2. Increases in post-tax/transfer income inequality approximately 3X bigger in Anglo-American countries vs Nordic/Continental

18

How can contradictory evidence regarding the stability of outsider status over time be reconciled?

Hausermann and Palier (2008)

1. Labour market dualisation intensified over time since earlier studies
2. Explains why more recent studies find more supportive evidence of stability of outsider status

19

Problem with Emmenegger's (2009) international survey evidence which shows that insiders/outsiders just as likely, on average, to support social democratic parties

1. Aggregated international survey data likely to be unreliable because strategies of centre-left likely to vary depending on national context and relative strength of insiders/outsiders

2. If each strategy similarly likely, evidence of nil effect unsurprising (even if insider/outsider divide significant within individual countries)

20

Evidence that outsiders have systematically different individual political preferences

1. Schwander and Hausermann (2013)
(i) Outsiders support more generous unemployment benefits and favour employment promotion more strongly

2. Hausermann et al (2016)
(i) Outsiders more strongly support redistribution, even given that outsiders tend to live w/insiders

3. Rovny and Rovny (2017)
(i) Outsiders more likely to support radical parties

21

Outsiders more likely to support radical parties

Rovny and Rovny (2017)

22

Outsiders more strongly support redistribution, even given that outsiders tend to live w/insiders

Hausermann et al (2016)

23

Outsiders support more generous unemployment benefits and favour employment promotion more strongly

Schwander and Hausermann (2013)

24

Evidence that outsiders have different social policy preferences

Schwander and Hausermann (2013)

Outsiders support more generous unemployment benefits and favour employment promotion more strongly

25

Evidence that outsiders have different redistribution preferences

Hausermann et al (2016)

Outsiders more strongly support redistribution, even given that outsiders tend to live w/insiders

26

Evidence that outsiders more likely to support certain types of parties

Rovny and Rovny (2017)

Outsiders more likely to support radical parties

27

Rueda (2005)

INSIDER/OUTSIDER DIVIDE

1. Traditional working-class fragmented between insiders and outsiders

2a. Insiders = employed in secure, protected jobs
2b. Outsiders = unemployed or employed in insecure post-industrial jobs (e.g. gig economy, Uber, Deliveroo)

28

Main causes of deindustrialisation

Iversen and Cusack (2000)

1. Changes in preferences from manufactured to service goods
2. Productivity increases in traditional sectors lead to falling employment

29

Evidence of heterogeneity in post-tax/transfer increases in income inequality

Huber and Stephens (2014)

Increases in post-tax/transfer income inequality approximately 3X bigger in Anglo-American countries vs Nordic/Continental

30

Iversen and Cusack (2000)

DEINDUSTRIALISATION, NOT GLOBALISATION, DRIVES WELFARE SPENDING

1a. Deindustrialisation accounts for large % of variation in welfare state spending, whereas globalisation not significant once deindustrialisation controlled for
1b. Changes in welfare spending non-linear and vary cross-nationally, which isn't well-explained by more uniform globalisation trend

2. Primary causes of deindustrialisation:
(i) Changes in preferences from manufactured to service goods
(ii) Productivity increases in traditional sectors lead to falling employment

31

Evidence that deindustrialisation, rather than globalisation, drives variation in welfare spending

Iversen and Cusack (2000)

1. Deindustrialisation accounts for large % of variation in welfare state spending, whereas globalisation not significant once deindustrialisation controlled for

32

Hausermann and Walter (2009)

1. Labour market risk and welfare state support related to BOTH globalisation and post-industrialism

2. Political conflict lines:
(i) labour market status
(ii) exposure to international competition

3. Cross-national variation in salience of new conflict lines based on:
(i) Economic openness
(ii) Size and type of welfare states

33

Evidence that labour market risk and welfare state support related to both globalisation and post-industrialism

Hausermann and Walter (2009)

1. Labour market risk and welfare state support related to BOTH globalisation and post-industrialism

2. Political conflict lines:
(i) labour market status
(ii) exposure to international competition

3. Cross-national variation in salience of new conflict lines based on:
(i) Economic openness
(ii) Size and type of welfare states

34

Autor et al (2015)

