UK Gov Essay Plans

Question 1

Themes for “evaluate the view that devolution has strengthened UK democracy”

Answer 1

Elections, assembly powers, impact on Westminster

Question 2

Evidence that devolution has not strengthened democracy via elections

Answer 2

-lower turnout in devolved elections (2021 Senedd elections=47%)
-proportional systems create a weaker MP-constituent link (NI constituencies have five MPs) so less direct representation

Question 3

Evidnece that devolution has strengthened democracy via elections

Answer 3

-the use of proptional systems pluralises the legislative meaning more views are represented and gives more voter choice (use of regional lists in AMS)
-the 2014 Scottish indyref had 85% turnout (encourages political participation on matters of regional public importance)

Question 4

Evidence that devolution has not strengthened UK democracy via assembly powers

Answer 4

-no region has devo-max (the facade of a quasi-federalist state and lack of regional ability to appease legislative appetites)
-asymmetrical devolution has strengthen democracy by varying degrees in different regions which is unfair (NI only have cooperation tax powers and mayors only have power over jobs, housing and transport which is comparatively less than Scotland who have significant administrative, legislative and financial devolution)

Question 5

Evidence that devolution has strengthened UK democracy via assembly powers

Answer 5

-the 2016 Scotland act granted Holyrood the power to vary almost all income tax (consideration of signficant power allocation to regions to improve representative democracy as financial decisions can be made in the interest of specific regions)
-in 2023 the Manchester mayor used his powers to deprivatise local buses, reflecting local community and identity (something that Westminster on its own would not consider due to need to consider more important national issues)

Question 6

Evidnece that devolution has not strengthened democracy via impact on Westminster

Answer 6

-in 2018 8DUP members voted to remove thousands of free school meals for only English students exacerbating the West Lothian question
-Barnett formulas disproportionate allocation of funds (in 2022 129% more was allocated per capita to Scotland and Northern Ireland than England), showing that devolution may have a negative impact both on the devolved regions and on England

Question 7

Evidnece that devolution has strengthen democracy via impact on Westminster

Answer 7

-allowed for better regional representation on the national scale (SNP dominance of Holyrood since 2007 allowed them to win 56/59 Scottish seats in 2015 thus amplifying minor party representation)
-2006 smoking bans by the Scottish assembly paved the way for nationwide ban in 2007 (improvement to democracy by applying pressure to parliament to pass nationally beneficial legislation)

Question 8

Themes for “evaluate the view that the legislative process takes too long to be considered effective”

Answer 8

Committees, commons, lords

Question 9

Evidence that the legislative process doesn’t take too long through committee work

Answer 9

-committee stage generally only lasts about 8 days
-public bill committees have a whip which means that their scrutiny process is catalysed by the ensurance that MPs vote in accordance with party lines

Question 10

Evidence that the legislative process does take too long via committees

Answer 10

-Evidence can take a long time as people called in to select committee hearing dont have to give viable evidence (in 2016 George Osborne blamed the Labour government for economic failures instead of taking accountability)
-grand committee decisions in the lords have to be unanimous (long time to debate and come to a conclusion)

Question 11

Evidence that the legislative process doesnt take too long in the commons

Answer 11

-rapid passage of emergency legislation as seen with the 2020 coronavirus act shows that the commons are capable of passing bills when they need to
-some private members bills enjoy a relatively short time for debate (e.g, the concept of the 10 minute PMB gives the MP only 10 minutes to present their legislative idea to the chamber)

Question 12

Evidence that the legislative process takes too long in the commons

Answer 12

-Brexit took 4 years to trigger due to parliamentary polarisation and division (policy stagnation as a product of disagreement)
-filibustering can delay the passage of legislation (Christopher Chope filibustering the passage of the upskirting bill in 2018)

Question 13

Evidence that the legislative process doesnt take too long in the lords

Answer 13

-reasonable time convention means the lords are limited to 60 days to review legislation
-1949 parliament act only allows the lords to delay legislation (not money bills due to financial privilege) for a year and has only been used seven times

