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Flashcards in Power vs Rules Deck (11)
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Krasner (1991)

Pareto optimum analysis ignore power differences, cooperational problems with distributional consequences lead to differences on the pareto frontier, Distributional conflicts can be resolved by exercising power: 1.Power to determine who plays the game 2.Power to dictate rules of the game 3.Power to change payoff matrix (issue linkages)


Martin (1999)

States are self-interested: interests clash, poor information undermines reciprocity, IOs assist states in cooperation dilemma, IOs allow states to reach pareto frontier, IOs satisfy states demand for monitoring and reliable information about other states behaviour-> IOs make actions of other states more predictable


Shadlen (2009)

There are “makers, takers and breakers” of int. institutions Rationalist (resources) vs institutionalist (rules) perspective on Post-Uruguay WTO negotiations. 1. Uruguay: Single undertaking made DCs agree to rules on IP and Investment to gain market access 2. Uruguay: - TRIPS: DCs exploited differences between Europe, US and Japan to exclude some restrictions, but had to agree to most - TRIMS: Same, but US wanted strong and broad investment agreement, DCs resisted successfully to limit to trade-related through deadlocking negotiations 3. Doha: Investment negotiations on basis of positive list - “like-minded group” (led by India and Malaysia) succeeds in establishing ‘explicit consensus’ rules in investment. -consensus rules aloud developing countries to secure a clarifying statement that clarified dcs right to issue compulsory licenses 4. Cancun: DCs interpreted explicit consensus to start negotiations, Developed countries as explicit consensus about modalities-> DCs effectively blocked negotiation on the basis of explicit consensus -> Therefore, rules empowered resource-poor countries to block more deepness (Investment) and clarified rules they were originally strongly opoosed to-> DCs have blocking power -> this was not possible during Uruguay round because of single undertaking in combination with withdrawal of EC and US from GATT 1947 immidiately upon joining GATT 1994 (Gruber: Go it alone power)


Chin (2012)

1. China has revolved into a net donor in the last fifteen years, surge has been catalysed by rise as an economic power and promoted by party leadership. (Brasil, and SA also net donors now), but china probably third largest donor in the world 2. China rose economically but continued to self-identify with south by redirecting part of wealth and technical expertise to Global South; at the same time China is receiving aid from traditional donors Aid recipients press China for more sustainability of aid relationship and transparency of processes and results (concerns over data)


Gagné (2000)

In the change from GATT to WTO substantial changes in authority, specifically DSU.


  • Quasi automatic process
  • Appellate body making precedence policies
  • Reverse consensus rule etc.

The cooperation of major powers in this respect is of particular significance to ensure the credibility and the viability of the world trading regime

Following the first five years, major powers, including the US, on the whole have abided by the international rules

Number of disputes has increased

Increased reliance on the system from developing countries

There remains concern over US unilateralism, which is related to the fragmentation of the trade policy-making process and s seemingly ambivalent attitude towards the WTO

BUT globalisation is making states more and more dependent on international exchange, to the extent that even for powerful states the benefits from an effective world trading regime may outweigh any possible short-term gains stemming from unilateral initiatives

  • Shared authority


Shaffer (2015)

Most WTO rules come from US or EU legal systems ,i.e. for them easier to adopt (cf. Kim, procedural costs)

4 dimensions:

  • Boundary between the market and the state (growth of administrative state)
    • Export orientated interest groups
    • WTO affects the balance of power if interests groups in nation states: the export-oriented business is favored over the protectionist ones.
  • Changes in the relative authority of institutions: promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance)
    • WTO enhances the power of federal gov. in federal systems (it cedes authority to the center in order to negotiate better)
    • WTO empowers national courts in the realm of intellectual property rights. (TRIPS calls for national courts to hear the complaints of private parties)
  • Changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation
    • More lawyers and Technocrats are requested within national administrations – for standard setting, review of patents
  • Changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms
    • market ideology (market liberalism and liberalized trade)
    • In WTO litigation, importance of determining meaning and interpretation of WTO legal norms.
    • Common in WTO governance is reporting and peer review systems, rather than dispute settlement, WTO members report their compliance.

All dimensions build on each other


Kim (2008)

Procedural cost, lawyers etc for developing countries higher. Often overlook and only substantive gains considered

Beyond substantive gains discussed by Realists or Neoliberal Institutionalists

Whereas legalisation (as from GATT to WTO DSM) decreases uncertainty and increases convergence of countries’ expectations on international outcomes, it imposes costs on countries by increasing the complexity and difficulty of procedures for them to utilise

Many scholars and practitioners expected these changes to benefit the less powerful countries in the WTO (cf. Gagne)

But difference substantive and procedural costs

Compared to the GATT era, developed countries – ones with greater capacity – are much more likely to utilise dispute settlement in the WTO than developing countries

Broader implications: costliness of procedures in international institutions can affect the openness of the international trading system in the long run – further negotiations for trade liberalisation can be hampered (Julia: in Doha round, many countries sceptical of bureaucratic overload)

International institutions likely interact with domestic institutions in a systematic manner

Therefore: institutional design matters: in addition to substantive rules, the design of procedural rules can influence countries’ behaviour at the international level


Steinberg (2002)

GATT/WTO consensus decision-making process is organized hypocrisy in the procedural context: 1. When GATT/WTO bargaining is law-based, states take procedural rules seriously, attempting to build a consensus that is Pareto-improving, yielding market-opening contracts that are roughly sym- metrical. When GATT/WTO bargaining is power-based, states bring to bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to rules (instruments based primarily on market size), invisibly weighting the decision-making process and generating outcomes that are asymmetrical and may not be Pareto-improving. 2. Trade rounds have been launched through law-based bargaining (pareto-improved contracts), concluded through power-based bargaining (asymmetrical contracts), agenda setting dominated by powerful states Sovereign equality decision making, because it allows states to formulate legislative packages that favor the interests of powerful states, yet can be accepted by all participating states and generally considered legitimate by them


Shadlen (2004)

Developing countries have limited control over the distributional and substantive dimensions of international institutions, but they retain an important stake in a rule- based international order that can reduce uncertainty and stabilise expectations. Because international institutions can provide small states with a potential mechanism to bind more powerful states to mutually recognised rules, developing coun- tries may seek to strengthen the procedural dimensions of multilateral institutions. Clear and strong multilateral rules cannot substitute for weakness, but they can help ameliorate some of the vulnerability that is a product of developing countries' position in the international system. Lacking the power to revise the substance of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), developing countries, allied with a network of international public health activists, subsequently designed strategies to operate within the constraining international political reality they faced. They sought to clarify the rules of international patent law, to affirm the rights established during the TRIPS negotiations, and to minimise vulnerability to opportunism by powerful states. In doing so the developing countries reinforced global governance in IPRs.


Pre vs Post-Uruguay


Shallow to Deep integration