Social Attitudes

Question 1

What are the mechanisms for postmaterialism?

Answer 1

1. Generational/cohort effect - each new generation develops views in their formative years, and retains similar attitudes throughout their life
2. Life cycle (ageing) effect - people become more conservative in their views as they become older
3. Period effect - all cohorts are changing their views in the same direction over time, due to changes in the societal climate

Question 2

Definition of postmaterialism

Answer 2

Postmaterialists care about quality of life, the environment, democracy, and human rights, mainly for the post-war generation who were socialised in the 1960s
Materialists care mainly about economic growth and security
Inglehart himself says - “Unfortunately, the word “postmodern” has become loaded with so many meanings that it is in danger of conveying everything and nothing.”

Question 3

Brooks and Manza

Answer 3

1. No evidence that people can be classified as either post-materialist or materialist and are categorically distinct - rather, they have mixed values. It is possibile to affirm both materialist and postmaterialist values, and they can be structurally compatible.
2. For example, ‘postmaterial’ environmental concerns can be material based on risks for jobs and economic growth that the establishment of struct environmental regulations threaten.
3. Post-materialism-materialism is an issue dimension and its relative salience compared with economic left-right is a separate question. Caring less about (salience of) one issue does not mean you take a particular position on another issue
4. Supposedly post-materialist New Social Movements are often concerned with the achievement of “materialist” goals, and the post-materialists are not less likely to see the state as a relevant means to achieving their aims
5. Argues against dealignment, proposes realignment, where voters switch from one party to another. In US and Australia, party ideology defines many aspects of voters’ lives; in Britain and Canada, voters have a tendency to switch parties on a whim, perhaps only for one election, as there is far less loyalty towards a particular party

Question 4

Inglehart

Answer 4

Proposes the postmaterialism thesis:
1. The comparative affluence experienced by post-war generations led to the decreasing relevance of material security, and instead a higher importance to be placed on non-material goals such as self-expression, autonomy, freedom of speech, gender equality and environmentalism. The needs for “belonging, esteem, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction became more prominent”.
2. Increasing prosperity would increase such postmaterialist values through intergenerational replacement.
3. The shift from materialist to post-materialist values is ‘only one aspect of a broader cultural shift from survival values to self-expression values’.
4. Important: post-materialist values are not “anti” materialist, they come around only because of the attainment of materialist goals. It’s not a reversal of values, more a repositioning of priorities

Question 5

Silent Revolution thesis

Answer 5

Rapid technological and economic development after WW2 led to the fulfilment of basic needs, such as food and shelter, as well as the rise of the welfare state, which in turn led to ‘emergence of concern with new nonmaterial needs, such as esteem and self-actualisation’

Question 6

Scarcity hypothesis

Answer 6

An individual’s priorities reflect the socio-economic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply’. Hence due to diminishing marginal utility, the younger generations gain more utility by satisfying higher needs, which is also supported by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs

Question 7

Socialisation hypothesis

Answer 7

Generations maintain the values developed during their adolescent years, so the effects of better economic conditions are delayed, and only gradually have impact through generational replacement

Question 8

Evidence for postmaterialism

Answer 8

1. Rise of New Social Movements, e.g. Peace movement, environmentalists, anti-trade.
2. Growth of ‘post-materialist’ parties, e.g. Green Party, Radical-right?
3. With the diminution of the working class, adaptation of left-wing parties to represent postmaterialists (new-left)

Question 9

Swales and Taylor

Answer 9

The growth in social liberalism seen in recent decades continues. Attitudes to sex before marriage, same-sex relationships, abortion and pornography have all become more liberal, while attitudes to euthanasia remain largely unchanged. Those without formal educational qualifications are more likely to be socially conservative

Question 10

Perrett

Answer 10

The public, on average, moved to the left during the early 1990s, to the right during New Labour, and back to the left from 2010. Such oscillations are even more pronounced for positions along a welfare dimension. In contrast, average positions along a libertarian-authoritarian dimension were constant until around 2010, when the public became more liberal

Question 11

Evidence against postmaterialism or increased liberalism

Answer 11

Stability and no cohort effects on attitudes to abortion in Britain since mid-1990s; and stable liberal attitudes to euthanasia in Britain

Question 12

Caughey et al

Answer 12

1. There is a negative relationship between economic conservatism and social and immigration conservatism, which means that European mass ideology cannot be captured with a single left-right dimension.
2. Compared to Southern and Eastern Europeans, Northern Europeans tend to be more progressive on social and immigration issues but more conservative on economics.