Question 14

Evidence that the legislative process takes too long in the lords

Answer 14

-reasonable time convention is not legally binding and has been deviated against (4 month delay on the 2002 animal health bill)
-“Parliamentary ping pong” can occur in which a bill continues going back and fourth between houses due to lack of agreement (as happened with the 2024 safety of Rwanda act)

Question 15

Themes for “evaluate the view that the most important power of the PM is gained by winning elections”

Answer 15

Passing legislation, patronage, foreign policy powers

Question 16

Evidence that PMs legislative power is not granted by winning elections

Answer 16

-winning doesnt always give a strong mandate to pass legistion (2017 Mays minority government meant failure to trigger Brexit due to lack of legitimacy in doing so and parliamentary resistance)
-courts can limit legislative power (Miller one 2017 disallowed may for unilaterally triggering Brexit)

Question 17

Evidence that PMs legislative power is achieved by winning elections

Answer 17

-winning landslides provides the political mandate to pass manifesto legislation by creating elective dictatorships (2024 labours 174 seat majority)
-elections prove the popularity of manifesto pledges, once again legitimising PM power to pass bills on them (Johnson’s “get Brexit done” campaign in 2019 paved the way for the 2020 EU Withdrawl agreement)

Question 18

Evidence that the PMs patronage powers are not a product of winning elections

Answer 18

-party disunity nullifies patronage (60 resignations under May and 62 under Johnson)
-patronage is not contingent upon national support from elections and may instead be impacted by factors such as financial influence (Lord Cruddas donated £500k to the conservatives 3 days after being made a lord in 2021)

Question 19

Evidence that the PMs patronage powers are a product of winning elections

Answer 19

-use of patronage to appoint politically advantageous cabinet that will reflect public appetites for certain policy (Mays appointment of big beasts like Johnson and Davis to the cabinet to balance her own europhilia)
-PMs who have won elections on spatial leadership campaigns have used this political popularity to make use of kitchen cabinets, sofa governments and SPADS (as Blair did and Johnson with Cummings)

Question 20

Evidence that PMs do not win foreign policy powers through winning elections

Answer 20

-May be hindered by polarisation in the commons and party disunity such as mays failure to trigger Brexit
-since 2003 its become constitutional convention that the PM consults Parliament before going to war hence Cameron’s refusal of Syria airstrikes in 2013

Question 21

Evidence that PMs do win foreign policy powers by winning elections

Answer 21

-winning the seat of PM grants them prerogative powers such as negotiation of treaties (such as Brexit and the 2007 Lisbon treaty) and commander in chief which they wouldn’t have without winning the election
-Johnson’s 80 seat majority as a product of popular “get Brexit done” campaign gave both political and legal sovereignty to pass it

Question 22

Themes for “evaluate the view that the UK Supreme Court is able to influence the executive and parliament”

Answer 22

Judicial independence, human rights, judicial review

Question 23

Evidence that the Supreme Court does influence exec and parl via independence

Answer 23

-guaranteed salary (currently around £270k) proves there’s provision in place to prevent government using financial means to persuade justices
-2005 constitutional reform act established an independant Supreme Court in 2009 to replace the law lords (separation of powers to ensure independant considerations of policy)

Question 24

Evidence that Supreme Court doesn’t influence exec and leg by independence

Answer 24

-increased court politicisation (“enemies of the people”daily mail headline in 2016 after ruling on the triggering of article 50) undermines separation of powers and influence as an independent body
-lack of diversity (with all justices being white and over 60) means a plurality of opinion isn’t considered so rulings may have an element of subconscious bias

Question 25

Evidence that Supreme Court does influence exec and parliament vis human rights

Answer 25

-can issue “declarations of incompatibility” against HRA to ensure rights protections and apply pressure to the government to change legislation -ruled in 2018 that the exclusion of heterosexual couples from civil partnerships was against HRA, scrutinising the 2004 civil partnerships act

Question 26

Evidence that the supreme court does not influence exec and parl via human rights

Answer 26

-declarations of incompatibility are not legally binding so Parliament can legislate in spite of them (like the 2024 safety of Rwanda act) -2016 investigatory powers act hinders individual right to privacy for the sake of public safety which the courts could not do anything about, so Parliament can make limitations to human rights and the court lacks influence to do anything about it

