Security Architecture and Engineering Flashcards

(104 cards)

1
Q

ISO 15288

A

Common for processes

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2
Q

TECHNICAL PROCESSES

A

Business and mission analysis process

Stakeholder needs and requirements definition process

System requirements definition process

Architecture definition process

Design definition process

System analysis process

Implementation process

Integration process

Verification process

Validation process

Operation process

Maintenance process

Disposal process

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3
Q

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

A

Project planning process

Project assessment and control process

Decision management process

Risk management process

Configuration management process

Information management process

Measurement process

Quality assurance process

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4
Q

ENABLING PROCESSES

A

Lifecycle model management process

Infrastructure management process

Portfolio management process

Human resources management process

Quality management process

Knowledge management process

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5
Q

SYSTEM AND SECURITY ENGINEERING PROCESSES

A

Commonly accepted sources for engineering processes:

International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE)
NIST SP800-160 System Security Engineering
ISO/IEC 15026 series-System and Software Engineering
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 Systems and Software Engineering

Systems and systems engineering processes have converged across major sources:

NIST and INCOSE recognize system security engineering as a specialty engineering function

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6
Q

AGREEMENT PROCESSES

A

Acquisition process

Supply process

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7
Q

KEY PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM SECURITY

A

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

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8
Q

SECURITY MODELS

A

Purpose: the security models define rules of behavior for an information system to enforce policies related to system security but typically involving confidentiality and/or integrity policies of the system

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9
Q

BELL-LPADULA (BLP) MODEL

A

CONFIDENTIALITY MODEL

State machine level

Developed for the Department of Defense (DOD)

Used for multilevel security (MLS)

3 Properties defined:

No read-up (simple security property)

No write-down (star property)

Access matrix (discretionary property)

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10
Q

BIBA MODEL

A

INTEGRITY

State transition model

Focus on integrity vice confidentiality

Opposite rules from VBell-LaPadule (BLP)

Can read up (simple integrity property)

Can write down (star integrity property)

Lower level process cannot request higher access (invocation propoerty)

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11
Q

BREWER AND NASH MODEL

A

CONFIDENTIALITY

Designed to prevent conflict of interest

Information flow control model

Decomposes a company’s information into discrete datasets based on potential conflicts of interest

Defines rules for acceptable access to data objects by a particular subject(e.g person or process)

Accessing a data object excludes future access to potential conflict of interest objects

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12
Q

CLARK-WILSON MODEL

A

INTEGRITY

Introduces the concept of triples:

Subject
Program
Object

Subjects can only manipulate data objects though the use of a defined program

Set of rules designed to ensure data integrity for all operation

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13
Q

GRAHAM-DENNING (MODEL

A

CONFIDENTIALITY + INTEGRITY

Set of rules for creation, assignment of access rights, and deletion of objects and subjects

Eight rules (create/delete object/subject, assign, read, grant, delete, and transfer access rights)

Often used in distributed systems

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14
Q

HARRISON RUZZO ULLMAN (HRU)

A

INTEGRITY

Primarily for protection of access rights integrity

Confidentiality is protected by access rights, so HRU does provide secondary confidentiality protection

Extends Graham-Denning model

Defines a set of primitive allowable operations involving subjects and objects

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15
Q

AVAILABILITY MODELS

A

THERE ARE NONE

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16
Q

SECURITY CONTROLS

A

Safeguards or countermeasures that mitigate risks to confidentiality, integrity and availability in a system or operating environment

Controls may impact or modify the behavior of people, process or technology

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17
Q

TYPE OF CONTROLS

A

PREVENTATIVE - reduce the likelihood o impact of an undesirable event from happening.