DISENTANGLING IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE

1. Analyse effects of trade and technology separately using US local market data

2. Research design - local labour market exposure to technological change (measured by specialisation in routine task-intensive production + clerical occupations) largely uncorrelated w/local labour market exposure to trade competition from China

3a. Exposure to trade competition – large fall in manufacturing employment and rise in unemployment
3b. Exposure to technological change – neutral impact on overall employment, but leads to substantial shifts in occupational composition within sectors

35

Goos et al (2014)

CAUSES OF POLARISATION

1. Data - European economies 1993-2010
2. Pervasive labour market polarisation explained mostly by routine-biased technological change and offshoring

36

Why does service sector expansion create additional demand for female labour?

1. Service jobs don’t place premium on physical skill (as many jobs in traditional sector do)
2. Service jobs rely more on general than specific labour market skills

37

Evidence that labour market polarisation mostly explained by routine-biased technological change and offshoring

Goos et al (2014)

38

Iversen and Cusack's (2000) criticisms of Garett's study, which finds that increased trade openness associated w/higher welfare state spending

1. Results highly sensitive to precise specification of control variables
2. Once better controls introduced (notably deindustrialisation), results disappear

39

Evidence that outsiders more likely to abstain from voting altogether

Rovny and Rovny (2017)

40

Rovny and Rovny (2017)

Outsiders more likely to:

1. Support radical parties
2. Abstain

41

Why do women tend to have low-paid jobs in specific skills systems?

1. Due to greater risk of leaving work to have children:
(i) Employers more reluctant to invest in co-specific skills
(ii) Women more likely to invest in general skills whose returns are more protected after periods of entering/exit workforce

2. In specific skills systems:
(i) High-wage jobs tend to be in export-oriented manufacturing (requiring specific skills)
(ii) Low-wage jobs tend to be in non-traded services (relying more on general skills)

42

'LOVELY' AND 'LOUSY' JOBS

1. Due to deindustrialisation and technological change, new post-industrial service economies providing greater demand for highly skilled and low-skilled, but less so for ‘middling’ jobs
2. Data - UK

Goos and Manning (2003)

43

INSIDER/OUTSIDER DILEMMA FOR CENTRE-LEFT

1. Centre-left face dilemma in policy proposals:
(i) Benefit insiders (e.g. increased employment protection), but risk losing outsiders (abstain or support populist parties)
(ii) Benefit outsiders (e.g. increased unemployment benefits), but risk losing insiders (to centre-right)

2. Example (Sweden) – attempts by left to recover outsiders’ support facilitated electoral success of centre-right

Rueda and Lindvall (2013)

44

1. Labour market risk and welfare state support related to BOTH globalisation and post-industrialism

2. Political conflict lines:
(i) labour market status
(ii) exposure to international competition

3. Cross-national variation in salience of new conflict lines based on:
(i) Economic openness
(ii) Size and type of welfare states

Hausermann and Walter (2009)

45

GROWTH OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT

1. Atypical employment (part-time or fixed-term employment) increased as % of total employment from ~10% in 70s to 25%-35% today

Emmenegger et al (2012)

46

STABILITY OF OUTSIDER STATUS OVER TIME

1. Outsider status reasonably persistent over time
2. Labour market status today predict future status

Tomlinson and Walker (2012)

47

EVIDENCE AND CAUSES OF RISING INEQUALITY

1a. Tested for effect of globalisation on income inequality via 3 measures of globalisation:
1b. No globalisation measure anywhere near statistically significant
1c. Key dynamic driving increased income inequality = labour market changes associated w/de-industrialisation

2. Increases in post-tax/transfer income inequality approximately 3X bigger in Anglo-American countries vs Nordic/Continental

Huber and Stephens (2014)

48

DEINDUSTRIALISATION, NOT GLOBALISATION, DRIVES WELFARE SPENDING

1. Deindustrialisation accounts for large % of variation in welfare state spending, whereas globalisation not significant once deindustrialisation controlled for

2. Primary causes of deindustrialisation:
(i) Changes in preferences from manufactured to service goods
(ii) Productivity increases in traditional sectors lead to falling employment

Iversen and Cusack (2000)