Question 27

Evidence that Supreme Court does influence exec and parl via judicial review

Answer 27

-have the power to declare government action as “ultra vires” like the 2019 prorogation case which deemed Johnson’s proroguing of Parliament was ultra vires and subsequently stopped -can use judicial review to balance power between exec and parliament vis (2017 ruling that May couldn’t unilaterally trigger article 50 without parliamentary consent) once again holding government to account by preventing overreach of power

Question 28

Evidence that Supreme Court doesn’t influence exec and parl via judicial review

Answer 28

-2022 judicial review and courts act has limited the scope of what the court can scrutinise (parliamentary sovereignty leading to limitation of court influence) -Parliament is able to legislate over any court rulings deeming actions as “ultra vires” as was done with the 2010 terrorist asset freezing act

Question 29

Themes for “evaluate the view that parliament are able to effectively hold the prime minister to account”

Answer 29

Committees, questions, Lords

Question 30

Evidence that parliament can hold the PM to account via committees

Answer 30

-the 2009 wright reforms made it so elections to select committees occur by secret ballot, preventing government influence in the selection process to cause bias scrutiny -the backbench business committee (also established by wright) have 35 days of the parliamentary calendar which they can use to address matters of public importance which the government has failed to address (e.g. 2011 debate devoted to the hilsborough disaster, following e-petition wishes and direct democratic consideration)

Question 31

Evidence that parliament cannot hold the PM to account via committees

Answer 31

-select committees cannot force ministers to give information (in 2016 George Osborne blamed labour for financial issues instead of taking accountability as chancellor of the exchequer) -select committee recommendations are not legally binding, with government only taking their considerations on board about 40% of the time

Question 32

Evidence that parliament can hold the PM to account via questions

Answer 32

-high attendance to PMQs (Johnson and Starmer both 94%) gives ample opportunity for direct scrutiny -increased use of emergency questions (around 300 from 2017-19), especially during Brexit means authentic scrutiny can occur without time to consider tip-toeing around the question

Question 33

Evidence that parliament cannot hold the PM to account via questions

Answer 33

-“punch and Judy” politics during PMQs (as seen between Sunak and Starmer in 2024) shows questions being used as a means of political point scoring instead of genuine policy scrutiny -poor attendance to oral/written questions, most of which just recieve a written response means pressure is taken off of the PM as they aren’t widely held to account (no media coverage means less attenuation of character)

Question 34

Evidence that parliament can hold the PM to account via the Lords

Answer 34

-the lords has a less effective whipping system and 181 crossbench (non partisan) peers meaning there’s less political bias and more thorough scrutiny -from 2021-23 there were 253 government defeats in the lords (the element of expertise and scrutiny they add to the legislative process prevents the passage of undue bills)

Question 35

Evidence that parliament cannot hold the PM to account via the lords

Answer 35

-Salisbury convention means the lords should not block manifesto legislation -1911 and 1949 parliament acts mean lords have no jurisdiction over money bills and can only delay legislation for up to a year (since this has only been used 7 times and 70% of bills are government bills they lack holistic legislative influence) -reasonable time convention also means they have only 60 days for scrutiny

Question 36

Themes for “evaluate the view that devolution has been successful for Scotland, wales and Northern Ireland but not for England”

Answer 36

Powers, representation, equality of outcome

Question 37

Evidence that devolution powers has been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 37

-there is national lack of power so not just England is at a disadvantage (no region has devo max) -English votes for English lords (2015-2021) disallowed lords representing devolved regions to vote on regional matters (put England at an advantage against devolved regions)

Question 38

Evidence that devolution powers has not been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 38

-both devolved English regions and Scotland wales and NI have the same administrative control over housing, transport and jobs however all of the other regions have further power on top of this -powers in devolved regions are more considerate of local cultures (NI= power sharing devolution between unionists and nationalists) shows power has been made to accommodate other regions more than England

Question 39

Evidence that representation by devolution has been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 39