Question 13

Lipset

Answer 13

Expansion of higher education and pervasive contribution of mass media means increased opportunity and knowledge to engage with politics, which leads to new value-based cleavages that crosscut left-right conflicts over distribution of material resources

‘increases in tolerance associated with higher educational levels are greater than those related to higher occupational level

Question 14

Devin et al

Answer 14

Since the 1980s, the European public has moved ‘markedly leftward on social issues and modestly so on immigration’

Question 15

Betz

Answer 15

1. Green supporters are heavily concerned with work and employment, but in terms of ‘good’ or ‘meaningful’ work rather than menial work: thus although ‘green supporters seem to vote for the Greens for economic reasons, their economic reasons have to be interpreted in a non-materialist way.
2. Analyses the German Green Party and how they succeeded in breaking the 5% barrier in 1984 for the first time in more than thirty years, as the first large post-materialist party in Europe. Education was the most important factor, and because in Germany there was an increase in unemployment among these highly-educated students, there was a rise in Green party support amongst the least well-off
3. Green party voters (in Germany), although highly educated, are not economically secure, but despite this they support the Greens for post-materialist reasons
   HENCE even seemingly material reasons may be explained in a postmaterial way
4. there could be a significant measurement issue - it is difficult to take the rise of so-called post-materialist parties as evidence for the rise of post-materialist values, because there may be other material reasons that people vote for them – thus the significant overlapping of social cleavages may confuse the picture

Question 16

Dalton

Answer 16

1. Issue voting eg. environment and the emergence of women’s movement have increased the boundaries of politics
2. Exception in declining social cleavages is race and ethnicity (e.g. black voters and Democratic Party)
3. Mechanisms for issue voting and dealignment:
   a) Ties between individuals and respective social groups have declined
   b) fewer people fit into well-defined categories
   c) parties sub-dividing to include many aspects and reinforced the process;
   d) Citizens are less likely to rely on these social group cues even when perceiving them, as they feel better able to make decisions;
   e) cognitive mobilisation, where voters are better equipped to evaluate policies for themselves, partly due to greater information availability (media) and educational attainment
4. Environmentalism actually experienced a decline in Britain, and that education is a main predictor of climate beliefs
5. Argues for a ‘New Politics’ and dealignment, where individuals are less attached to their political party.
   BUT in Europe, the most educated and informed are most likely to have strong identification (rebuts education theory)
6. Effects of dealignment: more likely to abstain or be volatile in their vote choice, express their opinions outside the electoral arena, be critical of political parties or democratic institutions
7. The new-politics value cleavage is unlikely to lead to a party-system realignment because it represents issue voting and will not likely be institutionalized in new parties: “Because issue-group cleavages are more difficult to institutionalize or “freeze” via social-group identifications linked to mass organizations, they may not be as stable

Question 17

Oesch and Rennwald

Answer 17

1. The Radical Right is on the rise, as a third pole besides the Left and the CentreRight. These three poles compete for the allegiance of different social classes.
2. Socio-cultural professionals vote for the Left, large employers and managers vote for the Centre-Right. The Radical Right competes with the Centre-right for the votes of small business owners, and the Left for the votes of the working class.
3. The traditional Left-Right axis is economic, but the new tripolar space is structured by the cultural axis of conflict.

Question 18

Tilley

Answer 18

1. The British electorate has become substantially more libertarian over the last 30 years, but older people have remained more authoritarian than younger people.
2. No evidence that social ageing (life cycle) leads to increases in authoritarianism, and that this is a generational change. (i.e. old people are still authoritarian)
3. Measurement issues - measuring post-materialism may primarily be measuring liberalism/authoritarianism, and we see similar cohort replacement effects for these values
4. Rebuts education/class thesis - controlling for education and class do little to moderate large cohort effects in liberalism in Britain. Notes endogeneity - liberal people choose to go into education, where they are socialised into certain views

Question 19

Flanagan

Answer 19

Critiques Inglehart - argues that traditional / liberal values are more accurate, and not the postmaterialist/ materialist dimension
There is a confusion with liberal and authoritarian values - post-materialist issues are actually non-materialist liberal issues

Question 20

Kirby

Answer 20

Attention-raising protests helped increase climate concern

Question 21

Guber

Answer 21

People’s attitudes towards the environment (especially global warming) are divided across partisan lines, but this only happens when people acquire information and become familiar with elite cues

Question 22

de Graaf and Evans

Answer 22

1. Rising education and the severity of the war-time experience is the main reason for the change in values, not formative affluence.
2. Post-materialism is very sensitive to current economic conditions and not solely due to cohort replacement.
   Supported by Altemeyer - liberal values are positively related to psychological security, so war experience as a threat to such security can affect liberal values, not postmaterialism

Question 23

Weill

Answer 23

Postmaterial values measures liberal values, and the increase in recent decades seems to be rooted in education, not affluence

