School Desegregation - Sheet1 Flashcards Preview

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Flashcards in School Desegregation - Sheet1 Deck (24):
1

“as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process . . . .” “Separation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.”

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)

2

“I am . . . mystified” that the Court overlooks the State’s role in causing and remedying the infringements in this case. The state is “the governmental entity ultimately responsible for desegregating its schools . . . .” Local entities are an arm of the state. Gomillion.

Milliken v. Bradley (1974) White, with Brennan, Marshall (dissenting):

3

“It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.” Such a belief incorrectly believes that black students suffer a psychological harm from being in a racially identifiable school—it rests on bad social science and an assumption of black inferiority. “[I]f separation itself is a harm, and integration therefore is the only way that blacks can receive a proper education, then there must be something inferior about blacks. Under this theory, segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot achieve.”

Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)Thomas (concurring):

4

4-H and Homemaker Clubs were still de facto segregated (had been de jure until the CRA 1964) in 1980. The Court held that Greene’s affirmative duty didn’t apply to clubs that no one was compelled to join—much like no one is compelled to go to college, much less the college of their choice.

Bazemore v. Friday (1986)

5

American schools are heavily segregated, and this puts desegregation plans in jeopardy. “[W]e have not yet realized the promise of Brown. … The plurality’s promise, I fear, would break that promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret.”

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. (2007)Breyer (dissenters)

6

An “integrated school system” doesn’t necessarily mean totally non-racially-identifiable. It means that the state in as many ways as it’s involved in the racial makeup of the school is affirmatively seeking to racially integrate. “[I]f, after such detailed and complete public supervision, substantial school segregation still persists, the presumption is strong that the school board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part responsible.” The burden then must fall on the school board. Busing should be approached with caution, as with “any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests”—the focus should be “the best quality education for all pupils.”

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973)Powell (concurring in part, dissenting in part):

7

Brown II required as an initial step banning the exclusion of black students, but “that immediate goal was only the first step . . . . The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about . . . .” The school didn’t demonstrate that “its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.” The means (freedom of choice) isn’t in itself unconstitutional, but it is not a permissible end. If it is ineffective, other means must be employed. School boards have “the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”

Green v. New Kent County School Board (1969)

8

Diversity in classrooms is not a compelling interest. If diversity is meant to help students see each other as individuals, treating them as members of a racial group is “fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.” Brown requires color-blindness: “Before Brown, school children were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again—even for very different reasons. … The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. (2007)Roberts (plurality):

9

Facts: University integrated but forced segregated seating in classrooms, libraries, and the cafeteria.Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Such segregation hinders students’ “ability to study, to engage in discussions, and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn [their] profession.”

McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950)

10

Higher Ed /= primary and secondary schools. Universities can serve specific missions and accept those that meet the mission. BUT the adoption of race-neutral policies alone is insufficient to affirmatively dismantle the state’s prior dual university system. Four policies in particular are traceable to the prior de jure system: (1) Admissions standards - Only 30% of black students get the required score. The flagship schools require a higher score. Focusing on grades more instead would significantly reduce the gap. (2) Program duplication - As with separate-but-equal, the schools seem to have unnecessary duplication with the only difference being racial makeup. (3) Institutional mission assignments - The missions are suspiciously aligned with the racial makeups of the schools. (4) Continued operation of all eight universities - This many schools is “wasteful and irrational” except for the goal of operating separate, equal schools. On remand, the court should determine whether these policies are educationally justifiable, or merely serve to perpetuate racial identifiability.

United States v. Fordice (1992)

11

History not helpful in determining original Framers’ intent for 14th Amd and public school racial segregation. There were racially segregated schools back then, but education was very different, and less important at that time. Separate but equal in education is unconstitutional. Even in light of equal “tangible factors,” it’s inherently unequal in the public education context—stamps black children with a badge of inferiority and deprives them of important opportunities available to whites. “Intangible factors” are impossible to overcome. Sweatt. Separating black students from whites affects black students psychologically and impedes the learning process (supported with social science material that has since been refuted).