DETECTIVE CONTROLS - identify an undesired event or collect information about it

CORRECTIVE CONTROLS - reduce or eliminate the impact of an undesirable event that has occurred

MEANS OF APPLICATION:
MANAGEMENT - policy or human driven controls

OPERATIONAL - process-driven controls

TECHNICAL - controls applied to technology

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18
Q

COMMON/INHERITABLE CONTROLS

A

Exist outside of a particular system but to provide some confidentiality, integrity and availability (firewall inherited by systems behind a firewall)

May include management, operational or technical controls

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19
Q

CONTROL SELECTION

A

Controls are selected to support the confidentiality, integrity and availability needs of the system

Control frameworks are often utilized to select appropriate controls and define controls

Inheritable controls that support the system are identified

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20
Q

CONTROL FRAMEWORKS

A

They define controls and control elements

frameworks allow for standardization of control implementation

Control frameworks often include evaluation criteria or mechanisms to verify controls are effective

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21
Q

EXAMPLE OF CONTROL FRAMEWORKS

A

ISO 27001 - industrial standard

NIST (SP800-52) - required for government use

COBIT - focused on business values

ISA/IEC 62443(ISA 99) - industrial automation and control systems

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22
Q

TAILORING CONTROLS

A

Control frameworks and standards are intended to be tailored to specific use-cases

Adjust control specifications or parameters to meet the needs of a specific system or environment

“Book” controls must be tailored to provide optimum value

Controls are not intended to be used as a checklists

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23
Q

EVALUATION CRITERIA

A

Each control should include specific evaluation methods and expected results

NIST Example:

TEST - coduct a direct test of the control

INTERVIEW - interview or question staff

EXAMINE - examine documentation or artifacts for evidence the control is properly employed