-in 2023 the Manchester metro mayor de privatises local buses to reflect local identity -turnout in devolved elections is lower than that of general elections (2021 Senedd= 47% whereas the 2017 UK election=69%) representation in Westminster is more reflective of a wider portion of the electorate - stormont under Westminster 2017-2020 due to disagreements shows failed representation

Question 40

Evidence that representation from devolution has not been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 40

-use of proportional voting systems in devolved regions has allowed for increased proportionality and voter choice (proportionality by the STV droop formula, choice by AMS regional lists) whereas FPTP use in general elections (and London mayor elections since 2024) creates less proportional outcomes -the greater power afforded to devolved regions allows for better representation of local appetites for policy (e.g. 2014 independence referendum that also had 85% turnout)

Question 41

Evidnece that equality of outcome from devolution has been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 41

-there is nationwide asymmetry in devolution so England doesn’t have it any more bad than other regions (Scotland full income tax powers since 2016 but Northern Ireland only cooperation tax) -there are currently more advancements being considered by the government to English devolution than other areas (e.g 2024 Labour government white paper on English devolution and local government)

Question 42

Evidence that equality of outcome in devolution has not been as successful for England as other parts of the UK

Answer 42

-Barnett formula disproportionately favours regions other than England (in 2022 129% more was awarded per capita to Scotland and Northern Ireland than England) -there are currently only 10 metro mayors across England, meaning there is inequality in the size of devolved assemblies allowing for less through debate and policy consideration (compare to the fact that all other regions have a full on assembly, Scotland has 129 MSPs)

Question 43

Themes for “evaluate the view that IMR and CMR give the PM enough power over their cabinet”

Answer 43

Use of IMR, use of CMR, impact on the PM

Question 44

Evidence that IMR does give the PM enough cabinet power

Answer 44

-allows for removal of incompetent individuals that paint the cabinet in a negative light against the will of the PM (2023 Dominic Raab resigns due to bullying allegations) -allows for removal of cabinet members who have politically acted against the PM (2017 Pritti Patel resigns due to secret meetings with Israeli officials)

Question 45

Evidence that IMR does not give the PM cabinet power

Answer 45

-reinstation of those previously resigned under IMR may lead to PM unpopularity/ questions of if they’ll have control should that person do the same thing again (e.g. Johnson places Patel back on cabinet in 2019) -ministers are less frequently accepting responsibility for department errors (Pritti Patel failure to accept asylum errors whilst Home Secretary)

Question 46

Evidence that CMR does give the PM enough cabinet power

Answer 46

-removes individuals in opposition to government policy (Lee Anderson resigns in 2024 over Rwanda) - can be removed like during Brexit

Question 47

Evidence that CMR does not give the PM cabinet power

Answer 47

-May avoid it due to hypocrisy like Johnson and partygate -can make a weak PM look out of control ass seen in in a lack of upholding of CMR under May and Brexit

Question 48

Evidence that IMR/CMR have a positive impact on the PM

Answer 48

-can make the PM look stronger by removing MPs with poor individual conduct which is independant of the PM and so shouldn’t be associated with them (since the labour government came into power there have been 2 resignations under IMR, both for individual misconduct rather than department failure) -ensures that cabinet offices (and thus the executive more holistically) are running efficiently (amber Rudd resigns in 2018 over windrush scandal)

Question 49

Evidence that IMR/CMR have a negative impact on the PM

Answer 49

-can force their own resignation (2022 partygate scandal catalysed Johnson’s resignation) -often ignored when the PM is weak as was done for May due to much public dissent over her Brexit policy

Question 50

Themes for “evaluate the view that the House of Lords has had its power too much reduced”

Answer 50

Legislation, scrutiny, membership

Question 51

Evidence that the lords has had too much legislative power removed

Answer 51

-Salisbury convention disallows them from blocking manifesto legislation -1911 and 1949 parliament acts only allow delays for up to one year and establish financial privilege of the commons

Question 52

Evidnece that the lords hasn’t had too much legislative power removed

Answer 52

-from 2021-2023 the government experience 253 defeats in the lords (still significant power to dictate the passage of legislation) -debates provide an element of expertise to considering legislation (the 2023 genetic tech and breeding bill debate in the lords involved 3 former ministers of agriculture, 2 science professors and 9 farmers)

