Quiz 2 Flashcards
1
Q
Accessibilism
A
a sort of internalism that argues that the epistemic justification of a eprson is determined by things which the person has reflective or introspective access
2
Q
Mentalism
A
a sort of of internalism that says the epistemic justification of a person’s belief is determined only by things that are internal to the the person’s mental life
3
Q
Supervenience thesis
A
the justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes supervenes solely on the person’s occurent and dispositional mental states, events, conditions
4
Q
Mental duplicate thesis
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implication of internalism… if any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are exactly alike justificationally.
5
Q
Externalism
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differences in justification can result from contingent non-mental differences, such as differing causal connections or reliability
6
Q
Examples used by Internalists…
A
difference between a novice birdwatcher and an expert birdwatcher
7
Q
Plantinga’s Three Kinds of Internal evidence
A
- Propositions (e.g. belief)
- Sensory (e.g. perception)
- Impulsional (e.g. intuition)
8
Q
Impulsional evidence
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the sense of conviction or confidence that accompanies beliefs
9
Q
Plantinga’s argument against Internalism
A
- Internalism is true only if impulsion justifies
- If impulsion justifies, then all beliefs are justified.
- It is not the case that all beliefs are justified.
- It is not the case that impulsion justifies.
- Internalism is not true.
10
Q
Internalist Replies to Plantinga’s Objection
A
Some propositions are believed reluctantly.
The denial of things we believe do not always feel “weird” or “absurd”.
Impulsional evidence provides strong justification only if it is undefeated and decisive.
Impulsional evidence must be accompanied by other evidence. (e.g., past reliability)
11
Q
Goldman’s Forgotten Evidence Objection
A
Sally reads about the benefits of broccoli in the NY science section. Forms the justified belief that broccoli is beneficial.
Sally no longer recalls where she learned about broccoli’s benefits
She retains belief that broccoli is beneficial
12
Q
Internalist Response to Goldman Forgotten Evidence
A
Justification provided by vivacity of memory and feelings of confidence
Justification by background belief in the reliability of memory
13
Q
Sosa’s Introspective Beliefs Objection
A
My experience of a triangle justifies my corresponding introspective belief.
My experience of a 23-sided figure does not justify my corresponding introspective belief. Why does the former justify while the latter does not?
14
Q
Weak Internalism vs. Strong Internalism
A
Weak - justification is at least partly determined by the mental states to which you have reflective access
Strong- justification is completely determined by the mental states to which you have reflective access
15
Q
Reliabilist Theories of Justification
A
Non-theory… S is externally justified in believing p=p is true, and S is a thinking subject
Reliability 1: S … = the process by means of which S was led to believe P is reliable
Reliability 2: S…. = the process by means of which S was led to believe that P is a process that generally leads to true belief
16
Q
Causal Theories of justification
A
Causal theory 1… S is externally justified in believing p= S believes p; and p’s being true is the cause of S’s believing p.
CT 2… Se is externally justified in believing p = S believes p; and p’s being true contributes causally to S’s believing p
CT 3 … S…. = p’s being ture contributes causally to S’s believing p; and it is evident to S that p’s being true contributes causally to her belief that p
17
Q
Mixed Theory of Justification
A
S is externally justified in believing p = S believes p and the cause of S’s believing that p is that S employes a belief-forming process that generally leads to a true belief
18
Q
Absolute Concept
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Absolute concepts have an all or nothing structure… e.g. pregnant, boiling, knowledge
19
Q
Peter Unger on Absolute Concepts
A
- according to Unger, knowledge requires absolute certainy
- skeptic reveals that there are ‘bumps’ and ‘irregularities’ in our ordinary evidence
- knowledge requires the elimination of all competing possibilities (i.e that contrast with waht is known)
- upshot: we seldom, if ever, satisfy the conditions for applying the concept
20
Q
Dretske on Absolute Concepts
A
- according to Dretske, absolute concepts depict a situation as being devoid of a certain kind of thing (e.g. flatness= absence of bumps, empty = absence of objects)
- relationally absolute (i.e. absolute relation to a certain standard)
21
Q
Why is knowledge absolute according to Unger and Dretske?