CONTROLS MAY BE EVALUATED BY MULTIPLE METHIDS

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24
Q

SYSTEM SECURITY CAPABILITIES

A

Access Control

Processor States

Memory Management

Process Isolation

Data Hiding

Abstraction Layers

Security Kernel

Encryption

Code Signing

Audit and Monitoring

Virtualization/ Sandbox

Hardware Security Modules

File System Attributes

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25
GENERIC OPERATING SYSTEM (OS) MODEL
Application APPLICATION APPLICATION API Services User Interface Security Monitor Memory Mgr. Process Mgr. I/O Mgr. Device Drivers Hardware Abstr. Layer HARDWARE Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
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TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE
Encryption
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REFERENCE OR SECURITY MANAGER
Theoretical
28
ACCESS CONTROL
OS controls access to objects Rules defined allowable behavior Security monitor or reference monitor enforces allowed behavior File systems typically support by assigning security attributes to objects/files
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PROCESSOR STATES
Processors typically support at least two states of operation: user and kernel modes. User mode has limited access to ore functions or direct hardware access
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MEMORY MANAGEMENT
Direct application access to system memory is restricted Modern operation systems randomize memory location (address space) Modern operating systems limit memory locations where code can execute - for example: Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows
31
PROCESS ISOLATION
Processes execute in separate memory space Direct exchanges between processes is limited Operating system (OS) manages inter-process exchanges through controlled interfaces
32
DATA HIDING
Typical with multi-level security (MLS) architectures using mandatory access control (MAC) Data or objects at a higher security level cannot be seen by objects at a lower security level (BLP Model) Also a coding practice where raw data is hidden from access and can only be obtained from a standardized interface.
33
ABSTRACTION LAYERS
Limits direct access to objects or entities Defines allowable actions and interactions between layers Protects against improper behavior or access between layers
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SECURITY KERNEL
Also known as reference monitor "Big brother" of kernel mode Monitors and validates access control over system objects Enforcement and validation component of all secure operating systems
35
REFERENCE MONITOR
Theoretical set of system tools which independently verify the actions of a system from a security standpoint.
36
Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
Hardware which provides cryptographic information and functions to enable the management and communications of sensitive information
37
ENCRYPTION
Can be applied to data at rest (hard-drive files) or in transit (communication channel) May protect confidentiality and/or integrity of data Protects data when OS features (security kernel) are not active or present for example - Bitlocker protects data when the OS is not running
38
CODE SIGNING and VALIDATION
Cryptographic function Executable code is digitally signed OS validates signature before loading code Unsigned code or code with a invalid signature is prevented from executing May include OS internal code to prevent placement of OS components
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AUDIT AND MONITORING
System actions are recorded and stored in a protected location Specific actions that are recorded are typically customized Audit records MUST be reviewed or monitored to be effective Monitoring and review may include both automated and manual elements Audit records are typically transferred off a system for protection and long term storage
40
VIRTUALIZATION / SANDBOX
Executing code is"wrapped" in a virtualization or sandbox layer Code executing within the environment is strictly limited from direct interaction outside the environment Permissions for a system access may be restricted independently for each virtualized or sandbox instance May be an OS native function or function provided by a third party software
41
HARDWARE SECURITY MODULES
Hardware components that provide security services Trusted Platform Module (TPM) most common security module provides secure storage and crypto functions typically used to generate and store crytpo keys keys or stored data cannot be accessed without permissions Specialized modules may contain multiple hardware security modules
42
FILE SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES
Various file systems may store security attributes or provide security functions A critical component to employing access control models in operating systems File systems may include journaling that can provide data integrity
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HOST PROTECTION SOFTWARE
Antivirus Host based intrusion prevention (HIPS) Host firewall File integrity monitoring Configuration and policy monitor
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HIPS
Host Based Intrusion Prevention
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NIPS
Network Based Intrusion Prevention
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TOP THREAT / MITIGATIONS
``` TOP THREAT ACTIONS Hacking Social Engineering Malware Distribution Phishing ``` ``` TOP MITIGATIONS Know what you have Patch and manage what you have Assess, monitor, log Educate users ```
47
COMMON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES - HARDWARE
HARDWARE Hardware components may fail at any time Mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) Failure rates higher during initial system operation Supply chain issues may introduce technical flaws/vulnerabilities or malicious modifications Old hardware may be difficult to repair or replace
48
COMMON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES - COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS: Can fail Can be blocked (DDoS) Can be intercepted Can be counterfeited (replayed) Can be modified Characteristics can expose information about the sender/receiver (address/location)
49
COMMON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES - ABUSE BY USER
Can be intentional or accidental Can degrade or bypass security controls Increases the likelihood as difficulty to operate increases
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COMMON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES - CODE FLAWS
CODE FLAWS Exist in all software with more than trivial complexity May be introduced accidentally or intentionally TYPICAL RISK CONDITIONS Known flaws, patch available, systems not patched, exploit available Known flaws, patch not available, exploit available Unknown flaws, exploit available (zero-day attack possible )
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COMMON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES - EMANATIONS
Hardware/physical elements may radiate information - Radio frequency - Visible or non-visible spectrum Can be used to discern system functions Can be used to locate systems/components