Question 53

Evidence that the lords had had their scrutiny power reduced too much

Answer 53

-reasonable time convention= only 60 days for scrutiny (insufficient time) -commons often rejects lords amendments (didnt take on any of their amendments of the illegal migration bill)

Question 54

Evidence that the lords have not had their scrutiny power too much reduced

Answer 54

-grand committee descions enjoy a less effective whipping system and have to make unanimous decisions (free from party biases and more through scrutiny to ensure all are in agreement) -presence of 181 crossbench peers that lack any party affiliation means no party has a majority in the lords (reinforcing ideas of politically neautral scrutiny so political point scoring can’t occur)

Question 55

Evidence that membership to the lords has been reduced in power

Answer 55

-1999 HoL reform act removes all by 92 hereditary peers (historically and finically influential individuals cannot join the upper chamber) -in 2021 lord cruddas donates £500k to conservatives 3 days after being made a peer (shows how membership is largely contingent on support within a party with power in the commons)

Question 56

Evidence that membership to the lords hasn’t been reduced in power

Answer 56

-recent appointments have shown progression towards pluralising the platform for debate and better represenating the nation (e.g. Doreen Lawrence in 2013) -2014 HoL reform act allows peers to retire or resign which is good by ensuring there isn’t policy stagnation and fresh ideas can come into the chamber for consideration regularly, bolstering their political legitimacy and perhaps public popularity

Question 57

Themes for “evaluate the view that the cabinet no longer has a leading role in UK politics”

Answer 57

Patronage, decision making, impact of the media

Question 58

Evidence that the cabinet does have a leading role in UK politics via patronage

Answer 58

-Mays appointment of big beasts such as Johnson and Davies in 2017 to her cabinet to balance her own europhilic agenda shows that the PM is vested in their patronage powers to appoint a politically advantageous cabinet -Truss appointment of Kwarteng in 2022 as chancellor shows use of patronage to ensure cabinet contains political allies

Question 59

Evidnece that cabinet does not have a leading role in politics via patronage

Answer 59

-Lee Anderson resignation in 2024 over Rwanda shows how CMR can attenuate cabinet efficacy and nullify the value of certain appointments -under coalition Cameron was forced to have 5 Lib Dem’s in cabinet shows PM can’t unilaterally use the cabinet to make politically advantageous decisions

Question 60

Evidence that the cabinet does have a leading role in UK politics via decision making

Answer 60

-Johnson’s reliance on health secretary Matt Hancock and frequent emergency cabinet meetings to make quick emergency decisions during COVID shows the value of the cabinet in preventing extended periods of political turmoil -cabinet ministers are imperative in the running of government departments, ensuring decisions are made swiftly in certain policy areas (seen in Goves education reforms)

Question 61

Evidence that the cabinet does not have a leading role in decision making

Answer 61

-PMs have increasingly used “kitchen cabinets” and “sofa governments” to make big decisions (e.g.Camerons use of the quad) -Increasing use of Spads has also undermined the role of the cabinet (e.g.Johnsons over amplification of Cummings power, allowing him to fire other spads, and mays utilisation of Fiona hill and Nick Timothy to write much of the 2017 Conservative Party manifesto)

Question 62

Evidence that the cabinet does have a leading role via the media

Answer 62

-heightened media presence and attention to the actions of the cabinet during Brexit (Johnson writes articles dissenting in Sunday times) shows how the media can significantly amplify the importance of cabinet decisions and sway public opinion -high profile offices of state enjoy attention to amplify the importance of their decisions ( Reeves budget)

Question 63

Evidence that the cabinet does not have a leading role via the media

Answer 63

-spatial leadership campaigns reduce media attention on the cabinet, instead focusing in on the PM and subsequently giving them the political authority to decrease use of the cabinet (e.g. Blair’s use of sofa governments) -the partygate scandal shows how the media is often at the cabinets disadvantage by holding them accountable to wrongdoings that would previously have gone unnoticed

