Reading summaries Flashcards
Wisdom of crowds
RQ1 - Do peer opinions actually impart value-relevant news? Or do they merely constitute “random chatter”?
RQ2 - Are some users attempting to intentionally spread false “information” and mislead fellow market participants?
2 reasons behind findings:
1) SA views indeed predict future stock market performance
2) Exploiting naïve investors
Negative words in SA articles and comments strongly predict subsequent scaled earnings surprises, thus the 2nd reasoning is false.
Incentives of truly informed users:
1) Attention and recognition 2) Monetary compensation 3) Public feedback 4) Convergence to real value
The cross section of expected returns
Many of the historically discovered factors would be deemed “significant” by chance.
Nevertheless, a t-statistic of 2.0 is no longer appropriate —even for factors that are derived from theory.
Two pillars of asset pricing
Joint Hypothesis problem
1st pillar - tests of market efficiency:
1) Event studies
2) Predictive regressions
3) Dependency on time
Bubbles – ambiguous as no reliable evidence that expected stock returns are sometimes negative.
2nd pillar – Asset pricing models (CAPM, 3 factor model)
Behavioral economics
Problem - one theory to accomplish two tasks -> to characterize optimal behavior and to predict actual behavior.
Contrary to the predictions of traditional theory, SIFs matter; in fact, in some situations the single most important determinant of behavior is a SIF.
Agents are expected to act as if they understood the complicated model.
EMH components:
1) No free lunch – mispricing;
2) Price is right – lack of predictability does not imply correct pricing (e.g. CUBA)
Defenses and refutes:
1) One should judge theories based on not whether they describe but whether they predict behavior – but what about non-experts?
2) Errors of humans are randomly distributed with the mean of zero - humans make judgements that are systematically biased.
3) Raising the stakes – the more expensive, the less practice we get.
4) Invisible handwave – humans are not master economists, markets will exacerbate behavioural biases by catering to those preferences.
All economics should be behavioral.
30-year perspective on property derivatives
Advantages:
1) Futures provide info on future prices.
2) Can hedge property risk.
3) Get exposure to Real Estate without owning it.
4) Reverse mortgages (elderly).
Why created:
1) Slow growth of prices.
2) Existence of covered mortgages.
3) Shift from balloon payments to adjustable-rate mortgages, shifting risk of inflation to buyers.
4) Land prices increased for residential land.
Obstacles:
1) Index construction mismatch
2) Low liquidity (nobody wants to short housing market)
3) Difficult to price.
4) Increased regulation now.
Anomalies - law of one price
LOP violation conditions:
1) Some agents falsely believe that there are real differences between two identical goods
2) Arbitrageurs are facing obstacles preventing them from profiting from the mispricing
Violations:
Closed end country funds.
ADRs – offer great diversification opportunity.
Twin shares – index inclusion hypothesis.
Dual class shares – SnP firm rights example.
Corporate spinoffs
What prevents the arbitrageurs from enforcing the LOP:
Short selling constraints
Noise trader risk
Hedge funds
Types of funds: 1) Closed end funds 2) Open end funds 3) ETFs 4) Hedge funds Hedge fund strategies: 1) Long and short equities 2) Event driven 3) Macro hedge fund 4) Fixed income arbitragers Difficulties of assessing performance: 1) Biased sample 2) Varying exposure to markets. 3) Past performance rarely predicts future behavior 4) Problems of valuation Key concerns: 1) Investor protection 2) Risks to financial institutions - credit exposures for financial institutions lending, transacting, etc. 3) Liquidity risks Growing industry - more activist hedge funds, dependence on reputation and the range of products offered
Bitcoin
Irreversible transactions, a prescribed path of money creation overtime, and a public transaction history. 1) Transactions and the blockchain 2) Built-in incentives 3) No governance structure – decentralization Intermediaries (centralization): 1) Exchanges 2) Wallets 3) Mixers 4) Mining pools Risks of Bitcoin: 1) Market risk – volatility 2) Liquidity 3) Dependency on intermediaries Regulation: 1) Fighting crime 2) Consumer protection 3) Regulatory options – where to impose?
Prone to fail
Sources of fragility:
1) Regulators failed
2) Financing meltdown risks
3) Opaque swap markets – complex webs of derivatives
4) Too-big-to-fail mentality
Moores law vs murphys law
Developments pushing the growing popularity of AT: 1) Quantitative finance 2) Index funds 3) Arbitrage trading 4) Automated execution and market making 5) High-frequency trading Examples of problems: 1) Quant meltdown 2) Flash crash 3) System bugs Financial regulation 2.0: 1) Systems -> engineered 2) Safeguards -> heavy 3) Transparency -> rich 4) Platform -> neutral
Towards a political theory of the firm
Giant global corporations.