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CLIENT BASED SYSTEMS
Desktops, laptops, thin client terminals Typically represent larger quantities Continuous state of adding new and decommissioning old in most organizations General purpose devices with inconsistent usage patterns across the install base
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THIN CLIENT
PC Without Storage
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CLIENT BASED SYSTEM VULNERABLITIES
Physically under user's control Susceptible to user misuse (intent. or accidental) May be lost / stolen Monitoring may be difficult 100% update may be difficult
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CLIENT BASED SYSTEM MITIGATIONS
Patch/Update - continuous action General network protections (network segmentation,firewall devices, IDS, IPS) Host protections (anti virus, hist IPS, host firewall, disk encryption) Monitor (log alerts, track location) Educate users (anti-phishing campaign, detecting attacks)
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SERVER BASED SYSTEMS
Application servers, file servers, domain controllers, print servers, network service servers (DNS, DHCP) Centrally managed / controlled Limited access / functionality Likely to be in a tightly controlled network segment
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SERVER BASED VULNERABILITIES
May be exposed to external communications / services Updates may be delayed due to operational need May exist for long periods (risk of being outdated) High traffic volume makes monitoring more difficult
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SERVER BASED MITIGATIONS
Targeted network protections (server specific rules, restricted ports/protocols Strong remote access mechanisms Configurations and change management Monitor: logs, alerts- targeted to server functions
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DATABASE SYSTEMS
Hosted on servers, cloud, distributed etc. Typically contains large quantities of valuable information Typically requires high-speed operation with large number of transactions
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DATABASE SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES
Inference Aggregations Data mining High-value target
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DATABASE SYSTEM MITIGATIONS
Input validation Robust authentication/access control Output throttling Anonymization Tokenization
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INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS)
Typically embedded, limited function hardware Interfaces between logical (computer) space and physical world Includes sensors, motors, actuators, valves, gauges etc.
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INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) TYPES
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) Distributed control systems (DCSs) Programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
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INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES
Limited functionality Limited protections Long lifespan (become outdated) Susceptible to misuse/error Highly susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks Attacks can produce physical effects Often unattended in remote locations
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INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) MITIGATIONS
Isolated network infrastructure Robust network connection restrictions and monitoring Highly segmented network Protect communications channels Robust configuration control
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CLOUD BASED SYSTEMS
Components hosted by a cloud service provider (CSP) CSP assumes specific security responsibilities, the remainder stay with the data owner Typically high reliability, speed, capacities CSP to data owner relationship is governed by a contract and/or service-level agreements (SLAs)
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CLOUD-BASED SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
On-demand self service Broad network access Resource pooling Rapid elasticity Measured service Multi-Tenancy
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CLOUD-BASED SYSTEM TYPES
Software as a Service (SaaS) Platform as a Service (PaaS) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Network as a Service (NaaS)
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CLOUD-BASED SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Private - exclusive use by one organization / on or off premise Community - Provisioned for exclusive use by a community of users Public - Open use by general public Hybrid - combination of two or more
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CLOUD-BASED VULNERABILITIES
Inherently exposed to external communications / access Misconfiguration a major risk May exist for long periods (risk of being outdated) Gap between CSP and data owner security controls
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CLOUD-BASED SYSTEM MITIGATIONS
Reputable loud service provider that supplies security/ information testing results Well trained system administrators Robust configuration/change control File and communication encryption Well managed identity and access controls
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DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Nodes and processors operate independently Storage and processing spread across multiple components Nodes "pass messages" to coordinate and communicate Example: traditional telephone Switches operate independently Coordinate to pass calls between them
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DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES
Lack of central control/monitoring Data elements may be lost if nodes fail Inconsistent security levels between nodes is possible Susceptible to communication failures, compromise, or denial of service (DoS)
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DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS MITIGATIONS
Standard security rules for nodes to enter distributed network Communication control, encryption, and redundancy Node backup and data sharing between nodes
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INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IOT) SYSTEMS
Generally small form factor, embedded hardware Limited functionality OS May interface with the physical world Pervasive and often connected to general purpose networks Functions /accessibility may be unclear to owner/user
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INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IOT) SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES
Limited vendor support for updates Limited to no onboard security capability Poor code management due to rapid development cycles May contain limited or weak security implementation on standard protocols (Bluetooth, WiFi)
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INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IOT) SYSTEMS MITGATIONS