Question 64

Themes for “evaluate the view that acts of parliament are the only feature of the UK constitution that really matter”

Answer 64

Acts of parliament, conventions, common law

Question 65

Evidence that acts of parliament are not the only constitutional source that matters

Answer 65

-they can be passed as a product of other constitutional sources (the 2020 EU Withdrawl agreement act signed the treaty with the EU on Brexit into law) -the 2022 dissolution and calling of parliament act reinstated the prerogative power to call en election which reinforced a convention (acts are simply means to an end for other sources)

Question 66

Evidence that acts of parliament are the only constitutional course that matters

Answer 66

-most significant constitutional reforms have been a product of acts (devolution acts, House of Lords reforms, rights reforms like the equality act, parliament acts) -the 1998 HRA requires all other laws and parliamentary proceedings to be compatible with it (SC can issue “declarations of incompatibility” against it)

Question 67

Evidence that conventions do matter to more or a greater extent than acts

Answer 67

-have been followed for decades whereas acts can easily be overwritten by parliament at any given time due to parliamentary sovereignty (Salisbury convention since 1945) -can determine if a government retains the legal sovereignty to be able to pass acts, as it is convention that the PM resigns if defeated in a vote of no confidence like Callaghan

Question 68

Evidnece that conventions do not matter to more or a greater extent than acts

Answer 68

-conventions are beginning to be written into law (the posonby convention was written into law by the 2010 constitutional reform and governance act) -the passage of the EU Withdrawl agreement act could be said to have undermined the Sewel convention, as Scotland voted to remain (shows how conventions are not legally binding)

Question 69

Evidence that common law matters to more or a greater extent than acts

Answer 69

-since the content of an act cannot possibly cover every scenario that it is applicable to, judicial interpretation ensures the act is upheld and followed properly (e.g. tribunals deciding if the 2010 equality act made “appropriate adjustments” to rights concerns”) -they help to establish core British values protecting us from parliamentary actions (Entick v Carrington (1765) prevents unsolicited search and seizure by the state)

Question 70

Evidnece that common law does not matter to more or a greater extent than acts

Answer 70

-acts of parliament can be passed in opposition to court rulings (2010 terrorist asset freezing act and 2024 safety of Rwanda act) -statute laws often need to be passed to clarify the ambiguous nature of common laws (2013 crime and courts act)

Question 71

Themes for “evaluate the view that English devolution has been a success”

Answer 71

Governance, representation, impact on Westminster

Question 72

Evidnece that English devolution has been a success in terms of governance

Answer 72

-Andy Burnham (Manchester) has negotiated further devolutionary powers to his region, such as over criminal justice and overseeing the deprivatisation of buses -all metro mayors have at least powers over transport, housing and jobs

Question 73

Evidence that English devolution has not been a success in terms of governance

Answer 73

-asymmetry in regional power across England (London mayor has power over transport, planning and police force whereas Cornwall and Devon have no devolved power) -across the UK other regions have much more power than devolved English regions (no power over education or taxation whereas these policies areas has been accommodated for Scotland wales and Northern Ireland)

Question 74

Evidence that English devolution has been a success in terms of representation

Answer 74

-14 regions have a metro mayors -in 2024 Angela rayner promised to work more with local authorities to eradicate devolved deserts

Question 75

Evidence that English devolution has not been a success in terms of representation

Answer 75

-low turnout in devolved mayoral elections (2025 greater Lincolnshire mayor election = 30%) - half of the population of England are represented solely by Whitehall (lack of devolution so lack of recognition of regional issues)

Question 76

Evidence that English devolution has been a success in terms of the impact on Westminster

Answer 76

-parliamentary sovereignty has been legislatively and financially retained, whilst still allowing for administrative appeasement of regional appetites for certain policies -EVEL required a majority of English MPs to agree on a law only impacting England before going to the floor for full vote in the commons (success for England in ensuring policy was representing the people it would be affecting)

Question 77

Evidence that English devolution has not been a success in terms of impact on Westminster

Answer 77

-West Lothian question is unanswered (in 2018 8 DUP members voted to remove thousands of free skl meals for only England) -Barnett formula disproportionately favours other regions (in 2022 129% more per capita was awarded to Scotland and Northern Ireland than England)