Question 24

Kalmijn and Kraaykamp

Answer 24

Higher educated are more liberal because:
a) institutions of higher education transmit values to students directly and such values are often egalitarian or liberal,
b) having followed schooling at a higher level increases a person’s breadth of perspective which can reduce intolerance and lead to support for ‘new’ values,
c) selection effects since educational system selects on the basis of cognitive abilities - indirectly affect attitudes, higher cognitive = better able to deal with complex issues and can have a more balanced view on matters,
d) higher educated tend to answer questions in surveys in a socially desirable manner, leading to an above average support for tolerance and liberalism on social issues among the higher educated (Jackman and Muha)

Question 25

Stubager

Answer 25

Education has a strong effect on authoritarian-libertarian values due to socialisation. Mechanisms:
1. Psychodynamic: people in education feel more secure, and are thus better able to accommodate variation from a norm, translating into more tolerance. Highly educated people will potentially be better able to accept large changes in society due to this psychological security
2. Socialisation model: through education people are “exposed to values which they internalise”. This can be through direct teaching of such norms and through the effects of frequent informal discussion with fellow students and teachers. There is good evidence for this, especially given the increased libertarian values of those educated in education, care and social work
3. Cognitive model: More schooling means specific knowledge about civil liberties and the democratic process. Education also comes increased awareness of the varieties of human experience that legitimize wide variation in beliefs, values, and behavior. More education means one’s cognitive development will be characterized by the flexible, rational strategies of thinking which encourage democratic restraint.” (Nunn et al)
4. Competition argument: higher education ceteris paribus leads to a more secure labour market position and higher earnings. This means less economic competition – those with secure, high paying jobs are less likely to compete with ethnic minorities, both of the same nationality and of foreign nationalities – not much evidence at all, no link between income and position on libertarian-authoritarian scale

Question 26

Scott

Answer 26

Provides the first causal estimate of higher education specifically, and that achieving a degree reduces authoritarianism and racial prejudice, and increases economic right-wing attitudes (argues against the self-selection thesis)

Question 27

Stubager (not education)

Answer 27

1. Concept of hierarchy: Authoritarians favour social hierarchy, the rank ordering, that is, of individuals in a system with a clear distinction between those who are superior and those who are inferior. To authoritarians such hierarchies are both natural and right. Libertarians, in contrast, loathe social hierarchies and value instead the free and equal interaction of people without regard to social positions of any kind; in Jenssen’s words libertarians favour ‘parity of power’ in social interactions.
2. Tolerance for non-conformity. Libertarians have a basic respect for and tolerance of other people, with variety among humans seen as something to be protected for its own sake

Question 28

Zaller

Answer 28

1. Public attitudes toward major issues are a response to the relative intensity of competing political communications. When elites come to disagree along partisan or ideological lines, the public’s response will become ideological as well
2. HENCE there is no ‘postmaterialist’ convergence of views or uniformly increased liberalism - because there is increased polarisation and partisan alignment, so it is untrue that parties are becoming ‘catch-all parties’ and decreasing the salience of class

Question 29

Material concerns and self interest still main driving force

Answer 29

Lewis - the environmental movements since the 1960s often stress how imminent ecological catastrophe necessitates citizen action
Joppke - anti-nuclear power campaigns stress the potentially disastrous consequences of the release of radioactive materials from nuclear power plants
Blum - women’s movements and activism often center directly on material issues, such as in the comparable worth campaign

Question 30

Is there such a thing as party identification?

Answer 30

No. Whilst Americans register as partisans for primaries, Europeans do not. Moreover their parties can change often (e.g. France and Italy)
Strength of party identification tracks strength of preference so it is not a long-term identity, but a proxy for strength of party preference

Question 31

Egan and Mullin

Answer 31

Even though on aggregate, Americans’ attitudes towards belief in climate change’s existence, concern about its consequences, and demand for policy response is stable, this masks increased partisan and ideological polarisation. This is due to elite cues. There are distinctive features on climate change opinion, including individuals’ trust in science, risk processing, and personal experience.

Question 32

Merkley and Stecula

Answer 32

Out-group cues from democratic elites caused a backlash that caused greater climate scepticism, especially among members of the Republican party

Question 33

Fisher et al

Answer 33

Climate polarisation - In Western Europe, climate politics follow a left-right cleavage in a way that cannot be accounted for by economic egalitarianism or liberal cultural attitudes. This partly but not fully accounts for why voters for different party families have different beliefs and worries about climate change. Right wing party-family voters are also less worried about climate change than their left-right orientations would suggest. However, in Central and Eastern Europe, there is no consistent structure

Question 34

Heath et al

Answer 34

Social classes are relics of stage in history containing traditional manufacturing industries. Trade unions decline, social mobility and affluence increase, and so such classes become less relevant. Labour shifts from traditional left-wing party to centre-left, ceasing to encourage people to feel attached to a class linked to political issues, and are less aware of class politics as New Labour ceased to promote working class politics