Terrorism and counterterrorism Flashcards
(48 cards)
1
Q
is terrorism a new concept?
A
no (200 years)
many waves of terrorism show that its existed since at least the 1880s
2
Q
what are the 4 waves of terrorism? (Rapaport)
A
- 1880s: Anarchists (Golden age of assassination)
- 1920s: anti-colonial wave
- 1960s: New Left Wave: 3rd world vanguards
- 1979-….: Religious wave
3
Q
what is the theory about the potential 5th wave?
A
- debate on what the 5th wave will be
- some say: catastrophic terrorism (more lethal, vague goals, networks (vs. orgs))
4
Q
why is there a lack of definition on terrorism?
A
- terrorism = subjective concept
- delegitimization and criminalization of certain groups (contradicting lists due to political pressure)
- many forms and manifestations of terrorism
- changed meaning over time
5
Q
why is having a definition important?
A
- agreement for int cooperation
- judicial measures
- avoid abuse
- research comparisons
6
Q
what is the essence of terrorism?
A
- instrument to achieve goals
- use of force isn’t the gol
- fear emphasis (vs. death)
- direct targets aren’t the ultimate targets
- media, politicians, public figures role in impact
7
Q
what is the history of terrorism studies?
A
pre-9/11: - little counterterrorism interest - gradual decrease in academic interest post-9/11: - boom - increase in training, policy advice, consultancy, research centers
8
Q
what are the 4 approaches of terrorism studies?
A
- rational organizational/instrumental approach (cost-benefit)
- psychological approach (thinking/behaviour, recruitment…)
- multi-causal approach
(4. political/structural approach (preconditions and precipitants))
9
Q
what are key challenges in terrorism studies?
A
- no accepted definition
- subjective and politicized (biased info)
- small-n
- always changing
- secrecy
- ethical issues (too understanding, national security…)
- reliability and validity (fooled interviewer)
10
Q
what is the current state of the art (limitations of current terrorism studies today)?
A
- niche focus -> overinflates
- assumption of big increasing threat
- selection bias to west
- event-driven research (focus on present threat rather than history)
- policy-oriented research (little independence)
- lack of empirical development
11
Q
what are the 5 key assumptions on terrorism?
A
- terrorism is caused by poverty
- terrorists are crazy
- terrorism is increasingly lethal
- terrorism is predominately anti-western
- terrorism is a successful strategy
12
Q
what supports the assumption that terrorism is caused by poverty
A
- poverty -> lack of opportunities to improve life
- so angry at those better off and gov
- violence is last resort for attention
- perceived correlation of where they think most terrorists are from
13
Q
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is caused by poverty
A
- empirical evidence!
1. many terrorists not actually that poor (Osama Bin Laden)
2. not poorer than citizens or other migrants in the country
3. most countries with high terrorism: not low income countries
4. no indicators of poverty are data linked to terrorism
14
Q
what supports the assumption that terrorists are crazy
A
- no sane person can commit terrorism (esp. suicide attacks)
- white supremacists tend to have (had) mental health issues (Bubolz and Simi)
15
Q
what contradicts the assumption that terrorists are crazy
A
- difficult to judge objectively a terrorist act
- following rational approach: act is by rational actor and rational (cost-benefit analysis) behaviour
- following psychological approach: groups often exclude unstable indivs due to security risk
- no terrorism personality
- can fight against by making community disapprove (so has to be rational)
16
Q
what supports the assumption that terrorism is increasingly lethal
A
- defining feature of our era (post-9/11 world)
- deadlier tech
- big impact
- depends on interpretation of ‘terrorist acts’ (syria and iraq -> many casualties)
- empirically (Piazza): - increase in number of victims per int attacks
17
Q
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is increasingly lethal
A
- terrorism is about the impact -> so seems like a bigger (more lethal) threat than it is
- empirically (Piazza):
- no increase in total numbers
18
Q
what supports the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western?
A
- jihadi terrorism (IS, Al Qaeda) = anti-wester (new type of terrorism?)
- anti-west rhetoric
19
Q
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is predominantly anti-western?
A
- low terrorist in the west (74% deaths in Middle East, Africa)
- most victims are muslim
- just that most terrorism in europe is jihadists
- > not mostly western victims
20
Q
what supports the assumption that terrorism is a successful strategy?
A
- creates fear and gains attention
- daily headlines in the media
- both in U.S. and the EU, there is kinda high concern by the populations of being a victims (still among top 10 concerns in the west)
21
Q
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is a successful strategy?
A
- level of fear is fading out in the west (U.S. and EU back to pre-9/11 levels)
- rarely achieves political goals (only 7%) -> poor rate inherent to nature of terrorism
- paradox of terrorism: often succeed tactically (attention) but not with own goals - goals itself usually vague and changing
22
Q
what are key assumptions on counterterrorism?
A
- one can recognize a terrorist
- deradicalization is possible
- decapitations works
- terrorism can’t be defeated
- terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach
23
Q
what supports the assumption that one can recognize/profile a terrorist?
