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PS 241 Exam 1 > PS 241 Exam 2 > Flashcards

PS 241 Exam 2 Flashcards

(106 cards)

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1
Q

Types of identities studied in comparative politics

A

Ethnicity, religion, nationality, others(sexuality, gender, class, etc)

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2
Q

Identity known for being visible, sticky

A

Ethnicity

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3
Q

Identity known for being personal, stable within individuals

A

Religion

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4
Q

Identity known for being based on another identity, inherently political

A

Nationality

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5
Q

Identity is based on ascriptive facts, the way that we identify based on such facts is changeable

A

Constructivism

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6
Q

Identities are natural and fixed

A

Primordialism

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7
Q

Primordialism treats identity as the:

A

IV

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8
Q

Constructivism treats identity as the:

A

DV

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9
Q

PRR: Defines this as a tool for building and maintaining barriers

A

Language

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10
Q

Argue that more politicization exists where cash crops are produced and African language books are published (examine historical forces shaping ethnic identities)

A

Pengl, Roessler, and Rueda (PRR)

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11
Q

Argue that growing cash crops creates wealth, especially for early adopters, and once expertise is developed you aim to protect your relative position, thus politicizing

A

PRR

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12
Q

Argues that identities can change in the shorter term, politicization is about the relative size of the groups in a country

A

Posner

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13
Q

Reason why Posner’s experiment was natural

A

The border between Zambia and Malawi already existed

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14
Q

Concludes that larger groups politicize because they are large enough to be politically relevant and smaller groups must work together

A

Posner

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15
Q

Chewas and Tambukas are more politicized here

A

Malawi

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16
Q

Chewas and Tambukas are less politicized here

A

Zambia

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17
Q

Showed that national identity/nationalism can depoliticize

A

Robinson

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18
Q

Measured how strongly Malawians identify nationally, boosting national identity in an experiment by discussing symbolism of Malawian flag

A

Robinson

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19
Q

What country’s measurement of ethnic groups did Fearon attempt to update?

A

Soviet Union

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20
Q

Used secondary sources such as Encyclopedia Britannica and CIA World Factbook to compile measurement of diversity and ethnic groups

A

Fearon

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21
Q

2 things Livny hoped for making measurement of ethnic groups

A

Data sources of similar quality, data sources of highest quality for each country

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22
Q

Problem created by rich, democratic countries being the most likely to have high-quality data

A

Phantom Correlation

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23
Q

What is the phantom correlation created by rich, democratic countries producing better information?

A

Economic development is connected to diversity

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24
Q

Variation: Why do some countries experience ethnic conflict and some don’t?