Isolated on private networks with controlled access Products selected for security features and update-ability Product security/penetration testing Disable unneeded functions
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WEB-BASED SYSTEMS
Application or data accessible and manipulated through a web browser or web service Often connects to a data source (database) that may be on or off platform Uses standard protocols and interface languages Connections are typically dynamic
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WEB-BASED SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES
Accessibility to network communications/access Use of obsolete protocols/encryption Code/Configuration errors that expose components to data
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WEB-BASED SYSTEM MITIGATIONS
Protect system behind firewalls and access controls Limit and monitor communications protocols Scan,evaluate, and assess interfaces and code (HTML, Java, scripts etc.) Tightly control configuration and change management Ensure platform is securely configured
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MOBILE SYSTEMS
PHONE TABLETS WEARABLE DEVICES Portable small form factor Limited functionality Embedded OS Typically contains limited amounts of data Connected (cellular, WIFI, Bluetooth, tethering) Designed for single user ``` LAPTOPS PERSONAL COMPUTERS Portable - medium form factor Full featured operating system Capability similar to desktop May contain large amounts of data Multi-user capable Connected (WI-FI, Bluetooth, tethering, possibly cellular) ```
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MOBILE SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES
Loss or theft Weak access controls configured Un-Encrypted data Communications interception or eavesdropping Limited onboard security services and monitoring
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MOBILE SYSTEMS MITIGATIONS
Mobile device management (MDM) installed (device tracking, wiping, software control, policy enforcement) Activate screen lock and high complexity pass-codes or biometrics Ensure device is encrypted Tunnel communications through VPN architecture Limit software / apps installed to trusted packages Prevent jailbreak or rooting devices Do not connect to public networks (coffee shop, hotel)
84
MOBILE SYSTEM MITIGATIONS (LAPTOPS)
Apply all traditional computer system protections (AV, FW, Host IPS etc.) Ensure encryption is activated Ensure strong passwords, biometrics, or two factor authentication on all user accounts Activate anti-theft function or tracking functions if available Tunnel mobile communications through VPN Do not connect to public networks
85
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
Computing platform with a dedicated function Limited function / specialized OS Limited processing power Long service life in many applications Includes a system on a chip (SoC) architectures Typically includes special device categories : IoT, ICS, mobile devices Highly diverse in nature (specialized computing vs general purpose computing)
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EMBEDDED SYSTEMS VULNERABILITIES
Limited function design doe not include all full monitoring and security control implementation Limited access controls Limited ability to update, vendor support, often time-limited
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EMBEDDED SYSTEMS MITIGATIONS
Limited access to devices Limit communications to devices Disable unnecessary /unneeded/ components/ features/communications Isolate on dedicated networks, if connected Monitor external communications with exterior sensors Apply vendor updates when available
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CRYPTOGRAPHY SERVICES
CONFIDENTIALITY INTEGRITY AUTHENTICITY NON-REPUDIATION ACCESS CONTROL
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DATA PROTECTION
DATA AT REST Backup tapes, off-site storage, password files DATA IN TRANSIT Provide secure and confidential methods to transmit data . Allows the verification of the integrity of the message so that any changes to the message itself can be detected
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LINK ENCRYPTION
Encrypts all of the data along a communication path Communications nodes need to decrypt the data t continue routing
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END-TO-END ENCRYPTION
Generally performed by the end user within an organization Encrypted at start and not decrypted until the end user Routing information remains visible
92
CRYPTOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION
Manual Mechanic Electro-Mechanical Electronic Quantum
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CAESAR CIPHER
Shifting letters by a certain number
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SPARTAN BELT SETTLE
Wrap belt around settle to read text
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BOOK CIPHER
Pages numbers
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WORK FACTOR
The level of difficulty in cracking a code
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STREAM CIPHERS
A key-stream (sequence of bits used as a key) is generated and combined with plain text using an exclusive -or (XOR) Statistically unpredictable Not linearly related to the key Operated on individual bites or bytes Functionally complex Long periods with no repeats Seemingly random due to the generation of the key-stream is usually controlled by the key
98
EXCLUSIVE-or XOR
If both values are the same = 0 If values are different = 1
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BLOCK CIPHERS
Uses fixed-sized blocks of text The size of the blocks affects the strength of the crypto implementation As plain-text is fed into the crytposystem, it's divided into blocks of a preset size Often a multiple of the ASCII character size: 64, 128, 192 bits etc.
100
INITIALIZATION VECTORS - WHY NEEDED
Encrypting the same text with the same key produces the same cipher-text Encrypting the same message with different keys may produce detectable patters An IV is a random value added to plain-text message before encrypting so that each cipher-text will be ubstantially different
101
KERCKHOFF's PRINCIPLE
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key , is public knowledge
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HIGH WORK FACTOR
Measured in units such as: Hours of computing time Cost in dollars of breaking the encryption If the work factor is substantially high, the encryption system is considered to be practically or economically unbreakable
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SUBSTITUTION CIPHERS
The process of substituting one letter fr another based upon a crypto-variable Involves shifting positions in the alphabet of a defined number of characters (Caesars cipher and Vigenere cipher) Involves using a scrambled alphabet to substitute one letter for another (Enigma Machine)
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TRANSPOSITION CIPHERS
Cryptosystems that use transposition or permutation rely on concealing the message through transposing of or interchanging the order of the letters