A
Unger= knowledge is absolute because it requires absolute certainty Dretske = knowledge is absollute because it requires full justification
22
Q
Dretske’s def. of knowledge
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an evidential state in which all relevant alternatives (to what is known) are eliminated
23
Q
Dretske’s def. of relevant alternatives
A
. the set of possible alternatives
that a person must be in an evidential position to exclude
24
Q
Methodist
A
we have to
25
Methodist
we know how we know -> we can figure out what we know... we have the answer to b, and given our answer to b we can figure out the answer to a
26
Particularist
we know what we know -> we can figure out how we know. We have the answer to a, and that given the answer to a, we can figure out the answer to b
27
Skeptic
We have to answer to neither a nor b. Since we cant answer a until we answer b and we cannot answer b until we anser a, we cant answer either one
28
Chisholm's Alternatives and Begging the Question
Methodism: begs the question as to how we know that the assumed method is correct
Particularism: begs the question... how do you know what you claim to know
Skepticism: begs the question by assuming that the particularist does not know that certain propositions are true tand theat the methodist does not know that certain criterion is correct...
Since all three beg the question, we are free to adopt a question begging solution
29
Chisholm's Arguments for Particularism
We are all already particularists since there are propositions we take to be true.
Since methodism and scepticism both beg the question, there is no reason for us to switch to either.
Particularism is best suited to allow us to make progress in epistemology.
30
Explanationism
Explanationist = we should answer (A) and (B) in a way that yields the most satisfactory explanatory picture.
-Explanationist employ the method of reflective equilibrium to respond to the problem of criterion.
31
Reflective Equilibrium
a state of balance or coherence among a set of beliefs arrived at by a process of deliberative mutual adjustment among general principles (e.g. methods) and particular judgments.
32
Explanatory Particularism
We begin with our considered, but revisable, beliefs or intuitions about which propositions are true, and try to come up with a criterion, and make adjustments until we reach a state of reflective equilibrium.
33
Cohertentism
We begin with both our beliefs/assumptions/intuitions about which propositions are true about which methods for telling if a proposition is true are correct and make adjustments until we reach a state of reflective equilibrium.
34
Contextualism
the truth conditions of the sentence 'S knows that p' varies depending on the context in which it is uttered
e.g. bank case
35
Contextual Factors
1. Importance of getting things right
2. Mentioning of an alternative possibility
3. Consideration of an alternative possibility
36
Invariantist
someone who denies that contextual factors influence the truth conditions of knowledge attributions
37
Invariantism
truth-conditions for knowledge attributions do not vary depending on context
38
Skeptical invariantism
the standards for true knowledge attributions remain constantly very high (e.g. bank case)
39
Non-skeptical invariantism
the standards for true knowledge attributions remain constantly very low (e.g. bank case)
40
Subject factors
features of the putative knower's situation... ex: the fact that the subject is in fake barn country
41
Attributer factors
features of the knowledge attributer's situation... ex: the fact that knowledge attribute is in a class on Descartes' evil demon
42
Contextualist RA theorists
RA theorist who allow attributer factors to influence which alternatives are relevant
43
Invariantist RA theorists
RA theorist who allows only subject factors to influence which alternatives are relevant
44
What does it mean to say that knowledge is indexical?
S1 may attribute knowledge to subject P, and S2 deny that P has knowledge without contradiction in the same way that I might say Prof. Archer is sitting in front of me and someone else might say Prof. Archer is not sitting in front of me without contradiction
45
What does it mean to say that knowledge is indexical?
S1 may attribute knowledge to subject P, and S2 deny that P has knowledge without contradiction in the same way that I might say Prof. Archer is sitting in front of me and someone else might say Prof. Archer is not sitting in front of me without contradiction.
46
Application of Knowledge as Indexical to Bank Case
the claim that one does not have knowledge (after wife expresses doubt) does not contradict previous claim that one did have knowledge (made before wife doubted), but the meaning of the word "know" changes
47
Subject factors and their affect
Subject factors affect the truth value of a knowledge attribution (whether or not you have knowledge) without altering the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution (what is required for knowledge). They affect how good an epistemic position the putative knoweer is actually in.
48
Attributer factors and their affect
Affect the truth value of a knowledge attribution by altering the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution. They affect how good an epistemic position a putative knower must be in in order to count as knowing.