Question 78

Themes for “evaluate the view that the conventions of IMR and CMR are no longer effectively upheld”

Answer 78

CMR, IMR (personal), IMR (professional)

Question 79

Evidence that CMR is effectively upheld

Answer 79

-cabinet ministers resign over genuine dissent over policy (2025 Dodds resigns as minister for development over Starmers cuts to foreign aid) -removal of CMR during periods of political polarisation and turmoil is effective at preventing resentment and suppressed factionalism which could lead a party to break down (Cameron did this to allow conservatives to independently campaign on Brexit and Starmer on the assisted dying bill)

Question 80

Evidence that CMR is not effectively upheld

Answer 80

-can be used to gain a political advantage rather than genuine dissent (in 2023 Robert Jenrick resignation over Rwanda as not going far enough) -can disintergrate under a weak MP (many public oppositions to Mays Brexit plan)

Question 81

Evidence that IMR (personal) is effectively upheld

Answer 81

-2021 Matt Hancock resigns after affair becomes public and breaking social distancing (pressurises morally questionable figures) -the ministerial code sets out the Nolan principles which are very clear ethical guidelines on how a minister should behave

Question 82

Evidence that IMR (personal) is not effectively upheld

Answer 82

-the PM acts as the sole arbiter of the ministerial code and so can rewrite it as they please to bend the rules (Johnsons 2022 rewrite established rules that a minister is not always expected to resign for misconduct) -can be undermined by the PM in the name of avoiding hypocrisy (Johnson during the 2021 partygate scandal)

Question 83

Evidence that IMR (professional) is effectively upheld

Answer 83

-2018 amber Rudd resigns over windrush scandal in which she admits to misleading the commons -2022 Estelle morris resigns as education secretary over failure to see a rise in literacy rates Shows prevention of departmental corruption, promoting of honesty and the smooth working of government

Question 84

Evidence that IMR (professional) is not effectively upheld

Answer 84

-PM may excuse departmental action in the name of preserving party factions (Johnson does not sack Pritti Patel over bullying allegations in the home office towards civil servants)= sacrificing the smooth running of government for the sake of party -PM may reshuffle those who have failed to prevent their embarrassment (Chris Grayling reshuffled from transport to justice, in both departments he made errors of judgment)

Question 85

Themes for “evaluate the view that since leaving the EU sovereignty has returned to Parliament”

Answer 85

Legal sovereignty, trade, borders

Question 86

Evidence that parliamentary sovereignty has returned since Brexit via legislation

Answer 86

-2023 retained EU legislation act allows parliament to repeal and amend EU laws -1800 EU laws have been repealed or amended, including the tampon tax (parliament are able to listen to public wishes for policy)

Question 87

Evidnece that parliamentary sovereignty has not returned since Brexit via legislation

Answer 87

-67% of EU laws have been incorporated into UK law via secondary legislation (more power to the executive than parliament), and parliament lack the popular sovereignty to remove some, like the working time directive -over 300 EU laws are still followed in the Uk as a means of preserving relationships with Ireland

Question 88

Evidnece that parliamentary sovereignty has returned since Brexit via trade

Answer 88

-Starmers 2025 free trade deal with US and India which wouldn’t of been possible under the EU shows greater power on the global trade stage with companies that have large trade influence -70 trade deals have been signed since Brexit including a tariff free deal with the EU

Question 89

Evidnece that parliamentary sovereignty has not returned since Brexit via trade

Answer 89

-loss of pooled sovereignty (EU accounts for 14% of world GDP whereas UK only accounts for 3%) -Windsor framework= Northern Ireland still have to abide by EU regulations to preserve trade with Ireland

Question 90

Evidence that parliamentary sovereignty has returned since Brexit via borders

Answer 90

-2023 illegal immigration act to tighten border control (wouldn’t have passed if still in EU) -since 2016 EU immigration to the UK has declined by 70%

Question 91

Evidence that parliamentary sovereignty has not returned since Brexit via borders