Increased concentration - in the last 2 decades, size of the average publicly listed company in the United States tripled.
Due to 2 trends:
1) Less new firms
2) High merger activity
Possible explanations
1) Network externalities
2) Winner-takes-all industries
3) Reduced anti-trust enforcement
1) The size and market share of companies has increased
2) The size and complexity of regulation has increased
3) Democrats now also lobby corporations
Need a goldilocks balance – firms and state need to be strong and weak enough.
PBOC
What affects the size of PBOC premium:
1) Size of the block traded
2) Presence of another shareholder
3) Sellers bargaining power
4) Industry
5) Tangibility of assets
How PBOC affects financial development:
1) Fewer companies are public – equity markets are thus underdeveloped.
2) Afraid of giving out shares -> less widely held companies.
3) Governments will sell companies privately.
What curbs PBOC:
1) Legal institutions
2) Public opinion pressure
3) Government as monitor through tax enforcement
4) Product market competition
PBOC premiums highest in ex-Comme countries
Behind the scenes: corporate governance preferences of institutional investors
Investors can:
Voice their concerns.
Threaten exit.
Institutional investors are active overall.
What determines the effectiveness of Voice:
1) Stock liquidity – more No.
2) Investment horizon – Long term -> more activism
3) Size of the stake – no evidence found but should be positive.
Voice and exit threats are complements.
Free rider problem and inadequate legal rules – discourage activism.
Main drivers of activism:
1) Excessive managerial compensation
2) Disagreement with large mergers and acquisitions
3) Contributions to politicians
Proxy advisors provide institutional investors with research, data, and recommendations on management and shareholder proxy proposals.
Can give too standardized advice.
Difficult to evaluate.
Low-cost analysis as they are also profit seeking.
Active ownership
Socially responsible investing that seeks to deliver social as well as financial benefits.
Effects of CSR:
1) Based on LR strategy – firm value UP.
2) Channel to express personal values (of stakeholders) – firm value UP.
3) Can reveal agency problems – firm value DOWN.
Channels of ESG value enhancement:
1) Consumers
2) Employees
3) Morals
4) Progressiveness
You can either raise awareness or request for change!
Determinants of successful ESG engagement:
1) Large and mature firms
2) Institutional ownership
3) Underperforming firms
4) Consumer industries
ESG activism increases stakeholder value when engagements are successful and does not destroy value if fails.
The agency problems of institutional investors
By aggregating the assets of investors, institutional investors hold substantial.
Stewardship activities - engagement with public companies to promote corporate governance practices (voting, monitoring, engaging with the management).
3 types of institutional investors:
1) Index funds
2) Active funds
3) Hedge funds
Investment managers of index funds bear full costs of stewardship but capture only a fraction of benefits.
Index funds engaging in stewardship do not improve relative performance to attract more assets. Free-rider problem!
Their investors are in fact incentivized to switch to their competitors that free ride on others’ expenses, as they offer the same return without higher fees to finance it.
Active funds also capture very small benefits from stewardship.
Potential sources of agency problems:
1) Most capture only a fraction of the benefits.
2) Investing in stewardship can reduce relative performance of the fund.
3) Institutional investors don’t want to ruin relationship with managers.
For hedge funds it is easier due to more risky positions, larger commission (incentive), larger stake in smaller number of firms (capture more benefit from stewardship).
Extreme governance
Determinants of dual class status:
1) PBOC
2) Personal name
3) Media companies
4) Activity of the founder
Key findings:
1) Firm value positively associated with insiders’ CF rights.
2) Firm value negatively associated with insiders voting rights.
3) Firm value negatively associated with difference between CF rights and voting rights.
Despite the evidence that dual-class system can reduce the value of the firm, a majority owner of a private company can still rationally choose to sacrifice some of firm value to maintain PBOC.
Bonding hypothesis on takeover defenses
Bonding hypothesis - the company will not act opportunistically and appropriate them, encouraging partners to make relation-specific investments.
Takeover defenses are used more often when you:
1) Have a large customer.
2) Dependent supplier.
3) Strategic alliance
Acts as an IPO anti-takeover defense.
IPO announcement benefits the customer as well but bring more risk.