A

Cross-sectional

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25
Variation: Why does conflict change over time in the same country?
Cross-temporal
26
IVs in Casseli and Coleman's argument
Ethnic distance, expropriable assets
27
Emotional cost resulting from trying to pass as an ethnic group
Psychic Cost
28
Argue that a median level of ethnic distance and expropriable resources make ethnic conflict more likely
Casseli and Coleman
29
Define value of religion for violent groups, argue that terrrorists and saints make personal sacrifices to prove they are true believers
Iannacone and Berman
30
Benefits religion offers
Material and psychic
31
Reason why people are willing to pay more to gain entry into a group
They believe they will be repaid with the psychic benefit
32
What identifies "true believers"?
Sacrifice
33
When are sacrifices smaller?
When groups fight to attract true believers
34
When are sacrifices larger?
When material benefits are in demand (state or market is weak)
35
Another term for material benefits
Club goods
36
Improvement in the economic condition in a society
Economic development
37
Something that cannot be seen with the eyes or measured with a physical instrument
Latent
38
Development is a:
Latent variable
39
Most widely used measure of development
GDP per capita
40
Problems with GDP per capita as a measure of development
Unclear whether income increases quality of life, who controls income, government statistics
41
Good things about GDP per capita as a measure of development
Reflects how country is doing as a whole, widely available over space and time
42
Argues development should be thought of as unfreedom, development should be delved from the removal of sources of unfreedom
Sen
43
3 areas of unfreedom
Economic poverty, lack of public facilities/social care, denial of political and civil liberties
44
Argue that invisible infrastructure keeps the poor poor
Banerjee and Duflo
45
Face choices, often carry debt, large families, few durable goods, small-scale entrepreneurs with multiple jobs
Characteristics of the lives of the poor
46
Food, festivals, TV/Radio, alcohol
Common expenses for the poor
47
Argues that GDP per capita is a poor measure of development because governments are likely to fabricate the statistics, autocrats lie about their GDPs
Martinez
48
Introduces idea of bright lights at night as a measure of economic activity and development
Martinez
49
Which type of government is more likely to lie about GDP per capita and why?
Autocrats because fewer people are tracking the numbers and it's easier to lie
50
Scenario that incentivizes governments to tell the truth about GDP per capita
Falling under the threshold for a loan
51
IV in Easterly and Levine's argument
Ethnic diversity
52
DV in Easterly and Levine's argument
Development
53
Mechanism in Easterly and Levine's argument
Policies
54
Argue that cross-country differences in ethnic diversity lead to poor development because of increased polarization that impedes agreement about growth policies
Easterly and Levine
55
Argue that trust in subsaharan Africa was damaged by the slave trade, negative consequence of diversity activated by politics
Nunn and Wanchekon
56
Argue that autocrats extract more resources because of uncertainty surrounding term length, spend money to shore up support, creates inefficiencies, leading to underdevelopment and more autocracy
RTV
57
What does social trust support and solve?
Supports democratic consolidation (losing with grace), solves collective action problems (encourages cooperation)
58
Argue that quality (democratic) institutions punishing dishonesty lead to more trust and less diligence, which leads to more development, which cycles into more democracy
Zak and Knack
59
Why is diligence inefficient?
The time spent investigating others could be better spent elsewhere
60
Trust is higher in equal, less diverse, less corrupt countries with better (democratic) institutions
Determinants of Trust
61
Why is homogeneity better for trust?
Easier to understand who can be (structured?)
62
Large scale interventions, at national level
Macro
63
Smaller scale interventions, individual or community level
Micro
64
In a macro intervention, what is compared?
Countries
65
Aid operates through national governments or large NGOs
Macro
66
Outcome gauged by seeing how reality plays out
Macro
67
Target randomly selected individuals or communities
Micro
68
Gauge outcome by comparing treated to control
Micro
69
Trade-off between micro and macro level interventions
Impact for Information
70
Concerns with micro-level interventions
External validity, problems of scale, ethical concerns
71
Argues that politics matter when determining recipients of foreign aid, little foreign aid is given to the poorest countries
Qian
72
Largest giver ($) of foreign aid
United States
73
Largest giver (% of national income) of foreign aid
Nordic countries
74
Why is so little foreign aid given to the poorest countries?
Doesn't seem to work (short-term impact), people don't care
75
Argue that among the given 3 types of micro-level aid, giving cash transfers is the most effective
Blattman and Niehaus
76
3 forms of micro-level aid discussed
Heifer International, Micro-loans, cash transfers
77
First step of comparative method
Choose phenomenon of interest
78
Second step of comparative method
Translate phenomenon into a variable with values
79
Third step of comparative method
Develop a hypothesis about the relationship between another variable and our outcome of interest
80
Fourth step of comparative method
Design a test to track whether changes in IV result in hypothesized effect on DV
81
Optional fifth step of comparative method
Explore specific case to explore why variable has impact on another
82
Final step of comparative method
Reflect on validity of hypothesis given the evidence
83
PRR's IV
Agriculture/language
84
PRR's mechanism
Boundaries/competition
85
PRR's DV
Politicization of identity
86
Posner's DV
Politicization of identity
87
Posner's IV
Group size
88
Robinson's IV
National identity
89
Robinson's DV
Politicization of identity
90
HHPW's IV
Diversity
91
HHPW's DV
Public goods provisions
92
Caselli and Coleman's IV
Expropriable resources/Ethnic Distance
93
Caselli and Coleman's DV
Ethnic conflict
94
Easterly and Levine's IV
Ethnic Diversity
95
Easterly and Levine's DV
Development
96
Nunn and Wantchekon's IV
Slave trade exposure
97
Nunn and Wantchekon's DV
Distrust
98
Zak and Knack's IV
Institutions supporting trust
99
Zak and Knack's mechanism
Diligence
100
Zak and Knack's DV
Development
101
Argue that ethnic diversity undermines public goods provision
HHPW
102
First preference theory, HHPW and game
Different groups want different goods, survey
103
Second preference theory, HHPW and game
You only want your group to enjoy public goods, anonymous money giving game
104
Efficacy theory, HHPW and game
You work better with your own group, teams solving puzzle
105
Findability theory, HHPW, supported and game
If someone doesn't donate to public goods, you can find them, finding stranger
106
Strategy Selection theory, HHPW supported and game
There are social expectations that come with interacting with coethnics, money game with someone watching

PS 241 Exam 1 (2 decks)

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