TASK 4 Flashcards

Cooperation

1
Q

Reproduction restraint

A

Adaptations that evolve because it increased the likelihood of survival for the population in bad times

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2
Q

Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)

A
  • Strategy which cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy that is initially rare
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3
Q

Kin selection

A
  • Evolutionary strategy that favours the reproductive success of an organism’s relatives, even at a cost to own reproduction and survival
  • follow Hamilton’s rule
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4
Q

Hamilton’s rule

A
  • Kin selection causes genes to increase in frequency –> when the genetic relatedness of a recipient to an actor (r) multiplied by the benefit to the recipient (b) is greater than the reproductive cost to the actor (c) = (r*b > c)
    OR = r > b/c
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5
Q

Inclusive fitness

A
  • sum of personal fitness and fitness resulting from helping a relative
  • -> direct fitness (number of offspring) + indirect fitness (offspring produced by relative)
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6
Q

Alloparenting

A
  • relative/individual other than the biological that performs the functions of a parent –> takes care of offspring
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7
Q

Cooperation

A

= Action/process of working together to the same end

  • True altruism
  • Mutual-benefits behaviour
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8
Q

Altruism

A
  • Selfless concern for the well-being of others

- behaviour that benefits others at costs for the actor

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9
Q

Mutual-benefits behaviour

A

Behaviour that is beneficial both to the actor and the recipient

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10
Q

By-product benefits

A

Situations where the mutual benefit arises simply from every individual following its own immediate self-interest

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11
Q

Direct reciprocity

A

= tit-for-tat
- We help individuals that helped us
- needs repeated encounters between same individuals
c < w*b (w = probability of recipient to reciprocate)
OR = w > c/b
–> prevents cheaters: receive benefits but never return

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12
Q

Indirect reciprocity

A
  • Help is given to individuals based on their reputation –> help individuals whom we have seen help others in the past
  • needs gossip (talk about others behaviour); high cognitive demands (maintain overview of network)
    c < q*b (q = probability about having correct info about reputation)
    OR = q > c/b
    –> prevents cheaters: bad reputation
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13
Q

Green beard effect

A
  • Explanation of selective altruism among individuals of a species –> help those who look more familiar
  • Occurs when an allele produces 3 effects: a perceptible trait (the green beard), recognition of this trait by others, preferential treatment of individuals with the trait
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14
Q

Eusociality

A
  • Highest level of organisation of animal sociality
  • cooperative brood care: parents raise offspring
  • overlapping generations: generations live together
  • philopatry: stay in particular area
  • division of labour: reproductive and non-reproductive groups
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15
Q

Reproductive altruism

A

Behaviour that increases other organisms’ fitness and permanently decreases the actor’s own fitness

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16
Q

Parochial altruism

A
  • Self-sacrifice to benefit our own group (“in-group love”)

- hurt or sabotage out-groups (“out-group aggression”)

17
Q

Network reciprocity

A
  • If a co-operator pays a cost (c) for each neighbour to receive a benefit (b) and defectors have no costs + neighbours receive no benefits –> network reciprocity favours cooperation
    b/c > k
    –> benefit-to-cost ratio must exceed the average number of people (k) (per individual)
    b/c > k
18
Q

Group selection

A

= Multi-level selection
- behaviours come to exist because they benefit the group rather than the individual
b/c > 1+(n/m)
–> n = maximum group size, m = number of groups

19
Q

Prisoner’s dilemma

A
  • Situation in which two players each have two options –> outcome depends crucially on the simultaneous choice made by the other
  • -> two prisoners separately deciding whether to confess to a crime
20
Q

Grudger

A

Always co-operates unless the other defects –> then he only defects (he is pissed off)

21
Q

Tit-for-tat “nice” strategy

A
  • Forgiving and allows cooperation again
  • just reacts to the previous action of the other (no past and no future matters) –> only copying and therefore cannot win –> only tie or loose
22
Q

Tit-for-two-tat

A

= Forgiving tit-for-tat

- 2 defections are required/’allowed’ before person using this strategy gets “pissed off” and defects as well

23
Q

Joss

A

Strategy that is basically tit-for-tat but sometimes tries defecting

24
Q

Tester

A

Strategy starts of cooperating –> defects to see what the opponent does and to find out their strategy

25
Q

Generous tit-for-tat

A

If the other cooperates, you cooperate –> if the other doesn’t cooperate, you sometimes do not cooperate as well

26
Q

Stay-loose-shift

A

You keep your strategy as long as you win –> if you lose, you change your strategy

27
Q

Ultimate explanations

A
  • WHY something occurs
  • “real” reason behind a behaviour –> evolutionary function
  • phylogeny: evolutionary history of mechanism
  • concerned with the fitness consequences of a trait or behaviour + whether it is (or is not) selected
  • phenotype –> genotype
28
Q

Proximate explanations

A
  • HOW something occurs
  • concerned with the mechanisms that underpin the trait or behaviour
  • ontogeny: development of mechanism
  • genotype –> phenotype
29
Q

Group viability selection

A
  • groups are less likely going extinct
30
Q

Group fecundity selection

A
  • groups of co-operators have higher rate of replication/making offspring
31
Q

Haplodiploidy

A
  • males: unfertilised eggs (= parthenogenesis) –> only have one set of chromosomes
  • females: fertilised eggs –> diploid
  • sisters share 75% of genes –> mother and kids only share 50% (if same father)
  • sisters propagate own genes more (helping mother raise more sisters rather than raise own daughters)