A
- helpful technology
- used in the past (Jack the Ripper, Mad Bomber…)
24
Q
what contradicts the assumption that one can recognize/profile a terrorist?
A
- no terrorist personality
- too few terrorists to gather enough data to profile well
- focusing on behaviour -> unreliable and difficult
- disproportional
- ethical implications
25
what supports the assumption that deradicalization is possible?
- occurred in the past: deradicalized terrorists became experts
- there are deradicalization programmes
- some successes of programmes
(if a. voluntary, b. personal commitment)
26
what contradicts the assumption that deradicalization is possible?
1. issues of deradicalization definition: leaving group but not ideas, is that still deradicalization?
- > academics: leaving terrorism isn't derad. (disengagement)
- > disengagement doesn't eliminate risk of violence
2. empirically some terrorists have gone back after being "deradicalized"
27
what supports the assumption that decapitations works as a strategy?
- included in many counterterrorism strategies (widely practiced)
- assumption that organizations' success depends on leadership
- > operational struggle of finding new leader
- > charismatic leadership (destabilizes)
- works in the long-term since these groups need leadership
- > esp. earlier it is and type of group
28
what contradicts the assumption that decapitations works as a strategy?
- on short-term rarely works (only 17% of the time)
- > depends on size, age, type of group
- many possible negative side effects
- no one size fits all
29
what supports the assumption that terrorism can't be defeated?
- military forces only results in defeat 7% of the time
| - whole of terrorism cannot be defeated (always new waves)
30
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism can't be defeated?
- 40% of the time: police + intelligence services and political engagement contribute to the end of terrorist groups
- defeats the tool of ter (political engagement) and some terrorist organizations
- depends on defeated definition
31
what supports the assumption that terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach?
- international level (UN) counterterrorism approach is based on this
- national level counterterrorism approaches are also based on this (Indonesia worked)
- academic consensus that it works
32
what contradicts the assumption that terrorism is best managed by a holistic approach?
- no actual assessment on the effectiveness of a holistic approach (no empirical evidence)
- no prioritization of finite resources
- differences between short-term vs long-term requirements
- easier said than done
33
have counterterrorism measures been successful in reducing fear? what are the implications
no, mostly just preventing terrorism
1. distrust and stereotyping
2. action-oriented policies only + too simple explanations
3. risk avoidance society
4. self-fulfilling prophecy of creating bigger impact
(e. g. political slogans)
- > leads to polarization -> further radicalization
34
what are 2 vital aspects of counterterrorism?
1. communication
2. resilience
- > limit chance + impact of an attack
35
what are 3 important dimensions of impact management?
1. organization (actors cooperation; deal with and monitor unrest)
2. communication (Golden Hour, be aware and listen)
3. resilience to terrorism (facilitate self-efficacy desire, care for indirect victims too)
36
what is meaning-making?
- framing of the attack through description and reflection
| - reflected and created through commemoration events
37
how important are commemoration events? what about them is important
- very for meaning-making
- opportunity to emphasize values
- differ completely between countries and attacks
- authority-citizen cooperation importance
- focus shift away from the terrorists
38
is it possible to predict future trends of terrorism?
- no
- past attempts very poor
- > failed to predict 9/11
- > mostly vague and imprecise
39
what is important in improving predictions of future trends of terrorism?
- including more people that are not today:
a. non-western
b. young
- taking a systematic approach
40
how does research on foreign fighters resemble today?
- mainly descriptive (no explanations)
- little on individual level, organizational level, reintegration process, why some don't go
- post-2012 boom
41
what are some key findings on foreign fighters?
1. ideological (religious) motivations
2. part of larger movement, organized travel
3. mainly young and male
4. (in)directly state-sponsored
42
who are the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
- from worldwide (Middle East, Europe, Balkans...)
- those from EU:
- > mostly nationals (vs. migrants, refugees...)
- > most ethnic backgrounds
- > most converts
- > mostly young men
43
what are pull factors for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
1. R2P (purpose, duty)
2. religious motivations (protect own community, caliphate, be part of new world)
3. comradeship and group processes
4. adventure, action, weapons
5. become a martyr (heaven)
44
what are push factors for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq?
1. personal problems
2. trouble with authorities
3. socio-economic and socio-political climate (marginalized)
but little evidence on this
45
why do some perceive returned foreign fighters as a big threat in Europe?
very home-centric
- will incite others to join
- involved in european violence
- fight infidels
- further radicalization by coming back with larger network
- traumatized -> violence
- polarization and clash
46
what are key dimensions of measures taken for foreign fighters
1. security (military force, no passports...)
2. legislative (prosecute)
3. preventive (invest in knowledge, train to recognize...)
mix is ideal
47
why are foreign fighters that don't return home also a threat
career foreign fighters:
- rank up in expertise (take leadership positions)
- bring violence to more conflicts (vs. returning home)
- when will return home: much more expertise
48
why do career foreign fighters move groups?
material and social incentives