More defenses associated with larger positive returns of main customer (Spillover effect)
On the foundations of CSR
CSR in Civil law countries is mandated by law.
Political institutions lag behind the legal origins as a predictor for the level of CSR.
Cultural values and religion don’t seem to affect CSR.
The “marginal” effect theory: civil law firms outperform because they are more responsive to the shocks changing the demand for CSR actions.
Two channels of responsiveness:
1) Consumer channel – changes in consumer demands.
2) Legal channel – firms in more stakeholder-orientated legal environments are more responsive.
Do investors value sustainability?
Investors mostly look at globe ratings.
Also, they focus on extreme outcomes.
Reasons why:
1) Institutional constraints (but pattern is visible in regular investors as well).
2) Rational performance expectations – expect these stocks to do better (the paper finds no evidence of them doing better though).
3) Irrational expectations - irrationally expect these stocks to do better
Is there a zero lower bound?
• Above the ZLB, all banks pass on most of the policy interest rate cut.
• Around the ZLB, little pass through, even after a year only 20% of the original cut is reflected
• Below the ZLB, pass through increases but only for financially sound banks.
Amount of the pass-through depends on the health of banks.
Banks do not experience large deposit outflows when they implement negative rates.
Firms exposed to NIR experience higher fixed asset growth and decrease in liquidity.
The positive effects of the NIRP on the economy are stronger if banks are healthy.
Risks and returns of cryptocurrencies
Exposure to asset pricing factors is small apart from Alphas.
Alphas are large and statistically significant.
No evidence of exposure to currencies.
No evidence of exposure to metal commodities (Ethereum to gold).
No evidence of exposure to macroeconomic factors (Ethereum to consumption growth).
Crypto specific factors (significant):
1) Time-series momentum
2) Positive media attention
3) Negative media attention
“Cryptocurrency represents an asset class that can be assessed using simple finance tools.
At the same time, cryptocurrencies comprise an asset class which is radically different from traditional asset classes.”
ETFs 101 for economists
Investor does not interact with the market directly.
ETF manager is in a legal contract with Authorized Participants (large financial institutions) who interact with the market.
ETF intricacies:
1) Reduced transaction costs.
2) Trades occur at a market determined price.
3) Transparent investment strategy.
4) Shorting, lending, margin trading available.
Types of ETFs:
1) Equity ETFs - (Market cap based, Sector based, Smart beta based)
2) Fixed income ETFs (Convenient, higher transparency, greater liquidity)
3) Commodity ETFs (often used as a hedge or for diversification)
Concerns:
1) Closures of ETFs
2) Short selling of ETFs
3) Securities lending by ETFs
4) Liquidity mismatch – if APs step down in a crisis (default), there is no party to provide liquidity.
Is the US public corporation in trouble?
Low numbers of newly listed firms and high numbers of delists.
Main reasons for delist:
1) No longer meets the requirements.
2) Has been acquired.
3) Voluntary.
Observations:
1) Tobin’s Q – peaked at Dot com bubble.
2) Herfindahl index – concentration of firms – concentration of profits.
3) The regulatory burden of being public increased.
4) Increase in intangible assets -> less informative balance sheet.
5) Share repurchases increased considerably.
Larger firms have a higher ratio of cash flow to assets → firms have been performing poorly on average, except for the largest firms.
Average public firm has more cash than debt!!! - Bank loans have become less important.
Agency problem of Free CFs – low payouts - Fall of inventory holdings but hold more cash.
Implications:
1) Firms don’t want to disclose their projects.
2) Institutional ownership more widespread.
3) More financing from Private equity and Venture capitals.
4) Economies of scope hypothesis - small firms have become less able to grow on their own.
5) Increased concentration.
6) Difficult to grow without patents.
7) Renting and outsourcing – makes it easier to put a product out (less funds required).
Fintech and Banking
Fintech - technologically enabled financial innovation.
Investments in Fintech are higher:
1) financially developed countries.
2) with less competitive banking systems.
3) higher lending and lower deposit interest rates.
Services:
1) Credit, deposits and capital raising (P2P lending, shadow banks).
2) Payments.
3) Investment management services.
4) Insurance.
Problems with P2P platforms (no bank):
1) Insufficient screening (no skin in the game)
2) Origination fees (causes overlending)
P2P advantage over banks – Operating costs
Bank advantage over P2P – trust to make good loans
The role of cryptocurrencies and fiat money:
CB digital currency and monetary policy.
Blockchain enables agents to collaborate without having to go through a neutral central authority.