49
Common Sense view of perception
perception gives us direct and immediate access to reality (ie physical objects)
50
The problem of perception
the possibility of hallucination and illusion show that the common sense view is false
51
Short version of the objection
- perception, as we ordinarily understand it, involves direct and immediate access to the world
- reflection on hallucination/illusion reveals perception not to be direct or immediate access to the world
- therefore, perception, as we ordinarily understand it, is impossible
52
Hallucination
a perceptual experience in which no physical object is actually perceived
53
Illusion
a perceptual experience in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is
54
Argument from Hallucination
It is possible for someone to have a hallucination which is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine perception but where there is no mind-independent object being perceived.
The perception and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination are essentially the same in kind.
Therefore it cannot be that the perception essentially depends on the objects being experienced since the same kind of experience can occur in the absence of the objects.
Therefore, the ordinary conception of perceptual experience—which treats experience as dependent on the mind-independent objects around us—cannot be correct. (negative conclusion)
Therefore, the things of which we are immediately aware in perception are mind-dependent objects. (positive conclusion)
55
Argument from Illusion
When viewing a partially submerged straight stick, one is directly aware of something bent.
No relevant physical thing is bent in this situation.
Therefore, in this situation, one is directly aware of something non-physical.
What one is directly aware of in this situation is the same kind of thing that one is directly aware of in normal, non-illusory perception.
Therefore, in normal perception, one is not directly aware of physical objects. (negative conclusion)
Therefore, in normal perception, one is directly aware of something non-physical. (positive conclusion)
56
Object of experience
what the subject is aware of when they are perceiving.
illusion and hallucination show that subject is not aware of ordinary real objects when perceiving
the term 'sense data' stands as proxy for whatever it is that is the object of experience
57
Sense data (standard view)
mind-dependent object that we are directly aware of in perseption, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have
58
Arguments for Sense Data
Argument from Secondary Qualities (e.g. everything we directly see has color... no physical thing is colored... therefore, everything we directly see is non-physical). A
Argument from Perceptual Variation
Argument from Double VIsion
Time Gap Argument
59
Argument from Secondary Qualities
everything we directly see has color... no physical thing is colored... therefore, everything we directly see is non-physical)
60
Argument from Perceptual Variation
In the phenomenon of perspectival variation, the thing we are directly aware of changes—for instance, its apparent size or shape changes.
The real, external object does not change at this time.
Therefore, the thing we are directly aware of is not the real, external object.
61
Argument from Double Vision
In a case of double vision, one sees two of something.
There are not two (relevant) physical objects in this situation.
Therefore, in a case of double vision, one sees something non-physical.
62
Time Gap Argument
There is always a delay between any event in the physical world and our perception of it.
During that delay, the physical may cease to exist.
Therefore, the thing we are aware of is not the physical object.
Therefore, the thing we are aware of is a mental image.
63
Russell's view of perceptual knowledge
a. one has a sense datum
b. one is immediately and infallibly aware of that sense datum
c. one is in a position to know that one has a sense datum of the kind one in fact has
d. one makes inferences about physical world to explain the series of sense datum
64
Main Objection to Sense Datum Theory: where are sense data located?
Answer 1: sense data are located in the head
2: sense data are located wherever the physical object causing them is located
3: sense data are located wherever they appear to be
65
Argument from Indeterminacy
- the apparent properties are sometimes indeterminate
- if the apparent properties of objects of perception are sometime indeterminate then the sense data involved would have to actually lack definite characteristics
- it is not logically possible for an object to lack definitite characteristics
- therefore, in cases of indeterminacy, the object of perception is not sense data
66
Adverbial Theory
- the properties we are aware of in experience are modifications of our perceptual experience itself
- visually perceiving a brown square = visually sensing 'brownly' and 'squarely'
- rejects 'act-object' framework of sense datum theory. there is only
67
Advantages and Disadvantages of Adverbial Theory
-Advantages: avoids metaphysical problems associated with positing sense data
Disadvantages: has difficulty explaining the difference between someone who senses a brown triangle and green square from someone who senses a brown square and green triangle
68
Intentionalist theory
perceptual experience is a form or intentionality or mental representation
69
Advantages and Disadvantages of Intentionalist theory
- Advantages: explains why perception seems to have an act-object structure even though it really does not; explains why
- Disadvantages: does not adequately distinguish perception from other mental states (e.g. imagination), makes; makes justification of individual perceptual beliefs problematic
70
Direct Realism
genuine perception is comprised of a direct relation of awareness between a conscious subject and an object or feature of the physical world
71
Disjunctivism
- genuine perceptions and hallucinations have different contents, mind-independent physical objects in the case of the former, but not in the case of the latter
- rejects common kind assumption that the fundamental kind of mental event that occurs when one is vertically perceiving can occur whether or not there are physical objects
- genuine perception is an essentially relational state; in genuine perception, we have direct access to physical objects
72
Malcolm on Factual Memory:S remembers that p iff...