Brown v. Board of Education I (1954)

12

Implementation of Brown I requires solution of “varied local school problems.” The local courts can best handle this, guided by principles of equity. The “personal interest of the plaintiffs” to be admitted is at stake. The courts should require the schools to “make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance”—“good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date”—“all deliberate speed.”

Brown II (1955)

13

Integration by the courts has not produced the educational benefits once believed. HBC’s in this respect “can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and achievement.”

Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)Thomas (concurring):

14

Once a violation has been found, district judges have broad authority to formulate a remedy. Ratios like this are a good “starting point.” Not every school had to be perfectly integrated to that ration, though. Set guidelines for future desegregation efforts:1) There must be a constitutional violation before remedies would be implemented.2) The scope of the violation limits the scope of the remedy.3) Once a school achieves “unitary status” the court’s job is done.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971)

15

Once purposeful discrimination is shown to have occurred in one area of a school system, this creates a “presumption” that the whole system has been affected. The burden then shifts to the school board to demonstrate that other segregated schools in the system are no the result of intentional segregation.

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973)

16

Should abandon the de jure / de facto distinction. Green was the keystone case that changed Brown’s “original meaning” and created the doctrine “requiring affirmative state action to segregate school systems. The problem of segregated schools by “segregated residential and migratory patterns” is “a national, not a southern, phenomenon” and “it is largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did not have segregative school laws.” “I would hold, quite simply, that where segregated public schools exist within a school district to a substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public authorities [the school board] are sufficiently responsible . . . .”

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973)Powell (concurring in part, dissenting in part):

17

SS applies. The plan is not narrowly tailored—the school districts failed to show a lack of race-neutral alternatives. (Kennedy): the school districts could use more strategic site selection; draw attendance zones with demographics of the neighborhoods in mind; spread around assets/resources; use targeted recruiting. Also, the effects are so modest that this cuts against the necessity of using race.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. (2007)Majority (Kennedy with plurality)

18

The affirmative duty from Green was applied to a school that had “rigidly excluded” black students for years. Whatever the soundness of that decision, “I can see no constitutional justification for it in a situation such as that which the record shows to have obtained in Denver.”

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado (1973)Rehnquist (dissenting):

19

The Greene remedy “has no proper application in the context of higher education . . . and is as likely to subvert as to promote the interests of those citizens on whose behalf the present suit was brought.” The majority’s test “is designed to achieve . . . the elimination of predominantly black institutions”—in seeking to maximize integration, the remedy actually minimizes diversity and limits choices.

United States v. Fordice (1992)Scalia (concurring, dissenting):

20

The harm in Brown was not simply isolation of black students but de jury segregation itself—racial classification itself. “Psychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state actors have engaged in intentional discrimination—the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.”

Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)Thomas (concurring):

21

The majority misreads Milliken. In that case, the remedy was clearly “inter-district”—it consolidated 53 districts into one and applied the remedy across the new district, all because of the actions of certain school boards. Nothing in that decision suggested that a “remedy that takes into account conditions outside of the district” isn an inter-district remedy.

Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)Souter, with Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer (dissenting):

22

The segregation in this case is the result of state actions that do not “automatically subside at the school district border.” The state must also bear part of the blame for white flight—it kept the races segregated for years and we are now seeing the effects.

Milliken v. Bradley (1974) Marshall (dissenting):

23

This decision is very different from Greene and others in primary and secondary school, specifically because it does not preclude the operation of HBCs. The institutional diversity of MS’s university system could be educationally justifiable.

United States v. Fordice (1992)Thomas (concurring):

24

This inter-district remedy was not justified by an inter-district violation. Milliken. Rejected a disparity in test scores as a basis for continued federal court involvement—“Although the District Court has determined that ‘segregation has caused a system wide reduction in achievement in the schools of KCMSD,’ it never has identified the incremental effect that segregation has had on minority student achievement or the specific goals of the quality education programs . . . .” “[N]umerous external factors beyond the control of the KCMSD and the State affect minority student achievement. So long as these external factors are not the result of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.”

Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)