Answer 91

-in 2023 net migration reached its highest ever (although sovereignty over it may have returned it doesn’t mean its been effectively implemented) -2023 think tank study saw a 33000 labour shortage in the UK

Question 92

Themes for “evaluate the view that the Supreme Court is able to act independently and neutrally”

Answer 92

Independence, neutrality, application/cases

Question 93

Evidence that the SC operates with independence

Answer 93

-guaranteed of salary around £270k means government cannot apply financial incentives for certain decisions -the 2005 CRA established both a separation of powers by making the Supreme Court an independant body in 2009 and established an independent judicial appointments commission (free from political bias before and during tenure)

Question 94

Evidnece that SC does not operate with independence

Answer 94

-cuts to funding to the ministry of justice in 2010s shows can still have financial influence -increased public dissent on SC decisions from politicians overly politicises the repercussions of rulings

Question 95

Evidence that the SC does act neutrally

Answer 95

-peer review means each case is head by typically 5-9 judges (a plurality of opinions are considered) -selected of judicial not political merit (must have been in the senior judiciary for 2 years and a legal qualified practitioner for 15)

Question 96

Evidence that SC does not act neutrally

Answer 96

-2016 Daily Mail “enemies of the people” headline undermines exemption from influence from political institutions -lack of descriptive representation (all white and over 65, 2 women, 1 non oxbridge) means there may be unconscious bias in decisions and lack of diverse opinion

Question 97

Evidence that SC actions/cases uphold independence and neutrality

Answer 97

-can declare government action as ultra vires, such as Johnsons prorogation of parliament, showing that they focus purely of the legal implications of the actions of an individual rather than the political motives -can issue declarations of incompatibility against the HRA showing that their power is limited to legal interpretation

Question 98

Evidence that SC actions/cases do not uphold independence and neutrality

Answer 98

-2025 ruling on the legal status of a woman extending only to biology shows ruling on an issue with drastic social repercussions (could argue that should be made by an elected body) -the Brexit cases (Miller 1 and 2) were overly politicised by the media and politicians which undermined judicial independence from political bodies

Question 99

Themes for “evaluate the view that the PM has become a presidential figure”

Answer 99

Cabinet use, image/popularity, foreign policy

Question 100

Evidence that the PM is not presidential via cabinet use

Answer 100

-still reliant on the cabinet in times of emergency (Johnson during COVID and reliance on Hancock for implementing health policy) -cabinet reshuffles showing the importance of patronage to uphold a strong executive image (Johnson’s 2020 reshuffle and mays appointment of Brexit big beasts like Johnson and Davies)

Question 101

Evidence that PM is presidential via cabinet use

Answer 101

-johsnons excessive use of SPAD Dominic Cummings, giving him the power to fire other spads like Sonia Khan shows less reliance on the cabinet -Blairs use of sofa governments and Cameron’s use of the quad to make important decisions undermines the role of the cabinet

Question 102

Evidence that PM is not presidential via image/popularity

Answer 102

-media can weaken PM Image (Mays failure to show to TV debates and Sunak leaving d day celebrations early) -even if they have popular sovereignty there may be restrictions on PM power from other branches of government (2019 SC ruling that Johnson’s prorogation of parliament was ultra vires)

Question 103

Evidence that PM is presidential via image/popularity

Answer 103

-popularity with the electorate can translate into large seat share to give a strong political mandate (2024= 174 seat majority, 1997= 179 seat majority) -spatial leadership campaigns increasing (Blair, Johnsons dogmatic “get Brexit done” campaign in 2019)

Question 104

Evidnece that PM is not presidential via foreign policy

Answer 104

-since Blairs 2003 invasion of Iraq it has become constitutional convention that the PM consult parliament before taking military action (Cameron refused military action in Syria in 2013 by parliament) -Mays 230 vote defeat over Brexit was the largest defeat in parliamentary history

Question 105

Evidence that PM is presidential via foreign policy

Answer 105

-use of prerogative power to negotiate treaties used by Johnson to oversee 2020 EU Withdrawl agreement -Starmers negotiation of free trade deals with large economic powers like the US and India in 2025 shows strength in foreign policy