S remembers that p iff S knows that p
73
Components of factual memory
- the present knowledge that p
- the previous knowledge that p
- the relationship between the present and previous knowledge that p expressed by saying S knows that p because S previously knew that p
74
Pure factual memory
unmixed with inference or present realization
75
According to Malcolm, the knowledge component of factual memory requires...
1. P to be true
2. S to be sure that P
3. Having grounds (justification) is - not necessary for knowledge
76
Definition of Memory Memory
retention of knowledge
- not two pieces of knowledge but one
- present knowledge has same grounds as previous knowledge
- forgotten grounds still count
77
According to Malcolm, when someone remembers that p, how certain is it that P?
- present knowledge (based on pure factual memory) has the same degree of certainty as previous knowledge, irrespective of whether or not the person remembers their grounds
78
According to Malcolm, is memory a source of knowledge?
No. Present knowledge cannot be superior to previous knowldge.
79
Objections to Malcolm
- it seems intuitive that someone who has forgotten the grounds for their previous knowledge is less justified than one who still remembers their grounds
- an agent's knowledge of her own fallibility should reduce her level of certainty
80
According to Malcolm, what does it mean to say someone knows that P because she previously knew that P?
- Because is to be understood in a negative sense. Previous knowledge that P is the source of present knowledge that P in the sense that the agent did not learn over again that P.
81
According to von Leyden, what does it mean to say someone knows that P bcause she previously knew that P?
Because is to be understood in terms of causal dependence. Previous knowledge is the cause of the present knowledge
82
Foundational Theory of Memory
- seeming to remember P makes one prima facie justified in believing that P
objections:
- entails that I may have additional justification aftr time has passed (a priori proof + seeming to remember)
- passage of time may transform unjustified belief into a justified one
83
Inferential Theory
- my memory is justified by my recognition of the past reliability of my memory
- objection:
circularity. memory is needed for me to recognize the past reliability of my memory
84
Preservation Theory
- memory merely preserves the justification I originally had for my belief
85
Memory Twin example
God created someone 5 minutes ago that was exactly the same state I was 5 minutes ago.
Let us call the version of me that was created 5 minutes ago Connor-2
Connor seems to remember having ceral for breakfast this mornign.
Connor-2 seems to remember having cereal for breakfast..
Upshot: If Connor is justified then so is Connor-2. Connor-2 has the same degree and kind of justification as Avery. According to the preservation theory, Connor-2 is highly irrational (unlike myself), despite the fact that he is intrinsically identical to me.
86
Dualistic Theory
- S's memorial belief is justified iff S had adequate justification of adopting the belief and adequate justification for retaining the belief
- in short, justified belief requires rational belief acquisition and rational belief retention
- Huemer's theory
87
Strengths of Dualistic THeory
- avoids the main problem of the foundation theory; does not allow an intiially irrational belief to become rational simply by means of passing into memory
- avoids the main problem of the preservation theory; entails that Connor-2 is justified because he acquired his belief that P via seeming to remember P
88
Implications of Dualistic theory
- implies that seeming to remember is a rational way of acquiring a belief, but not of retaining a belief.
- implies that wishful thinker is not justified because he did not acquire, but only retained his belief via seeming to remember
- implies that justification does not supervene on current internal states, but rather on the total history of internal states
- implies that Connor 2 may be more justified than Connor in cases in which Connor's belief was originally acquired via wishful thinking
89
Objections to Dualistic theory
- implies that someone who was originally justified in acquiring a belief and is also justified in retaining the belief may still be unjustified in currently having the belief
- implies that someone who has no justification for or against acquiring and retaining the belief that P has some justification for disbelieving
- implies that connor-2 is not currently justified
90
Dualistic theory as Math
current justification = acquisition justification x retention justification
