substance dualism Flashcards
(24 cards)
immaterial mind
spatially unextended thinking thing
5 main theses of Cartesian Dualism
- immaterial mind + physical body = person
- immaterial minds = mental properties
- physical objects = physical properties
- mind & body able to exist independently
- mind & body = 2 way causal interaction
mental property
property such that anything that has it must be conscious
physical object
a thing that is extended in space & time
physical property
property such that anything that has it must be a physical object
epistemic argument
P1: mind cannot be doubted
P2: body can be doubted
C: mind does not equal body
objections to epistemic argument
hespherus objection
- epistemic argument is fallacious
ex:
Premise 1: Hespherus is Phospherus can be doubted
Premise 2: Hespherus is Hesperus cannot be doubted
Conclusion: Hespherus is Hespherus cannot be doubted
BUT same thing named separately
upshot: fact that I doubt Phospherus is fact about me, not Hespherus. therefore, cannot be used to establish a conclusion about nature of Hespherus
objections to epistemic argument
masked-man fallacy
hespherus objection claims that epistemic argument commits Masked-Man Fallacy
ex:
P1: I think the masked man may be your dad
P2: That’s impossible. I know who my dad is, but I don’t know who the masked man is. Therefore, their properties are different and they can’t be the same person
Conclusion - P2’s argument is fallacious because what we think about something is not a property of that thing, only a property of us
possibility argument
Premise 1: It is possible that my mind may exist without my body (e.g. God could resurrect my mind without a body)
Premise 2: If it is possible for my mind to exist without my body, then mind does NOT equal body
Conclusion: Mind does NOT equal body
objection to possibility argument
revised hespherus objection
Premise 1: As far as I know, it is possible that Hespherus could be destroyed, with Phospherus remaining intact
Premise 2: If it ispossible for Hespherus to be destroyed with Phospherus remaining intact, then Hespherus does NOT equal Phospherus
Conclusion: As far as I know, Hespherus does NOT Phospherus
- similar to masked-man fallacy
ontological argument
Premise 1: mind does not have mass or take up space
Premise 2: body does have mass and does take up space
Indiscernability of Identicals: if X & Y are the same, then X has property P if and only if Y has property P
Conclusion: Mind does NOT equal body
- no problem from MMF because about things not thoughts
princess elizabeth objection
interaction problem: how can two substances of fundamentally different natures such as the material body & immaterial mind, interact with each other
objections from PEO
problem of mental causation
how can mind, which is immaterial, cause physical events in the body, such as moving a limb or feeling pain?
ex: modern take on PEO
objections from PEO
problem of individuation
how can we individuate or distinguish one mind from another. if minds are immaterial, not clear how to do this, since immaterial things don’t have spatial/physical properties to distinguish them
objections from PEO
problem of neural dependency
recent research in neuroscience suggests that consciousness is dependent on the brain, suggesting brain is not immaterial substance but product of brain
objections from PEO
problem of parsimony
SD postulates the existence of 2 substances when one can suffice - not parismonious
ryle’s critiques
other minds objection
P1. Dualism says we cannot know what other people are thinking, feeling, etc
P2. If we cannot know what other people are thinking, feeling, etc., then we cannot apply mental concepts to other people
P3. but we can apply mental concepts to other people
C. Therefore, the official doctrine must be false
ryle’s critiques
problem with ryle’s first critique
Direct access to X is not necessary for knowing X
ex: testimonial and inferential knowledge
Infallible access to X is not necessary for knowing X
ex: perceptual knowledge
ryle’s critques
category mistake objection
dualism is based on category mistake, represents facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category when they belong to another
upshot: mind is not in the same cateogry as the body, it makes no sense to speak of the mind as a substance either like or distint from the body
ryle’s critiques
category & category mistake
range of items of which the same sorts of things can be meaningfully asserted
linguistic error when one mistakes one type of word for another
category mistake example
can take a nap, take control, or take wallet - all different categories
ryle’s critiques
ryle’s test definition
X & Y in same category if X and Y can be conjoined or disjoined without absurdity
ryle’s critiques
ryle’s test example
- I lost my phone, laptop, and my mind - absurd
- i don’t have cash, credit, or a clue
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